



Reports

ORFA and IIRF

Joint Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief

Country visit to Nigeria

2026 / 12

International Institute
for Religious Freedom



International Institute
for Religious Freedom

Internationales Institut für Religionsfreiheit
Institut International pour la Liberté Religieuse
Instituto Internacional para la Libertad Religiosa

The International Institute for Religious Freedom (IIRF) was founded in 2007 with the mission to promote religious freedom for all faiths from an academic perspective. The IIRF aspires to be an authoritative voice on religious freedom. We provide reliable and unbiased data on religious freedom—beyond anecdotal evidence—to strengthen academic research on the topic and to inform public policy at all levels. Our research results are disseminated through the *International Journal for Religious Freedom* and other publications. A particular emphasis of the IIRF is to encourage the study of religious freedom in university institutions through its inclusion in educational curricula and by supporting postgraduate students with research projects.

The IIRF has a global presence with academic and advocacy partners on all continents. We perform original research and in collaboration with our partners. The IIRF is also a “meeting place” for all scholars that take an interest in religious freedom.


We understand Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB) as a fundamental and interdependent human right as described in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In line with CCPR General Comment No. 22, we view FoRB as a broad and multi-dimensional concept that needs to be protected for all faiths in all spheres of society.



Dr. Dennis P. Petri
(V.i.S.d.P.)
International Director



Dr. Kyle Wisdom
Deputy Director



Prof. Dr. mult.
Thomas Paul
Schirmacher
President of the
Academic/Editorial
Board



Prof. Dr. Janet Epp
Buckingham
Executive Editor of the
International Journal
for Religious Freedom
(IJRF)

ORFA and IIRF

Joint Submission to the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief

Country visit to Nigeria

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The **International Institute for Religious Freedom** (IIRF) was founded in 2007 with the mission to promote religious freedom for all faiths from an academic perspective.

The **Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa** (ORFA) is a research, training, and advocacy program, with the mission to promote religious freedom on the continent.

CONTENTS

Introduction.....	5
1. Correcting the narrative.....	5
2. The objective data from ORFA.....	5
Scale.....	6
Religious identity of civilian victims.....	6
Perpetrators.....	6
Spatial and temporal patterns.....	7
Patterns of displacement: “No Road Home”	7
Escalation in Q4 2025 and early 2026.....	7
3. Failure to protect.....	7
4. Recommendations.....	8
Closing.....	9
Appendices.....	10

Introduction

This joint submission provides the Special Rapporteur with verified, incident-level evidence on violence affecting freedom of religion or belief (FoRB) in Nigeria between 1 October 2019 and 30 September 2025, together with emerging data for Q4 2025 and early 2026. It is organised around four messages: (1) the public narrative about Nigeria needs correcting; (2) the ORFA dataset offers an objective evidentiary base; (3) the Nigerian State is failing its duty to protect; and (4) we propose concrete recommendations for the country visit and subsequent report. Full documentation is provided as appendices.

1. Correcting the narrative

The international conversation about religiously motivated violence in Nigeria is trapped between two inaccurate framings, and both obscure what the evidence shows.

The first framing is the “genocide” narrative, built largely on aggregate death tolls circulated by Intersociety and amplified in political commentary. Those figures lack transparent sourcing and a reproducible methodology, and they cannot be verified at the incident level. They have drawn justified criticism.

The second framing is the reactive dismissal that follows. Having debunked the inflated numbers, mainstream outlets and parts of the humanitarian community conclude that religious targeting is not a meaningful factor, and recast the violence as a “farmer and herder” or “climate-driven” resource conflict. This framing cannot explain the geographic consistency of which villages are attacked, which homes and places of worship are destroyed, and which community and religious leaders are killed, nor the timing of attacks in the farming season in the North Central zone.

A structural problem compounds the confusion. The main humanitarian datasets (ACLED, UNHCR, IOM, IDMC) do not record the religious identity of victims. The absence of religious identity in official data is then routinely misread as evidence that religious targeting does not occur. Naming further distorts the picture: state and media reporting frequently use “bandits” or “unknown gunmen” where villagers and local officials identify Armed Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani militia.

The truth sits between the two distorted framings. What the verified evidence shows is a conflict with genuine resource and governance dimensions and a real, measurable pattern of religious targeting that must be named to be addressed.

2. The objective data from ORFA

ORFA is a collaborative project that documents incidents of terror-related killings and abductions in Nigeria at the attack, location, and victim level, disaggregated by religious background. Data for the six-year reporting period (1

October 2019 to 30 September 2025) combine primary records from ORFA's local partner network (approximately 39 % of attacks in 2025) with ACLED data that has been reviewed and, where possible, enriched with religious-identity attribution through on-the-ground verification. Incidents are triangulated across sources to avoid double counting.

Scale

Over six years, ORFA recorded:

- 79,323 people killed, including 42,033 civilians; 15,434 attacks with killings; an average of seven attacks per day involving killings.
- 34,917 people abducted, including 34,773 civilians; 4,590 attacks with abductions; an average of two attacks per day involving abductions.
- 75% of civilians killed and 73 % of civilians abducted died or disappeared in the context of attacks on their own communities.

Religious identity of civilian victims

Among the 42,033 civilians killed, 22,835 were Christians, 10,519 were Muslims, 184 were African Traditional Religionists, and 8,495 had an unknown religious identity. After distribution of the unknown cases in proportion to known victims: 28,551 Christians, 13,224 Muslims, 258 ATRs. The actual Christian-to-Muslim killing ratio was 2.2; adjusted for the religious composition of each affected state, the population-proportional ratio was 4.4.

Among the 34,773 civilians abducted, 15,932 were Christians, 15,272 were Muslims, 252 were ATRs, and 3,317 were of unknown religious identity. Distributed: 17,642 Christians, 16,857 Muslims, 274 ATRs. The actual ratio was 1.0; the population-proportional ratio was 3.2.

Christians were therefore disproportionately killed and abducted relative to their population share in the affected states. Hausa Muslims, notably in the North West, were also abducted and killed in very large numbers by the same perpetrator groups. The evidence does not support a one-directional “war on Christians” frame, but it does establish a consistent and measurable religious targeting pattern.

Perpetrators

Of civilians killed, Fulani Terror Groups were responsible for 44 % (18,577) and Unidentified Terror Groups for 32 % (13,346). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 12 % (4,941). For Christians specifically, Fulani Terror Groups accounted for 53 % and Boko Haram plus ISWAP for only 8 %. ORFA's research identifies the Fulani Terror Groups as affiliates of a broader Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM), an ethno-religious armed network; a substantial share of “bandit” and “unidentified” actors are also FEM-affiliated. On a six-year view, FEM is now a larger factor in lethal violence than Boko Haram and ISWAP combined.

Spatial and temporal patterns

Community attacks involving Christian farmers in the North Central zone peak in April and May, the heart of the farming season. Security Forces' operations are concentrated in the North East and North West, leaving North Central exposed. There is almost no overlap between the 10 LGAs with the highest civilian killings and the 10 LGAs where Security Forces or terror group members were killed in clashes: only one LGA (Shiroro) appears on both lists. Civilians die where the State is not engaged.

Patterns of displacement: “No Road Home”

The patterns above leave a long-term trace in the lives of those displaced. The No Road Home report (IIRF/ODI/WEA, 2024) documents how religious affiliation shapes the experience of internally displaced Christians in northern Nigeria, identifying recurrent vulnerabilities: killings of pastors and catechists that hollow out congregations; church burnings that erase community civic centres; occupation of farmland that prevents return; and attack and abduction within IDP camps that single out displaced Christians. These findings corroborate the geographic and identity patterns in the ORFA data.

Escalation in Q4 2025 and early 2026

Preliminary ORFA figures for Q4 2025 versus Q4 2024 show killings up 39 % (2,624 to 3,661), civilian killings up 51 % (1,148 to 1,739), and abductions up 153% (1,352 to 3,427). Q4 2025 is the worst quarter for killings and abductions in ORFA's seven years of monitoring. Combined Q4 2025 and partial January and February 2026 data project over 7,300 killings and over 5,400 abductions in a five-month period, again the highest recorded.

3. Failure to protect

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Articles 6 and 18), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Articles 4 and 8), and Section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution of Nigeria (“the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”), the Federal Republic of Nigeria is obliged to prevent attacks, protect populations at risk, investigate, prosecute, and remedy.

The ORFA evidence documents a systemic breach of those duties:

- Foreseeability without deployment. Community attacks in North Central Nigeria recur on a predictable seasonal calendar, yet Security Forces are not pre-positioned at the known hot spots. Civilians are killed where the State is absent, not where it is engaged.
- Impunity for FEM. Despite being responsible for more than half of Christian civilian killings and near half of all civilian killings, commanders of Fulani militia are almost never identified, arrested, or prosecuted. The attention given to Boko Haram and ISWAP, while justified, is not matched by comparable action against FEM.
- Misnaming that frustrates accountability. The routine substitution of “bandits” and “unknown gunmen” for identifiable Fulani Militia perpetrators in official communications and media coverage obstructs investigation, disarmament, and prosecution. It also hinders international protection responses.
- Data architecture that erases the religious dimension. The absence of religious-identity fields in ACLED, UNHCR, IOM, and IDMC data feeds produces the misreading that religious targeting does not occur, and therefore does not require a security or justice response.
- Escalation without a commensurate response. The 153 % year-on-year rise in abductions in Q4 2025 and the ongoing intensification into 2026 indicate that the State’s trajectory is not one of improving protection.

4. Recommendations

To the Government of Nigeria:

- Acknowledge publicly that violence in Nigeria has both resource and religious dimensions, and that FEM, distinct from Boko Haram and ISWAP, is a principal driver. Designate FEM-affiliated armed groups accordingly.
- Elevate respect for FoRB to the level of national discourse and structural reform: outlaw religious hate speech in the Criminal and Penal Codes and anchor FoRB protections in the Constitution.
- End impunity: conduct credible, independent investigations of mass community attacks, with priority for North Central states, and prosecute militia commanders.
- Rebalance security deployments across the North East, North West, and North Central zones in line with ORFA’s geographic and seasonal hot-spot data; fund and integrate community-level policing.
- Adopt victim-support policies including trauma counselling, safe havens, ransom-debt relief, land-return and reintegration for IDPs, and early warning systems in attack-prone communities.

- Require religious-identity fields in national security and humanitarian reporting (NEMA and State authorities) and encourage UNHCR, IOM, IDMC and ACLED to do the same.

To the Special Rapporteur, for the country visit and subsequent report:

- Visit attacked communities and IDP camps in Plateau, Benue, Southern Kaduna, Taraba, and at least one North West state (for example Zamfara or Sokoto) in addition to Abuja.
- Meet Christian, Muslim, and African Traditional Religion leaders, including Hausa Muslim victim communities, and female survivors of abduction.
- Request from the Federal Government disaggregated data on arrests, prosecutions, and convictions related to mass community attacks since 2019.
- Recommend, in the final report, that naming the perpetrators accurately is itself a protection measure, and that the humanitarian and human rights architecture serving Nigeria adopts religious-identity disaggregation as standard practice.

Closing

The undersigned organisations remain available to brief the Special Rapporteur, facilitate field contacts in all six geopolitical zones, and share the underlying incident database under appropriate confidentiality safeguards.

Appendices

- ORFA, Countering the myth of religious indifference in Nigerian terror (10/2019 to 9/2023), 4-year report, published 29 August 2024.
- ORFA, Fact Sheet Nigeria: Killings in the Context of “Terror” (October 2019 to September 2025).
- ORFA, Fact Sheet Nigeria: Abductions in the Context of “Terror” (October 2019 to September 2025).
- IIRF/ODI/WEA, No Road Home: Christian IDPs displaced by extremist violence in Nigeria, 2024.

Countering the myth of religious indifference in Nigerian terror (10/2019 – 9/2023)

Publication date: 29 August 2024

This document is the property of the Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA). It may be used and distributed free of charge, but please always acknowledge the source as: © 2024 Observatory of Religious Freedom in Africa.

Contents

MAP OF NIGERIA WITH GEOPOLITICAL ZONES AND CHRISTIAN POPULATION PER STATE	5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
INTRODUCTION	8
METHODOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATION	10
HOW THE VIOLENCE DATA WAS COLLATED	10
WHY DOES THE REPORT INCLUDE THE RELIGIOUS BACKGROUND OF THE CIVILIAN VICTIMS?	11
DATA GATHERING AND ORGANIZATION PROCESS	11
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS	13
1. SUMMARY DATA ON KILLINGS IN NIGERIA'S GEOPOLITICAL ZONES, STATES AND LGA'S	15
1.1 ATTACKS WITH KILLINGS IN THE REPORTING PERIOD	15
1.2 TOTAL NUMBER OF ALL PEOPLE KILLED IN THE 4-YEAR REPORTING PERIOD	17
1.3 RATIO OF CHRISTIANS TO MUSLIMS KILLED IN THE 4-YEAR REPORTING PERIOD, ADJUSTED ACCORDING TO POPULATION PERCENTAGE	20
1.4 CIVILIAN KILLINGS IN DIFFERENT LGAs IN THE OVERALL REPORTING PERIOD	21
2. SUMMARY DATA ON ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA'S GEOPOLITICAL ZONES, STATES AND LGA'S	24
2.1 ATTACKS WITH ABDUCTIONS IN THE 4-YEAR REPORTING PERIOD	24
2.2 NUMBER OF PEOPLE ABDUCTED IN THE OVERALL 4-YEAR REPORTING PERIOD	26
2.3 RATIO OF CHRISTIANS TO MUSLIMS ABDUCTED IN THE 4-YEAR PERIOD, ADJUSTED ACCORDING TO POPULATION PERCENTAGE	29
2.3 INSERT - DISPARATE TREATMENT OF CHRISTIAN AND MUSLIM CAPTIVES BY MEMBERS OF TERROR GROUPS	30
2.4 CIVILIAN ABDUCTIONS IN DIFFERENT LGAs IN THE OVERALL REPORTING PERIOD	31
3. DISTINGUISHING ATTACKS ON COMMUNITIES FROM OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK	34
3.1 KILLINGS IN COMMUNITY OR OTHER ATTACKS	35
3.1.1 Killings occurring during community attacks and other attacks	35
3.1.2 Many attacks with limited numbers of civilians abducted	37
3.1.3 Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed during community attacks and other attacks	38
3.2 ABDUCTIONS IN COMMUNITY OR OTHER ATTACKS	39
3.2.1 Abductions occurring during community attacks and other attacks	40
3.2.2 Many attacks with limited number of civilians abducted	42
3.2.3 Ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted during community attacks and other attacks	42
4. THE SPREAD OF ATTACKS OVER THE YEAR	44
4.1 KILLINGS OVER THE YEAR	44
4.1.2 Civilian killings over the year for the geopolitical zones	45
4.1.3 Killings over the year in the individual reporting periods	46
4.1.4 Civilian killings over the year for each of the four reporting periods	46
4.1.5 Total Civilians killed over the year in comparison to total Security Forces and Terror Group members killed ..	47
4.2 ABDUCTIONS OVER THE YEAR	48
4.2.1 The spread of civilian abductions over the year per geopolitical zone	48
4.2.2 The spread of civilian abductions over the year per individual reporting period	49
5. KILLING ANALYSIS PER AGGRESSOR	50
5.1 ALL PEOPLE KILLED, AND CIVILIANS KILLED	51
5.2 CIVILIANS KILLED IN COMMUNITY ATTACKS AND OTHER ATTACKS	51
5.3 DEADLIEST TERROR GROUPS FOR CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS	52
5.4 RATIO OF CHRISTIANS TO MUSLIMS KILLED IN COMMUNITY AND OTHER ATTACKS BY DIFFERENT AGGRESSORS	53
5.5 CHRISTIAN KILLING ANALYSIS BY AGGRESSOR	54
5.6 MUSLIM KILLING ANALYSIS BY AGGRESSOR	55
5.7 MAIN AREAS OF OPERATION OF DIFFERENT TERROR GROUPS INVOLVED IN CIVILIAN KILLINGS	56
5.7 INSERT – ABOUT THE FULANI ETHNIC MILITIA (FEM)	60
6. ABDUCTION ANALYSIS PER AGGRESSOR	63

6.1 ALL PEOPLE ABDUCTED, AND CIVILIANS ABDUCTED	63
6.2 CIVILIANS ABDUCTED IN COMMUNITY ATTACKS AND OTHER ATTACKS	64
6.3 TERROR GROUPS WITH MOST ABDUCTIONS FOR CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS	65
6.4 RATIO OF CHRISTIANS TO MUSLIMS ABDUCTED IN COMMUNITY AND OTHER ATTACKS BY DIFFERENT AGGRESSORS	65
6.5 CHRISTIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS PER AGGRESSOR	67
6.6 MUSLIM ABDUCTION ANALYSIS PER AGGRESSOR	68
6.7 MAIN AREAS OF OPERATION OF DIFFERENT TERROR GROUPS INVOLVED IN ABDUCTIONS	68
6.7 INSERT - BANDITS, ARMED FULANI HERDSMEN AND THE RELIGIOUS AGENDA CONNECTION	72
APPENDIX	74
APPENDIX 1A: ALL REGISTERED KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2020	74
APPENDIX 1B: ALL REGISTERED KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2020 – SEPT 2021	75
APPENDIX 1C: ALL REGISTERED KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2021 – SEPT 2022	76
APPENDIX 1D: ALL REGISTERED KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2022 – SEPT 2023	77
APPENDIX 1E: ALL REGISTERED KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2023	78
APPENDIX 2A: RELIGIOUS KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2020	79
APPENDIX 2B: RELIGIOUS KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2020 – SEPT 2021	80
APPENDIX 2C: RELIGIOUS KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2021 – SEPT 2022	81
APPENDIX 2D: RELIGIOUS KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2022 – SEPT 2023	82
APPENDIX 2E: RELIGIOUS KILLINGS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2023	83
APPENDIX 3A: ALL REGISTERED ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2020	84
APPENDIX 3B: ALL REGISTERED ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2020 – SEPT 2021	85
APPENDIX 3C: ALL REGISTERED ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2021 – SEPT 2022	86
APPENDIX 3D: ALL REGISTERED ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2022 – SEPT 2023	87
APPENDIX 3E: ALL REGISTERED ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2023	88
APPENDIX 4A: RELIGIOUS ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2020	89
APPENDIX 4B: RELIGIOUS ABDUCTIONS NIGERIA OCT 2020 – SEPT 2021	90
APPENDIX 4C: RELIGIOUS ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2021 – SEPT 2022	91
APPENDIX 4D: RELIGIOUS ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2022 – SEPT 2023	92
APPENDIX 4E: RELIGIOUS ABDUCTIONS IN NIGERIA OCT 2019 – SEPT 2023	93
APPENDIX 5A: KILLING ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - OTHER KILLINGS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	94
APPENDIX 5B: KILLING ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - OTHER KILLINGS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	95
APPENDIX 5C: KILLING ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - OTHER KILLINGS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	96
APPENDIX 5D: KILLING ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - OTHER KILLINGS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	97
APPENDIX 5E: KILLING ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - OTHER KILLINGS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	98
APPENDIX 6A: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - OTHER ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	99
APPENDIX 6B: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - OTHER ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	100
APPENDIX 6C: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - OTHER ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	101
APPENDIX 6D: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - OTHER ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	102
APPENDIX 6E: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - OTHER ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	103
APPENDIX 7A: KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	104
APPENDIX 7B: CIVILIAN KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	105
APPENDIX 7C: KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	106
APPENDIX 7D: CIVILIAN KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	107
APPENDIX 7E: KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	108
APPENDIX 7F: CIVILIAN KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	109
APPENDIX 7G: KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	110
APPENDIX 7H: CIVILIAN KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	111
APPENDIX 7I: KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	112
APPENDIX 7J: CIVILIAN KILLING ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	113
APPENDIX 8A: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	114
APPENDIX 8B: CIVILIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2020)	115
APPENDIX 8C: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	116
APPENDIX 8D: CIVILIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2020 - SEPT 2021)	117
APPENDIX 8E: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	118
APPENDIX 8F: CIVILIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2021 - SEPT 2022)	119
APPENDIX 8G: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	120

APPENDIX 8H: CIVILIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2022 - SEPT 2023)	121
APPENDIX 8I: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	122
APPENDIX 8J: CIVILIAN ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: THE SPREAD OVER MONTHS (OCT 2019 - SEPT 2023)	123
APPENDIX 9A: KILLING ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2019 – SEP 2020)	124
APPENDIX 9B: KILLING ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2021).....	124
APPENDIX 9C: KILLING ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2021 – SEP 2022)	125
APPENDIX 9D: KILLING ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2022 – SEP 2023)	125
APPENDIX 9E: KILLING ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2019 – SEP 2023).....	126
APPENDIX 10A: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2019 – SEP 2020)	126
APPENDIX 10B: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2021).....	127
APPENDIX 10C: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2021 – SEP 2022)	127
APPENDIX 10D: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2022 – SEP 2023)	128
APPENDIX 10E: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023)	128
APPENDIX 11: TOP 100 LOCAL GOV'T AREAS (LGAs) WITH MOST CIVILIAN KILLINGS (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023)	129
APPENDIX 12: TOP 100 LOCAL GOV'T AREAS (LGAs) WITH MOST CIVILIAN ABDUCTIONS (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023)	131
APPENDIX 13A: KILLING ANALYSIS: CHRISTIAN KILLINGS BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023)	133
APPENDIX 13B: KILLING ANALYSIS: MUSLIM KILLINGS BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023).....	134
APPENDIX 14A: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: CHRISTIAN ABDUCTIONS BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023).....	135
APPENDIX 14B: ABDUCTION ANALYSIS: MUSLIM ABDUCTIONS BY AGGRESSOR (OCT 2020 – SEP 2023)	136

Map of Nigeria with geopolitical zones and Christian population per state



Executive summary

Nigeria continues to face a multifaceted security crisis marked by widespread violence, particularly against religious communities. The data presented in this report covers a four-year period from 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2023 and provides critical insights into the patterns and dynamics of this violence. This executive summary presents 16 'highlights' from the data. The most striking point is that the Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) are killing Nigerian civilians unopposed. Mass killings, abductions and the torture of whole families go largely unchallenged as government forces pursue targets hundreds of miles away, according to the research findings. (See 5.7 INSERT, 6.7 INSERT.)

Nigeria was a very violent and insecure place to live in the 4-year reporting period, at least in parts of the country. In total 55,910 people were killed in 9,970 attacks, while 21,621 people were abducted in 2,705 attacks. There was some overlap. ORFA documented 11,610 distinct attacks in which people were killed and/or abducted. Out of these, 8,905 involved killings without abductions; 1,065 involved both killings and abductions; 1,640 involved abductions without killings. This is an average of 8 attacks per day involving killings and/or abductions over a 4-year period. These numbers include attacks with civilians, Security Forces and/or Terror Groups killed and abducted. (See Sections 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2.)

Many civilians lived in high levels of insecurity and fear of the unexpected. For instance, eye witnesses talked about children sleeping in trees at night. In total 30,880 civilians were killed in 6,942 attacks. The remaining 25,030 people killed were members of the Security Forces or Terror Groups. Additionally, 21,532 civilians were abducted in 2,670 attacks. Another 89 people abducted were members of the Security Forces or Terror Groups. (See Sections 1.1, 1.2, 2.1, 2.2.)

There were frequent clashes between Security Forces and Terror Groups and between Terror Groups themselves. This had impact on civilians too. In 3,028 attacks (out of the 9,970 attacks with killings) only non-civilians were killed: 4,377 were members of the Security Forces and 19,323 members of Terror Groups. In 35 attacks (out of the 2,705 attacks with abductions) only non-civilians were abducted: 68 belonging to the Security Forces and 2 to Terror Groups. (See Sections 1.1, 2.1.)

The data shows that more Nigerian Christians were victims of violence than Nigerians holding to other religious affiliations. Amongst the 30,880 civilians killed in the 4-year reporting period, the number of Christians killed was 16,769, while the number of Muslims killed was 6,235. Among the 21,532 civilians abducted, the number of Christians abducted was 11,185, while the number of Muslims abducted was 7,899. The number of African Traditional Religionists (ATRs) killed was 154 and the number of ATRs abducted was 184. The religious identity of 7,722 civilians killed and 2,264 civilians abducted remained unknown. (See Sections 1.2, 2.2.)

The ratio of Christians to Muslims killed rises significantly when the religious composition of the states is taken into consideration. Looking at the overall numbers, the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was 2.7:1; the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted was 1.4:1. However, when taking into account the relative sizes of the Christian and Muslim populations within the different states, the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed increases to 6.5:1, and the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted to 5.1:1. (See Sections 1.3, 2.3.)

Violent attacks occurred all over the territory. There were 65 different LGAs over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings; 42 of them appeared only once in the LGA top 25 for civilian killings. The LGAs in the LGA top 25 for civilian killings were spread over 15 different states, in 4 different geopolitical zones. For abductions these data points were slightly different: There were 60 different LGAs over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions with 38 LGAs appearing only once. These were spread over 14 different states in 6 different geopolitical zones. (See Sections 1.4, 2.4.)

People were most vulnerable at home. Most civilians were killed (25,312) or abducted (16,761) during attacks on their communities, in distinction from other attacks during which 5,568 civilians were killed and 4,771 abducted. Attacks on communities were especially devastating for the victims. They often involved a whole spectrum of violence, suffering and destruction, leading to high numbers of forcibly displaced people. Their fields were destroyed or taken over by the aggressors ('land grabbing'). Ransom payment added to the loss of livelihood and often drove people deep into a debt trap. (See Sections 3.1.1, 3.2.1.)

The start of the rainy season, which is the heart of the farming season, saw most civilians killed. Over the year, considering the 4-year period in total, there was a peak in killings between January and June. The North West, North Central and North East were by far the main contributors to that peak. The data included members of Security Forces and Terror Groups killed with peaks in March and September. For

civilians killed the biggest peak was between April and June. The North Central contributed most to the April-June peak, followed by the North West and North East. (See Sections 4.1.1, 4.1.2, 4.1.5.)

During the 'heart' of the farming season, attacks by the Security Forces against Terror Groups dropped significantly. While the number of civilians killed spiked from April to June, the number of those killed belonging to the Security Forces and Terror Groups dropped. The majority of civilians killed were Christian farmers. The killings of members of the Security Forces and Terror Groups were an indicator of their violent confrontation. It follows that in the period of the year when civilians were most severely attacked by Terror Groups, the Security Forces remained relatively absent. (See Section 4.1.5.)

Considering the 4-year reporting period in total, the North West was the epicenter of abductions, followed by the North Central. The abduction phenomenon was more spread out over the year than was the case with killings, although most abductions also took place in the context of community attacks. Looking at the four distinct reporting periods, the abduction phenomenon began slowly in the 2020 reporting period, but then picked up speed in 2021 onwards. (See Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2.)

Most havoc was caused by less-known aggressors. Most civilians were killed by Other Terrorist Groups (12,039) and Armed Fulani Herdsmen (11,948). The better-known Boko Haram and ISWAP combined killed 3,079 civilians. The Armed Fulani Herdsmen are part of the Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM). It is believed that part of the Other Terrorist Groups (often called 'Fulani bandits') are also connected to FEM (See Section 5.1).

It implies that FEM is a much bigger factor in the Nigerian culture of violence than Boko Haram and ISWAP. (See Sections 5.7 INSERT, 6.7 INSERT.)

Muslims were killed by the same groups that killed Christians, although with different percentages. 55% of the Christians killed were killed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (9,153); 29% by Other Terrorist Groups (4,895). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined stood for 8% of the Christians killed (1,268). For Muslims it was the opposite: 24% of the Muslims killed were killed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (1,473); 53% by Other Terrorist Groups (3,334). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined stood for 12% of the Muslims killed (770). (See Sections 5.1, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6.)

The same aggressors that were responsible for most of the killings, were by far the most important actors in the Nigerian abduction industry as well. Most civilians were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (13,728) and Armed Fulani Herdsmen (6,380). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined abducted 1,023 civilians. The data warns against national and international attention being focused mainly on Boko Haram and ISWAP, with FEM activity being largely passed over. (See Sections 6.1, 5.7 INSERT, 6.7 INSERT.)

Muslims were abducted by the same groups that abducted Christians, but with different percentages. 60% of Christians abducted were kidnapped by Other Terrorist Groups (6,675) and 35% by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (3,914). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 4% of abductions of Christians (422). For Muslims it was comparable: 71% of the Muslims abducted were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (5,635); 24% by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (1,903). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 4% of the abductions of Muslims (300). (See Sections 6.1, 6.3, 6.5, 6.6.)

Since 2015, there have been consistent reports of disparate treatment meted out to Christian and Muslim captives by members of Terror Groups. Differences in treatment were observed based on reports from victims or their families, relating to forced labor; sexual violence; ransom demands and release; execution risks; religious tests. (See 2.3 INSERT.)

The areas of operation of Other Terrorist Groups and Armed Fulani Herdsmen merged into each other and partly overlapped. The main area for Armed Fulani Herdsmen activity was in North Central (including the southern part of Kaduna state); for Other Terrorist Groups it was the North West, also crossing into North Central. Boko Haram and ISWAP had their main area of operation in the North East. Mapping the killings and abductions, however, it can be seen that they all carried out violent attacks in other geopolitical zones too. (See Sections 5.7, 6.7.)

The epicenter of violent attacks was in the North West and North Central. Most civilian killings took place in the North West (11,626) and North Central (8,789). The North East followed with 5,521 civilians killed. For Christians these numbers were 5,250, 6,081 and 2,595; for Muslims they were 3,678, 1,106 and 1,262. Most civilian abductions were in the North West (12,042) and North Central (6,325). For Christians these numbers were 5,931 and 3,277; for Muslims they were 4,976 and 2,469. Please note that the numbers given for Christians and Muslims do not include the 7,722 civilians killed with 'Unknown Religious Identity' or the 2,264 civilians abducted with 'Unknown Religious Identity'. (See Sections 1.2, 2.2, 5.7, 6.7.)

The areas of operation of the Security Forces were mainly in the North West and the North East. That is where they killed 13,480 members of Terror Groups. They left the population in the North Central relatively in the lurch. In other words, they gave the Armed Fulani Herdsmen ample opportunity for their violent attacks, with Christians as their main victims. (See Section 5.7.)

Introduction

The violence data presented in this report is the result of a 4-year project of data-gathering by Nigerian partners within the country. The first phase of the project was from 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2020; the second phase from 1 October 2020 to 30 September 2021; the third phase from 1 October 2021 to 30 September 2022; the fourth phase from 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023.

The project tried to be comprehensive in recording attacks involving killings and abductions. That means, it documented killings and abductions of civilians and their religious backgrounds, of the Security Forces and of aggressors referred to as 'Terror Groups'. (See Section 1 below).

The violence data presented in this report, however, limits itself to killings and abductions in the context of a 'culture of violence' created by 'Terror Groups' such as Boko Haram, ISWAP, armed Fulani herders, 'bandits'¹ and other, smaller groups. Many factors play a role but violent Islamism, as a religious ideology, is an important part of it.

¹ Bandits is a catch-all category used in many news reports, that can include the previously listed terror groups. The violence committed by 'bandits' is included in this report when there seems to be a direct or indirect relation to these groups. It is very likely that at times the term 'bandits' is not only used to simplify reporting but also to mask the true nature of the perpetrators.

However hard one tries, a data-gathering project like this one is never exhaustive since much violence goes unreported. Nevertheless, the researchers are confident that the data supplied gives a balanced indication of the situation in the country over the four reporting periods.

The numbers supplied in this report only represent actual victims of killings and abductions. However, many others were severely impacted. Attacks involving killings and abductions often represent a whole spectrum of violence and suffering: Communities raided or permanently occupied; people wounded or maimed; women and girls raped; houses, shops and other businesses destroyed or occupied; fields destroyed or occupied; houses of worship abandoned, closed or destroyed; people driven from their homelands into dire situations of internal displacement. Ransom payments bring families and religious communities to the brink of bankruptcy, while at the same time financing the operations of the 'Terror Groups'.

Structure of the report

The report is organized into several key sections, each addressing a crucial aspect of the violence that has plagued Nigeria. The **Executive Summary** provides an overview of the report's most significant findings. This section is essential for grasping the broader implications of the data and the urgency of the issues at hand. Following the executive summary and this **Introduction**, the report provides a detailed presentation of the **Methodology** that was followed to collect the data. The section on **Policy Recommendations** consolidates the report's findings into actionable steps for policymakers, international partners, and civil society organizations. These recommendations are designed to address the root causes of violence and encourage long-term peace and stability in Nigeria.

The report then presents all the data that was collected by the ORFA team, divided into several detailed sections that comprehensively analyze the state of killings and abductions across Nigeria, particularly focusing on the geopolitical zones, states, and Local Government Areas (LGAs).

The section **Summary Data on Killings in Nigeria's Geopolitical Zones, States and LGAs** provides an in-depth look at the attacks with killings reported over the specified period, breaking down the data into geopolitical zones, states and LGAs. It examines the total number of people killed, comparing the impact on different religious communities by calculating the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed, adjusted according to their population percentages in the different states. Additionally, the section explores the distribution of civilian casualties across various LGAs.

Moving from killings to abductions, the section **Summary Data on Abductions in Nigeria's Geopolitical Zones, States and LGAs** focuses on the prevalence and impact of abduction attacks during the reporting period. It presents a comprehensive overview of the number of people abducted, again adjusted according to religious demographics. The section also delves into the geographical spread of these abductions, identifying key hotspots and trends over time.

The section **Distinguishing Attacks on Communities from Other Forms of Attack** differentiates between community-targeted attacks and other types of violence, offering a nuanced analysis of how these distinctions impact the nature and scale of both killings and abductions. It highlights the overall distribution of attacks, the number of civilians affected, and the specific targeting of religious groups in community versus other attacks.

In section **Spread of Attacks Over the Year**, the report examines how killings and abductions fluctuate throughout the course of a year, providing a temporal analysis of violence. The data is broken down further according to geopolitical zones and distinct reporting periods, allowing for a detailed understanding of the patterns and peaks in violent attacks.

The critical section **Killing Analysis per Aggressor** analyzes the aggressors behind the killings, categorizing them by the groups involved and the specific communities they target. It provides a breakdown of overall and civilian killings by aggressors, identifying the main areas of operation for these groups and offering insight into the religious demographics of the killed individuals.

Similar to the killing analysis, the section **Abduction Analysis per Aggressor** focuses on the groups responsible for abductions. It includes a detailed breakdown of civilian abductions by different aggressors and an examination of the most threatening terror groups for both Christians and Muslims.

We strongly encourage the reader to study the full report. It provides vital context and offers a roadmap for addressing the ongoing challenges in Nigeria. Engagement with this report is crucial for shaping informed and effective policies that can make a tangible difference to the lives of those affected by violence.

Methodological justification

How the violence data was collated

In 2023, approximately 52% of the attacks were reported by ORFA's primary partner organization in Nigeria. The remaining 48% was sourced by ORFA researchers, other local partners, and other organizations.²

ORFA's primary partner organization (name withheld due to security considerations) collected information on the ground via their network, whereas ORFA researchers reviewed the latest media and NGO reports from local, national and international sources including Armed Conflict and Location Data (ACLED).

ORFA considers the inclusion of attributes such as religious background critical for understanding the scope and nature of the violence.

ORFA's primary partner intentionally included data on the religious background, which other local partners and other organizations collecting data do not provide. For this reason, our primary partner organization reviewed and confirmed each recorded attack and gathered additional data points (esp. religious background).

As a matter of practice, ORFA researchers work to 'triangulate' all the information from different sources to avoid any attack being reported multiple times and to provide as much relevant information as possible. Often there was an overlap of attacks initially reported by our primary partner organization and later also

² More information about these other sources can be obtained at request by email to ORFA.

reported by ORFA researchers or other organizations. The additional reports often proved valuable and either confirmed facts already gathered from other sources or provided additional insights about specific attacks.

For the periods 2020 and 2021 the number of civilian victims with unknown religious identity was much higher compared to 2022 and 2023. The explanation for this is that during the reporting periods 2022 and 2023 the attacks from ACLED were integrated monthly and it was possible for our primary partner to review the religious identity of civilian victims in a timely manner. However, the data from ACLED for the reporting periods 2020 and 2021 were only integrated in 2023 and it was no longer feasible to accurately determine the religious identity of the civilian victims.

More information about the methodology can be found [here](#).

Why does the report include the religious background of the civilian victims?

The report distinguishes between the religious background of the civilian victims because a variety of contradictory analyses exists concerning the causes of violence in Nigeria. Some analyses blame everything on a ‘classical’ herder-farmer conflict made worse by environmental degradation in the wider region.³ Other analyses see as the exclusive guiding theme the vision of Usman Dan Fodio, a Fulani radical Islamic scholar who began an Islamic jihad in Gobir in 1804, and by 1808 had established the Sokoto Caliphate. He had vowed to enforce Islam through the power of the sword from the Sahara Desert in the north to the Atlantic Ocean in the south.

ORFA is not taking sides. The Observatory wants to let the data speak for itself without purposefully steering towards one or other of these narratives.

Data gathering and organization process

The data on killings and abductions was registered for four reporting periods:

1. October 2019 to September 2020 – indicated in the column headings as 2020.
2. October 2020 to September 2021 – indicated in the column headings as 2021.
3. October 2021 to September 2022 – indicated in the column headings as 2022.
4. October 2022 to September 2023 – indicated in the column headings as 2023.

The term ‘4-year reporting period’ refers to all four periods taken together: October 2019 to September 2023.

In the report, data is presented in two ways:

- a. Per geopolitical zone: Overall data covering the 4 reporting periods is presented per geopolitical zone. There are 6 geopolitical zones in Nigeria.

³ “Classical” means that conflicts between herders and farmers have been ongoing for generations. However, “classical” also includes the scope of weapons used: ‘sticks and machetes’, not AK-47 rifles. The frequent use of assault weapons such as AK-47 rifles, at least partially undermines that narrative.

- b. Per individual reporting period: Overall data covering the 6 geopolitical zones is presented per individual reporting period. There are 4 individual reporting periods.

The appendices give more details about the data presented in the tables in the main body of this report.

The combination of both ways of presentation gives an insight into the geographical dimension of the violent attacks in Nigeria, as well as the time dimension.

The report also distinguishes between killings and abduction in the context of attacks on communities and other attacks that were more on an individual basis or at least outside the context of attacks on communities as such. (See Section 3.)

‘Unknown Religious Identity’ killed or abducted

When data for killings or abductions of Christians, Muslims and ATRs is used for analysis, all people killed or abducted with “Unknown Religious Identity” are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages (%) or ratios. It is a problem when bare data is used.

KILLINGS: There is a high number of “Unknown Religious Identity” in the data (**7,722**), split over the four reporting periods: 2,806 in the 2020 reporting period, 4,351 in the 2021 reporting period, 471 in the 2022 reporting period and 94 in the 2023 reporting period. If the number of “Unknown religious identity” were divided over the categories “Christians killed”, “Muslims killed” and “ATRs killed” using the same ratios as registered for the 2022 and 2023 reporting periods, the total number of Christians killed would rise from 16,769 to 22,361. For Muslims killed it would rise from 6,235 to 8,314. (See Section 1.2.)

ABDUCTIONS: There is also a high number of “Unknown Religious Identity” in the data (**2,264**), split over the reporting periods: 597 in the 2020 reporting period, 1,312 in the 2021 reporting period, 247 in the 2022 reporting period and 108 in the 2023 reporting period. If the number of “Unknown religious identity” were divided over the categories “Christians abducted”, “Muslims abducted” and “ATRs abducted” using the same ratios as registered for the 2022 and 2023 reporting periods, the total number of Christians abducted would rise from 11,185 to 12,499. For Muslims abducted it would rise from 7,899 to 8,827. (See Section 2.2.)

Actual versus proportional ratio for Christian victims compared to Muslim victims

To understand whether religious background plays a role in a person becoming a victim of violence, the report relates as far as possible the numbers of Christians and Muslims killed or abducted in the different Nigerian states to the size of their populations in those states. A small Christian population with just slightly more victims than the Muslim population, could still be disproportionately affected by the violence.

Section 1, subsection 1.3 (table 5) shows the example of the North West with 5,250 Christians killed and 3,678 Muslims killed over the 4-year reporting period (actual ratio of 1.4:1). When the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the different states of the North West are taken into consideration, this ratio increases significantly (proportional ratio of 7.5:1).

Section 2, subsection 2.3 (table 13) gives a comparable example for abductions in the North West: 5,931 Christians abducted compared to 4,976 Muslims giving an actual ratio of 1.2:1; the proportional ratio is 6.2:1.

For Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 the proportionality issue is not taken into account in the religious analysis. Just the directly recorded numbers are used. Taking into account the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the different Nigerian states ('proportionality') in the analysis in Sections 3 to 6 would further emphasize the trends.

Policy Recommendations

1. The Nigerian government should give **priority to value reorientation** that promotes justice, forgiveness, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence among all Nigerians. The National Orientation Agency (NOA) should be funded and directed to create a national program to awaken the consciousness of the entire Nigerian populace on its responsibility to peace and foster a sense of oneness in the people.
2. The Nigerian government should wake up to its **responsibility of securing the lives and properties of Nigerians**. Impunity has allowed targeted attacks against innocent people to continue unabatedly. The government has responsibility to maintain law and order, therefore, providing protection for lives and properties will reassure citizens and endear trust in the government. If the people cannot trust the government to deliver justice, more militant groups and sub state actors could rise up to the State against its citizens.
3. **Respect for Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB)** should be elevated to the level of national discourse and social action as a conversation, practice and structural framework. For example, the use of discriminatory words that reinforce religious intolerance such as *arne* (infidel) and *kafir* (pagan) should be treated as hate speech and be outlawed not only in Nigeria's Criminal and Penal Codes, but also in the Constitution. The Nigerian government, religious leaders and Civil Society Organizations should draft targeted peacebuilding and reconciliation programs that address ethnic and religious biases, particularly focusing on the disparities in violence against Christians and Muslims. These programs should include interfaith dialogue, community workshops, and education campaigns aimed at promoting mutual understanding and reducing tensions between different groups. Religious leaders should be actively involved in these efforts to leverage their influence in promoting peace and reconciliation.
4. The Federal government and State governments in Nigeria need to **work together with unity of purpose**, across political party lines to address the factors which have triggered the violence, killings and abductions which this study has revealed. A striving for peace in all the country's trouble hotspots should be pursued to put an end to the violent attacks recorded in this report. As much as possible, State governments should be given support to take independent decisive action based on the specific forms of violence in each state.

5. The violent community attacks in the North Central zone are often tagged “farmer-herder conflicts” and attributed to climate change. The study shows this is often not the case. There is therefore a need to acknowledge that there are **different dynamics and nuances at play** in different locations where violent attacks occur in Nigeria and re-define the narrative accordingly. Insisting on one generic narrative, engaging in denial and insisting on political correctness is not only overly simplistic in many cases but also misleading and unhelpful. For example, when villagers report that they have been attacked by Armed Fulani Herdsmen or Fulani militia, it is important to report this fact instead of using the word “Bandits” or “Unknown Gunmen.”
6. The narrative that Armed Fulani Herdsmen kill villagers as a form of reprisal for earlier attacks is also **not only simplistic but unfounded**. It hides the real issue and ensures unjust killings continue in the North Central zone in particular. It is important for the media, government and Security Forces to ensure they do not pass on narratives that aggravate the victims of violence and exonerate perpetrators, which in the end leads to double victimization.
7. Perpetrators of violence who have been arrested in connection with violence should be **duly prosecuted**. This will end impunity by deterring others who may be inclined to engage in violence and criminal activities.
8. Federal and State governments should adopt **policies for support of victims of mass violence**. The different ministries should develop and implement targeted support programs for vulnerable populations, especially programs working closely with women, children and religious minorities. These programs should include safe havens, trauma counselling, and reintegration support for abductees. Additionally, establishing early warning systems in communities prone to attacks can help reduce the number of casualties and abductions.
9. There is a need to ensure security presence at all times by **increasing and improving policing at community level**. Nigerians in rural areas are the farmers who ensure the nation is fed. Yet they bear the heavy brunt of violence and insecurity. Consequently, violent attacks on villagers have devastating effects on the direct victims and on the nation as a whole. The nation is currently facing food scarcity which in large part is due to the violence that has displaced many, making them Internally Displaced Persons (IPDs) in their own country. This reality has made it impossible for them to cultivate their land. The Nigerian government and local governments should allocate increased funding and resources to establish and enhance local security infrastructure, particularly in the North West and North Central regions. This should include training and equipping community-based security groups and integrating them with national security forces to ensure rapid response to attacks. Regular joint detachments and community engagement initiatives should be conducted to build trust and cooperation between local communities and security forces. Community policing is key in securing communities.
10. In many communities, rural dwellers have been **driven out of their ancestral lands** by continuous acts of violence on their persons and properties. As a consequence of their becoming IDPs, their lands have been taken over by their attackers, renaming the villages in some cases. This issue of land-grab also affects food security. The Nigerian government should take a clear stance on such gross violation of citizens’ rights by taking a stance that supports the immediate return of all

displaced citizens to their ancestral homelands and a commitment to end the rampant ‘food terrorism’ that is being witnessed today in Nigeria in areas prone to violence.

11. The Nigerian government should provide **additional and proper security** for internally displaced people surviving in camps or other informal displacement settings.
12. **Collaboration and local ownership** should be a key underlining principle in all peacebuilding initiatives and so the importance of partnerships between government agencies, civil society organizations, religious leaders, and local communities cannot be overemphasized. Local actors should be empowered to take ownership of peacebuilding initiatives and ensure their voices are heard in decision-making processes. This also promotes transparency, accountability and sustainability.
13. The Nigerian government should create a **new recruitment and training program** for the police and armed forces, with the aim of a nationwide reform of police and security culture and restructuring of the entire security architecture of Nigeria.
14. The EU member states, and the US and UK governments, should **allocate more aid resources** to Nigeria’s North Central Zone and Southern Kaduna, which are suffering a crisis of displacement. Where return to home communities is possible, IDPs find it is to ruined houses and communities.
15. The EU, US and UK governments should enact aid programs charged with **transforming the situation in the areas affected by violent attacks** and **assisting the return of displaced persons**.
16. The US and UK governments should use their seats at the UN Security Council to **seek a resolution** that enhances the security of communities vulnerable to attack in Nigeria.

1. Summary data on killings in Nigeria’s geopolitical zones, states and LGA’s

When the recorded data for killings and abductions of Christians, Muslims and ATRs is used for analysis, all people killed or abducted with “Unknown Religious Identity” are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

1.1 Attacks with killings in the reporting period

In the 4-year reporting period many attacks with killings and abductions were registered in the context of violent attacks by aggressors summarized under the term ‘Terror Groups’. This section further focuses on attacks with killings. Section 2 focuses on attacks with abductions.

Table 1 and 2 give an overview of all attacks with killings. Table 1 focuses on the geopolitical zones for the 4-year reporting period; table 2 on the four separate reporting periods.

Table 1 shows that many people were killed (55,910). Table 9 in Section 2.1 shows that many others were abducted (21,621). The total number of attacks with killings was 9,970 and total number of attacks

with abductions was 2,705. There was some overlap. ORFA registered 11,610 attacks in which people were killed and/or abducted. Out of these, 8,905 have recorded killings, no abductions; 1,065 have recorded both killings and abductions; 1,640 have recorded abductions, no killings. This is an average of 8 attacks per day with killings and/or abductions over a 4-year period. Section 2 further elaborates upon the data on abductions.

There were frequent confrontations between Security Forces and Terror Groups and between Terror Groups themselves. This had impact on civilians too. In 3,028 attacks (out of the 9,970 attacks with killings) only non-civilians were killed (4,377 Security Forces, 19,323 Terror Groups). It follows that 95% of these killings were in mutual confrontations. See Section 5.7 for more details on the confrontations between Security Forces and Terror Groups.

Table 1: All attacks with killings in the geopolitical zones, for the 4-year reporting period, with emphasis on attacks with civilians killed

Geopolitical zone	# of all incidents with people killed	Grand total all people killed	# of incidents with civilians killed	Grand total civilians killed
North West	2,900	18,635	2,128	11,626
North Central	2,307	11,974	1,978	8,789
North East	2,058	18,508	823	5,521
South East	954	3,251	636	2,273
South South	921	1,978	671	1,369
South West	830	1,564	706	1,302
Grand Total	9,970	55,910	6,942	30,880

According to table 1, most attacks with killings took place in the North West (2,900), followed by the North Central (2,307) and North East (2,058). The South East (954), South South (921) and South West (830) had their share of attacks too. Looking at civilians alone, the North West (2,128) and North Central (1,978) had most attacks. The North East had far less (823), as did the South West (706), South South (671) and South East (636). The average of civilians killed per attack in the southern zones is lower than in the northern zones.

The difference between attacks with people killed (9,970) and with civilians killed (6,942) was considerable, because there were many clashes recorded between Security Forces and Terror Groups.

Table 2: All attacks with killings for the four separate reporting periods, with emphasis on attacks with civilians killed

Year	# of all incidents with people killed	Grand total all people killed	# of incidents with civilians killed	Grand total civilians killed
2020	2,111	11,913	1,519	7,434
2021	2,859	16,274	2,034	9,940
2022	2,576	15,037	1,740	7,651
2023	2,424	12,686	1,649	5,855
2020-2023	9,970	55,910	6,942	30,880

Table 2 shows that most attacks with people killed were in the 2021 reporting period (2,859), followed by 2022 (2,576), 2023 (2,424) and 2020 (2,111). For civilians killed, the order was the same: Most attacks with civilians killed were in 2021 (2,034), followed by 2022 (1,740), 2023 (1,649) and 2020 (1,519).

People killed in the context of attacks by ‘Terror Groups’ were categorized according to their religious background: Christian, Muslim or African Traditional Religionist (ATR). The religious identity of the victims was not always known. These four subcategories together formed the category “civilians”. The data also covered members of the Security Forces killed and members of the ‘Terror Groups’ killed. See Section 5 for more details.

Most attacks with civilians killed targeted communities, the majority of them Christian communities. See Section 3. Community attacks often involved a shocking variety of hostile acts and led to enormous numbers of forcibly displaced. At the end of 2023, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) reported 3.3 million forcibly displaced civilians by conflict and violence in Nigeria.

The numbers of Muslims killed by Christian local vigilantes are included in this report, as are Muslims killed by retaliatory attacks by Christians on Muslims. However, the data shows that by far the majority of Muslims were killed by the same aggressors as those who killed Christians and ATRs. This means, that most of the Muslims killed as reported by ORFA must not be seen as victims of Christians but as victims of their radicalized religious kin. The main ‘victims’ of the Christian local vigilantes were members of the ‘Terror Groups’. See Section 5 for more data on this issue.

1.2 Total number of all people killed in the 4-year reporting period

Table 3 shows that the total number of people killed in the 4-year reporting period was 55,910. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 1. Amongst them the number of Christians killed was 16,769, while the total number of Muslims killed was 6,235. The total number of African Traditional Religionists (ATRs) killed was 154. The religious identity of 7,722 civilians killed remained unknown. The Security Forces (4,953) and Terror Groups (20,077) had high numbers killed too.

If the number of ‘Unknown religious identity’ were divided over the categories “Christians killed”, “Muslims killed” and “ATRs killed” using the same ratios as registered for the 2022 and 2023 reporting periods, the total for Christians killed rises from 16,769 to 22,361, and for Muslims it rises from 6,235 to 8,314.


Table 3: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES - People killed in Nigeria in the context of ‘Terror groups’ from Oct 2019 until Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	2020-2023							
	Total Killed	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	18,635	11,626	5,250	3,678	52	2,646	912	6,097
North Central	11,974	8,789	6,081	1,106	22	1,580	584	2,601
North East	18,508	5,521	2,595	1,262	21	1,643	2,612	10,375
South East	3,251	2,273	1,677	78	2	516	526	452
South South	1,978	1,369	622	23	15	709	236	373
South West	1,564	1,302	544	88	42	628	83	179
Grand Total	55,910	30,880	16,769	6,235	154	7,722	4,953	20,077

Most killings were in the North West (18,635), closely followed by the North East (18,508). These include high numbers of Security Forces killed in the North West (912 killed) and the North East (2,612 killed), and in particular Terror Groups killed in the North West (6,097 killed) and the North East (10,375 killed). When focusing on civilians, North West had most civilians killed (11,626), followed by North Central (8,789). In all geopolitical zones more Christians were killed than Muslims.

Map 1 visualizes the overall data for people killed presented in table 3. It shows the spread of the killings over the country.

MAP 1: All people killed in the 4-year reporting period



(Map source: ORFA)

Table 4 shows the killings in the four individual reporting periods.


Table 4: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS - People killed in Nigeria in the context of 'Terror groups' from Oct 2019 until Sept 2023

Year	Total Killed	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
2020	11,913	7,434	3,619	1,009	-	2,806	1,117	3,362
2021	16,274	9,940	4,328	1,237	24	4,351	2,130	4,204
2022	15,037	7,651	4,877	2,263	40	471	957	6,429
2023	12,686	5,855	3,945	1,726	90	94	749	6,082
2020-2023	55,910	30,880	16,769	6,235	154	7,722	4,953	20,077

Table 4 shows the number of the killings over the four separate reporting periods. Killings increased from 2020 (11,913) to 2021 (16,274) and then decreased in 2022 (15,037) and 2023 (12,686). Particularly in the 2023 reporting period, the number of people killed decreased, although the 2023 number was still higher than the 2020 number. This was due to the much higher number of members of Terror Groups killed in 2023 (6,082), mainly by the Security Forces. However, the number of civilians killed in 2023 (5,855) was lower than the number of civilians killed in 2020 (7,434). This might be (partly) related to the 2023 elections period. See Section 4 for more details.


Maps 2A - 2D visualize these data for each individual reporting period. Maps 3A - 3D do so for the four reporting periods cumulatively.

Maps 2A – 2D: All people killed in the four individual reporting periods displayed



(Maps source: ORFA)

Maps 3A – 3D All people killed in the four reporting periods cumulatively



(Maps source: ORFA)

1.3 Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed in the 4-year reporting period, adjusted according to population percentage

To understand whether religious background plays a role in a person becoming a victim of violence, this section of the report relates the numbers of Christians and Muslims killed in the different Nigerian states to the size of their respective populations in those states. A small Christian population with just slightly more victims than the Muslim population, could still be disproportionately affected by the violence.

Tables 5 and 6 indicate that in the 4-year reporting period, the actual ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was **2.7:1**. When taking into account the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the individual states where attacks occurred, the proportional ratio of Christians to Muslims killed rises to **6.5:1**. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 2.

Table 5: GEOPOLITICAL ZONE - Comparison of the ratio of the number of Christians killed to the number of Muslims killed from Oct 2019 until Sep 2023 taking into account the Christian/Muslim population levels

Geopolitical zone	2020-2023				
	Total Christians and Muslims killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportional ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	8,928	5,250	3,678	1.4	7.5
North Central	7,187	6,081	1,106	5.5	4.6
North East	3,857	2,595	1,262	2.1	5.3
South East	1,755	1,677	78	21.5	5.3
South South	645	622	23	27.0	6.3
South West	632	544	88	6.2	3.1
Grand Total	23,004	16,769	6,235	2.7	6.5

Table 5 shows that the initial ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was by far the highest in the South South (27.0:1) and the South East (21.5:1). The ratio in the North West (1.4:1) and the ratio in the North East (2.1:1) were the lowest. However, when taking into account the population sizes of Christians and Muslims in the different states, the highest ratio was in the North West (7.5:1), followed by the South South (6.3:1) and the North East and South East (both with a ratio of 5.3:1). It is remarkable that these ratios for the Christian-majority South South and South East were still so high.

Table 6: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS - Comparison of the ratio of Christians killed to Muslims killed from October 2019 until September 2023 taking into account the Christian/Muslim population levels

Year	Total Christians and Muslims killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportional ratio Christians to Muslims killed
2020	4,628	3,619	1,009	3.6	9.3
2021	5,565	4,328	1,237	3.5	7.7
2022	7,140	4,877	2,263	2.2	6.6
2023	5,671	3,945	1,726	2.3	3.7
2020-2023	23,004	16,769	6,235	2.7	6.5

Table 6 shows that the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed decreased over the 4 reporting periods from 3.6:1 to 2.2:1/2.3:1, meaning that in the course of the violence, Muslims were increasingly targeted by Terror Groups compared to Christians, though still less in number than Christians. When taking into account the population sizes of Christians and Muslims in the different states, the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed decreased from 9.3:1 to 3.7:1. Although 3.7:1 still shows a serious difference between Christians and Muslims killed in relation to their population sizes in the Nigerian states, this decrease indicates that over the four reporting periods there was a relative shift of the stage of the violence to states with higher proportions of Christian populations.

1.4 Civilian killings in different LGAs in the overall reporting period

This section analyses the geographical volatility of the violent attacks causing civilian killings.

The project has registered data on people killed for 762 LGAs, with civilian killings in 710 LGAs spread over Nigeria. Appendix 11 gives the data of the LGA top 100 with most civilians killed over the 4-year reporting period.

Table 7: Numbers and percentages of civilians killed in the LGA top 10, 25 and 100 with most killings for all four reporting periods combined

2020-2023	Total civilians killed		Christians killed		Muslims killed		ATRs killed		Unknown religious identity killed	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Top 10	7,268	24	5,264	31	918	15	32	21	1,054	14
Top 25	12,324	40	7,918	47	2,161	35	48	31	2,197	28
Top 100	22,846	74	13,019	78	4,929	79	90	58	4,808	62
All 710	30,880		16,769		6,235		154		7,722	

Most civilian killings took place in a limited number of LGAs. Table 8 shows the numbers and percentages of civilians killed in the LGA top 10, 25 and 100 with most killings for all four reporting periods combined. Out of the 710 LGAs with civilian killings, 24% took place in the LGA top 10, 40% in the top LGA 25 and 74% in the LGA top 100. The remaining 26% of killings took place in ranks 101 to 710.

Table 8: 25 LGAs with the most civilian killings (totals over the four year reporting period)

LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	2020-2023				
			Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed
Zangon Kataf	Kaduna	North West	1,232	1,013	35	1	183
Shiroro	Niger	North Central	986	571	291	-	124
Kajuru	Kaduna	North West	858	699	50	1	108
Chikun	Kaduna	North West	718	535	34	-	149
Guma	Benue	North Central	707	657	4	-	46
Wasagu/Danko	Kebbi	North West	641	397	197	29	18
Bassa	Plateau	North Central	607	442	14	-	151
Munya	Niger	North Central	509	299	92	1	117
Katsina-Ala	Benue	North Central	506	423	-	-	83
Giwa	Kaduna	North West	504	228	201	-	75
Faskari	Katsina	North West	465	160	142	-	163
Takum	Taraba	North East	420	407	8	3	2
Monguno	Borno	North East	388	244	99	-	45
Kaura	Kaduna	North West	362	330	10	-	22
Maru	Zamfara	North West	360	18	137	-	205
Sabon Birni	Sokoto	North West	359	29	177	-	153
Mangu	Plateau	North Central	349	305	33	-	11
Birnin Gwari	Kaduna	North West	337	177	74	-	86
Anka	Zamfara	North West	334	79	221	-	34
Gwer West	Benue	North Central	303	258	-	1	44
Maradun	Zamfara	North West	286	48	145	-	93
Maiduguri Metro (MMC)	Borno	North East	285	81	45	-	159
Multiple LGAs combined in	Imo	South East	284	256	28	-	-
Igabi	Kaduna	North West	278	93	102	-	83
Bali	Taraba	North East	246	169	22	12	43
Total civilians killed top 25 LGAs			12,324	7,918	2,161	48	2,197
Total civilians killed all LGAs			30,880	16,769	6,235	154	7,722

Table 8 (above) gives the data for all four reporting periods combined. Analysis of each reporting period separately leads to the following results:

- 65 different LGAs over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings

- 42 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings once in 4 years
- 14 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings twice in 4 years
- 6 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings three times in 4 years
- 3 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings in all 4 years

This corresponds with an indication of geographical volatility of **200**. The range of this indication varies between 100 and 400. If all killings were focused on the LGAs over the four years, the value would have been 400. If all killings took place in different LGAs over the four years, the value would have been 100.

- 15 different states over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 3 states 1 time in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 2 states 2 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 1 state 3 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 2 states 4 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 1 state 5 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 1 state 8 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 1 state 9 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 3 states 13 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - 1 state 21 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings


In the 2020 reporting period, the LGA top 25 killings were in 10 different states. So, it went from 10 states in 2020 to 15 states in 2023.


- 4 different geopolitical zones over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian killings
 - North West: mentioned 45 times out of 100
 - North Central: mentioned 32 times out of 100
 - North East: mentioned 20 times out of 100
 - South East: mentioned 3 times out of 100

In the 2020 reporting period, the LGA top 25 killings were in 3 different geopolitical zones. So, it went from 3 geopolitical zones in 2020 to 4 geopolitical zones states in 2023.

Maps 4a – 4d show how the geographical focus of civilian killings has shifted over the four reporting periods. Map 4e gives the combined image for all four years together.

Maps 4A – 4E: 2020–2023 annual LGA top 25 with most civilians killed





(Maps source: ORFA)

2. Summary data on abductions in Nigeria's geopolitical zones, states and LGA's

When the recorded data for abductions of Christians, Muslims and ATRs is used for analysis, all people killed or abducted with "Unknown Religious Identity" are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

2.1 Attacks with abductions in the 4-year reporting period

In the 4-year reporting period many attacks involving killings and abductions were recorded in the context of violent attacks by aggressors summarized under the term 'Terror Groups'. This section further focuses on attacks with abductions. Section 1 focuses on attacks with killings.

Table 9 and 10 give an overview of all attacks with abductions. Table 9 focuses on the geopolitical zones for the 4-year reporting period; table 10 focuses on the four distinct reporting periods.

Table 9 shows that many people were abducted (21,621). Table 1 in Section 1.1 shows that many others were killed (55,910). Total attacks with abductions 2,705 and total attacks with killings 9,970. There was

some overlap. ORFA registered 11,610 attacks in which people were killed and/or abducted. Out of these, 8,905 have recorded killings, no abductions; 1,065 have recorded both killings and abductions; 1,640 have recorded abductions, no killings. This is an average of **8 attacks per day** with killings and/or abductions over a 4-year period. Section 1 further elaborates upon the data on killings.

There were frequent confrontations between Security Forces and Terror Groups and between Terror Groups themselves. This had an impact on civilians too. In 35 attacks (out of the 2,705 attacks with abductions) only non-civilians were abducted: 68 members of the Security Forces and 2 members of Terror Groups. Mutual confrontations clearly did not lead to abductions but to killings. See Section 1 for the data on killings.

Table 9: All attacks with abductions in the geopolitical zones, for the 4-year reporting period, with special emphasis on attacks with civilians abducted

Geopolitical zone	# of all incidents with people abducted	Grand total all people abducted	# of incidents with civilians abducted	Grand total of civilians abducted
North West	1,054	12,062	1,047	12,042
North Central	999	6,351	993	6,325
North East	269	1,599	261	1,579
South East	124	476	115	465
South South	135	708	132	701
South West	124	425	122	420
Grand Total	2,705	21,621	2,670	21,532

According to table 9, most attacks with abductions took place in the North West (1,054), followed by the North Central (999) and North East (269). The South East (124), South South (135) and South West (124) had their share of attacks too. Looking purely at the number of civilians abducted, the North West (1,047) and North Central (993) had most attacks. The North East had a lower number (261), as did the South West (115), South South (132) and South East (122). In the southern zones, the average number of civilians abducted per attack was less than in the northern zones.

The difference between attacks with people abducted (2,705) and with civilians abducted (2,670) is small because during the many clashes between Security Forces and Terror Groups, many were killed but very few abducted.

Table 10: All attacks with abductions for the four individual reporting periods, with special emphasis on attacks with civilians abducted

Geopolitical zone	# of all incidents with people abducted	Grand total all people abducted	# of incidents with civilians abducted	Grand total of civilians abducted
2020	264	1,677	260	1,665
2021	734	5,907	747	5,907
2022	861	7,762	829	7,705
2023	846	6,275	834	6,255
2020-2023	2,705	21,621	2,670	21,532

Table 10 shows that most attacks with people abducted were in the 2022 reporting period (861), followed by 2023 (846), 2021 (734) and 2020 (264). For civilians abducted it was the same: Most attacks with civilians abducted were in 2023 (834), followed by 2022 (829), 2021 (747) and 2020 (260).

As with killings, people abducted in the context of the attacks by Terror Groups were categorized according to their religious background: Christian, Muslim or African Traditional Religionist (ATR). The religious identity of the victims was not always known. These four subcategories make up the category civilians. The data also covered members of the Security Forces and Terror Groups killed. See Section 6 for more details.

2.2 Number of people abducted in the overall 4-year reporting period

Table 11 shows that the total number of people abducted in the 4-year reporting period was 21,621. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 3. The total number of Christians abducted was 11,185; Muslims abducted numbered 7,899 and African Traditional Religionists (ATRs) 184. The religious identity of 2,264 civilians abducted remained unknown.⁴ The Security Forces (85) and Terror Groups (4) had very low numbers abducted.

If the number of ‘Unknown religious identity’ were divided over the categories “Christians abducted”, “Muslims abducted” and “ATRs abducted” using the same ratios as registered for the 2022 and 2023 reporting periods, the total for Christians abducted rises from 11,185 to 12,499. For Muslims abducted it rises from 7,899 to 8,827.

Table 11: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES - People abducted in Nigeria in the context of ‘Terror groups’ for the period October 2019 until September 2023

Geopolitical zone	2020-2023							
	Total Abducted	Total civilians abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	12,062	12,042	5,931	4,976	60	1,075	19	1
North Central	6,351	6,325	3,277	2,469	113	466	26	-
North East	1,599	1,579	681	377	-	521	17	3
South East	476	465	437	11	-	17	11	-
South South	708	701	582	23	4	92	7	-
South West	425	420	277	43	7	93	5	-
Grand Total	21,621	21,532	11,185	7,899	184	2,264	85	4

Most abductions were in the North West (12,062), followed by the North Central (6,351). When focusing on civilians, North West had most civilians abducted (12,042), followed by North Central (6,325). In all geopolitical zones more Christians were abducted than Muslims.

⁴ The number of ‘Unknown religious identity’ abducted is high. As explained in the methodology section, additional violence incidents from 2020 and 2021 recorded by ACLED were integrated into the existing data. Unfortunately, it was no longer possible to identify the religious background of the victims from these additional attacks. For the third and fourth year of the reporting period, ACLED data was included from the beginning, as was the determination of the religious identity of the victims. The total of ‘Unknown religious identity’ abducted for the third and fourth reporting periods was 355 civilians. Using this information, a value for the percentage of Christians abducted compared to Muslims abducted for the full 4-year reporting period can be confidently estimated.

Map 5 visualizes the overall data for people abducted in table 11. It shows the spread of abductions over the country.

Map 5: All people abducted in the 4-year period



(Map source: ORFA)

Table 12 shows the abductions in the four separate reporting periods.

Table 12. INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS - People abducted in Nigeria in the context of 'Terror groups' from October 2019 until September 2023


Year	Total Abducted	Total civilians abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
2020	1,677	1,665	977	91	-	597	12	-
2021	5,907	5,907	2,346	2,243	6	1,312	-	-
2022	7,762	7,705	4,634	2,691	133	247	55	2
2023	6,275	6,255	3,228	2,874	45	108	18	2
2020-2023	21,621	21,532	11,185	7,899	184	2,264	85	4

According to table 12, abductions increased sharply from 2020 (1,677) to 2022 (7,762) and then somewhat decreased in 2023 (6,275). The number of civilians abducted in 2023 (6,255) was still much higher than the number of civilians abducted in 2020 (1,665).⁵

⁵ As with killings, it seems that the 2023 reporting period shows a break – possibly temporary – in the trend. Some analysts argue it has to do with the election period, suggesting 'powers in the shadows' wanted to give the voters a sense of security under the wings of the ruling party. They say that violence took off again in full force after the elections.

Maps 6A - 6D visualize the data for each separate reporting period. Maps 7A - 7D visualize the same data presented cumulatively.

Maps 6A – 6D: All people killed in the four individual reporting periods



(Maps source: ORFA)

Maps 7A – 7D. All people abducted in the four reporting periods cumulatively





Table 14. INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS - Comparison of the ratio of the number of Christians abducted to the number of Muslims abducted from October 2019 until September 2023 taking into account the Christian/Muslim population levels

Year	Total Christians and Muslims	Christians Abducted	Muslims Abducted	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims abducted	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims abducted
2020	1,068	977	91	10.7	55.1
2021	4,589	2,346	2,243	1.0	4.4
2022	7,325	4,634	2,691	1.7	5.9
2023	6,102	3,228	2,874	1.1	3.4
2020-2023	19,084	11,185	7,899	1.4	5.1

The ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted was very high in the 2020 reporting period (10.7:1). In the three following reporting periods this ratio dropped sharply with strongly increasing total abductions for Muslims and Christians (with ratios between 1.0:1 and 1.7:1), apparently meaning that the abductors suddenly focused on Muslims as well as Christians. However, when taking into account the population sizes of Christians and Muslims in the different states, the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted remained in the range of 3.4:1 – 5.9:1, indicating a stronger focus of the abductors on Christians than on Muslims.

2.3 INSERT - Disparate treatment of Christian and Muslim captives by members of Terror Groups

Disparate treatment meted out to Christian and Muslim captives by members of Terror Groups

Since 2015, there have been consistent reports of disparate treatment meted out to Christian and Muslim captives by members of Terror Groups. The following differences in treatment were observed based on reports from victims or their families. The information was gathered during interviews with our primary partner. The identity of the victims and their families has been kept confidential at the request of the victims.

- **Forced Labor:** Christian captives, including men, women, and children, are routinely subjected to forced labor and grueling physical tasks, often under inhumane conditions. In contrast, their Muslim counterparts are typically spared from such treatment.
- **Sexual Violence:** Christian women and girls are frequently subjected to rape, sexual abuse, and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated by their captors. Muslim women, on the other hand, are generally not subjected to such atrocities.
- **Ransom Demands and Release:** Muslim captives who cannot afford to pay ransoms are sometimes released without payment, indicating a degree of preferential treatment. However, Christian captives are rarely granted such leniency.
- **Execution Risks:** According to media reports and research conducted over the past 10 years, Christian captives are more likely to be executed in captivity than Muslim captives held by the same terror groups. There are numerous instances where Christian captives were brutally murdered by their abductors, even after ransoms were paid.

- **Religious Tests:** In documented attacks, such as one in 2022 where over a hundred people were kidnapped from a village, the bandits asked Muslim captives to identify themselves and recite portions of the Quran to ascertain their faith. Those who could recite the Quran were allowed to go home without ransom payment, while those who could not were taken to the camp, presumed to be Christians.
- **Christian women for the sexual gratification of their FEM captors:** There are documented cases of Christian women being subjected to brutal sexual abuses in captivity by their FEM captors. A nursing Christian mother from a certain community, who had barely given birth to her child, was repeatedly raped by her captors. She eventually bled to death in captivity. Some of the victims who witnessed the barbaric attack said the FEM members who took turns to rape the woman were boasting and saying that Christian women will always be for their sexual gratification whenever and wherever they find them.

2.4 Civilian abductions in different LGAs in the overall reporting period

This section analyses the geographical volatility of the violent attacks causing civilian abductions.

ORFA has data on the number of people abducted and the number of specifically civilian abductions in 440 LGAs spread over Nigeria. Appendix 12 gives the data of the LGA top 100 with most civilians abducted over the 4-year reporting period.

Table 15: Numbers and percentages of civilians abducted in the LGA top 10, 25 and 100 with most abductions over the 4-year reporting period

	Total civilians abducted		Christians abducted		Muslims abducted		ATRs abducted		Unknown religious identity abducted	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Top 10	9,077	42	5,066	45	3,352	42	87	47	572	25
Top 25	13,404	62	7,024	63	5,360	68	129	70	891	39
Top 100	18,933	88	9,453	85	7,429	94	171	93	1,880	83
All 440	21,532		11,185		7,899		184		2,264	

Even more than with killings, most civilian abductions took place in a limited number of LGAs. Table 15 shows the numbers and percentages of civilians abducted in the LGA top 10, 25 and 100 with most abductions for all four reporting periods combined. Out of the 440 LGAs with civilian abductions, 42% took place in the LGA top 10, 62% in the LGA top 25 and 88% in the LGA top 100. The remaining 12% of abductions took place in ranks 101 to 440.

Table 16: 25 LGAs with the most civilian abductions (totals over the four year reporting period)

LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	2020-2023				
			Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown
Kajuru	Kaduna	North West	2,184	2,001	175	-	8
Rafi	Niger	North Central	1,275	356	725	53	141
Chikun	Kaduna	North West	1,158	899	123	1	135
Munya	Niger	North Central	1,151	648	424	4	75
Shiroro	Niger	North Central	845	479	338	-	28
Birnin Gwari	Kaduna	North West	627	259	263	24	81
Maru	Zamfara	North West	546	63	402	5	76
Talata Mafara	Zamfara	North West	443	21	422	-	-
Giwa	Kaduna	North West	425	279	133	-	13
Maradun	Zamfara	North West	423	61	347	-	15
Kachia	Kaduna	North West	420	340	79	-	1
Kankara	Katsina	North West	403	52	335	-	16
Bungudu	Zamfara	North West	390	147	239	-	4
Wasagu/Danko	Kebbi	North West	377	190	159	1	27
Paikoro	Niger	North Central	334	201	110	2	21
Rijau	Niger	North Central	288	210	43	35	-
Mashegu	Niger	North Central	287	94	181	4	8
Igabi	Kaduna	North West	280	195	84	-	1
Kagarko	Kaduna	North West	259	93	143	-	23
Gusau	Zamfara	North West	246	61	185	-	-
Jibia	Katsina	North West	219	29	147	-	43
Sabon Birni	Sokoto	North West	216	36	71	-	109
Bakura	Zamfara	North West	206	66	136	-	4
Lapai	Niger	North Central	202	94	96	-	12
Sokoto South	Sokoto	North West	200	150	-	-	50
Total civilians abducted top 25 LGAs			13,404	7,024	5,360	129	891
Total civilians abducted all LGAs			21,532	11,185	7,899	184	2,264

Table 16 (above) gives the data for all four reporting periods combined. Analysis of each individual reporting period leads to the following results:

- 60 different LGAs over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 38 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions once in 4 years
 - 11 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions twice in 4 years
 - 4 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions thrice in 4 years
 - 7 LGAs in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions in all 4 years

This corresponds with an indication of the geographical volatility of **230**. The range of this indication varies between 100 and 400. If all abductions were focused on the LGAs over the four years, the value would have been 400. If all abductions took place in different LGAs over the four years, the value would have been 100.

- 14 different states over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 6 states 1 time in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 3 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 2 states 5 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 6 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 12 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 16 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 23 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - 1 state 24 times in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions

In the 2020 reporting period, the LGA top 25 abductions were in 9 different states. So it went from 9 states in 2020 to 14 states in 2023.


- 6 different geopolitical zones over the 4 years in the LGA top 25 of civilian abductions
 - North West: mentioned 55 times out of 100
 - North Central: mentioned 28 times out of 100
 - North East: mentioned 13 times out of 100
 - South East: mentioned 1 time out of 100
 - South South: mentioned 2 times out of 100
 - South West: mentioned 1 time out of 100

In the 2020 reporting period, the LGA top 25 abductions were in 5 different geopolitical zones. So it went from 5 geopolitical zones in 2020 to 6 geopolitical zones states in 2023.

Maps 8a – 8d show how the geographical focus of civilian abductions has shifted over the four reporting periods. Map 8e gives the combined image for the complete 4-year period.

Maps 8A –8E: 2020 – 2023 annual LGA top 25 with most civilians abducted





(Maps source: ORFA)

3. Distinguishing attacks on communities from other forms of attack

For this section the proportionality issue is not taken into account in the religious analysis. Just the directly recorded numbers are used. Taking into account the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the different Nigerian states ('proportionality') in the analysis in this section would further emphasize the trends.

This section looks deeper into the attacks involving killings and abductions. It distinguishes between attacks on communities and other attacks that were more on an individual basis or at least outside the context of attacks on communities as such. Therefore, the analysis focuses on civilians: Christians, Muslims, ATR adherents and those of 'Unknown Religious Identity', although mention is also made of Security Forces or Terror Group members killed.

Attacks on communities are especially devastating for the victims. As indicated in the introduction, it is particularly attacks on communities which often involve a whole spectrum of violence and suffering with people killed or abducted; people wounded or maimed; women and girls raped; houses, shops and other businesses destroyed or occupied; fields destroyed or occupied; houses of worship abandoned, closed or destroyed; people driven from their homelands into dire situations of internal displacement.

3.1 Killings in community or other attacks

In this section where the religious background is mentioned, the data presented does not take into account the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the states where the killings were recorded.

When data for the killings of Christians, Muslims and ATR adherents is used for analysis, all people killed or abducted with 'Unknown Religious Identity' are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

3.1.1 Killings occurring during community attacks and other attacks

Table 17 shows how many of the overall killings and civilian killings occurred in community attacks or in other attacks. The data is shown per geopolitical zone and covers the overall 4-year reporting period.

Table 17: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES - Killings within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Geopolitical zone	Total killed (community and other incidents)	# of incidents with civilians killed	Total civilians killed (community and other incidents)	Community incidents				
				Total community incidents	Total killed	Civilians killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	18,635	2,128	11,626	1,657	11,470	10,305	298	867
North Central	11,974	1,978	8,789	1,475	8,251	7,515	215	521
North East	18,508	823	5,521	578	6,272	4,632	339	1,301
South East	3,251	636	2,273	292	1,501	1,377	79	45
South South	1,978	671	1,369	346	908	821	68	19
South West	1,564	706	1,302	318	702	662	16	24
Grand Total	55,910	6,942	30,880	4,666	29,104	25,312	1,015	2,777

Geopolitical zone	Total killed (community and other incidents)	# of incidents with civilians killed	Total civilians killed (community and other incidents)	Other incidents				
				Total incidents otherwise	Total killed	Civilians killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	18,635	2,128	11,626	471	7,165	1,321	614	5,230
North Central	11,974	1,978	8,789	503	3,723	1,274	369	2,080
North East	18,508	823	5,521	245	12,236	889	2,273	9,074
South East	3,251	636	2,273	344	1,750	896	447	407
South South	1,978	671	1,369	325	1,070	548	168	354
South West	1,564	706	1,302	388	862	640	67	155
Grand Total	55,910	6,942	30,880	2,276	26,806	5,568	3,938	17,300

A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 5.

ALL PEOPLE KILLED: Table 17 shows that the total number of people killed during attacks on communities and during other attacks were comparable. Community attacks claimed the lives of many civilians, while other forms of attack claimed the lives of many members of Terror Groups and Security Forces. Many of the Security Forces and Terror Groups members killed happened in the context of

clashes between Security Forces and Terror Groups and were mostly (though not exclusively) outside the context of community attacks.

- The number of people killed during 4,666 attacks (with civilian casualties) on communities was 29,104.
- The number of civilians killed during 2,276 other attacks (with civilian casualties) was 26,806.
- The ratio 'People killed during community attacks' to 'People killed during other attacks' was 1.1:1.
- The average number of people killed per community attack was 6.2; for other attacks it was 11.8.
- Members of Security Forces killed and Terror Groups killed during community attacks numbered 3,792 out of 29,104 (13%).
- Members of Security Forces killed and Terror Groups killed during other attacks numbered 21,238 out of 26,806 (79%).
- During community attacks, the ratio of Terror Groups to Security Forces killed was 2.7:1; during other attacks it was 4.4:1.

It follows that there were fierce clashes between Security Forces and Terror Groups. These clashes were mostly outside the context of attacks on communities. This suggests that most of these clashes did not take place as interventions by the Security Forces during attacks on communities by Terror Groups. The high number of Terror Groups killed during 'other attacks' also refers to internal clashes within the category 'Terror Groups'.

CIVILIANS KILLED: Most civilians were killed during attacks on their communities compared to other attacks. Attacks on communities aim at disrupting the life of inhabitants and terrorizing them or driving them away from their livelihoods. Other attacks were more individually focused or occurred outside the context of attacks on communities as such.

- The number of civilians killed during 4,666 attacks on communities was 25,312.
- The number of civilians killed during 2,276 other attacks was 5,568.
- The ratio of 'Civilians killed during community attacks' to 'Civilians killed during other attacks' was 4.5:1.
- The average number of civilian killings per community attack was 5.4; for other attacks it was 2.4.

Table 17 also allows a breakdown of the overall data for civilians killed for the different geopolitical zones.

GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – CIVILIANS KILLED:

- **ALL ATTACKS:** Most civilians were killed in the North West (11,262), followed by the North Central (8,789) and North East (5,521). The total number of killings in the three southern geopolitical zones was 4,944 civilians killed in all forms of attack.
- **COMMUNITY ATTACKS:** Most civilians were killed in the North West (10,305), North Central (7,515) and North East (4,632). The total number of civilians killed in the three southern geopolitical zones was 2,860.
- **OTHER ATTACKS:** Most civilians were killed in the North West (1,321), the North Central (1,274) and in the North East (889). The total number of civilians killed in the three southern geopolitical zones was 2,084.

Table 18 compares the number of civilians killed during community attacks with those occurring during other forms of attack for the four individual reporting periods.

Table 18: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS - Killings within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Year	Total killed (community and other incidents)	# of incidents with civilians killed	Total civilians killed (community and other incidents)	Community incidents				
				Total community incidents	Total killed	Civilians killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
2020	11,913	1,519	7,434	1,187	6,919	6,565	176	178
2021	16,274	2,034	9,940	1,577	9,279	8,484	382	413
2022	15,037	1,740	7,651	859	7,156	5,521	222	1,413
2023	12,686	1,649	5,855	1,043	5,750	4,742	235	773
2020-2023	55,910	6,942	30,880	4,666	29,104	25,312	1,015	2,777

Year	Total killed (community and other incidents)	# of incidents with civilians killed	Total civilians killed (community and other incidents)	Other incidents				
				Total incidents otherwise	Total killed	Civilians killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
2020	11,913	1,519	7,434	332	4,994	869	941	3,184
2021	16,274	2,034	9,940	457	6,995	1,456	1,748	3,791
2022	15,037	1,740	7,651	881	7,881	2,130	735	5,016
2023	12,686	1,649	5,855	606	6,936	1,113	514	5,309
2020-2023	55,910	6,942	30,880	2,276	26,806	5,568	3,938	17,300

INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – CIVILIANS KILLED:

- ALL ATTACKS: Most civilians were killed in the 2021 reporting period (9,940), followed by 2022 (7,651) and 2020 (7,434); the lowest number was in 2023 (5,855).
- COMMUNITY ATTACKS: Most civilians were killed in the 2021 reporting period (8,484), followed by 2020 (6,565) and 2022 (5,521); the lowest number was in 2023 (4,742).
- OTHER ATTACKS: Most civilians were killed in the 2022 reporting period (2,130), followed by 2021 (1,456) and 2023 (1,113); the lowest number was in 2020 (869).

3.1.2 Many attacks with limited numbers of civilians abducted

Table 19 shows the breakdown of data on attacks with civilian killings, specifying the numbers of civilians killed per attack. Lower numbers per attack (“smaller scale”) might indicate small-scale attacks or high alertness of the population to flee the locations of the attacks.

Table 19: Civilians killed during community attacks and other attacks

Killings with Civilians		
ALL incidents with Civilians - 6942	Community 4666 incidents:	Other 2276 incidents:
0 – 5 civilian killings = 5704 incidents 82%	0 – 5 civilian killings = 3577 incidents 77%	0 – 5 civilian killings = 2127 incidents 93%
6 – 10 civilian killings = 623 incidents 9%	6 – 10 civilian killings = 521 incidents 11%	6 – 10 civilian killings = 102 incidents 5%
So % 91 on “smaller scale”	So 88% on “smaller scale”	So 98% on smaller scale
11 – 25 civilian killings = 445 incidents	11 – 25 civilian killings = 410 incidents	11 – 25 civilian killings = 35 incidents
26 – 50 civilian killings = 130 incidents	26 – 50 civilian killings = 122 incidents	26 – 50 civilian killings = 8 incidents
51 – 100 civilian killings = 31 incidents	51 – 100 civilian killings = 28 incidents	51 – 100 civilian killings = 3 incidents
>100 (up to 256) civilian killings = 9 incidents	>100 (up to 256) civilian killings = 8 incidents	>100 (up to 256) civilian killings = 1 incident

Apart from their direct impact, the large number of ‘small-scale’ attacks creates massive fear.

3.1.3 Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed during community attacks and other attacks

Tables 20 and 21 give the breakdown of civilian killings within the community context or otherwise. Table 20 does so for the geopolitical zones; table 21 for the individual reporting periods.

The ratio of ‘Christians killed during community attacks’ (13,563) to ‘Christians killed during other attacks’ (3,206) was 4.2:1. The ratio of ‘Muslims killed during community attacks’ (5,201) to ‘Muslims killed during other attacks’ (1,034) was 5.0:1. This means that both Christian and Muslim killings were mostly done in the context of attacks on their communities, with the total of Christians killed being much higher than the total of Muslims killed.

Table 20: Breakdown of civilian killings per geopolitical zone within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Geopolitical zone	Community incidents				
	Total civilians killed community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed
North West	10,305	4,606	3,264	51	2,384
North Central	7,515	5,271	890	12	1,342
North East	4,632	2,235	995	19	1,383
South East	1,377	954	18	-	405
South South	821	281	11	2	527
South West	662	216	23	11	412
Grand Total	25,312	13,563	5,201	95	6,453

Geopolitical zone	Other incidents				
	Total civilians killed otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed
North West	1,321	644	414	1	262
North Central	1,274	810	216	10	238
North East	889	360	267	2	260
South East	896	723	60	2	111
South South	548	341	12	13	182
South West	640	328	65	31	216
Grand Total	5,568	3,206	1,034	59	1,269

COMMUNITY ATTACKS – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS KILLED:

- **CHRISTIANS KILLED:** Over the 4-year reporting period, most Christians were killed in the North Central zone (5,271), followed by the North West (4,606) and North East (2,235). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 1,451 Christians killed.
- **MUSLIMS KILLED:** Over the 4-year reporting period, by far most Muslims were killed in the North West zone (3,264), followed by the North East (995) and North Central (890). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 52 Muslims killed.

OTHER FORMS OF ATTACK – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS KILLED:

- **CHRISTIANS KILLED:** Over the 4-year reporting period, most Christians were killed in the North Central zone (810), followed by the South East (723), North West (644), North East (360), South South (341) and South West (328).
- **MUSLIMS KILLED:** Over the 4-year reporting period, most Muslims were killed in the North West (414), followed by the North East (267) and North Central (216). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 137 Muslims killed.

Table 21: Breakdown of civilian killings per reporting period within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Year	Community incidents				
	Total civilians killed community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed
2020	6,565	3,196	909	-	2,460
2021	8,484	3,761	1,083	24	3,616
2022	5,521	3,308	1,865	28	320
2023	4,742	3,298	1,344	43	57
2020-2023	25,312	13,563	5,201	95	6,453

Year	Other incidents				
	Total civilians killed otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed
2020	869	423	100	-	346
2021	1,456	567	154	-	735
2022	2,130	1,569	398	12	151
2023	1,113	647	382	47	37
2020-2023	5,568	3,206	1,034	59	1,269

COMMUNITY ATTACKS - CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS KILLED:

- **CHRISTIANS KILLED:** Most Christians were killed in the 2021 reporting period (3,761), followed by 2022 (3,308) and 2023 (3,298); the lowest number was in 2020 (3,196). All values here are fairly similar.
- **MUSLIMS KILLED:** Most Muslims were killed in the 2022 reporting period (1,865), followed by 2023 (1,344) and 2021 (1,083); the lowest number was in 2020 (909).

OTHER ATTACKS – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS KILLED:

- **CHRISTIANS KILLED:** Most Christians were killed in the 2022 reporting period (1,569), followed by 2023 (647) and 2021 (567); the lowest number was in 2020 (423).
- **MUSLIMS KILLED:** Most Muslims were killed in the 2022 reporting period (398), followed by 2023 (382) and 2021 (154); the lowest number was in 2020 (100).

3.2 Abductions in community or other attacks

In this section where the religious background is mentioned, the data presented does not take into account the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the states where the abductions were recorded.

When the data for abductions of Christians, Muslims and ATRs are used for analysis, all people killed or abducted with ‘Unknown Religious Identity’ are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

3.2.1 Abductions occurring during community attacks and other attacks

Table 22 compares the number of abductions taking place during community attacks with the number occurring during other forms of attack. This is shown for all geopolitical zones in the 4-year reporting period.

Table 22: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES - Abductions within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Geopolitical zone	Total abductions	# of incidents with civilian abductions	Total civilians abducted (community and other incidents)	Community incidents				
				Total community incidents	Total abducted	Civilians abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	12,062	1,047	12,042	809	9,585	9,573	11	1
North Central	6,351	993	6,325	772	5,473	5,456	17	-
North East	1,599	261	1,579	158	1,019	1,013	4	2
South East	476	115	465	57	251	249	2	-
South South	708	132	701	47	258	258	-	-
South West	425	122	420	62	212	212	-	-
Grand Total	21,621	2,670	21,532	1,905	16,798	16,761	34	3

Geopolitical zone	Total abductions	# of incidents with civilian abductions	Total civilians abducted (community and other incidents)	Other incidents				
				Total other incidents	Total abducted	Civilians abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	12,062	1,047	12,042	238	2,477	2,469	8	-
North Central	6,351	993	6,325	221	878	869	9	-
North East	1,599	261	1,579	103	580	566	13	1
South East	476	115	465	58	225	216	9	-
South South	708	132	701	85	450	443	7	-
South West	425	122	420	60	213	208	5	-
Grand Total	21,621	2,670	21,532	765	4,823	4,771	51	1

ALL PEOPLE ABDUCTED: Table 22 shows that many more people were abducted during attacks on their communities (16,798) than during other forms of attack (4,832). While for killings, the numbers of those killed belonging to the Security Forces and Terror Groups were substantial, this was not the case for abductions: 85 members of the Security Forces were abducted and 4 members of Terror Groups. For this reason, the analysis now concentrates fully on civilians abducted. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 6.

CIVILIANS ABDUCTED: Most civilians were abducted during attacks on their communities compared to other attacks. Attacks on communities aim to disrupt the life of the inhabitants and terrorize them or drive them away from their livelihoods. Other attacks were more individually focused or occurred outside the context of attacks on communities. Ransom payment added to the loss of livelihood, and often drove people deep into a debt trap.

- The number of civilians abducted during 1,905 attacks on communities was 16,761.
- The number of civilians abducted during 765 other attacks was 4,771.
- The ratio 'Civilians abducted during community attacks' to 'Civilians abducted during other attacks' was 3.5:1.
- The average number of civilian abductions per community attack was 8.8; for other attacks it was 6.2.

Table 22 also allows a breakdown of the overall data for Christians abducted per geopolitical zone.

GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – CIVILIANS ABDUCTED:

- ALL ATTACKS: Most civilians were abducted in the North West (12,042), followed by the North Central (6,325) and North East (1,579). Total abductions in the three southern geopolitical zones numbered 1,586 civilians.
- COMMUNITY ATTACKS: Most civilians were abducted in the North West (9,573), North Central (5,456) and North East (1,013). The total number of civilians abducted in the three southern geopolitical zones was 719.
- OTHER ATTACKS: Most civilians were abducted in the North West (2,469), with far lower numbers occurring in North Central (869), North East (566), South South (443), South East (216) and South West (208).

Table 23 compares the number of civilians abducted during community attacks with the number abducted during other forms of attack for each of the four individual reporting periods.

Table 23: REPORTING PERIODS - Abductions within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Geopolitical zone	Total abductions	# of incidents with civilian abductions	Total civilians abducted (community and other incidents)	Community incidents				
				Total community incidents	Total abducted	Civilians abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
2020	1,677	260	1,665	144	1,094	1,089	5	-
2021	5,907	747	5,907	614	5,246	5,246	-	-
2022	7,762	829	7,705	503	5,438	5,413	24	1
2023	6,275	834	6,255	644	5,020	5,013	5	2
2020-2023	21,621	2,670	21,532	1,905	16,798	16,761	34	3

Geopolitical zone	Total abductions	# of incidents with civilian abductions	Total civilians abducted (community and other incidents)	Other incidents				
				Total other incidents	Total abducted	Civilians abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
2020	1,677	260	1,665	116	583	576	7	-
2021	5,907	747	5,907	133	661	661	-	-
2022	7,762	829	7,705	326	2,324	2,292	31	1
2023	6,275	834	6,255	190	1,255	1,242	13	-
2020-2023	21,621	2,670	21,532	765	4,823	4,771	51	1

REPORTING PERIODS – CIVILIANS ABDUCTED:

- ALL ATTACKS: Most civilians were abducted in the 2022 reporting period (7,705), followed by 2023 (6,255) and 2021 (5,907); the lowest number was in 2020 (1,665).
- COMMUNITY ATTACKS: Most civilians were abducted in the 2022 reporting period (5,413), closely followed by 2021 (5,246) and 2023 (5,031); the lowest number was in 2020 (1,089).

- **OTHER ATTACKS:** Most civilians were abducted in the 2022 reporting period (2,292), followed by 2023 (1,242) and 2021 (661); the lowest number was in 2020 (576).

The abductions saw a sudden rise from the 2021 reporting period onwards.

3.2.2 Many attacks with limited number of civilians abducted

Table 24 shows the breakdown of data on attacks with abductions, specifying the numbers of people abducted per attack. Lower numbers per attack (“smaller scale”) might indicate small-scale attacks or high alertness of the population to flee the locations of the attacks.

Table 24. Civilians abducted during community attacks and other attacks

ABDUCTIONS with Civilians					
ALL incidents with CIVILIANS - 2670		Community 1905 incidents:		Other 765 incidents:	
0 – 5 kidnapped = 1772 incidents 66%		0 – 5 kidnapped = 1193 incidents 63%		0 – 5 kidnapped = 579 incidents 75%	
6 – 10 kidnapped = 400 incidents 15%		6 – 10 kidnapped = 306 incidents 16%		6 – 10 kidnapped = 94 incidents 12%	
So 81% on “smaller scale”		So 79% on “smaller scale”		So 87% on smaller scale	
11 – 25 kidnapped = 328 incidents		11 – 25 kidnapped = 270 incidents		11 – 25 kidnapped = 58 incidents	
26 – 50 kidnapped = 119 incidents		26 – 50 kidnapped = 97 incidents		26 – 50 kidnapped = 22 incidents	
51 – 100 kidnapped = 40 incidents		51 – 100 kidnapped = 32 incidents		51 – 100 kidnapped = 8 incidents	
>100 (up to 300) kidnapped = 11 incidents		>100 (up to 300) kidnapped = 7 incidents		>100 (up to 300) kidnapped = 4 incidents	

Large numbers of ‘small-scale’ attacks create massive fear. Paying ransoms depletes both family finances and the financial resources of religious communities (predominantly church communities).

3.2.3 Ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted during community attacks and other attacks

Tables 25 and 26 give the breakdown of civilian killings within the community context or otherwise. Table 25 does so for the geopolitical zones; table 26 for the individual reporting periods.

The ratio of ‘Christians abducted during community attacks’ (8,203) to ‘Christians abducted during other attacks’ (2,982) was 2.8:1. The ratio of ‘Muslims abducted during community attacks’ (6,661) to ‘Muslims abducted during other attacks’ (1,238) was 5.4:1. Both Christian and Muslim abductions were mostly carried out in the context of attacks on their communities. For Muslims, the proportion of abductions during community attacks was (much) higher than for Christians.

Table 25: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES - Civilian abductions within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Geopolitical zone	Community Abductions				
	Total civilian community abductions	Christian abductions	Muslim abductions	ATR abductions	Unknown religious identity abductions
North West	9,573	4,534	4,108	60	871
North Central	5,456	2,677	2,271	109	399
North East	1,013	448	247	-	318
South East	249	236	9	-	4
South South	258	186	13	4	55
South West	212	122	13	7	70
Grand Total	16,761	8,203	6,661	180	1,717

Geopolitical zone	Other Abductions				
	Total civilian community abductions	Christian abductions	Muslim abductions	ATR abductions	Unknown religious identity abductions
North West	2,469	1,397	868	-	204
North Central	869	600	198	4	67
North East	566	233	130	-	203
South East	216	201	2	-	13
South South	443	396	10	-	37
South West	208	155	30	-	23
Grand Total	4,771	2,982	1,238	4	547

COMMUNITY ATTACKS – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:

- **CHRISTIANS ABDUCTED:** Over the 4-year reporting period and during community attacks, most Christians were abducted in the North West (4,534), followed by the North Central (2,677); considerably fewer were also abducted in the North East (448). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 544 Christians abducted.
- **MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:** Over the 4-year reporting period and during community attacks, most Muslims were abducted in the North West (4,108), followed by the North Central (2,271); considerably fewer were also abducted in the North East (247). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 35 Muslims abducted.

OTHER ATTACKS – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:

- **CHRISTIANS ABDUCTED:** Over the 4-year reporting period and during other forms of attack, most Christians were abducted in the North West (1,397), followed by the North Central (600), South South (396), North East (233), South East (201) and South West (155).
- **MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:** Over the 4-year reporting period and during other forms of attack, most Muslims were abducted in the North West (868), followed by the North Central (198) and North East (130). The three southern geopolitical zones together accounted for 42 Muslims abducted.

Table 26: Civilian abductions per individual reporting period within the community context or otherwise (October 2019 until September 2023)

Year	Community incidents				
	Total civilian community abductions	Christian abductions	Muslim abductions	ATR abductions	Unknown religious identity abductions
2020	1,089	654	79	-	356
2021	5,246	2,001	2,140	6	1,099
2022	5,413	2,947	2,157	133	176
2023	5,013	2,601	2,285	41	86
2020-2023	16,761	8,203	6,661	180	1,717

Year	Other incidents				
	Total civilian abductions otherwise	Christian abductions	Muslim abductions	ATR abductions	Unknown religious identity abductions
2020	576	323	12	-	241
2021	661	345	103	-	213
2022	2,292	1,687	534	-	71
2023	1,242	627	589	4	22
2020-2023	4,771	2,982	1,238	4	547

COMMUNITY ATTACKS - CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:

- CHRISTIANS ABDUCTED: Most Christians were abducted in the 2022 reporting period (2,947), followed by 2023 (2,601) and 2021 (2,001); the lowest number was in 2020 (654).
- MUSLIMS ABDUCTED: Most Muslims were abducted in the 2023 reporting period (2,285), closely followed by 2022 (2,157) and 2021 (2,140); the lowest number was in 2020 (79).

OTHER ATTACKS – CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS ABDUCTED:

- CHRISTIANS ABDUCTED: Most Christians were abducted in the 2022 reporting period (1,687), followed at distance by 2023 (627) and 2021 (345); the lowest number was in 2020 (323).
- MUSLIMS ABDUCTED: Most Muslims were abducted in the 2023 reporting period (589), followed by 2022 (534) and 2021 (103); the lowest number was in 2020 (12).

4. The spread of attacks over the year

This section looks more closely at how the attacks with killings and/or abductions are spread over the course of a year.

4.1 Killings over the year

4.1.1 Killings over the year per geopolitical zone

Table 27 shows the spread of all killings over the months in the different geopolitical zones, for the 4-year reporting period. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 7.

Table 27: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – All killings over the months

Geopolitical zone	2020-2023												
	Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	18,635	1,252	1,198	1,411	1,613	1,528	2,183	1,646	1,709	1,745	1,863	1,236	1,251
North Central	11,974	533	359	372	1,063	809	1,536	1,701	1,986	995	794	998	828
North East	18,508	1,445	1,294	1,571	1,567	1,470	1,771	1,461	1,837	1,999	1,209	1,065	1,819
South East	3,251	187	232	181	229	279	297	350	363	630	151	152	200
South South	1,978	185	141	113	145	202	167	203	273	168	145	102	134
South West	1,564	112	97	132	200	171	144	84	143	209	86	104	82
Grand Total	55,910	3,714	3,321	3,780	4,817	4,459	6,098	5,445	6,311	5,746	4,248	3,657	4,314

Figure 1 visualizes the data of table 27

Figure 1. GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – All killings over the months




Figure 1 shows all people killed over the months for the 4-year period in the six geopolitical zones. There is a peak in killings between January and June. The North West, North Central and North East are by far the main contributors to that peak.

4.1.2 Civilian killings over the year for the geopolitical zones

Table 28 shows the spread of civilian killings per month in the different geopolitical zones, for the overall 4-year reporting period. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 7.

Table 28: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – Civilians killed per month

Geopolitical zone	Civilians Killed	2020-2023											
		Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	11,626	658	700	615	1,054	1,060	1,461	1,053	1,109	1,363	1,139	871	543
North Central	8,789	340	222	303	794	635	724	1,251	1,838	796	655	662	569
North East	5,521	341	363	378	431	339	189	419	782	1,011	616	360	292
South East	2,273	113	163	119	170	157	240	278	260	477	77	94	125
South South	1,369	135	102	94	115	146	117	140	174	108	82	71	85
South West	1,302	93	85	115	175	155	120	64	116	182	70	69	58
Grand Total	30,880	1,680	1,635	1,624	2,739	2,492	2,851	3,205	4,279	3,937	2,639	2,127	1,672

Figure 2 visualizes the data of table 28.

Figure 2: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – Civilian killed per month




Figure 2 shows all civilians killed over the months in the 4-year period. Although the totals peak between January and July, the biggest peak is between April and June, which is the ‘heart’ of the farming season. The North Central contributes most to the April-June peak, followed by North West and North East.

4.1.3 Killings over the year in the individual reporting periods

Table 29 shows the spread of all killings per month in the four individual reporting periods. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 7.

Table 29: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – All killings over the months

Year	Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
2020	11,913	473	395	489	1,008	762	804	1,123	2,017	1,908	1,193	1,029	712
2021	16,274	1,045	937	778	1,100	1,393	1,694	1,623	2,217	1,590	1,300	1,538	1,059
2022	15,037	1,250	920	1,032	1,802	1,237	2,281	1,657	1,024	987	825	206	1,816
2023	12,686	946	1,069	1,481	907	1,067	1,319	1,042	1,053	1,261	930	884	727
2020-2023	55,910	3,714	3,321	3,780	4,817	4,459	6,098	5,445	6,311	5,746	4,248	3,657	4,314

Figure 3 visualizes the data of table 29.

Figure 3. INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – All killings over the months




Figure 3 shows all people killed over the months in each of the four reporting periods. The peak in the killings, which runs from January to June, cannot be clearly attributed to one specific reporting period.

4.1.4 Civilian killings over the year for each of the four reporting periods

Table 30 looks at the spread of civilian killings over the months per individual reporting period. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 7.

Table 30: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – Civilian killings over the months

Year	Total Civilans Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
2020	7,434	201	206	263	634	570	537	723	1,067	1,404	786	708	335
2021	9,940	574	481	473	547	820	889	1,086	1,729	1,143	806	855	537
2022	7,651	497	491	461	1,235	686	952	788	740	690	519	157	435
2023	5,855	408	457	427	323	416	473	608	743	700	528	407	365
2020-2023	30,880	1,680	1,635	1,624	2,739	2,492	2,851	3,205	4,279	3,937	2,639	2,127	1,672

Figure 4 visualizes the data of table 30.

Figure 4. INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – Civilian killings over the months




Figure 4 shows all civilians killed over the months per individual reporting period. There is a peak in killings between January and June. The 2022 reporting period contributed most to the January peak. The 2021 reporting period did so for the April and May peaks and the 2020 reporting period for the June peak.

4.1.5 Total Civilians killed over the year in comparison to total Security Forces and Terror Group members killed


Table 31 takes the overall 4-year reporting period and compares the number of civilians killed per month with the combined number of members of the Security Forces and Terror Groups killed. When the number of civilians killed is at its highest, the number of Security Forces/Terror Group members killed is at its lowest.

Table 31: All killings over the months of the 4-year reporting period split in killings of civilians and killings of members of Security Forces and Terror Groups combined

2020 - 2023	Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
Civilian	30,880	1,680	1,635	1,624	2,739	2,492	2,851	3,205	4,279	3,937	2,639	2,127	1,672
Security Forces/Terror Groups	25,030	2,034	1,686	2,156	2,078	1,967	3,247	2,240	2,032	1,809	1,609	1,530	2,642
All killings	55,910	3,714	3,321	3,780	4,817	4,459	6,098	5,445	6,311	5,746	4,248	3,657	4,314


Figure 5 visualizes the data of table 31.

Figure 5: All killings over the months of the 4-year reporting period split in killings of civilians and killings of members of Security Forces and Terror Groups combined



Figures 6A-6D show the three categories of killings (i.e., all killings, civilians killed and Security Forces/Terror Group members killed) per month for each individual reporting period. Although the 2021 reporting period most clearly mirrors the overall critical April to June peak in figure 5, each reporting period has contributed to it.

Figure 6A – 6D: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – All killings per month, distinguishing killings of civilians and killings of members of Security Forces and Terror Groups combined



4.2 Abductions over the year

For this section no analysis has been carried out for all abductions but only for civilians. The reason for this was that the difference between all people abducted and civilians abducted was only 89 persons (i.e., members of Security Forces and Terror Groups combined).

4.2.1 The spread of civilian abductions over the year per geopolitical zone

Table 32 shows the spread of civilian abductions over the year in the different geopolitical zones, for the 4-year reporting period. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 8.

Table 32: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – Civilian abductions per month

Geopolitical zone	2020-2023												
	Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	12,042	405	562	1,500	857	1,219	1,700	600	532	1,053	1,517	908	1,189
North Central	6,325	336	520	246	733	620	569	737	1,012	568	196	370	418
North East	1,579	115	76	285	335	66	32	73	37	169	140	125	126
South East	465	92	19	21	34	37	20	17	27	64	72	23	39
South South	701	149	69	33	101	24	81	18	61	32	59	20	54
South West	420	41	10	15	61	6	27	54	34	37	37	19	79
Grand Total	21,532	1,138	1,256	2,100	2,121	1,972	2,429	1,499	1,703	1,923	2,021	1,465	1,905

Figure 7 visualizes the data of table 32.

Figure 7: GEOPOLITICAL ZONES – Civilian abductions per month




Figure 7 shows all civilians abducted over the months for the 4-year period in the six geopolitical zones. The highest peaks took place in the North West in December, March and July. In May the North Central saw more civilians abducted than the North West, although its highest value was still considerably less than several other monthly highest values in the North West.

The data shows that over the overall 4-year reporting period, the North West was the epicenter of abductions, followed by the North Central zone. The abduction phenomenon is more spread out over the year than is the case with killings, although most abductions also take place in the context of community attacks.

4.2.2 The spread of civilian abductions over the year per individual reporting period

Table 33 looks at the spread of civilian abductions over the separate reporting periods. For the reason stated above in the opening paragraph of Section 4.2, no analysis has been carried out for all abductions. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 8.

Table 33: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – Civilian abductions over the year

Year	Total civilians abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
2020	1,665	39	38	64	501	139	81	97	60	153	172	98	223
2021	5,907	209	148	691	272	806	648	363	811	448	801	400	310
2022	7,705	426	572	498	996	841	1,144	542	321	797	625	279	664
2023	6,255	464	498	847	352	186	556	497	511	525	423	688	708
2020-2023	21,532	1,138	1,256	2,100	2,121	1,972	2,429	1,499	1,703	1,923	2,021	1,465	1,905

Figure 8 visualizes the data of table 33.

Figure 8: INDIVIDUAL REPORTING PERIODS – Civilian abductions over the year




Figure 8 shows all civilians abducted per month for the four separate reporting periods. The highest monthly values were in January and March for the 2022 period.

The data shows that the abduction phenomenon began slowly in the 2020 reporting period, but then increased rapidly from 2021 onwards, despite a dip in 2023 in January and February. Although in 2023 abductions increased in March, the numbers stayed more or less stable until July, after which the number of abductions increased again.

5. Killing analysis per aggressor

This section looks more closely at who is behind the killings. The data shows that by far the majority of Muslims were killed by the same aggressors as those who killed Christians and adherents of ATR. This means, that most of the Muslims killed (as reported by ORFA) are not to be seen as victims of Christian aggression but as victims of their radicalized religious kin.

For this Section 5, the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the different Nigerian states ('proportionality') has not been taken into account in the religious analysis, which means that just the directly recorded numbers have been used. Taking proportionality into account would further emphasize the trends.

When the recorded data for the killing of Christians, Muslims and adherents of ATR are used for analysis, all people killed with 'Unknown Religious Identity' are unavoidably left out of the analysis. That is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

In the text below, the Security Forces are also referred to as 'aggressors'. It could be argued that this is not correct since fighting Terror Groups is their calling to protect civilians.

5.1 All people killed, and civilians killed

Table 34 shows that 55,910 people were killed during 9,970 attacks by different aggressors. Of these, 30,880 were civilians. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 9.

ALL KILLINGS: The top 5 killers overall were Other Terrorist Groups (15,954), Security Forces (15,094), Armed Fulani Herdsmen (13,109), Boko Haram (4,359) and ISWAP (4,130). In total, these 5 categories killed 52,646 people, of whom only 28,408 were civilians. Security Forces killed many Terror Group members (13,480), while the top 4 of them killed a significant number belonging to the Security Forces (4,575). Terror Groups also turned against each other, with the four main groups totaling 5,911 mutual killings. The Security Forces also killed civilians (1,342).

Table 34: ALL KILLINGS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims killed by the different aggressors

Perpetrators	2020-2023											
	Total killings											
	Total # of incidents with killings	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	% total civilians killed	Christians killed	% Christians killed	Muslims killed	% Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	3,588	15,954	12,039	39	4,895	29	3,334	53	57	3,753	1,675	2,240
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	2,175	13,109	11,948	39	9,153	55	1,473	24	31	1,291	627	534
Boko Haram	400	4,359	2,200	7	971	6	548	9	-	681	590	1,569
Security Forces	1,934	15,094	1,342	4	506	3	317	5	12	507	272	13,480
Locals	543	1,060	917	3	273	2	123	2	5	516	30	113
Cultists	473	1,116	912	3	306	2	53	1	36	517	6	198
ISWAP	549	4,130	879	3	297	2	222	4	2	358	1,683	1,568
Assailants	139	282	263	1	141	1	68	1	3	51	10	9
Communal clash	44	221	197	1	138	1	36	1	7	16	-	24
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	80	207	117	0	69	0	16	0	-	32	57	33
Vigilantes	45	378	66	0	20	0	45	1	1	-	3	309
Total	9,970	55,910	30,880		16,769		6,235		154	7,722	4,953	20,077

The analysis will now focus on civilians.

CIVILIANS KILLED: Table 34 shows that most civilians were killed by Other Terrorist Groups (39.0%), very closely followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (38.7%). This category 'Other Terrorist Groups' actually consists of a variety of unidentified terrorist groups, although the characteristics of their attacks were often (very) comparable to the attacks of the Armed Fulani Herdsmen, Boko Haram and/or ISWAP. Remarkably the percentages for Boko Haram (7%) and ISWAP (3%) were much lower than expected, as compared to the Armed Fulani Herdsmen.

5.2 Civilians killed in community attacks and other attacks

This section compares the number of civilians killed in community attacks with those killed in other forms of attack.

Table 35: COMMUNITY KILLINGS OF CIVILIANS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims killed by the different aggressors

Perpetrators	2020-2023											
	Community killings											
	Total # of incidents with killings	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	% total civilians killed	Christians killed	% Christians killed	Muslims killed	% Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	2,344	11,707	10,274	41	3,804	28	2,919	56	48	3,503	515	918
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,722	11,112	10,617	42	7,980	59	1,340	26	30	1,267	323	172
Boko Haram	195	2,170	1,951	8	851	6	491	9	-	609	65	154
Security Forces	143	1,742	567	2	260	2	142	3	2	163	33	1,142
Locals	49	193	181	1	81	1	71	1	1	28	2	10
Cultists	277	676	656	3	124	1	29	1	8	495	-	20
ISWAP	107	1,063	688	3	265	2	127	2	-	296	77	298
Assailants	29	124	119	0	48	0	19	0	1	51	-	5
Communal clash	22	151	146	1	99	1	26	0	5	16	-	5
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	27	75	75	0	39	0	11	0	-	25	-	-
Vigilantes	9	91	38	0	12	0	26	0	-	-	-	53
Total	4,924	29,104	25,312		13,563		5,201		95	6,453	1,015	2,777

COMMUNITY KILLINGS: Table 35 shows that during attacks on communities, most civilians were killed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (42%), closely followed by Other Terrorist Groups (41.0%). The percentages for Boko Haram (8%) and ISWAP (3%) were much lower.

Table 36: OTHER KILLINGS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims killed by the different aggressors

Perpetrators	2020-2023											
	Other killings											
	Total # of incidents with killings	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	% total civilians killed	Christians killed	% Christians killed	Muslims killed	% Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	1,244	4,247	1,765	32	1,091	34	415	40	9	250	1,160	1,322
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	453	1,997	1,331	24	1,173	37	133	13	1	24	304	362
Boko Haram	205	2,189	249	4	120	4	57	6	-	72	525	1,415
Security Forces	1,791	13,352	775	14	246	8	175	17	10	344	239	12,338
Locals	494	867	736	13	192	6	52	5	4	488	28	103
Cultists	196	440	256	5	182	6	24	2	28	22	6	178
ISWAP	442	3,067	191	3	32	1	95	9	2	62	1,606	1,270
Assailants	110	158	144	3	93	3	49	5	2	-	10	4
Communal clash	22	70	51	1	39	1	10	1	2	-	-	19
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	53	132	42	1	30	1	5	0	-	7	57	33
Vigilantes	36	287	28	1	8	0	19	2	1	-	3	256
Total	5,046	26,806	5,568		3,206		1,034		59	1,269	3,938	17,300

OTHER KILLINGS: Table 36 shows that during other forms of attack, most civilians were killed by Other Terrorist Groups (32%), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (24%). The percentages for Boko Haram (4%) and ISWAP (3%) were again much lower.

5.3 Deadliest Terror Groups for Christians and Muslims

Tables 34, 35 and 36 show that Armed Fulani Herdsmen were the deadliest Terror Group for killing Christians (55%), followed by the 'Other Terrorist Groups' (29%). Boko Haram was responsible for 6% of Christians killed, and ISWAP for 2%. For Muslims the Other Terrorist Groups were the deadliest group (responsible for 53% of Muslims killed), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (24%), Boko Haram (9%) and ISWAP (4%).

The high percentage of Muslims killed by Other Terrorist Groups, is partially related to the area of operation of these groups which is largely (though not exclusively) in the North West. In the North West the Christian population is relatively small. If the size of the Christian and Muslim populations were taken into account in this section, the picture would be different. (See Section 1.3.)

5.4 Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed in community and other attacks by different aggressors

Table 37 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors. Community killings and other killings are taken together.

Table 37: KILLINGS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by each category of aggressor

Perpetrators	2020-2023									
	Killings									
	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	Total # of incidents with killings	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Ratio Christians to Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	15,954	12,039	3,588	4,895	3,334	1.5	57	3,753	1,675	2,240
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	13,109	11,948	2,175	9,153	1,473	6.2	31	1,291	627	534
Boko Haram	4,359	2,200	400	971	548	1.8	-	681	590	1,569
Security Forces	15,094	1,342	1,934	506	317	1.6	12	507	272	13,480
Locals	1,060	917	543	273	123	2.2	5	516	30	113
Cultists	1,116	912	473	306	53	5.8	36	517	6	198
ISWAP	4,130	879	549	297	222	1.3	2	358	1,683	1,568
Assailants	282	263	139	141	68	2.1	3	51	10	9
Communal clash	221	197	44	138	36	3.8	7	16	-	24
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	207	117	80	69	16	4.3	-	32	57	33
Vigilantes	378	66	45	20	45	0.4	1	-	3	309
Total	55,910	30,880	9,970	16,769	6,235		154	7,722	4,953	20,077

Table 37 shows that the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors was remarkably high for the Armed Fulani Herdsmen (6.2:1). For Boko Haram it was 1.8:1, for Other Terrorist Groups 1.5:1 and for ISWAP 1.3:1.

Table 38 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors. The focus is on community killings.

Table 38: COMMUNITY KILLINGS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by each category of aggressor

Perpetrators	2020-2023									
	Community killings									
	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	Total # of incidents with killings	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	11,707	10,274	2,344	3,804	2,919	1.3	48	3,503	515	918
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	11,112	10,617	1,722	7,980	1,340	6.0	30	1,267	323	172
Boko Haram	2,170	1,951	195	851	491	1.7	-	609	65	154
Security Forces	1,742	567	143	260	142	1.8	2	163	33	1,142
Locals	193	181	49	81	71	1.1	1	28	2	10
Cultists	676	656	277	124	29	4.3	8	495	-	20
ISWAP	1,063	688	107	265	127	2.1	-	296	77	298
Assailants	124	119	29	48	19	2.5	1	51	-	5
Communal clash	151	146	22	99	26	3.8	5	16	-	5
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	75	75	27	39	11	3.5	-	25	-	-
Vigilantes	91	38	9	12	26	0.5	-	-	-	53
Total	29,104	25,312	4,924	13,563	5,201		95	6,453	1,015	2,777

COMMUNITY KILLINGS OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS: The ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors in the context of community attacks was remarkably high for the Armed Fulani

Herdsmen (6.0:1). For ISWAP it was 2.1:1, for Boko Haram it was 1.7:1 and for Other Terrorist Groups 1.3:1.

Table 39 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors. The focus is on other killings (i.e., on killings carried out in a non-community attack context).

Table 39: OTHER KILLINGS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by each category of aggressor

Perpetrators	2020-2023									
	Other killings									
	Total of killings	Total civilians killed	Total # of incidents with killings	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	4,247	1,765	1,244	1,091	415	2.6	9	250	1,160	1,322
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,997	1,331	453	1,173	133	8.8	1	24	304	362
Boko Haram	2,189	249	205	120	57	2.1	-	72	525	1,415
Security Forces	13,352	775	1,791	246	175	1.4	10	344	239	12,338
Locals	867	736	494	192	52	3.7	4	488	28	103
Cultists	440	256	196	182	24	7.6	28	22	6	178
ISWAP	3,067	191	442	32	95	0.3	2	62	1,606	1,270
Assailants	158	144	110	93	49	1.9	2	-	10	4
Communal clash	70	51	22	39	10	3.9	2	-	-	19
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	132	42	53	30	5	6.0	-	7	57	33
Vigilantes	287	28	36	8	19	0.4	1	-	3	256
Total	26,806	5,568	5,046	3,206	1,034		59	1,269	3,938	17,300

OTHER KILLINGS OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS: The ratio of Christians to Muslims killed by the different aggressors in the context of non-community attacks was even higher for the Armed Fulani Herdsmen (8.8:1). For Other Terrorist Groups it was 2.6:1, for Boko Haram it was 2.1:1 and for ISWAP it was 0.3:1 (32 Christians killed, 95 Muslims killed).

5.5 Christian killing analysis by aggressor

In this section the recorded data for the killing of Christians is used, with all people killed with 'Unknown Religious Identity' left out of the analysis. Because most killings with 'Unknown Religious Identity' took place in the 2020 and 2021 reporting periods, this analysis can only be done at the level of the total of all four reporting periods, with the goal of showing proportions between different aggressors, not absolute data.

Table 40 shows who killed Christians in the 4-year reporting period per category of aggressor. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 13A.

Table 40: Christians killed by different categories of aggressors

Year	Total Christians Killed	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
2020-2023	16,769	16,263	9,153	971	297	4,895	141	306	-	69	20	138	273	506


Table 40 shows that most Christians were killed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (9,153), followed by Other Terrorist Groups (4,895). The combination of Boko Haram and ISWAP accounted for 1,268 Christians killed. All the rest together adds up to 1,453 Christians killed (including 506 Christians killed by the Security Forces).

Table 41 then offers a closer look at the Terror Group categories and compresses several smaller categories into one 'Rest' category. This leads to the visualization presented in figure 9.

Table 41: Christians killed by different categories of Terror Groups

Year	Christians killed by Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Rest
2020-2023	16,263	9,153	971	297	4,895	141	806

Figure 9: Christians killed by different categories of Terror Groups



Armed Fulani Herdsmen were the deadliest Terror Group for Christians, followed by the 'Other Terrorist Groups'. Boko Haram and ISWAP were much less of a threat for killing Christians.

5.6 Muslim killing analysis by aggressor

In this section the recorded data for the killings of Muslims has been used. This means that all people killed with 'Unknown Religious Identity' have been left out of the analysis. Because most killings with 'Unknown Religious Identity' took place in the 2020 and 2021 reporting periods, this analysis can only be done at the level of the total of all four reporting periods, with the goal of showing proportions between different aggressors, not absolute data.

Tables 42 shows who killed Muslims in the 4-year reporting period per category of aggressor. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 13B.

Table 42: Muslims killed by different categories of aggressors

Year	Total Muslims Killed	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
2020-2023	6,235	5,918	1,473	548	222	3,334	68	53	-	16	45	36	123	317


Table 42 shows that most Muslims were killed by Other Terrorist Groups (3,334), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (1,473). The combination of Boko Haram and ISWAP accounts for 770 Muslims killed. All the rest together adds up to 658 Muslims killed (including 317 Muslims killed by Security Forces).

Table 43. Muslims killed by different categories of Terror Groups

Year	Muslims killed by Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Rest
2020-2023	5,918	1,473	548	222	3,334	68	273

Table 43 offers a closer look at the Terror Group categories and compresses several of the smaller categories into one 'Rest' category. This leads to the visualization presented in figure 10.

Figure 10. Muslims killed by different categories of Terror Groups



For Muslims, the Other Terrorist Groups were the deadliest category, followed by the Armed Fulani Herdsmen. Boko Haram and ISWAP were much less of a threat for killing Muslims.

5.7 Main areas of operation of different Terror Groups involved in civilian killings


Over the 4-year reporting period, violence was concentrated in specific parts of the country, and connected with the areas of operation of specific groups of aggressors. The North West and the North Central were the epicenter of killings. Most civilian killings took place in the North West (11,626) and North Central (8,789), The North East followed with 5,521 civilians killed. For Christians these numbers were 5,250; 6,081 and 2,595; for Muslims they were 3,678; 1,106 and 1,262. Please note that 7,722 'Unknown Religious Identity' killed have not been included in these numbers for Christians and Muslims.

The following maps suggest that there was a connection between "Armed Fulani Herdsmen" and "Other Terrorist Groups".

Boko Haram and ISWAP turned out to be minor 'players' than the Armed Fulani Herdsmen and Other Terrorist Groups.

The Security Forces mostly killed members of Terror Groups (13,480). The areas of operation of the Security Forces were mainly in the North West and the North East. They left the population in the North Central relatively unprotected. In other words, they gave the Armed Fulani Herdsmen ample opportunity for their violent attacks, with Christians as their main victims.

MAPS 9A – 9D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS BY ALL AGGRESSORS – showing how over the four years reporting period, killings increased all over the country and particularly in North West, North Central and North East zones.



(Maps source: ORFA)

MAPS 10A – 10D 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS – ISWAP/ BOKO HARAM shows how killings by Boko Haram and/or ISWAP have developed over the years






(Maps source: ORFA)

MAPS 11A – 11D 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS – ARMED FULANI HERDSMEN show how killings by Armed Fulani Herdsmen have developed over the years



(Maps source: ORFA)

MAPS 12A –12D 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS – OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS show how killings by Other Terrorist Groups have developed over the years.




(Maps source: ORFA)

The number of killings by Boko Haram and ISWAP together, were far less than the killings by either the Armed Fulani Herdsmen or Other Terrorist Groups. The area of operation of Boko Haram and ISWAP was mainly in the North East. The areas of operation of the Armed Fulani Herdsmen and the Other Terrorist Groups were connected and partly overlapping, forming a wide strip from the North West to the North Central. The Armed Fulani Herdsmen were more prominent in the North Central (including Southern Kaduna) and the Other Terrorist Groups in the North West.

Selective killing of members of Terror Groups by the Security Forces

MAPS 13A – 13D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS BY SECURITY FORCES - showing the killings by Security Forces (15,094). Most people killed by the Security Forces were members of the Terror Groups (13,480). The maps show that the Security Forces killed most people in the North East and the North West. The North Central zone where many civilians were killed by the Armed Fulani Herdsmen, received little attention from the Security Forces.

MAPS 13A – 13D 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE KILLINGS - SECURITY FORCES show how killings by Security Forces have developed over the years



(Maps source: ORFA)

5.7 INSERT – About the Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM)

About the Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM)

For over a decade atrocities against civilians in Nigeria have been downplayed or minimized. This has proved a major obstacle for those seeking to understand the violence. Misleading euphemisms, such as 'armed herdsmen' and 'cattle grazers' are used to describe continual waves of invasion, torture and killing in rural communities. Descriptions of attacks as 'ethnic clashes', 'farmers-herders clashes' or retaliatory attacks are seriously misleading. The use of the phrase 'bandits' to refer to militias carrying out mass kidnaps, and enforcement of serfdom on communities, is another case in point. And a policy of concealing the religious identity of victims also serves to distort the true picture.

Security observers familiar with the structures and finance flows of Islamic extremism categorize the violence as ethno-religious warfare, sponsored by Islamist terror. The shared ethnicity, clan networks and linguistic identity of perpetrators, and evidence of inflows of weaponry and finance, point to this.

One observer - a Nigerian journalist who has spent fifteen years investigating the violence - describes why Islamist banditry networks and the Armed Fulani Herdsmen should be considered 'twin brothers of the same mother' which is the Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM). His name has been withheld, to protect security.

The Fulani Ethnic Militia or FEM have come to be identified as a group of armed Fulani herdsmen who are responsible for launching several attacks on Middle Belt Communities, including Southern Kaduna. This group also engages in mass abductions for ransom in some parts of the Middle Belt. Evidence gathered from testimonies of victim communities, confession of political office holder, research and various [media reportage](#) confirmed the fact that these armed men are of the Fulani ethnic group. There have also been times when Fulani sociocultural groups such as Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association (MACBAN) [publicly claimed responsibility](#) for attacks. All these proved beyond doubt that the armed herdsmen perpetrating killing, abductions and destruction in the Middle Belt are Fulani militants.

Having said that, it is also important to point out that many of the so-called bandits carrying out kidnapping and attacks on communities in the Northwest are also of the Fulani ethnic group. This claim is backed by evidence already on public space such as this [admittance](#) by the immediate past governor of Katsina state that the bandits are Fulani like him. The [2022 BBC documentary](#) 'The bandit warlords of Zamfara' as well as several research works like that of [Professor Rufai Ahmed](#) 'I am a Bandit', all pointed to the facts that many 'bandits' are members of the Fulani ethnic group.

It is important to point out that not all Fulanis are bandits or armed terrorists. Yet, the fact remains that most bandits and armed herdsmen who engage in these terrible acts of deadly attacks and violence are of Fulani ethnic heritage. Some live in Nigeria while some are Fulanis from across West Africa who take advantage of the porous borders to transverse the West African sub-region and Sahel almost unchecked. There are also criminal elements who take advantage of this situation for their personal gain, and this introduces an element of criminality in the mix.

By our own understanding, the Nigerian media and the immediate past government deliberately chose to call the Fulani terrorists operating in the northwest 'bandits' to conceal the real intention of their nefarious activities in the region, thereby making it look like it is just criminality and not terrorism as it is. That is why when you look critically at all media reportage on the happenings in the Northwest, you will always hear the term 'bandits' but when you look at the Middle Belt, all you will see are mostly herdsmen. This is why I strongly believe that both the armed Fulani Herdsmen and the Bandits are 'identical twins' working to execute the same agenda in both the Northwest and the Middle Belt ... both to be considered branches of FEM.

Another critical question that has been asked over the years is: Why are bandits in the Northwest attacking and killing Muslims since the Fulani bandits are Muslims too?

To answer this question, it is helpful to revisit the history of the Danfodio jihad of 1804 in Northern Nigeria. It is recorded that even though the Hausa were mostly Muslim, Usman dan Fodio claimed that he brought a purer version of Islam which he forced them to embrace by the sword. This led to the establishment of the Sokoto caliphate, the killing of traditional Hausa kings and their subsequent replacement with Fulani emirs all over the core north. To date, all [emirs](#) in northern Nigeria are Fulani even though the Fulani are a minority in the region.

In addition to that, the Hausas are mostly farmers in Zamfara and Katsina states, but the Fulanis are not and the seizures of the farm produce of the Hausas by the bandits through their kidnappings and ransom impositions has led to violent clashes between the two. Hence Muslim Fulanis are killing Muslim Hausas.

The 2022 BBC documentary mentioned above also made it very clear that the Fulani bandits are in a war with the native Hausa communities in the northwest. This points to the fact that the attacks by Fulani bandits on Muslim Hausa communities in the northwest are simply to reassert Fulani dominance in the region just as is the case in the Middle Belt. The expected outcome of [attacks](#) whether in the northwest or Middle Belt by both bandits and armed Fulani herdsmen is to displace the original occupants of the land and farms and occupy them. That is why today, there are many communities that have been completely [occupied](#) by Bandits in the northwest and Armed Fulani Herdsmen in the Middle Belt.

In conclusion, this insightful piece by [Premium Times](#) (published on 17 July 2021) sheds much light on the activities of Fulani bandits in the northwest.”

Another observer - also a Nigerian journalist who has similarly spent many years investigating the violence - elaborates on the Field Commanders of Fulani Ethnic Militia in Nigeria. His name is also withheld, to protect his security.

There are many Fulani Ethnic Militias operating in North West, North Central and North Eastern Nigeria. These Militias are not acting as one single unit but individually and independently. However, they do collaborate if there is the need to, and at times they also fight each other. However, one thing is certain, the militias are led by powerful individuals such as Ado Aleru, Bello Turji, Bello Halliliu, Bello Khalifu, and Dogo Gide.

The Fulani Ethnic Militia (FEM) has unleashed a reign of terror in regions like Benue and Plateau, Southern Kaduna, Kogi and Taraba states by employing a sinister strategy to wreak havoc on unsuspecting communities. Their modus operandi begins with reconnaissance, as they send agents to pose as harmless cattle herders, gathering vital information on their targets. Once they've gathered enough intel, they send a chilling warning to their fighters, using kolanuts to signal an impending attack.

Each leader of FEM contributes a significant force, with some estimates suggesting around 100 fighters per leader. This means that a coordinated attack could involve a staggering 400 fighters or more, descending upon a defenseless community with devastating consequences. The use of

advanced weaponry, including gun trucks and even airplanes, only adds to the terror they inflict. In Southern Kaduna, the Southern Kaduna Peoples Union reported that an unmarked aircraft attacked several communities in Southern Kaduna.

The people of the affected states have suffered greatly at the hands of FEM, and their cries for help must be heard. It's time for decisive action to be taken against this ruthless militia, to bring an end to their reign of terror and restore peace to these troubled regions.

The ORFA report distinguishes between 'Armed Fulani Herdsmen' and 'Other Terrorist Groups'. Both together are responsible for by far the most violent attacks in Nigeria with numerous killings and abductions. It may be concluded that the majority of the category Other Terrorist Groups consists of different groups of 'Fulani bandits' who are as much part of the Fulani Ethnic Militia (a decentralized armed group) as the Armed Fulani Herdsmen.

6. Abduction analysis per aggressor

This section looks more closely at those responsible for abducting people. The data shows that by far the majority of Muslims were abducted by the same aggressors as those who abducted Christians and adherents of ATR. This means, that most of the Muslims abducted (as reported by ORFA) are not to be seen as victims of Christian aggression but as victims of their radicalized religious kin.

For this section, the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the different Nigerian states ('proportionality') has not been taken into account in the religious analysis. Just the directly recorded numbers have been used. However, taking 'proportionality' into account in the analysis in this section would further emphasize the trends.

When using the recorded data for the abductions of Christians, Muslims and adherents of ATR for analysis, all people abducted with 'Unknown Religious Identity' have been unavoidably left out of the analysis. As stated before, that is not a problem when the goal is to present percentages or ratios. It is a complication when the bare data is used.

In the text below the Security Forces are also referred to as 'aggressors'. It could be argued that this is not correct, since fighting Terror Groups is their calling to protect civilians.

6.1 All people abducted, and civilians abducted

Table 44 shows that 21,612 people were abducted during 2,705 attacks by different aggressors. Of these, 21,532 were civilians. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 8 and 10.

The top 5 civilian abductors were Other Terrorist Groups (13,728), Armed Fulani Herdsmen (6,380), Boko Haram (702), ISWAP (321) and Security Forces (175). These five categories abducted 21,306 civilians out of the total of 21,532.

Table 44: ALL ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims abducted by the different aggressors

Aggressors	Abductions											
	Total # of incidents with abductions	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	% civilians abducted	Christians abducted	% Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	% Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	1,566	13,777	13,728	64%	6,657	60%	5,635	71%	177	1,259	47	2
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	884	6,403	6,380	30%	3,914	35%	1,903	24%	3	560	22	1
Boko Haram	91	705	702	3%	302	3%	173	2%	-	227	2	1
ISWAP	38	332	321	1%	120	1%	127	2%	-	74	11	-
Security Forces	58	176	175	1%	44	0%	15	0%	-	116	1	-
Assailants	40	151	151	1%	100	1%	38	0%	-	13	-	-
Locals	13	45	45	0%	26	0%	3	0%	4	12	-	-
Vigilantes	2	12	12	0%	7	0%	5	0%	-	-	-	-
Communal clash	2	6	6	0%	6	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Cultists	5	6	6	0%	3	0%	-	0%	-	3	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	5	5	3	0%	3	0%	-	0%	-	-	2	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	1	3	3	0%	3	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Total	2,705	21,621	21,532		11,185		7,899		184	2,264	85	4

CIVILIANS ABDUCTED: Table 44 shows that most civilians were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (64%), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (30%). The percentages for Boko Haram (3%) and ISWAP (1%) were very low compared to those for Other Terrorist Groups and Armed Fulani Herdsmen.

6.2 Civilians abducted in community attacks and other attacks

This section compares the number of civilians abducted during community attacks with the number abducted in other forms of attack.

Table 45: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims abducted by the different aggressors

Aggressors	Community Abductions											
	Total # of incidents with abductions	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	% civilians abducted	Christians abducted	% Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	% Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	1,109	10,870	10,847	65%	4,876	59%	4,669	70%	173	1,129	21	2
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	681	5,147	5,135	31%	3,005	37%	1,760	26%	3	367	11	1
Boko Haram	59	452	450	3%	175	2%	142	2%	-	133	2	-
ISWAP	17	145	145	1%	52	1%	51	1%	-	42	-	-
Assailants	24	78	78	0%	42	1%	31	0%	-	5	-	-
Security Forces	11	53	53	0%	15	0%	3	0%	-	35	-	-
Locals	3	30	30	0%	23	0%	-	0%	4	3	-	-
Vigilantes	2	12	12	0%	7	0%	5	0%	-	-	-	-
Cultists	1	5	5	0%	2	0%	-	0%	-	3	-	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	1	3	3	0%	3	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Communal clash	4	2	2	0%	2	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	1	1	1	0%	1	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Total	1,913	16,798	16,761		8,203		6,661		180	1,717	34	3

COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS: Table 45 shows that during attacks on communities, most civilians were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (65%), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (31%). The percentages for Boko Haram (3%) and ISWAP (1%) were very low.

Table 46: OTHER ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims abducted by the different aggressors

Aggressors	Other Abductions											
	Total # of incidents with abductions	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	% civilians abducted	Christians abducted	% Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	% Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	457	2,907	2,881	60%	1,781	60%	966	78%	4	130	26	-
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	203	1,256	1,245	26%	909	30%	143	12%	-	193	11	-
Boko Haram	32	253	252	5%	127	4%	31	3%	-	94	-	1
ISWAP	21	187	176	4%	68	2%	76	6%	-	32	11	-
Security Forces	34	123	122	3%	29	1%	12	1%	-	81	1	-
Assailants	29	73	73	2%	58	2%	7	1%	-	8	-	-
Locals	10	15	15	0%	3	0%	3	0%	-	9	-	-
Communal clash	-	4	4	0%	4	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	1	4	2	0%	2	0%	-	0%	-	-	2	-
Cultists	4	1	1	0%	1	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Vigilantes	1	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	0%	-	0%	-	0%	-	-	-	-
Total	792	4,823	4,771		2,982		1,238		4	547	51	1

OTHER ABDUCTIONS: Table 46 shows that during other forms of attack, most civilians were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (60%), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (26%). The percentages for Boko Haram (5%) and ISWAP (4%) were much lower.

6.3 Terror Groups with most abductions for Christians and Muslims

Tables 44, 45 and 46 show that Other Terrorist Groups were the strongest threat for abduction for Christians (60%), followed by the Armed Fulani Herdsmen (35%). Boko Haram was responsible for 3% of Christian abductions and ISWAP for 1%. For Muslims, the Other Terrorist Groups were the strongest threat for abduction too (71%), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (24%). Boko Haram was responsible for 2% and ISWAP for 2% of Muslim abductions.

The high percentage of Muslims abducted by the Other Terrorist Groups, is partially related to the area of operation of these groups which is largely (though not exclusively) in the North West. In the North West the Christian population is relatively small. If the size of the Christian and Muslim populations were taken into account in this section, the picture would be different. (See Section 2.3.)

6.4 Ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted in community and other attacks by different aggressors

Table 47 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors. Community abductions and other abductions are taken together.

Table 47: ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by each category of aggressor

Aggressors	Abductions									
	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	Total # of incidents with abductions	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	Ratio Christians to Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	13,777	13,728	1,566	6,657	5,635	1.2	177	1,259	47	2
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	6,403	6,380	884	3,914	1,903	2.1	3	560	22	1
Boko Haram	705	702	91	302	173	1.7	-	227	2	1
ISWAP	332	321	38	120	127	0.9	-	74	11	-
Security Forces	176	175	40	44	15	2.9	-	116	1	-
Assailants	151	151	58	100	38	2.6	-	13	-	-
Locals	45	45	13	26	3	8.7	4	12	-	-
Vigilantes	12	12	2	7	5	1.4	-	-	-	-
Communal clash	6	6	2	6	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Cultists	6	6	5	3	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	3	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	5	3	5	3	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	2	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	3	3	1	3	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Total	21,621	21,532	2,705	11,185	7,899		184	2,264	85	4

Table 47 shows that the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors was comparable for the top 4 aggressors: Armed Fulani Herdsmen, 2.1:1; Boko Haram 1.7:1; Other Terrorist Groups 1.2:1; ISWAP 0.9:1 (120 Christians abducted, 127 Muslims abducted).

Table 48 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors. The focus is on community abductions.

Table 48: COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by each category of aggressor

Aggressors	Community Abductions									
	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	Total # of incidents with abductions	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	Ratio Christians to Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	10,870	10,847	1,109	4,876	4,669	1.0	173	1,129	21	2
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	5,147	5,135	681	3,005	1,760	1.7	3	367	11	1
Boko Haram	452	450	59	175	142	1.2	-	133	2	-
ISWAP	145	145	17	52	51	1.0	-	42	-	-
Assailants	78	78	24	42	31	1.4	-	5	-	-
Security Forces	53	53	11	15	3	5.0	-	35	-	-
Locals	30	30	3	23	-	(No Muslims abd.)	4	3	-	-
Vigilantes	12	12	2	7	5	1.4	-	-	-	-
Cultists	5	5	4	2	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	3	-	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	3	3	1	3	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Communal clash	2	2	1	2	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	1	1	1	1	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Total	16,798	16,761	1,913	8,203	6,661		180	1,717	34	3

COMMUNITY ABDUCTIONS OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS: Table 48 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors in the context of community attacks: Armed Fulani Herdsmen 1.7:1; Boko Haram 1.2:1; Other Terrorist Groups 1.0:1; ISWAP 1.0:1.

Table 49 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors. The focus is on other (i.e., non-community attack) abductions.

Table 49: OTHER ABDUCTIONS - Distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from October 2019 until September 2023 with the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by each category of aggressor

Aggressors	Other Abductions									
	Total of abductions	Total civilians abducted	Total # of incidents with abductions	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	Ratio Christians to Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Other Terrorist Groups	2,907	2,881	457	1,781	966	1.8	4	130	26	-
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,256	1,245	203	909	143	6.4	-	193	11	-
Boko Haram	253	252	32	127	31	4.1	-	94	-	1
ISWAP	187	176	21	68	76	0.9	-	32	11	-
Security Forces	123	122	29	29	12	2.4	-	81	1	-
Assailants	73	73	34	58	7	8.3	-	8	-	-
Locals	15	15	10	3	3	1.0	-	9	-	-
Communal clash	4	4	1	4	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	4	2	4	2	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	2	-
Cultists	1	1	1	1	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Vigilantes	-	-	-	-	-	(None abducted)	-	-	-	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	(No Muslims abd.)	-	-	-	-
Total	4,823	4,771	792	2,982	1,238		4	547	51	1

OTHER ABDUCTIONS OF CHRISTIANS AND MUSLIMS: Table 49 shows the ratio of Christians to Muslims abducted by the different aggressors in the context of other forms of attack. The ratio was highest for Armed Fulani Herdsmen (6.4:1). For Boko Haram it was 4.1:1, for Other Terrorist Groups it was 1.8:1 and for ISWAP it was 0.9:1 (68 Christians abducted, 76 Muslims abducted).

6.5 Christian abduction analysis per aggressor

In this section the recorded data for the abduction of Christians is used, with all people abducted with 'Unknown Religious Identity' left out of the analysis. As mentioned earlier, because most abductions with 'Unknown Religious Identity' took place in the 2020 and 2021 reporting periods, this analysis can only be done at the level of the total of all four reporting periods, with the goal of showing proportions between different aggressors, not absolute data.

Table 50 shows who abducted Christians in the 4-year reporting period, for all categories of aggressors. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 14A.

Table 50: Christians abducted by different categories of aggressors

Year	Total Christians Abducted	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
2020-2023	11,185	11,141	3,914	302	120	6,657	100	3	3	3	7	6	26	44


Table 50 shows that most Christians were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (6,657), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (3,914). The combination of Boko Haram and ISWAP accounts for 422 Christians abducted. All the rest together adds up to 192 Christians abducted (including 44 Christians abducted by the Security Forces).

Table 51 offers a closer look at the Terror Group categories and compresses several of the smaller categories into one 'Rest' category. This leads to the visualization presented in figure 11.

Table 51: Christians abducted by different categories of Terror Groups

Year	Total Christians abducted by Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Rest
2020-2023	11,141	3,914	302	120	6,657	100	48

Figure 11: Christians abducted by different categories of Terror Groups



For Christians, the Other Terrorist Groups were the strongest threat for abduction, followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen. Boko Haram and ISWAP were much less of a threat for abducting Christians.

6.6 Muslim abduction analysis per aggressor

In this section the recorded data for the abduction of Muslims is used, with all people abducted with 'Unknown Religious Identity' left out of the analysis. For the reason explained in Section 6.5 and earlier sections, analysis can only be carried out at the level of the total of all four reporting periods, with the goal of showing proportions between different aggressors, not absolute data.

Table 52 shows which categories of aggressors abducted Muslims in the 4-year reporting period. A full overview at state level is available in Appendix 14B.

Table 52: Muslims abducted by different categories of aggressors

Year	Total Muslims Abducted	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
2020-2023	7,899	7,876	1,903	173	127	5,635	38	-	-	-	5	-	3	15


Table 52 shows that most Muslims were abducted by Other Terrorist Groups (5,635), followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen (1,903). The combination of Boko Haram and ISWAP accounts for 300 Muslims abducted. All the rest together adds up to 61 Muslims abducted (including 15 Muslims abducted by the Security Forces).

Table 53 offers a closer look at the Terror Group categories and compresses several of the smaller categories into one 'Rest' category. This leads to the visualization presented in figure 12.

Table 53: Muslims abducted by different categories of Terror Groups

Year	Muslims abducted by Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Rest
2020-2023	7,884	1,903	173	127	5,635	38	8

Figure 12: Muslims abducted by different categories of Terror Groups



For Muslims, the Other Terrorist Groups were the strongest threat for abduction, followed by Armed Fulani Herdsmen. Boko Haram and ISWAP were much less of a threat for the abduction of Muslims.

6.7 Main areas of operation of different Terror Groups involved in abductions

Over the 4-year reporting period, Terror Group violence was concentrated in specific parts of the country and connected with the areas of operation of specific groups of aggressors. The North West and the North


Central were the epicenter for abductions. Most civilian abductions were in the North West (12,042) and North Central (6,325). For Christians these numbers were 5,931 and 3,277; for Muslims they were 4,976 and 2,469. Please note that 2,264 abductions in the category ‘Unknown Religious Identity’ have not been included in these numbers for Christians and Muslims.

The data suggests that there was a connection between Armed Fulani Herdsmen and Other Terrorist Groups.

Once again, Boko Haram and ISWAP turned out to be minor ‘players’ compared to the Armed Fulani Herdsmen category and Other Terrorist Groups.

The number of members of the Security Forces and Terror Groups abducted were very low and not considered in the abduction analysis.

MAPS 14A – 14D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE ABDUCTIONS – ALL AGGRESSORS – showing how over the course of the four years covered by this report, abductions have increased all over the country, but with a particular emphasis in the North West, North Central and North East zones.



(Maps source: ORFA)

MAPS 15A – 15D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE ABDUCTIONS – ISWAP/BOKO HARAM – showing how abductions by Boko Haram and/or ISWAP have developed over the years



(Maps source: ORFA)


MAPS 16A – 16D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE ABDUCTIONS – ARMED FULANI HERDSMEN – showing how abductions by Armed Fulani Herdsmen have developed over the years.





(Maps source: ORFA)

MAPS 17A – 17D: 2020-2023 CUMULATIVE ABDUCTIONS – OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS – showing how abductions by Other Terrorist Groups have developed over the years.



(Maps source: ORFA)

The number of abductions by Boko Haram and ISWAP together, were far less than the abductions by either Other Terrorist Groups or Armed Fulani Herdsmen. The area of operation of Boko Haram and ISWAP was

mainly in the North East. The areas of operation of the Armed Fulani Herdsmen and the Other Terrorist Groups were connected and partly overlapping, forming a wide strip from the North West to the North Central. Armed Fulani Herdsmen were more prominent in the North Central zone (including South Kaduna), and the Other Terrorist Groups were more prominent in the North West.

6.7 INSERT - Bandits, Armed Fulani Herdsmen and the Religious Agenda Connection

Bandits, Armed Fulani Herdsmen and the Religious Agenda Connection

A Nigerian pastor shares these testimonies of victims that provide valuable insights which shed light on the connections between what the Bandits and the Armed Fulani Herdsmen are doing and their hidden religious agenda.

There follow two testimonies:

First testimony – the Bandit Hidden Religious Agenda

A missionary was kidnapped in Jos while heading to a funeral reception. He found a taxi but unknown to him the taxi driver, a lady and another occupant were actually Bandits who came in from Zamfara state to purposefully kidnap Christians in Plateau state and Southern Kaduna. Their goal was clear, targeting Christians in Southern Kaduna and Plateau. When he was kidnapped, he was drugged through a spray they made him inhale and he immediately became only partially conscious. He later awoke at night to find himself in a forest in Southern Kaduna in the company of other Christian men and women they had picked up from Southern Kaduna. From there, they were taken to a forest then driven in the night to another forest in Adara land in Kajuru Local Government Area and kept there until it was early in the morning. Before daybreak they were driven to a house in Kaduna metropolis.

In Kaduna, some phone calls were made and negotiations for some of the victims were carried out. One was a Christian woman, and her people paid for her ransom, but they chose not to release her. So when they set out to drive the kidnapped victims out of Kaduna by night, she protested and they warned her to stay calm and quiet or they would teach her a lesson and a warning to any would-be protesters. She reminded them that her ransom had been paid and that she would not go anywhere. She was shot in the presence of the other kidnap victims and her dead body was shoved out of the vehicle onto the ground and they drove off.

From Kaduna at night, they were driven to Katsina state to another forest where there was a Bandits camp. Later, the missionary was asked to provide a contact for negotiations to start and he gave them the name of his friend but warned his friend never to disclose his true identity. They tried to extract money from the person they were negotiating with. They later discovered that this missionary had an ATM card with money in his account so they chose to use him as a cash machine and any time they needed money they would take him to an ATM Machine blind-folded at night to withdraw money from his account.

After some days in Jibiya, Katsina state, some of them were left there but some, along with the missionary, were driven to another camp in Zamfara state. While at Zamfara state, they started questioning him and told him that it would only be a matter of days before Christianity became history in Nigeria. They said in Hausa: 'Lokaci kadan, adini Krista zata zamma tarihi a kassan Nijeriya.' Meaning: It is only a matter of time; Christianity will become history in Nigeria. As he remained in captivity in Zamfara they kept trying to entice him to convert to Islam, but he refused. So, they just took him to draw money from his account for their use. He was quite bold and tough, but they kept him because of the immediate cash they could access through him. His hands and legs were usually tied and he was moved in shackles.

Once, at night, he was driven out again to the state capital Gusau to take money from his account at the ATM. This was done, but on the way back to the forest, something happened which I won't disclose here for obvious reasons. God in a most miraculous way provided a way for him to escape at the dead of night; he unshackled himself and ran, walked for hours upon hours in the dead of the night until day break. Covered in dust, people took him for a mad person. Finally, he found a village with a church and he was identified by someone in the church and later helped him to return to Jos. I had the privilege of debriefing him as a member of our church. For security reasons, we worked to relocate him out of Nigeria where he is continuing with his missionary service.

This testimony points to the fact that beyond kidnap for ransom, the religious factor is there. It will certainly surface to the top with time. The ORFA report points to the danger of the religious factor which other researchers either intentionally ignore by downplaying it or denying its potency. Looking at the number of Christians killed shows disproportionality in comparison with Muslims and even the kidnapping figures, the disproportionality is also there. Denying the role of religion makes mockery of the many lives of Christians wasted in targeted persecution and killings.

Second testimony – The Armed Fulani Herdsmen Hidden Religious Agenda

The following occurred in Zangon Kataf, Southern Kaduna. It concerns Armed Fulani Herdsmen who attacked a village and kidnapped some women. While in their custody, they mocked them saying that the Allah of the Koran is stronger than the God of the Bible. They asked these women, victims of the attack in a Southern Kaduna community to convert to Islam or they will regret choosing to remain Christians. They urged these women to renounce Christianity and embrace Islam because Muslims would soon overrun Christians in Nigeria. As days went by, they decided to rape them and the women protested and cried, asking them not to rape them. They accompanied their protest with prayer asking God to spare them the agony of sexual abuse. The attackers ignored their pleas and cries and proceeded not only to rape them but taunted them. They asked them to renounce Christianity, since the God of the Bible could not answer their prayer against being raped as He had done nothing to spare them. They proceeded to portray Allah and Islam as the only religion where prayers are answered.

The above testimonies provide a religious connection between Bandits and Armed Fulani Herdsmen terrorist activities in Nigeria.

Appendix

Appendix 1A: All registered killings in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2020

Geopolitical zone	State	2020						
		Total Killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown Religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	23	6	-	-	14	-	3
North West	Kaduna	2,017	1,237	169	-	413	53	145
North West	Kano	5	-	-	-	5	-	-
North West	Katsina	1,018	123	160	-	293	65	377
North West	Kebbi	75	42	9	-	24	-	-
North West	Sokoto	254	26	94	-	22	-	112
North West	Zamfara	835	32	86	-	136	15	566
North West Total		4,227	1,466	518	-	907	133	1,203
North Central	Abuja FCT	17	-	-	-	14	1	2
North Central	Benue	377	199	4	-	154	1	19
North Central	Kogi	112	58	3	-	38	3	10
North Central	Kwara	4	1	-	-	3	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	74	11	-	-	56	1	6
North Central	Niger	654	385	54	-	128	43	44
North Central	Plateau	300	208	-	-	79	9	4
North Central Total		1,538	862	61	-	472	58	85
North East	Adamawa	288	115	-	-	138	10	25
North East	Bauchi	13	-	-	-	13	-	-
North East	Borno	4,400	848	427	-	605	748	1,772
North East	Gombe	3	-	-	-	3	-	-
North East	Taraba	323	194	-	-	107	-	22
North East	Yobe	333	17	-	-	41	95	180
North East Total		5,360	1,174	427	-	907	853	1,999
South East	Abia	26	2	-	-	17	5	2
South East	Anambra	34	-	-	-	32	2	-
South East	Ebonyi	32	-	-	-	31	1	-
South East	Enugu	3	-	-	-	1	-	2
South East	Imo	30	-	-	-	25	1	4
South East Total		125	2	-	-	106	9	8
South South	Akwa Ibom	21	-	-	-	19	-	2
South South	Bayelsa	68	14	-	-	38	10	6
South South	Cross River	70	7	-	-	55	3	5
South South	Delta	119	34	-	-	57	23	5
South South	Edo	97	11	-	-	56	10	20
South South	Rivers	68	9	-	-	45	1	13
South South Total		443	75	-	-	270	47	51
South West	Ekiti	18	12	-	-	6	-	-
South West	Lagos	85	7	1	-	65	2	10
South West	Ogun	39	8	-	-	20	8	3
South West	Ondo	27	7	-	-	13	7	-
South West	Osun	16	3	-	-	11	-	2
South West	Oyo	35	3	2	-	29	-	1
South West Total		220	40	3	-	144	17	16
Grand Total		11,913	3,619	1,009	-	2,806	1,117	3,362

Appendix 1B: All registered killings in Nigeria Oct 2020 – Sep 2021

Geopolitical zone	State	2021						
		Total Killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown Religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	26	12	1	-	6	4	3
North West	Kaduna	2,051	1,003	65	-	471	101	411
North West	Kano	16	4	2	-	7	-	3
North West	Katsina	857	104	110	11	262	14	356
North West	Kebbi	585	368	113	13	26	35	30
North West	Sokoto	395	28	112	-	173	61	21
North West	Zamfara	1,890	46	372	-	602	65	805
North West Total		5,820	1,565	775	24	1,547	280	1,629
North Central	Abuja FCT	65	18	1	-	34	8	4
North Central	Benue	1,320	939	-	-	285	25	71
North Central	Kogi	91	5	1	-	52	6	27
North Central	Kwara	42	-	8	-	34	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	89	36	12	-	27	9	5
North Central	Niger	1,336	291	188	-	330	116	411
North Central	Plateau	691	408	46	-	217	2	18
North Central Total		3,634	1,697	256	-	979	166	536
North East	Adamawa	147	38	-	-	92	2	15
North East	Bauchi	12	-	5	-	6	1	-
North East	Borno	3,628	113	140	-	449	1,212	1,714
North East	Gombe	29	20	-	-	9	-	-
North East	Taraba	170	111	8	-	42	7	2
North East	Yobe	283	-	1	-	61	95	126
North East Total		4,269	282	154	-	659	1,317	1,857
South East	Abia	44	1	-	-	20	17	6
South East	Anambra	255	75	19	-	96	57	8
South East	Ebonyi	445	290	-	-	124	21	10
South East	Enugu	112	67	-	-	18	19	8
South East	Imo	584	267	29	-	89	123	76
South East Total		1,440	700	48	-	347	237	108
South South	Akwa Ibom	65	-	-	-	42	20	3
South South	Bayelsa	22	1	-	-	18	1	2
South South	Cross River	46	-	-	-	35	11	-
South South	Delta	183	5	-	-	134	28	16
South South	Edo	80	8	-	-	68	-	4
South South	Rivers	162	10	-	-	95	43	14
South South Total		558	24	-	-	392	103	39
South West	Ekiti	35	3	-	-	30	-	2
South West	Lagos	136	2	-	-	127	1	6
South West	Ogun	96	20	1	-	60	5	10
South West	Ondo	59	7	-	-	44	2	6
South West	Osun	77	1	1	-	59	9	7
South West	Oyo	150	27	2	-	107	10	4
South West Total		553	60	4	-	427	27	35
Grand Total		16,274	4,328	1,237	24	4,351	2,130	4,204

Appendix 1C: All registered killings in Nigeria Oct 2021 – Sept 2022

Geopolitical zone	State	2022						
		Total Killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown Religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	33	9	11	-	1	3	9
North West	Kaduna	1,801	862	280	2	37	33	587
North West	Kano	89	18	22	-	-	5	44
North West	Katsina	629	71	182	-	43	28	305
North West	Kebbi	541	182	106	21	9	143	80
North West	Sokoto	543	123	189	-	62	1	168
North West	Zamfara	1,594	233	668	-	33	52	608
North West Total		5,230	1,498	1,458	23	185	265	1,801
North Central	Abuja FCT	56	16	22	-	11	4	3
North Central	Benue	574	495	-	1	20	10	48
North Central	Kogi	88	41	8	2	7	12	18
North Central	Kwara	47	15	4	-	7	-	21
North Central	Nasarawa	94	73	16	-	-	3	2
North Central	Niger	2,110	549	357	2	32	163	1,007
North Central	Plateau	619	334	56	-	8	10	211
North Central Total		3,588	1,523	463	5	85	202	1,310
North East	Adamawa	142	94	6	-	4	11	27
North East	Bauchi	48	18	23	1	1	-	5
North East	Borno	3,372	184	192	-	24	242	2,730
North East	Gombe	37	28	6	-	1	1	1
North East	Taraba	707	524	44	3	40	28	68
North East	Yobe	97	18	7	-	-	12	60
North East Total		4,403	866	278	4	70	294	2,891
South East	Abia	92	26	8	-	42	4	12
South East	Anambra	304	135	9	-	7	48	105
South East	Ebonyi	146	102	1	-	4	18	21
South East	Enugu	131	94	1	-	2	31	3
South East	Imo	220	136	3	-	5	42	34
South East Total		893	493	22	-	60	143	175
South South	Akwa Ibom	42	35	2	-	-	1	4
South South	Bayelsa	44	22	1	-	4	4	13
South South	Cross River	94	65	-	-	5	5	19
South South	Delta	146	57	3	-	8	5	73
South South	Edo	90	31	-	-	2	5	52
South South	Rivers	61	26	-	3	10	9	13
South South Total		477	236	6	3	29	29	174
South West	Ekiti	9	5	-	-	-	3	1
South West	Lagos	107	41	10	1	18	4	33
South West	Ogun	87	35	12	4	6	8	22
South West	Ondo	116	101	1	-	9	1	4
South West	Osun	68	41	9	-	8	2	8
South West	Oyo	59	38	4	-	1	6	10
South West Total		446	261	36	5	42	24	78
Grand Total		15,037	4,877	2,263	40	471	957	6,429

Appendix 1D: All registered killings in Nigeria Oct 2022 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2023						
		Total Killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown Religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	18	-	14	-	-	1	3
North West	Kaduna	946	446	107	-	2	24	367
North West	Kano	61	11	46	-	-	-	4
North West	Katsina	469	88	157	4	-	59	161
North West	Kebbi	180	64	72	-	-	9	35
North West	Sokoto	305	32	137	1	3	16	116
North West	Zamfara	1,379	80	394	-	2	125	778
North West Total		3,358	721	927	5	7	234	1,464
North Central	Abuja FCT	44	22	14	1	3	3	1
North Central	Benue	1,135	1,040	8	9	31	20	27
North Central	Kogi	85	42	25	2	4	4	8
North Central	Kwara	43	18	10	1	1	1	12
North Central	Nasarawa	278	160	92	-	-	5	21
North Central	Niger	987	167	126	2	5	124	563
North Central	Plateau	642	550	51	2	-	1	38
North Central Total		3,214	1,999	326	17	44	158	670
North East	Adamawa	66	32	9	-	-	1	24
North East	Bauchi	156	24	59	-	-	1	72
North East	Borno	3,902	58	241	-	7	143	3,453
North East	Gombe	14	6	5	-	-	-	3
North East	Taraba	283	152	75	17	-	3	36
North East	Yobe	55	1	14	-	-	-	40
North East Total		4,476	273	403	17	7	148	3,628
South East	Abia	57	30	-	-	-	8	19
South East	Anambra	229	95	1	2	-	51	80
South East	Ebonyi	101	65	-	-	2	15	19
South East	Enugu	217	162	2	-	1	27	25
South East	Imo	189	130	5	-	-	36	18
South East Total		793	482	8	2	3	137	161
South South	Akwa Ibom	52	34	-	-	9	3	6
South South	Bayelsa	24	19	1	-	-	1	3
South South	Cross River	35	27	-	1	-	1	6
South South	Delta	162	79	14	3	2	29	35
South South	Edo	81	51	1	3	7	11	8
South South	Rivers	146	77	1	5	-	12	51
South South Total		500	287	17	12	18	57	109
South West	Ekiti	11	7	3	-	1	-	-
South West	Lagos	94	60	8	10	2	7	7
South West	Ogun	82	34	5	16	-	1	26
South West	Ondo	60	36	4	6	7	3	4
South West	Osun	43	21	8	3	4	-	7
South West	Oyo	55	25	17	2	1	4	6
South West Total		345	183	45	37	15	15	50
Grand Total		12,686	3,945	1,726	90	94	749	6,082

Appendix 1E: All registered killings in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2023

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023						
Geopolitical zone	State	Total Killed	Total Killed	Total Killed	Total Killed	Total Killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown Religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups
North West	Jigawa	23	26	33	18	100	27	26	-	21	8	18
North West	Kaduna	2,017	2,051	1,801	946	6,815	3,548	621	2	923	211	1,510
North West	Kano	5	16	89	61	171	33	70	-	12	5	51
North West	Katsina	1,018	857	629	469	2,973	386	609	15	598	166	1,199
North West	Kebbi	75	585	541	180	1,381	656	300	34	59	187	145
North West	Sokoto	254	395	543	305	1,497	209	532	1	260	78	417
North West	Zamfara	835	1,890	1,594	1,379	5,698	391	1,520	-	773	257	2,757
North West Total		4,227	5,820	5,230	3,358	18,635	5,250	3,678	52	2,646	912	6,097
North Central	Abuja FCT	17	65	56	44	182	56	37	1	62	16	10
North Central	Benue	377	1,320	574	1,135	3,406	2,673	12	10	490	56	165
North Central	Kogi	112	91	88	85	376	146	37	4	101	25	63
North Central	Kwara	4	42	47	43	136	34	22	1	45	1	33
North Central	Nasarawa	74	89	94	278	535	280	120	-	83	18	34
North Central	Niger	654	1,336	2,110	987	5,087	1,392	725	4	495	446	2,025
North Central	Plateau	300	691	619	642	2,252	1,500	153	2	304	22	271
North Central Total		1,538	3,634	3,588	3,214	11,974	6,081	1,106	22	1,580	584	2,601
North East	Adamawa	288	147	142	66	643	279	15	-	234	24	91
North East	Bauchi	13	12	48	156	229	42	87	1	20	2	77
North East	Borno	4,400	3,628	3,372	3,902	15,302	1,203	1,000	-	1,085	2,345	9,669
North East	Gombe	3	29	37	14	83	54	11	-	13	1	4
North East	Taraba	323	170	707	283	1,483	981	127	20	189	38	128
North East	Yobe	333	283	97	55	768	36	22	-	102	202	406
North East Total		5,360	4,269	4,403	4,476	18,508	2,595	1,262	21	1,643	2,612	10,375
South East	Abia	26	44	92	57	219	59	8	-	79	34	39
South East	Anambra	34	255	304	229	822	305	29	2	135	158	193
South East	Ebonyi	32	445	146	101	724	457	1	-	161	55	50
South East	Enugu	3	112	131	217	463	323	3	-	22	77	38
South East	Imo	30	584	220	189	1,023	533	37	-	119	202	132
South East Total		125	1,440	893	793	3,251	1,677	78	2	516	526	452
South South	Akwa Ibom	21	65	42	52	180	69	2	-	70	24	15
South South	Bayelsa	68	22	44	24	158	56	2	-	60	16	24
South South	Cross River	70	46	94	35	245	99	-	1	95	20	30
South South	Delta	119	183	146	162	610	175	17	3	201	85	129
South South	Edo	97	80	90	81	348	101	1	3	133	26	84
South South	Rivers	68	162	61	146	437	122	1	8	150	65	91
South South Total		443	558	477	500	1,978	622	23	15	709	236	373
South West	Ekiti	18	35	9	11	73	27	3	-	37	3	3
South West	Lagos	85	136	107	94	422	110	19	11	212	14	56
South West	Ogun	39	96	87	82	304	97	18	20	86	22	61
South West	Ondo	27	59	116	60	262	151	5	6	73	13	14
South West	Osun	16	77	68	43	204	66	18	3	82	11	24
South West	Oyo	35	150	59	55	299	93	25	2	138	20	21
South West Total		220	553	446	345	1,564	544	88	42	628	83	179
Grand Total		11,913	16,274	15,037	12,686	55,910	16,769	6,235	154	7,722	4,953	20,077

Appendix 2A: Religious killings in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2020

Geopolitical zone	State	2020						
		Total Killed	Christians Killed	% Christians in the State	Muslims Killed	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	23	6	10	-	88	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North West	Kaduna	2,017	1,237	35	169	50	7.3	10.5
North West	Kano	5	-	9	-	91	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
North West	Katsina	1,018	123	7	160	91	0.8	10.0
North West	Kebbi	75	42	10	9	88	4.7	41.1
North West	Sokoto	254	26	5	94	94	0.3	5.2
North West	Zamfara	835	32	5	86	94	0.4	7.0
North West Total		4,227	1,466		518		2.8	9.4
North Central	Abuja FCT	17	-	50	-	30	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
North Central	Benue	377	199	75	4	10	49.8	6.6
North Central	Kogi	112	58	50	3	41	19.3	15.9
North Central	Kwara	4	1	45	-	50	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North Central	Nasarawa	74	11	45	-	40	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North Central	Niger	654	385	25	54	70	7.1	20.0
North Central	Plateau	300	208	60	-	17	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North Central Total		1,538	862		61		14.1	20.0
North East	Adamawa	288	115	30	-	65	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North East	Bauchi	13	-	15	-	80	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
North East	Borno	4,400	848	20	427	60	2.0	6.0
North East	Gombe	3	-	30	-	55	only Chr. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
North East	Taraba	323	194	30	-	55	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North East	Yobe	333	17	10	-	87	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North East Total		5,360	1,174		427		2.7	7.7
South East	Abia	26	2	80	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Anambra	34	-	80	-	15	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South East	Ebonyi	32	-	67	-	23	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South East	Enugu	3	-	75	-	15	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South East	Imo	30	-	80	-	18	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South East Total		125	2		-		#DIV/0!	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Akwa Ibom	21	-	75	-	20	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South South	Bayelsa	68	14	75	-	20	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Cross River	70	7	72	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Delta	119	34	76	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Edo	97	11	79	-	5	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Rivers	68	9	60	-	19	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South Total		443	75		-		only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Ekiti	18	12	60	-	25	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Lagos	85	7	83	1	12	7.0	1.0
South West	Ogun	39	8	60	-	29	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Ondo	27	7	55	-	30	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Osun	16	3	59	-	39	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Oyo	35	3	55	2	43	1.5	1.2
South West Total		220	40		3		13.3	6.0
Grand Total		11,913	3,619		1,009		3.6	9.3

Appendix 2B: Religious killings in Nigeria Oct 2020 – Sept 2021

Geopolitical zone	State	2021						
		Total Killed	Christians Killed	% Christians in the State	Muslims Killed	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	26	12	10	1	88	12.0	105.6
North West	Kaduna	2,051	1,003	35	65	50	15.4	22.0
North West	Kano	16	4	9	2	91	2.0	20.2
North West	Katsina	857	104	7	110	91	0.9	12.3
North West	Kebbi	585	368	10	113	88	3.3	28.7
North West	Sokoto	395	28	5	112	94	0.3	4.7
North West	Zamfara	1,890	46	5	372	94	0.1	2.3
North West Total		5,820	1,565		775		2.0	9.8
North Central	Abuja FCT	65	18	50	1	30	18.0	10.8
North Central	Benue	1,320	939	75	-	10	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North Central	Kogi	91	5	50	1	41	5.0	4.1
North Central	Kwara	42	-	45	8	50	0.0	0.0
North Central	Nasarawa	89	36	45	12	40	3.0	2.7
North Central	Niger	1,336	291	25	188	70	1.5	4.3
North Central	Plateau	691	408	60	46	17	8.9	2.5
North Central Total		3,634	1,697		256		6.6	4.3
North East	Adamawa	147	38	30	-	65	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North East	Bauchi	12	-	15	5	80	0.0	0.0
North East	Borno	3,628	113	20	140	60	0.8	2.4
North East	Gombe	29	20	30	-	55	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North East	Taraba	170	111	30	8	55	13.9	25.4
North East	Yobe	283	-	10	1	87	0.0	0.0
North East Total		4,269	282		154		1.8	4.3
South East	Abia	44	1	80	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Anambra	255	75	80	19	15	3.9	0.7
South East	Ebonyi	445	290	67	-	23	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Enugu	112	67	75	-	15	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Imo	584	267	80	29	18	9.2	2.1
South East Total		1,440	700		48		14.6	3.9
South South	Akwa Ibom	65	-	75	-	20	#DIV/0!	no rel. killings reported
South South	Bayelsa	22	1	75	-	20	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Cross River	46	-	72	-	18	no rel. killings reported	no rel. killings reported
South South	Delta	183	5	76	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Edo	80	8	79	-	5	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Rivers	162	10	60	-	19	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South Total		558	24		-		#DIV/0!	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Ekiti	35	3	60	-	25	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Lagos	136	2	83	-	12	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Ogun	96	20	60	1	29	20.0	9.7
South West	Ondo	59	7	55	-	30	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Osun	77	1	59	1	39	1.0	0.7
South West	Oyo	150	27	55	2	43	13.5	10.6
South West Total		553	60		4		15.0	9.2
Grand Total		16,274	4,328		1,237		3.5	7.7

Appendix 2C: Religious killings in Nigeria Oct 2021 – Sept 2022

Geopolitical zone	State	2022						
		Total Killed	Christians Killed	% Christians in the State	Muslims Killed	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	33	9	10	11	88	0.8	7.2
North West	Kaduna	1,801	862	35	280	50	3.1	4.4
North West	Kano	89	18	9	22	91	0.8	8.3
North West	Katsina	629	71	7	182	91	0.4	5.1
North West	Kebbi	541	182	10	106	88	1.7	15.1
North West	Sokoto	543	123	5	189	94	0.7	12.2
North West	Zamfara	1,594	233	5	668	94	0.3	6.6
North West Total		5,230	1,498		1,458		1.0	7.3
North Central	Abuja FCT	56	16	50	22	30	0.7	0.4
North Central	Benue	574	495	75	-	10	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
North Central	Kogi	88	41	50	8	41	5.1	4.2
North Central	Kwara	47	15	45	4	50	3.8	4.2
North Central	Nasarawa	94	73	45	16	40	4.6	4.1
North Central	Niger	2,110	549	25	357	70	1.5	4.3
North Central	Plateau	619	334	60	56	17	6.0	1.7
North Central Total		3,588	1,523		463		3.3	3.9
North East	Adamawa	142	94	30	6	65	15.7	33.9
North East	Bauchi	48	18	15	23	80	0.8	4.2
North East	Borno	3,372	184	20	192	60	1.0	2.9
North East	Gombe	37	28	30	6	55	4.7	8.6
North East	Taraba	707	524	30	44	55	11.9	21.8
North East	Yobe	97	18	10	7	87	2.6	22.4
North East Total		4,403	866		278		3.1	7.3
South East	Abia	92	26	80	8	18	3.3	0.7
South East	Anambra	304	135	80	9	15	15.0	2.8
South East	Ebonyi	146	102	67	1	23	102.0	35.0
South East	Enugu	131	94	75	1	15	94.0	18.8
South East	Imo	220	136	80	3	18	45.3	10.2
South East Total		893	493		22		22.4	5.3
South South	Akwa Ibom	42	35	75	2	20	17.5	4.7
South South	Bayelsa	44	22	75	1	20	22.0	5.9
South South	Cross River	94	65	72	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Delta	146	57	76	3	18	19.0	4.5
South South	Edo	90	31	79	-	5	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Rivers	61	26	60	-	19	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South Total		477	236		6		39.3	9.2
South West	Ekiti	9	5	60	-	25	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South West	Lagos	107	41	83	10	12	4.1	0.6
South West	Ogun	87	35	60	12	29	2.9	1.4
South West	Ondo	116	101	55	1	30	101.0	55.1
South West	Osun	68	41	59	9	39	4.6	3.0
South West	Oyo	59	38	55	4	43	9.5	7.4
South West Total		446	261		36		7.3	3.8
Grand Total		15,037	4,877		2,263		2.2	6.6

Appendix 2D: Religious killings in Nigeria Oct 2022 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2023						
		Total Killed	Christians Killed	% Christians in the State	Muslims Killed	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	18	-	10	14	88	0.0	0.0
North West	Kaduna	946	446	35	107	50	4.2	6.0
North West	Kano	61	11	9	46	91	0.2	2.4
North West	Katsina	469	88	7	157	91	0.6	7.3
North West	Kebbi	180	64	10	72	88	0.9	7.8
North West	Sokoto	305	32	5	137	94	0.2	4.4
North West	Zamfara	1,379	80	5	394	94	0.2	3.8
North West Total		3,358	721		927		0.8	4.9
North Central	Abuja FCT	44	22	50	14	30	1.6	0.9
North Central	Benue	1,135	1,040	75	8	10	130.0	17.3
North Central	Kogi	85	42	50	25	41	1.7	1.4
North Central	Kwara	43	18	45	10	50	1.8	2.0
North Central	Nasarawa	278	160	45	92	40	1.7	1.5
North Central	Niger	987	167	25	126	70	1.3	3.7
North Central	Plateau	642	550	60	51	17	10.8	3.1
North Central Total		3,214	1,999		326		6.1	3.0
North East	Adamawa	66	32	30	9	65	3.6	7.7
North East	Bauchi	156	24	15	59	80	0.4	2.2
North East	Borno	3,902	58	20	241	60	0.2	0.7
North East	Gombe	14	6	30	5	55	1.2	2.2
North East	Taraba	283	152	30	75	55	2.0	3.7
North East	Yobe	55	1	10	14	87	0.1	0.6
North East Total		4,476	273		403		0.7	1.7
South East	Abia	57	30	80	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Anambra	229	95	80	1	15	95.0	17.8
South East	Ebonyi	101	65	67	-	23	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South East	Enugu	217	162	75	2	15	81.0	16.2
South East	Imo	189	130	80	5	18	26.0	5.9
South East Total		793	482		8		60.3	13.6
South South	Akwa Ibom	52	34	75	-	20	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Bayelsa	24	19	75	1	20	19.0	5.1
South South	Cross River	35	27	72	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Delta	162	79	76	14	18	5.6	1.3
South South	Edo	81	51	79	1	5	51.0	3.2
South South	Rivers	146	77	60	1	19	77.0	24.4
South South Total		500	287		17		16.9	4.0
South West	Ekiti	11	7	60	3	25	2.3	1.0
South West	Lagos	94	60	83	8	12	7.5	1.1
South West	Ogun	82	34	60	5	29	6.8	3.3
South West	Ondo	60	36	55	4	30	9.0	4.9
South West	Osun	43	21	59	8	39	2.6	1.7
South West	Oyo	55	25	55	17	43	1.5	1.1
South West Total		345	183		45		4.1	1.8
Grand Total		12,686	3,945		1,726		2.3	3.7

Appendix 2E: Religious killings in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023						
		Total Killed	Christians Killed	% Christians in the State	Muslims Killed	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	100	27	10	26	88	1.0	9.1
North West	Kaduna	6,815	3,548	35	621	50	5.7	8.2
North West	Kano	171	33	9	70	91	0.5	4.8
North West	Katsina	2,973	386	7	609	91	0.6	8.2
North West	Kebbi	1,381	656	10	300	88	2.2	19.2
North West	Sokoto	1,497	209	5	532	94	0.4	7.4
North West	Zamfara	5,698	391	5	1,520	94	0.3	4.8
North West Total		18,635	5,250		3,678		1.4	7.5
North Central	Abuja FCT	182	56	50	37	30	1.5	0.9
North Central	Benue	3,406	2,673	75	12	10	222.8	29.7
North Central	Kogi	376	146	50	37	41	3.9	3.2
North Central	Kwara	136	34	45	22	50	1.5	1.7
North Central	Nasarawa	535	280	45	120	40	2.3	2.1
North Central	Niger	5,087	1,392	25	725	70	1.9	5.4
North Central	Plateau	2,252	1,500	60	153	17	9.8	2.8
North Central Total		11,974	6,081		1,106		5.5	4.6
North East	Adamawa	643	279	30	15	65	18.6	40.3
North East	Bauchi	229	42	15	87	80	0.5	2.6
North East	Borno	15,302	1,203	20	1,000	60	1.2	3.6
North East	Gombe	83	54	30	11	55	4.9	9.0
North East	Taraba	1,483	981	30	127	55	7.7	14.2
North East	Yobe	768	36	10	22	87	1.6	14.2
North East Total		18,508	2,595		1,262		2.1	5.3
South East	Abia	219	59	80	8	18	7.4	1.7
South East	Anambra	822	305	80	29	15	10.5	2.0
South East	Ebonyi	724	457	67	1	23	457.0	156.9
South East	Enugu	463	323	75	3	15	107.7	21.5
South East	Imo	1,023	533	80	37	18	14.4	3.2
South East Total		3,251	1,677		78		21.5	5.3
South South	Akwa Ibom	180	69	75	2	20	34.5	9.2
South South	Bayelsa	158	56	75	2	20	28.0	7.5
South South	Cross River	245	99	72	-	18	only Chr. killings reported	only Chr. killings reported
South South	Delta	610	175	76	17	18	10.3	2.4
South South	Edo	348	101	79	1	5	101.0	6.4
South South	Rivers	437	122	60	1	19	122.0	38.6
South South Total		1,978	622		23		27.0	6.3
South West	Ekiti	73	27	60	3	25	9.0	3.8
South West	Lagos	422	110	83	19	12	5.8	0.8
South West	Ogun	304	97	60	18	29	5.4	2.6
South West	Ondo	262	151	55	5	30	30.2	16.5
South West	Osun	204	66	59	18	39	3.7	2.4
South West	Oyo	299	93	55	25	43	3.7	2.9
South West Total		1,564	544		88		6.2	3.1
Grand Total		55,910	16,769		6,235		2.7	6.5

Appendix 3A: All registered abductions in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2020

Geopolitical zone	State	2020						
		Total Abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious indentity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	Jigawa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	458	312	-	-	145	1	-
North West	Kano	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	50	23	2	-	25	-	-
North West	Kebbi	30	28	2	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	158	150	6	-	2	-	-
North West	Zamfara	11	7	-	-	4	-	-
North West Total		707	520	10	-	176	1	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	36	-	-	2	-	-
North Central	Benue	34	13	-	-	21	-	-
North Central	Kogi	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
North Central	Kwara	19	6	-	-	13	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	14	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	240	151	47	-	42	-	-
North Central	Plateau	5	1	-	-	4	-	-
North Central Total		351	221	47	-	83	-	-
North East	Adamawa	35	17	-	-	18	-	-
North East	Bauchi	10	-	1	-	9	-	-
North East	Borno	349	130	33	-	184	2	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	79	30	-	-	47	2	-
North East	Yobe	17	12	-	-	5	-	-
North East Total		490	189	34	-	263	4	-
South East	Abia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		6	4	-	-	2	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	3	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Delta	41	15	-	-	26	-	-
South South	Edo	6	1	-	-	5	-	-
South South	Rivers	17	7	-	-	4	6	-
South South Total		68	26	-	-	36	6	-
South West	Ekiti	6	5	-	-	1	-	-
South West	Lagos	5	-	-	-	5	-	-
South West	Ogun	24	-	-	-	23	1	-
South West	Ondo	10	7	-	-	3	-	-
South West	Osun	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
South West	Oyo	8	5	-	-	3	-	-
South West Total		55	17	-	-	37	1	-
Grand Total		1,677	977	91	-	597	12	-

Appendix 3B: All registered abductions in Nigeria Oct 2020 – Sept 2021

Geopolitical zone	State	2021						
		Total Abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	Jigawa	3	1	2	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,430	1,093	253	-	84	-	-
North West	Kano	3	-	1	-	2	-	-
North West	Katsina	639	110	392	-	137	-	-
North West	Kebbi	225	115	83	-	27	-	-
North West	Sokoto	318	20	53	-	245	-	-
North West	Zamfara	1,198	198	800	-	200	-	-
North West Total		3,816	1,537	1,584	-	695	-	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	67	31	7	-	29	-	-
North Central	Benue	21	18	-	-	3	-	-
North Central	Kogi	27	17	7	-	3	-	-
North Central	Kwara	29	8	4	-	17	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	42	1	18	-	23	-	-
North Central	Niger	1,278	430	593	4	251	-	-
North Central	Plateau	44	39	4	-	1	-	-
North Central Total		1,508	544	633	4	327	-	-
North East	Adamawa	55	51	2	-	2	-	-
North East	Bauchi	4	3	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	298	86	22	-	190	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	17	12	1	-	4	-	-
North East	Yobe	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
North East Total		375	152	26	-	197	-	-
South East	Abia	20	20	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	3	3	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		25	24	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	17	2	-	-	15	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	11	2	-	-	9	-	-
South South	Edo	40	16	-	-	24	-	-
South South	Rivers	25	25	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		97	49	-	-	48	-	-
South West	Ekiti	4	2	-	-	2	-	-
South West	Lagos	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	21	13	-	-	8	-	-
South West	Ondo	3	1	-	-	2	-	-
South West	Osun	11	5	-	-	6	-	-
South West	Oyo	46	18	-	2	26	-	-
South West Total		86	40	-	2	44	-	-
Grand Total		5,907	2,346	2,243	6	1,312	-	-

Appendix 3C: All registered abductions in Nigeria Oct 2021 – Sept 2022

Geopolitical zone	State	2022						
		Total Abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	Jigawa	2	1	-	-	-	1	-
North West	Kaduna	2,563	2,049	437	21	49	6	1
North West	Kano	11	3	8	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	415	134	198	-	76	7	-
North West	Kebbi	240	80	123	21	16	-	-
North West	Sokoto	340	115	216	-	9	-	-
North West	Zamfara	765	233	509	5	17	1	-
North West Total		4,336	2,615	1,491	47	167	15	1
North Central	Abuja FCT	124	51	34	1	24	14	-
North Central	Benue	17	14	-	-	3	-	-
North Central	Kogi	57	52	5	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	30	19	10	-	1	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	15	6	9	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	2,106	1,066	931	80	26	3	-
North Central	Plateau	169	137	32	-	-	-	-
North Central Total		2,518	1,345	1,021	81	54	17	-
North East	Adamawa	23	19	3	-	-	1	-
North East	Bauchi	5	1	4	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	237	118	107	-	-	11	1
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	153	111	40	-	2	-	-
North East	Yobe	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		422	253	154	-	2	12	1
South East	Abia	41	41	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	11	8	-	-	2	1	-
South East	Ebonyi	4	-	-	-	-	4	-
South East	Enugu	40	40	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	45	39	-	-	5	1	-
South East Total		141	128	-	-	7	6	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	14	13	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	24	24	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Edo	139	138	-	-	-	1	-
South South	Rivers	28	21	-	-	7	-	-
South South Total		207	198	-	-	8	1	-
South West	Ekiti	24	22	2	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	8	5	2	-	1	-	-
South West	Ogun	29	18	3	-	4	4	-
South West	Ondo	72	45	18	5	4	-	-
South West	Osun	3	3	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		138	95	25	5	9	4	-
Grand Total		7,762	4,634	2,691	133	247	55	2

Appendix 3D: All registered abductions in Nigeria Oct 2022 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2023						
		Total Abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	Jigawa	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,340	883	427	4	25	1	-
North West	Kano	6	-	6	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	476	126	349	1	-	-	-
North West	Kebbi	96	59	34	-	3	-	-
North West	Sokoto	210	50	160	-	-	-	-
North West	Zamfara	1,073	141	913	8	9	2	-
North West Total		3,203	1,259	1,891	13	37	3	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	238	162	74	-	1	1	-
North Central	Benue	59	54	3	-	1	1	-
North Central	Kogi	133	107	25	1	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	76	54	20	1	-	1	-
North Central	Nasarawa	48	38	8	1	-	1	-
North Central	Niger	1,347	693	627	25	-	2	-
North Central	Plateau	73	59	11	-	-	3	-
North Central Total		1,974	1,167	768	28	2	9	-
North East	Adamawa	8	7	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	34	8	23	-	-	1	2
North East	Borno	189	17	116	-	56	-	-
North East	Gombe	6	6	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	75	49	23	-	3	-	-
North East	Yobe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		312	87	163	-	59	1	2
South East	Abia	13	11	-	-	-	2	-
South East	Anambra	49	43	3	-	1	2	-
South East	Ebonyi	17	17	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	146	132	8	-	6	-	-
South East	Imo	79	78	-	-	-	1	-
South East Total		304	281	11	-	7	5	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	18	18	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	4	4	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	50	50	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	65	64	1	-	-	-	-
South South	Edo	135	109	22	4	-	-	-
South South	Rivers	64	64	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		336	309	23	4	-	-	-
South West	Ekiti	22	16	6	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	12	11	1	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	25	22	3	-	-	-	-
South West	Ondo	58	52	6	-	-	-	-
South West	Osun	20	15	2	-	3	-	-
South West	Oyo	9	9	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		146	125	18	-	3	-	-
Grand Total		6,275	3,228	2,874	45	108	18	2

Appendix 3E: All registered abductions in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023						
		Total Abducted	Total Abducted	Total Abducted	Total Abducted	Total Abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
North West	Jigawa	-	3	2	2	7	2	4	-	-	1	-
North West	Kaduna	458	1,430	2,563	1,340	5,791	4,337	1,117	25	303	8	1
North West	Kano	-	3	11	6	20	3	15	-	2	-	-
North West	Katsina	50	639	415	476	1,580	393	941	1	238	7	-
North West	Kebbi	30	225	240	96	591	282	242	21	46	-	-
North West	Sokoto	158	318	340	210	1,026	335	435	-	256	-	-
North West	Zamfara	11	1,198	765	1,073	3,047	579	2,222	13	230	3	-
North West Total		707	3,816	4,336	3,203	12,062	5,931	4,976	60	1,075	19	1
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	67	124	238	467	280	115	1	56	15	-
North Central	Benue	34	21	17	59	131	99	3	-	28	1	-
North Central	Kogi	1	27	57	133	218	176	37	1	4	-	-
North Central	Kwara	19	29	30	76	154	87	34	1	31	1	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	42	15	48	119	59	35	1	23	1	-
North Central	Niger	240	1,278	2,106	1,347	4,971	2,340	2,198	109	319	5	-
North Central	Plateau	5	44	169	73	291	236	47	-	5	3	-
North Central Total		351	1,508	2,518	1,974	6,351	3,277	2,469	113	466	26	-
North East	Adamawa	35	55	23	8	121	94	6	-	20	1	-
North East	Bauchi	10	4	5	34	53	12	29	-	9	1	2
North East	Borno	349	298	237	189	1,073	351	278	-	430	13	1
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	6	6	6	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	79	17	153	75	324	202	64	-	56	2	-
North East	Yobe	17	1	4	-	22	16	-	-	6	-	-
North East Total		490	375	422	312	1,599	681	377	-	521	17	3
South East	Abia	-	20	41	13	74	72	-	-	-	2	-
South East	Anambra	2	1	11	49	63	51	3	-	6	3	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	4	17	21	17	-	-	-	4	-
South East	Enugu	4	1	40	146	191	177	8	-	6	-	-
South East	Imo	-	3	45	79	127	120	-	-	5	2	-
South East Total		6	25	141	304	476	437	11	-	17	11	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	17	2	18	37	22	-	-	15	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	2	14	4	23	22	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Cross River	1	2	-	50	53	52	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Delta	41	11	24	65	141	105	1	-	35	-	-
South South	Edo	6	40	139	135	320	264	22	4	29	1	-
South South	Rivers	17	25	28	64	134	117	-	-	11	6	-
South South Total		68	97	207	336	708	582	23	4	92	7	-
South West	Ekiti	6	4	24	22	56	45	8	-	3	-	-
South West	Lagos	5	1	8	12	26	17	3	-	6	-	-
South West	Ogun	24	21	29	25	99	53	6	-	35	5	-
South West	Ondo	10	3	72	58	143	105	24	5	9	-	-
South West	Osun	2	11	3	20	36	23	2	-	11	-	-
South West	Oyo	8	46	2	9	65	34	-	2	29	-	-
South West Total		55	86	138	146	425	277	43	7	93	5	-
Grand Total		1,677	5,907	7,762	6,275	21,621	11,185	7,899	184	2,264	85	4

Appendix 4A: Religious abductions in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2020

Geopolitical zone	State	2020						
		Total Abducted	Christians Abducted	% Christians in the State	Muslims Abducted	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	-	-	10	-	88	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North West	Kaduna	458	312	35	-	50	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North West	Kano	-	-	9	-	91	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North West	Katsina	50	23	7	2	91	11.5	149.5
North West	Kebbi	30	28	10	2	88	14.0	123.2
North West	Sokoto	158	150	5	6	94	25.0	470.0
North West	Zamfara	11	7	5	-	94	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North West Total		707	520		10		52.0	394.3
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	36	50	-	30	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central	Benue	34	13	75	-	10	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central	Kogi	1	-	50	-	41	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North Central	Kwara	19	6	45	-	50	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central	Nasarawa	14	14	45	-	40	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central	Niger	240	151	25	47	70	3.2	9.0
North Central	Plateau	5	1	60	-	17	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central Total		351	221		47		4.7	9.9
North East	Adamawa	35	17	30	-	65	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East	Bauchi	10	-	15	1	80	0.0	0.0
North East	Borno	349	130	20	33	60	3.9	11.8
North East	Gombe	-	-	30	-	55	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North East	Taraba	79	30	30	-	55	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East	Yobe	17	12	10	-	87	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East Total		490	189		34		5.6	17.2
South East	Abia	-	-	80	-	18	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East	Anambra	2	-	80	-	15	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	67	-	23	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East	Enugu	4	4	75	-	15	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Imo	-	-	80	-	18	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East Total		6	4		-		only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	75	-	20	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South South	Bayelsa	3	3	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Cross River	1	-	72	-	18	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South South	Delta	41	15	76	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Edo	6	1	79	-	5	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Rivers	17	7	60	-	19	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South Total		68	26		-		only Chr. abductions	abductions reported
South West	Ekiti	6	5	60	-	25	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Lagos	5	-	83	-	12	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South West	Ogun	24	-	60	-	29	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South West	Ondo	10	7	55	-	30	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Osun	2	-	59	-	39	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South West	Oyo	8	5	55	-	43	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West Total		55	17		-		only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
Grand Total		1,677	977		91		10.7	55.1

Appendix 4B: Religious abductions Nigeria Oct 2020 – Sept 2021

Geopolitical zone	State	2021						
		Total Abducted	Christians Abducted	% Christians in the State	Muslims Abducted	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	3	1	10	2	88	0.5	4.4
North West	Kaduna	1,430	1,093	35	253	50	4.3	6.2
North West	Kano	3	-	9	1	91	0.0	0.0
North West	Katsina	639	110	7	392	91	0.3	3.6
North West	Kebbi	225	115	10	83	88	1.4	12.2
North West	Sokoto	318	20	5	53	94	0.4	7.1
North West	Zamfara	1,198	198	5	800	94	0.2	4.7
North West Total		3,816	1,537		1,584		1.0	5.1
North Central	Abuja FCT	67	31	50	7	30	4.4	2.7
North Central	Benue	21	18	75	-	10	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North Central	Kogi	27	17	50	7	41	2.4	2.0
North Central	Kwara	29	8	45	4	50	2.0	2.2
North Central	Nasarawa	42	1	45	18	40	0.1	0.0
North Central	Niger	1,278	430	25	593	70	0.7	2.0
North Central	Plateau	44	39	60	4	17	9.8	2.8
North Central Total		1,508	544		633		0.9	2.0
North East	Adamawa	55	51	30	2	65	25.5	55.3
North East	Bauchi	4	3	15	1	80	3.0	16.0
North East	Borno	298	86	20	22	60	3.9	11.7
North East	Gombe	-	-	30	-	55	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North East	Taraba	17	12	30	1	55	12.0	22.0
North East	Yobe	1	-	10	-	87	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North East Total		375	152		26		5.8	15.6
South East	Abia	20	20	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Anambra	1	-	80	-	15	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	67	-	23	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South East	Enugu	1	1	75	-	15	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Imo	3	3	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East Total		25	24		-		only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Akwa Ibom	17	2	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Bayelsa	2	2	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Cross River	2	2	72	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Delta	11	2	76	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Edo	40	16	79	-	5	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Rivers	25	25	60	-	19	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South Total		97	49		-		only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South West	Ekiti	4	2	60	-	25	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Lagos	1	1	83	-	12	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Ogun	21	13	60	-	29	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Ondo	3	1	55	-	30	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Osun	11	5	59	-	39	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West	Oyo	46	18	55	-	43	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West Total		86	40		-		only Chr. abductions	only Chr. Abductions
Grand Total		5,907	2,346		2,243		1.0	4.4

Appendix 4C: Religious abductions in Nigeria Oct 2021 – Sept 2022

Geopolitical zone	State	2022						
		Total Abducted	Christians Abducted	% Christians in the State	Muslims Abducted	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	2	1	10	-	88	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
North West	Kaduna	2,563	2,049	35	437	50	4.7	6.7
North West	Kano	11	3	9	8	91	0.4	3.8
North West	Katsina	415	134	7	198	91	0.7	8.8
North West	Kebbi	240	80	10	123	88	0.7	5.7
North West	Sokoto	340	115	5	216	94	0.5	10.0
North West	Zamfara	765	233	5	509	94	0.5	8.6
North West Total		4,336	2,615		1,491		1.8	8.0
North Central	Abuja FCT	124	51	50	34	30	1.5	0.9
North Central	Benue	17	14	75	-	10	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
North Central	Kogi	57	52	50	5	41	10.4	8.5
North Central	Kwara	30	19	45	10	50	1.9	2.1
North Central	Nasarawa	15	6	45	9	40	0.7	0.6
North Central	Niger	2,106	1,066	25	931	70	1.1	3.2
North Central	Plateau	169	137	60	32	17	4.3	1.2
North Central Total		2,518	1,345		1,021		1.3	3.1
North East	Adamawa	23	19	30	3	65	6.3	13.7
North East	Bauchi	5	1	15	4	80	0.3	1.3
North East	Borno	237	118	20	107	60	1.1	3.3
North East	Gombe	-	-	30	-	55	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
North East	Taraba	153	111	30	40	55	2.8	5.1
North East	Yobe	4	4	10	-	87	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
North East Total		422	253		154		1.6	4.1
South East	Abia	41	41	80	-	18	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South East	Anambra	11	8	80	-	15	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South East	Ebonyi	4	-	67	-	23	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South East	Enugu	40	40	75	-	15	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South East	Imo	45	39	80	-	18	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South East Total		141	128		-		only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Akwa Ibom	2	2	75	-	20	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Bayelsa	14	13	75	-	20	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Cross River	-	-	72	-	18	no rel. abductions	no rel. abductions
South South	Delta	24	24	76	-	18	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Edo	139	138	79	-	5	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South	Rivers	28	21	60	-	19	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South South Total		207	198		-		only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South West	Ekiti	24	22	60	2	25	11.0	4.6
South West	Lagos	8	5	83	2	12	2.5	0.4
South West	Ogun	29	18	60	3	29	6.0	2.9
South West	Ondo	72	45	55	18	30	2.5	1.4
South West	Osun	3	3	59	-	39	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South West	Oyo	2	2	55	-	43	only Chr. Abductions	only Chr. Abductions
South West Total		138	95		25		3.8	1.9
Grand Total		7,762	4,634		2,691		1.7	5.9

Appendix 4D: Religious abductions in Nigeria Oct 2022 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2023						
		Total Abducted	Christians Abducted	% Christians in the State	Muslims Abducted	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	2	-	10	2	88	0.0	0.0
North West	Kaduna	1,340	883	35	427	50	2.1	3.0
North West	Kano	6	-	9	6	91	0.0	0.0
North West	Katsina	476	126	7	349	91	0.4	4.7
North West	Kebbi	96	59	10	34	88	1.7	15.3
North West	Sokoto	210	50	5	160	94	0.3	5.9
North West	Zamfara	1,073	141	5	913	94	0.2	2.9
North West Total		3,203	1,259		1,891		0.7	3.7
North Central	Abuja FCT	238	162	50	74	30	2.2	1.3
North Central	Benue	59	54	75	3	10	18.0	2.4
North Central	Kogi	133	107	50	25	41	4.3	3.5
North Central	Kwara	76	54	45	20	50	2.7	3.0
North Central	Nasarawa	48	38	45	8	40	4.8	4.2
North Central	Niger	1,347	693	25	627	70	1.1	3.1
North Central	Plateau	73	59	60	11	17	5.4	1.5
North Central Total		1,974	1,167		768		1.5	2.9
North East	Adamawa	8	7	30	1	65	7.0	15.2
North East	Bauchi	34	8	15	23	80	0.3	1.9
North East	Borno	189	17	20	116	60	0.1	0.4
North East	Gombe	6	6	30	-	55	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East	Taraba	75	49	30	23	55	2.1	3.9
North East	Yobe	-	-	10	-	87	only Chr. abductions	no rel. abductions
North East Total		312	87		163		0.5	1.3
South East	Abia	13	11	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Anambra	49	43	80	3	15	14.3	2.7
South East	Ebonyi	17	17	67	-	23	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Enugu	146	132	75	8	15	16.5	3.3
South East	Imo	79	78	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East Total		304	281		11		25.5	5.5
South South	Akwa Ibom	18	18	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Bayelsa	4	4	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Cross River	50	50	72	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Delta	65	64	76	1	18	64.0	15.2
South South	Edo	135	109	79	22	5	5.0	0.3
South South	Rivers	64	64	60	-	19	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South Total		336	309		23		13.4	2.6
South West	Ekiti	22	16	60	6	25	2.7	1.1
South West	Lagos	12	11	83	1	12	11.0	1.6
South West	Ogun	25	22	60	3	29	7.3	3.5
South West	Ondo	58	52	55	6	30	8.7	4.7
South West	Osun	20	15	59	2	39	7.5	5.0
South West	Oyo	9	9	55	-	43	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West Total		146	125		18		6.9	3.6
Grand Total		6,275	3,228		2,874		1.1	3.4

Appendix 4E: Religious abductions in Nigeria Oct 2019 – Sept 2023

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023						
		Total Abducted	Christians Abducted	% Christians in the State	Muslims Abducted	% Muslims in the State	Actual ratio Christians to Muslims killed	Proportionate ratio Christians to Muslims killed
North West	Jigawa	7	2	10	4	88	0.5	4.4
North West	Kaduna	5,791	4,337	35	1,117	50	3.9	5.5
North West	Kano	20	3	9	15	91	0.2	2.0
North West	Katsina	1,580	393	7	941	91	0.4	5.4
North West	Kebbi	591	282	10	242	88	1.2	10.3
North West	Sokoto	1,026	335	5	435	94	0.8	14.5
North West	Zamfara	3,047	579	5	2,222	94	0.3	4.9
North West Total		12,062	5,931		4,976		1.2	6.2
North Central	Abuja FCT	467	280	50	115	30	2.4	1.5
North Central	Benue	131	99	75	3	10	33.0	4.4
North Central	Kogi	218	176	50	37	41	4.8	3.9
North Central	Kwara	154	87	45	34	50	2.6	2.8
North Central	Nasarawa	119	59	45	35	40	1.7	1.5
North Central	Niger	4,971	2,340	25	2,198	70	1.1	3.0
North Central	Plateau	291	236	60	47	17	5.0	1.4
North Central Total		6,351	3,277		2,469		1.3	2.9
North East	Adamawa	121	94	30	6	65	15.7	33.9
North East	Bauchi	53	12	15	29	80	0.4	2.2
North East	Borno	1,073	351	20	278	60	1.3	3.8
North East	Gombe	6	6	30	-	55	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East	Taraba	324	202	30	64	55	3.2	5.8
North East	Yobe	22	16	10	-	87	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
North East Total		1,599	681		377		1.8	4.9
South East	Abia	74	72	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Anambra	63	51	80	3	15	17.0	3.2
South East	Ebonyi	21	17	67	-	23	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East	Enugu	191	177	75	8	15	22.1	4.4
South East	Imo	127	120	80	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South East Total		476	437		11		39.7	8.5
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	22	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Bayelsa	23	22	75	-	20	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Cross River	53	52	72	-	18	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South	Delta	141	105	76	1	18	105.0	24.9
South South	Edo	320	264	79	22	5	12.0	0.8
South South	Rivers	134	117	60	-	19	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South South Total		708	582		23		25.3	4.5
South West	Ekiti	56	45	60	8	25	5.6	2.3
South West	Lagos	26	17	83	3	12	5.7	0.8
South West	Ogun	99	53	60	6	29	8.8	4.3
South West	Ondo	143	105	55	24	30	4.4	2.4
South West	Osun	36	23	59	2	39	11.5	7.6
South West	Oyo	65	34	55	-	43	only Chr. abductions	only Chr. abductions
South West Total		425	277		43		6.4	3.4
Grand Total		21,621	11,185		7,899		1.4	5.1

Appendix 5A: Killing analysis: Community killings - Other killings (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020																	
		Grand total civilian victims	# of incidents with civilians killed	Community Killings								Other Killings							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	20	12	15	8	6	-	-	9	-	1	5	4	-	-	-	5	-	2
North West	Kaduna	1,819	289	1,652	240	1,128	148	-	376	1	-	167	49	109	21	-	37	52	145
North West	Kano	5	2	5	2	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	576	97	550	85	122	155	-	273	23	12	26	12	1	5	-	20	42	365
North West	Kebbi	75	17	75	17	42	9	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	142	17	117	14	4	94	-	19	-	1	25	3	22	-	-	3	-	111
North West	Zamfara	254	40	244	35	32	82	-	130	-	106	10	5	-	4	-	6	15	460
North West Total		2,891	474	2,658	401	1,334	488	-	836	24	120	233	73	132	30	-	71	109	1,083
North Central	Abuja FCT	14	11	11	8	-	-	-	11	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	3	1	2
North Central	Benue	357	104	313	87	167	4	-	142	-	-	44	17	32	-	-	12	1	19
North Central	Kogi	99	31	83	24	57	-	-	26	-	-	16	7	1	3	-	12	3	10
North Central	Kwara	4	4	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	67	22	55	15	8	-	-	47	-	-	12	7	3	-	-	9	1	6
North Central	Niger	567	135	556	127	378	51	-	127	8	-	11	8	7	3	-	1	35	44
North Central	Plateau	287	80	225	54	151	-	-	74	3	-	62	26	57	-	-	5	6	4
North Central Total		1,395	387	1,245	317	761	55	-	429	11	-	150	70	101	6	-	43	47	85
North East	Adamawa	253	37	229	29	113	-	-	116	6	-	24	8	2	-	-	22	4	25
North East	Bauchi	13	5	11	3	-	-	-	11	-	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-
North East	Borno	1,880	195	1,681	158	764	365	-	552	73	39	199	37	84	62	-	53	675	1,733
North East	Gombe	3	1	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	301	67	256	54	163	-	-	93	-	2	45	13	31	-	-	14	-	20
North East	Yobe	58	14	35	6	4	-	-	31	50	3	23	8	13	-	-	10	45	177
North East Total		2,508	319	2,215	251	1,044	365	-	806	129	44	293	68	130	62	-	101	724	1,955
South East	Abia	19	15	7	3	-	-	-	7	-	-	12	12	2	-	-	10	5	2
South East	Anambra	32	16	25	11	-	-	-	25	-	-	7	5	-	-	-	7	2	-
South East	Ebonyi	31	15	25	11	-	-	-	25	-	-	6	4	-	-	-	6	1	-
South East	Enugu	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	2
South East	Imo	25	17	18	12	-	-	-	18	-	-	7	5	-	-	-	7	1	4
South East Total		108	64	75	37	-	-	-	75	-	-	33	27	2	-	-	31	9	8
South South	Akwa Ibom	19	10	9	5	-	-	-	9	-	-	10	5	-	-	-	10	-	2
South South	Bayelsa	52	21	31	12	9	-	-	22	4	-	21	9	5	-	-	16	6	6
South South	Cross River	62	17	46	10	-	-	-	46	-	-	16	7	7	-	-	9	3	5
South South	Delta	91	54	70	38	20	-	-	50	6	4	21	16	14	-	-	7	17	1
South South	Edo	67	34	42	23	1	-	-	41	1	8	25	11	10	-	-	15	9	12
South South	Rivers	54	30	48	26	6	-	-	42	-	-	6	4	3	-	-	3	1	13
South South Total		345	166	246	114	36	-	-	210	11	12	99	52	39	-	-	60	36	39
South West	Ekiti	18	8	12	3	10	-	-	2	-	-	6	5	2	-	-	4	-	-
South West	Lagos	73	37	55	25	-	-	-	55	-	1	18	12	7	1	-	10	2	9
South West	Ogun	28	18	19	11	6	-	-	13	1	1	9	7	2	-	-	7	7	2
South West	Ondo	20	13	9	5	4	-	-	5	-	-	11	8	3	-	-	8	7	-
South West	Osun	14	8	9	6	-	-	-	9	-	-	5	2	3	-	-	2	-	2
South West	Oyo	34	25	22	17	1	1	-	20	-	-	12	8	2	1	-	9	-	1
South West Total		187	109	126	67	21	1	-	104	1	2	61	42	19	2	-	40	16	14
Grand Total		7,434	1,519	6,565	1,187	3,196	909	-	2,460	176	178	869	332	423	100	-	346	941	3,184

Appendix 5B: Killing analysis: Community killings - Other killings (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

		2021																		
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total civilian victims	# of incidents with civilians killed	Community Killings								Other Killings								
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
North West	Jigawa	19	8	16	5	12	-	-	4	1	-	3	3	-	1	-	2	3	3	
North West	Kaduna	1,539	332	1,438	285	937	55	-	446	16	9	101	47	66	10	-	25	85	402	
North West	Kano	13	10	10	8	4	1	-	5	-	-	3	2	-	1	-	2	-	3	
North West	Katsina	487	101	415	91	84	101	11	219	5	6	72	10	20	9	-	43	9	350	
North West	Kebbi	520	35	487	31	339	110	13	25	24	23	33	4	29	3	-	1	11	7	
North West	Sokoto	313	46	288	38	23	107	-	158	21	3	25	8	5	5	-	15	40	18	
North West	Zamfara	1,020	103	1,000	94	46	368	-	586	39	72	20	9	-	4	-	16	26	733	
North West Total		3,911	635	3,654	552	1,445	742	24	1,443	106	113	257	83	120	33	-	104	174	1,516	
North Central	Abuja FCT	53	21	30	11	16	-	-	14	3	4	23	10	2	1	-	20	5	-	
North Central	Benue	1,224	182	1,126	150	893	-	-	233	14	5	98	32	46	-	-	52	11	66	
North Central	Kogi	58	25	48	18	3	-	-	45	4	-	10	7	2	1	-	7	2	27	
North Central	Kwara	42	24	23	11	-	-	-	23	-	-	19	13	-	8	-	11	-	-	
North Central	Nasarawa	75	22	66	18	32	10	-	24	9	1	9	4	4	2	-	3	-	4	
North Central	Niger	809	153	745	145	281	182	-	282	26	25	64	8	10	6	-	48	90	386	
North Central	Plateau	671	168	549	122	355	8	-	186	-	6	122	46	53	38	-	31	2	12	
North Central Total		2,932	595	2,587	475	1,580	200	-	807	56	41	345	120	117	56	-	172	110	495	
North East	Adamawa	130	25	113	20	38	-	-	75	1	3	17	5	-	-	-	17	1	12	
North East	Bauchi	11	9	8	6	-	3	-	5	1	-	3	3	-	2	-	1	-	-	
North East	Borno	702	92	600	69	100	137	-	363	119	241	102	23	13	3	-	86	1,093	1,473	
North East	Gombe	29	3	25	2	20	-	-	5	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	4	-	-	
North East	Taraba	161	40	144	30	108	-	-	36	2	1	17	10	3	8	-	6	5	1	
North East	Yobe	62	15	41	10	-	1	-	40	4	-	21	5	-	-	-	21	91	126	
North East Total		1,095	184	931	137	266	141	-	524	127	245	164	47	16	13	-	135	1,190	1,612	
South East	Abia	21	12	14	6	-	-	-	14	6	-	7	6	1	-	-	6	11	6	
South East	Anambra	190	51	141	31	66	-	-	75	21	-	49	20	9	19	-	21	36	8	
South East	Ebonyi	414	37	403	33	289	-	-	114	7	2	11	4	1	-	-	10	14	8	
South East	Enugu	85	22	71	17	57	-	-	14	4	-	14	5	10	-	-	4	15	8	
South East	Imo	385	52	60	26	-	-	-	60	6	4	325	26	267	29	-	29	117	72	
South East Total		1,095	174	689	113	412	-	-	277	44	6	406	61	288	48	-	70	193	102	
South South	Akwa Ibom	42	17	29	12	-	-	-	29	8	-	13	5	-	-	-	13	12	3	
South South	Bayelsa	19	12	16	9	-	-	-	16	-	-	3	3	1	-	-	2	1	2	
South South	Cross River	35	11	23	6	-	-	-	23	6	-	12	5	-	-	-	12	5	-	
South South	Delta	139	79	102	54	2	-	-	100	7	2	37	25	3	-	-	34	21	14	
South South	Edo	76	40	54	28	6	-	-	48	-	-	22	12	2	-	-	20	-	4	
South South	Rivers	105	41	70	28	3	-	-	67	19	-	35	13	7	-	-	28	24	14	
South South Total		416	200	294	137	11	-	-	283	40	2	122	63	13	-	-	109	63	37	
South West	Ekiti	33	19	27	13	2	-	-	25	-	-	6	6	1	-	-	5	-	2	
South West	Lagos	129	64	70	36	1	-	-	69	-	4	59	28	1	-	-	58	1	2	
South West	Ogun	81	35	54	23	16	-	-	38	3	-	27	12	4	1	-	22	2	10	
South West	Ondo	51	28	42	21	6	-	-	36	2	-	9	7	1	-	-	8	-	6	
South West	Osun	61	33	44	27	1	-	-	43	1	-	17	6	-	1	-	16	8	7	
South West	Oyo	136	67	92	43	21	-	-	71	3	2	44	24	6	2	-	36	7	2	
South West Total		491	246	329	163	47	-	-	282	9	6	162	83	13	4	-	145	18	29	
Grand Total		9,940	2,034	8,484	1,577	3,761	1,083	24	3,616	382	413	1,456	457	567	154	-	735	1,748	3,791	

Appendix 5C: Killing analysis: Community killings - Other killings (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

Geopolitical zone	State	2022																	
		Grand total civilian victims	# of incidents with civilians killed	Community Killings								Other Killings							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	21	13	2	1	2	-	-	-	2	-	19	12	7	11	-	1	1	9
North West	Kaduna	1,181	307	932	189	677	229	1	25	10	95	249	118	185	51	1	12	23	492
North West	Kano	40	8	12	2	-	12	-	-	-	-	28	6	18	10	-	-	5	44
North West	Katsina	296	86	236	58	60	148	-	28	5	83	60	28	11	34	-	15	23	222
North West	Kebbi	318	36	244	25	118	96	21	9	9	18	74	11	64	10	-	-	134	62
North West	Sokoto	374	42	310	29	107	172	-	31	1	19	64	13	16	17	-	31	-	149
North West	Zamfara	934	90	832	68	210	614	-	8	5	152	102	22	23	54	-	25	47	456
North West Total		3,164	582	2,568	372	1,174	1,271	22	101	32	367	596	210	324	187	1	84	233	1,434
North Central	Abuja FCT	49	31	17	12	3	5	-	9	1	-	32	19	13	17	-	2	3	3
North Central	Benue	516	110	412	73	391	-	1	20	4	3	104	37	104	-	-	-	6	45
North Central	Kogi	58	31	15	7	10	-	-	5	-	-	43	24	31	8	2	2	12	18
North Central	Kwara	26	21	4	4	1	-	-	3	-	-	22	17	14	4	-	4	-	21
North Central	Nasarawa	89	10	50	3	39	11	-	-	-	-	39	7	34	5	-	-	3	2
North Central	Niger	940	157	824	124	460	332	2	30	95	184	116	33	89	25	-	2	68	823
North Central	Plateau	398	102	204	51	163	34	-	7	3	191	194	51	171	22	-	1	7	20
North Central Total		2,076	462	1,526	274	1,067	382	3	74	103	378	550	188	456	81	2	11	99	932
North East	Adamawa	104	23	90	13	83	4	-	3	-	-	14	10	11	2	-	1	11	27
North East	Bauchi	43	17	20	8	4	15	-	1	-	-	23	9	14	8	1	-	-	5
North East	Borno	400	58	300	31	141	150	-	9	37	575	100	27	43	42	-	15	205	2,155
North East	Gombe	35	10	24	5	24	-	-	-	1	1	11	5	4	6	-	1	-	-
North East	Taraba	611	59	472	41	407	23	2	40	16	53	139	18	117	21	1	-	12	15
North East	Yobe	25	8	20	3	16	4	-	-	5	7	5	5	2	3	-	-	7	53
North East Total		1,218	175	926	101	675	196	2	53	59	636	292	74	191	82	2	17	235	2,255
South East	Abia	76	16	57	5	7	8	-	42	-	-	19	11	19	-	-	-	4	12
South East	Anambra	151	57	53	7	47	4	-	2	1	20	98	50	88	5	-	5	47	85
South East	Ebonyi	107	30	46	6	42	1	-	3	2	4	61	24	60	-	-	1	16	17
South East	Enugu	97	47	52	16	51	-	-	1	2	-	45	31	43	1	-	1	29	3
South East	Imo	144	56	84	17	80	-	-	4	16	-	60	39	56	3	-	1	26	34
South East Total		575	206	292	51	227	13	-	52	21	24	283	155	266	9	-	8	122	151
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	19	6	2	6	-	-	-	-	-	31	17	29	2	-	-	1	4
South South	Bayelsa	27	19	3	2	-	-	-	3	1	-	24	17	22	1	-	1	3	13
South South	Cross River	70	14	52	8	49	-	-	3	1	-	18	6	16	-	-	2	4	19
South South	Delta	68	50	13	8	5	-	-	8	-	3	55	42	52	3	-	-	5	70
South South	Edo	33	16	18	5	16	-	-	2	1	1	15	11	15	-	-	-	4	51
South South	Rivers	39	22	19	8	10	-	-	9	-	-	20	14	16	-	3	1	9	13
South South Total		274	140	111	33	86	-	-	25	3	4	163	107	150	6	3	4	26	170
South West	Ekiti	5	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	5	5	5	-	-	-	1	1
South West	Lagos	70	44	12	9	1	1	1	9	-	3	58	35	40	9	-	9	4	30
South West	Ogun	57	33	5	3	3	2	-	-	1	-	52	30	32	10	4	6	7	22
South West	Ondo	111	32	64	6	63	-	-	1	-	-	47	26	38	1	-	8	1	4
South West	Osun	58	36	7	6	2	-	-	5	1	1	51	30	39	9	-	3	1	7
South West	Oyo	43	25	10	4	10	-	-	-	-	-	33	21	28	4	-	1	6	10
South West Total		344	175	98	28	79	3	1	15	4	4	246	147	182	33	4	27	20	74
Grand Total		7,651	1,740	5,521	859	3,308	1,865	28	320	222	1,413	2,130	881	1,569	398	12	151	735	5,016

Appendix 5D: Killing analysis: Community killings - Other killings (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2023																	
		Grand total civilian victims	# of incidents with civilians killed	Community Killings								Other Killings							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	14	9	8	3	-	8	-	-	-	2	6	6	-	6	-	-	1	1
North West	Kaduna	555	193	481	151	397	83	-	1	1	13	74	42	49	24	-	1	23	354
North West	Kano	57	16	33	8	7	26	-	-	-	1	24	8	4	20	-	-	-	3
North West	Katsina	249	70	236	61	86	146	4	-	50	9	13	9	2	11	-	-	9	152
North West	Kebbi	136	15	131	11	64	67	-	-	6	2	5	4	-	5	-	-	3	33
North West	Sokoto	173	39	145	28	32	109	1	3	9	2	28	11	-	28	-	-	7	114
North West	Zamfara	476	95	391	70	67	324	-	-	70	238	85	25	13	70	-	2	55	540
North West Total		1,660	437	1,425	332	653	763	5	4	136	267	235	105	68	164	-	3	98	1,197
North Central	Abuja FCT	40	33	18	14	12	6	-	-	-	-	22	19	10	8	1	3	3	1
North Central	Benue	1,088	153	1,037	135	995	4	7	31	8	9	51	18	45	4	2	-	12	18
North Central	Kogi	73	30	47	18	29	17	1	-	-	6	26	12	13	8	1	4	4	2
North Central	Kwara	30	24	12	11	8	4	-	-	-	1	18	13	10	6	1	1	1	11
North Central	Nasarawa	252	31	238	20	149	89	-	-	-	1	14	11	11	3	-	-	5	20
North Central	Niger	300	97	239	75	145	92	1	1	37	80	61	22	22	34	1	4	87	483
North Central	Plateau	603	166	566	136	525	41	-	-	-	5	37	30	25	10	2	-	1	33
North Central Total		2,386	534	2,157	409	1,863	253	9	32	45	102	229	125	136	73	8	12	113	568
North East	Adamawa	41	23	27	11	25	2	-	-	-	-	14	12	7	7	-	-	1	24
North East	Bauchi	83	27	70	17	23	47	-	-	1	3	13	10	1	12	-	-	-	69
North East	Borno	306	49	225	29	55	170	-	-	20	368	81	20	3	71	-	7	123	3,085
North East	Gombe	11	8	8	5	5	3	-	-	-	-	3	3	1	2	-	-	-	3
North East	Taraba	244	33	217	24	142	58	17	-	3	5	27	9	10	17	-	-	-	31
North East	Yobe	15	5	13	3	-	13	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	40
North East Total		700	145	560	89	250	293	17	-	24	376	140	56	23	110	-	7	124	3,252
South East	Abia	30	11	12	3	12	-	-	-	1	-	18	8	18	-	-	-	7	19
South East	Anambra	98	50	37	17	37	-	-	-	5	13	61	33	58	1	2	-	46	67
South East	Ebonyi	67	33	48	20	48	-	-	-	2	-	19	13	17	-	-	2	13	19
South East	Enugu	165	52	134	33	131	2	-	1	-	2	31	19	31	-	-	-	27	23
South East	Imo	135	46	90	18	87	3	-	-	6	-	45	28	43	2	-	-	30	18
South East Total		495	192	321	91	315	5	-	1	14	15	174	101	167	3	2	2	123	146
South South	Akwa Ibom	43	12	30	5	27	-	-	3	-	-	13	7	7	-	-	6	3	6
South South	Bayelsa	20	14	12	9	12	-	-	-	-	-	8	5	7	1	-	-	1	3
South South	Cross River	28	14	7	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	21	13	20	-	1	-	1	6
South South	Delta	98	55	40	18	29	11	-	-	6	-	58	37	50	3	3	2	23	35
South South	Edo	62	29	35	13	29	-	-	6	4	1	27	16	22	1	3	1	7	7
South South	Rivers	83	41	46	16	44	-	2	-	4	-	37	25	33	1	3	-	8	51
South South Total		334	165	170	62	148	11	2	9	14	1	164	103	139	6	10	9	43	108
South West	Ekiti	11	9	2	2	1	-	-	1	-	-	9	7	6	3	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	80	57	16	11	13	-	2	1	1	2	64	46	47	8	8	1	6	5
South West	Ogun	55	34	28	17	20	3	5	-	-	10	27	17	14	2	11	-	1	16
South West	Ondo	53	33	27	14	17	2	2	6	-	-	26	19	19	2	4	1	3	4
South West	Osun	36	22	15	9	10	2	-	3	-	-	21	13	11	6	3	1	-	7
South West	Oyo	45	21	21	7	8	12	1	-	1	-	24	14	17	5	1	1	3	6
South West Total		280	176	109	60	69	19	10	11	2	12	171	116	114	26	27	4	13	38
Grand Total		5,855	1,649	4,742	1,043	3,298	1,344	43	57	235	773	1,113	606	647	382	47	37	514	5,309

Appendix 5E: Killing analysis: Community killings - Other killings (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023																	
		Grand total civilian victims	# of incidents with civilians killed	Community Killings								Other Killings							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
North West	Jigawa	74	42	41	17	20	8	-	13	3	3	33	25	7	18	-	8	5	15
North West	Kaduna	5,094	1,121	4,503	865	3,139	515	1	848	28	117	591	256	409	106	1	75	183	1,393
North West	Kano	115	36	60	20	11	39	-	10	-	1	55	16	22	31	-	2	5	50
North West	Katsina	1,608	354	1,437	295	352	550	15	520	83	110	171	59	34	59	-	78	83	1,089
North West	Kebbi	1,049	103	937	84	563	282	34	58	39	43	112	19	93	18	-	1	148	102
North West	Sokoto	1,002	144	860	109	166	482	1	211	31	25	142	35	43	50	-	49	47	392
North West	Zamfara	2,684	328	2,467	267	355	1,388	-	724	114	568	217	61	36	132	-	49	143	2,189
North West Total		11,626	2,128	10,305	1,657	4,606	3,264	51	2,384	298	867	1,321	471	644	414	1	262	614	5,230
North Central	Abuja FCT	156	96	76	45	31	11	-	34	4	4	80	51	25	26	1	28	12	6
North Central	Benue	3,185	549	2,888	445	2,446	8	8	426	26	17	297	104	227	4	2	64	30	148
North Central	Kogi	288	117	193	67	99	17	1	76	4	6	95	50	47	20	3	25	21	57
North Central	Kwara	102	73	41	28	9	4	-	28	-	1	61	45	25	18	1	17	1	32
North Central	Nasarawa	483	85	409	56	228	110	-	71	9	2	74	29	52	10	-	12	9	32
North Central	Niger	2,616	542	2,364	471	1,264	657	3	440	166	289	252	71	128	68	1	55	280	1,736
North Central	Plateau	1,959	516	1,544	363	1,194	83	-	267	6	202	415	153	306	70	2	37	16	69
North Central Total		8,789	1,978	7,515	1,475	5,271	890	12	1,342	215	521	1,274	503	810	216	10	238	369	2,080
North East	Adamawa	528	108	459	73	259	6	-	194	7	3	69	35	20	9	-	40	17	88
North East	Bauchi	150	58	109	34	27	65	-	17	2	3	41	24	15	22	1	3	-	74
North East	Borno	3,288	394	2,806	287	1,060	822	-	924	249	1,223	482	107	143	178	-	161	2,096	8,446
North East	Gombe	78	22	60	13	49	3	-	8	1	1	18	9	5	8	-	5	-	3
North East	Taraba	1,317	199	1,089	149	820	81	19	169	21	61	228	50	161	46	1	20	17	67
North East	Yobe	160	42	109	22	20	18	-	71	59	10	51	20	16	4	-	31	143	396
North East Total		5,521	823	4,632	578	2,235	995	19	1,383	339	1,301	889	245	360	267	2	260	2,273	9,074
South East	Abia	146	54	90	17	19	8	-	63	7	-	56	37	40	-	-	16	27	39
South East	Anambra	471	174	256	66	150	4	-	102	27	33	215	108	155	25	2	33	131	160
South East	Ebonyi	619	115	522	70	379	1	-	142	11	6	97	45	78	-	-	19	44	44
South East	Enugu	348	122	257	66	239	2	-	16	6	2	91	56	84	1	-	6	71	36
South East	Imo	689	171	252	73	167	3	-	82	28	4	437	98	366	34	-	37	174	128
South East Total		2,273	636	1,377	292	954	18	-	405	79	45	896	344	723	60	2	111	447	407
South South	Akwa Ibom	141	58	74	24	33	-	-	41	8	-	67	34	36	2	-	29	16	15
South South	Bayelsa	118	66	62	32	21	-	-	41	5	-	56	34	35	2	-	19	11	24
South South	Cross River	195	56	128	25	56	-	-	72	7	-	67	31	43	-	1	23	13	30
South South	Delta	396	238	225	118	56	11	-	158	19	9	171	120	119	6	3	43	66	120
South South	Edo	238	119	149	69	52	-	-	97	6	10	89	50	49	1	3	36	20	74
South South	Rivers	281	134	183	78	63	-	2	118	23	-	98	56	59	1	6	32	42	91
South South Total		1,369	671	821	346	281	11	2	527	68	19	548	325	341	12	13	182	168	354
South West	Ekiti	67	41	41	18	13	-	-	28	2	-	26	23	14	3	-	9	1	3
South West	Lagos	352	202	153	81	15	1	3	134	1	10	199	121	95	18	8	78	13	46
South West	Ogun	221	120	106	54	45	5	5	51	5	11	115	66	52	13	15	35	17	50
South West	Ondo	235	106	142	46	90	2	2	48	2	-	93	60	61	3	4	25	11	14
South West	Osun	169	99	75	48	13	2	-	60	2	1	94	51	53	16	3	22	9	23
South West	Oyo	258	138	145	71	40	13	1	91	4	2	113	67	53	12	1	47	16	19
South West Total		1,302	706	662	318	216	23	11	412	16	24	640	388	328	65	31	216	67	155
Grand Total		30,880	6,942	25,312	4,666	13,563	5,201	95	6,453	1,015	2,777	5,568	2,276	3,206	1,034	59	1,269	3,938	17,300

Appendix 6A: Abduction analysis: Community abductions - Other abductions (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

		2020																	
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total of civilian abductions	Grand total # of incidents with civilian abductions	Community Abductions								Other Abductions							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims
North West	Jigawa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	457	49	419	34	286	-	-	133	1	-	38	15	26	-	-	12	-	-
North West	Kano	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	50	10	41	6	18	-	-	23	-	-	9	4	5	2	-	2	-	-
North West	Kebbi	30	5	28	3	28	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	158	3	8	2	-	6	-	2	-	-	150	1	150	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Zamfara	11	2	7	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	4	-	-
North West Total		706	69	503	46	339	6	-	158	1	-	203	23	181	4	-	18	-	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	3	38	3	36	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Benue	34	9	22	4	4	-	-	18	-	-	12	5	9	-	-	3	-	-
North Central	Kogi	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	19	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	19	3	6	-	-	13	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	1	14	1	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	240	44	216	36	134	40	-	42	-	-	24	8	17	7	-	-	-	-
North Central	Plateau	5	3	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	4	2	1	-	-	3	-	-
North Central Total		351	64	292	46	188	40	-	64	-	-	59	18	33	7	-	19	-	-
North East	Adamawa	35	7	29	5	13	-	-	16	-	-	6	2	4	-	-	2	-	-
North East	Bauchi	10	2	9	1	-	-	-	9	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	347	63	140	28	84	33	-	23	2	-	207	35	46	-	-	161	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	77	12	57	5	24	-	-	33	2	-	20	7	6	-	-	14	-	-
North East	Yobe	17	7	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	15	6	12	-	-	3	-	-
North East Total		486	91	237	40	121	33	-	83	4	-	249	51	68	1	-	180	-	-
South East	Abia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	4	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	4	-	-	2	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Delta	41	10	22	4	-	-	-	22	-	-	19	6	15	-	-	4	-	-
South South	Edo	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	1	-	-	5	-	-
South South	Rivers	11	3	4	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	7	1	7	-	-	-	6	-
South South Total		62	17	26	6	-	-	-	26	-	-	36	11	26	-	-	10	6	-
South West	Ekiti	6	3	4	2	3	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	5	-	-
South West	Ogun	23	2	19	1	-	-	-	19	-	-	4	1	-	-	-	4	1	-
South West	Ondo	10	5	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	7	4	4	-	-	3	-	-
South West	Osun	2	1	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	8	4	3	1	-	-	-	3	-	-	5	3	5	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		54	17	31	6	6	-	-	25	-	-	23	11	11	-	-	12	1	-
Grand Total		1,665	260	1,089	144	654	79	-	356	5	-	576	116	323	12	-	241	7	-

Appendix 6B: Abduction analysis: Community abductions - Other abductions (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

		2021																	
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total of civilian abductions	Grand total # of incidents with civilian abductions	Community Abductions								Other Abductions							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims
North West	Jigawa	3	3	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,430	127	1,173	99	888	217	-	68	-	-	257	28	205	36	-	16	-	-
North West	Kano	3	2	2	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	639	49	621	41	108	380	-	133	-	-	18	8	2	12	-	4	-	-
North West	Kebbi	225	21	189	19	85	77	-	27	-	-	36	2	30	6	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	318	15	207	12	20	53	-	134	-	-	111	3	-	-	-	111	-	-
North West	Zamfara	1,198	34	1,180	29	198	786	-	196	-	-	18	5	-	14	-	4	-	-
North West Total		3,816	251	3,373	202	1,299	1,514	-	560	-	-	443	49	238	70	-	135	-	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	67	15	37	7	12	1	-	24	-	-	30	8	19	6	-	5	-	-
North Central	Benue	21	14	17	11	14	-	-	3	-	-	4	3	4	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kogi	27	10	15	6	12	-	-	3	-	-	12	4	5	7	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	29	9	10	3	3	-	-	7	-	-	19	6	5	4	-	10	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	42	7	39	5	1	17	-	21	-	-	3	2	-	1	-	2	-	-
North Central	Niger	1,278	303	1,234	288	420	584	4	226	-	-	44	15	10	9	-	25	-	-
North Central	Plateau	44	22	39	17	36	2	-	1	-	-	5	5	3	2	-	-	-	-
North Central Total		1,508	380	1,391	337	498	604	4	285	-	-	117	43	46	29	-	42	-	-
North East	Adamawa	55	4	53	3	51	-	-	2	-	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	4	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	3	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	298	35	287	33	86	22	-	179	-	-	11	2	-	-	-	11	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	17	14	10	8	8	-	-	2	-	-	7	6	4	1	-	2	-	-
North East	Yobe	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		375	56	351	45	145	22	-	184	-	-	24	11	7	4	-	13	-	-
South East	Abia	20	6	16	3	16	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	4	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	3	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		25	10	17	4	17	-	-	-	-	-	8	6	7	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	17	3	15	1	-	-	-	15	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	2	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	11	4	4	2	-	-	-	4	-	-	7	2	2	-	-	5	-	-
South South	Edo	40	7	21	3	11	-	-	10	-	-	19	4	5	-	-	14	-	-
South South	Rivers	25	6	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	24	5	24	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		97	24	42	8	13	-	-	29	-	-	55	16	36	-	-	19	-	-
South West	Ekiti	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	2	-	-	2	-	-
South West	Lagos	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	21	7	18	5	10	-	-	8	-	-	3	2	3	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ondo	3	2	3	2	1	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Osun	11	3	6	2	-	-	-	6	-	-	5	1	5	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	46	10	45	9	18	-	2	25	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-
South West Total		86	26	72	18	29	-	2	41	-	-	14	8	11	-	-	3	-	-
Grand Total		5,907	747	5,246	614	2,001	2,140	6	1,099	-	-	661	133	345	103	-	213	-	-

Appendix 6C: Abduction analysis: Community abductions - Other abductions (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

		2022																	
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total of civilian abductions	Grand total # of incidents with civilian abductions	Community Abductions								Other Abductions							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims
North West	Jigawa	1	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	2,556	228	1,817	172	1,434	327	21	35	3	1	739	56	615	110	-	14	3	-
North West	Kano	11	6	6	2	-	6	-	-	-	-	5	4	3	2	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	408	61	341	42	107	182	-	52	6	-	67	19	27	16	-	24	1	-
North West	Kebbi	240	16	121	10	42	42	21	16	-	-	119	6	38	81	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	340	26	231	17	83	147	-	1	-	-	109	9	32	69	-	8	-	-
North West	Zamfara	764	53	608	35	121	465	5	17	-	-	156	18	112	44	-	-	1	-
North West Total		4,320	391	3,125	279	1,788	1,169	47	121	10	1	1,195	112	827	322	-	46	5	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	110	22	77	10	24	28	1	24	14	-	33	12	27	6	-	-	-	-
North Central	Benue	17	13	14	10	11	-	-	3	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kogi	57	15	8	2	8	-	-	-	-	-	49	13	44	5	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	30	9	16	4	6	9	-	1	-	-	14	5	13	1	-	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	15	7	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	13	6	6	7	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	2,103	189	1,901	148	919	881	80	21	-	-	202	41	147	50	-	5	3	-
North Central	Plateau	169	40	42	11	30	12	-	-	-	-	127	29	107	20	-	-	-	-
North Central Total		2,501	295	2,060	186	998	932	81	49	14	-	441	109	347	89	-	5	3	-
North East	Adamawa	22	15	3	3	1	2	-	-	-	-	19	12	18	1	-	-	1	-
North East	Bauchi	5	2	3	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	225	16	49	4	34	15	-	-	-	-	176	12	84	92	-	-	11	1
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	153	18	109	14	77	30	-	2	-	-	44	4	34	10	-	-	-	-
North East	Yobe	4	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	4	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		409	52	164	22	113	49	-	2	-	-	245	30	140	105	-	-	12	1
South East	Abia	41	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	41	7	41	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	10	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	7	8	-	-	2	1	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
South East	Enugu	40	10	11	3	11	-	-	-	-	-	29	7	29	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	44	12	31	5	28	-	-	3	-	-	13	7	11	-	-	2	1	-
South East Total		135	36	42	8	39	-	-	3	-	-	93	28	89	-	-	4	6	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	14	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	5	13	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	24	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	24	5	24	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Edo	138	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	138	7	138	-	-	-	1	-
South South	Rivers	28	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	6	21	-	-	7	-	-
South South Total		206	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	206	25	198	-	-	8	1	-
South West	Ekiti	24	6	5	2	3	2	-	-	-	-	19	4	19	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	8	3	3	2	-	2	-	1	-	-	5	1	5	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	25	9	9	3	6	3	-	-	-	-	16	6	12	-	-	4	4	-
South West	Ondo	72	9	5	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	67	8	45	18	-	4	-	-
South West	Osun	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	2	3	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		134	30	22	8	9	7	5	1	-	-	112	22	86	18	-	8	4	-
Grand Total		7,705	829	5,413	503	2,947	2,157	133	176	24	1	2,292	326	1,687	534	-	71	31	1

Appendix 6D: Abduction analysis: Community abductions - Other abductions (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

		2023																	
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total of civilian abductions	Grand total # of incidents with civilian abductions	Community Abductions								Other Abductions							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims
North West	Jigawa	2	1	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,339	162	1,153	133	770	354	4	25	-	-	186	29	113	73	-	-	1	-
North West	Kano	6	5	6	5	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	476	68	435	62	118	316	1	-	-	-	41	6	8	33	-	-	-	-
North West	Kebbi	96	16	96	16	59	34	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	210	21	174	17	42	132	-	-	-	-	36	4	8	28	-	-	-	-
North West	Zamfara	1,071	63	706	48	119	575	8	4	-	-	365	15	22	338	-	5	2	-
North West Total		3,200	336	2,572	282	1,108	1,419	13	32	-	-	628	54	151	472	-	5	3	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	237	37	225	29	153	72	-	-	1	-	12	8	9	2	-	1	-	-
North Central	Benue	58	18	29	10	28	-	-	1	-	-	29	8	26	3	-	-	1	-
North Central	Kogi	133	19	45	10	38	7	-	-	-	-	88	9	69	18	1	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	75	19	67	16	47	19	1	-	-	-	8	3	7	1	-	-	1	-
North Central	Nasarawa	47	13	21	6	16	5	-	-	-	-	26	7	22	3	1	-	1	-
North Central	Niger	1,345	116	1,270	108	663	584	23	-	2	-	75	8	30	43	2	-	-	-
North Central	Plateau	70	32	56	24	48	8	-	-	-	-	14	8	11	3	-	-	3	-
North Central Total		1,965	254	1,713	203	993	695	24	1	3	-	252	51	174	73	4	1	6	-
North East	Adamawa	8	5	8	5	7	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	31	16	26	13	7	19	-	-	-	2	5	3	1	4	-	-	1	-
North East	Borno	189	26	170	23	17	104	-	49	-	-	19	3	-	12	-	7	-	-
North East	Gombe	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	6	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	75	13	57	10	38	19	-	-	-	-	18	3	11	4	-	3	-	-
North East	Yobe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		309	62	261	51	69	143	-	49	-	2	48	11	18	20	-	10	1	-
South East	Abia	11	3	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	2	10	-	-	-	2	-
South East	Anambra	47	19	24	14	22	1	-	1	1	-	23	5	21	2	-	-	1	-
South East	Ebonyi	17	4	17	4	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	146	20	118	14	110	8	-	-	-	-	28	6	22	-	-	6	-	-
South East	Imo	78	21	30	12	30	-	-	-	1	-	48	9	48	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		299	67	190	45	180	9	-	1	2	-	109	22	101	2	-	6	3	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	18	7	2	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	16	5	16	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	4	2	4	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	50	12	22	6	22	-	-	-	-	-	28	6	28	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	65	11	60	7	60	-	-	-	-	-	5	4	4	1	-	-	-	-
South South	Edo	135	16	66	8	49	13	4	-	-	-	69	8	60	9	-	-	-	-
South South	Rivers	64	18	36	8	36	-	-	-	-	-	28	10	28	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		336	66	190	33	173	13	4	-	-	-	146	33	136	10	-	-	-	-
South West	Ekiti	22	7	10	4	10	-	-	-	-	-	12	3	6	6	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	12	3	3	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	9	2	8	1	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	25	9	23	8	20	3	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ondo	58	13	34	7	33	1	-	-	-	-	24	6	19	5	-	-	-	-
South West	Osun	20	13	12	8	7	2	-	3	-	-	8	5	8	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	9	4	5	2	5	-	-	-	-	-	4	2	4	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		146	49	87	30	78	6	-	3	-	-	59	19	47	12	-	-	-	-
Grand Total		6,255	834	5,013	644	2,601	2,285	41	86	5	2	1,242	190	627	589	4	22	13	-

Appendix 6E: Abduction analysis: Community abductions - Other abductions (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

		2020-2023																	
Geopolitical zone	State	Grand total of civilian abductions	Grand total # of incidents with civilian abductions	Community Abductions								Other Abductions							
				Total community victims	Total community incidents	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims	Total victims otherwise	Total incidents otherwise	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATRs abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces victims	Terror Groups victims
North West	Jigawa	6	5	4	3	1	3	-	-	1	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	5,782	566	4,562	438	3,378	898	25	261	4	1	1,220	128	959	219	-	42	4	-
North West	Kano	20	13	14	8	-	12	-	2	-	-	6	5	3	3	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	1,573	188	1,438	151	351	878	1	208	6	-	135	37	42	63	-	30	1	-
North West	Kebbi	591	58	434	48	214	153	21	46	-	-	157	10	68	89	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	1,026	65	620	48	145	338	-	137	-	-	406	17	190	97	-	119	-	-
North West	Zamfara	3,044	152	2,501	113	445	1,826	13	217	-	-	543	39	134	396	-	13	3	-
North West Total		12,042	1,047	9,573	809	4,534	4,108	60	871	11	1	2,469	238	1,397	868	-	204	8	-
North Central	Abuja FCT	452	77	377	49	225	101	1	50	15	-	75	28	55	14	-	6	-	-
North Central	Benue	130	54	82	35	57	-	-	25	-	-	48	19	42	3	-	3	1	-
North Central	Kogi	218	45	69	19	58	7	-	4	-	-	149	26	118	30	1	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	153	40	93	23	56	28	1	8	-	-	60	17	31	6	-	23	1	-
North Central	Nasarawa	118	28	76	13	31	24	-	21	-	-	42	15	28	11	1	2	1	-
North Central	Niger	4,966	652	4,621	580	2,136	2,089	107	289	2	-	345	72	204	109	2	30	3	-
North Central	Plateau	288	97	138	53	114	22	-	2	-	-	150	44	122	25	-	3	3	-
North Central Total		6,325	993	5,456	772	2,677	2,271	109	399	17	-	869	221	600	198	4	67	9	-
North East	Adamawa	120	31	93	16	72	3	-	18	-	-	27	15	22	3	-	2	1	-
North East	Bauchi	50	22	38	15	8	21	-	9	-	2	12	7	4	8	-	-	1	-
North East	Borno	1,059	140	646	88	221	174	-	251	2	-	413	52	130	104	-	179	11	1
North East	Gombe	6	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	2	6	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	322	57	233	37	147	49	-	37	2	-	89	20	55	15	-	19	-	-
North East	Yobe	22	9	3	2	-	-	-	3	-	-	19	7	16	-	-	3	-	-
North East Total		1,579	261	1,013	158	448	247	-	318	4	2	566	103	233	130	-	203	13	1
South East	Abia	72	16	17	4	17	-	-	-	-	-	55	12	55	-	-	-	2	-
South East	Anambra	60	28	24	14	22	1	-	1	1	-	36	14	29	2	-	5	2	-
South East	Ebonyi	17	4	17	4	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-
South East	Enugu	191	32	129	17	121	8	-	-	-	-	62	15	56	-	-	6	-	-
South East	Imo	125	35	62	18	59	-	-	3	1	-	63	17	61	-	-	2	1	-
South East Total		465	115	249	57	236	9	-	4	2	-	216	58	201	2	-	13	9	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	12	17	3	2	-	-	15	-	-	20	9	20	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	23	10	4	2	4	-	-	-	-	-	19	8	18	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Cross River	53	15	23	7	23	-	-	-	-	-	30	8	29	-	-	1	-	-
South South	Delta	141	30	86	13	60	-	-	26	-	-	55	17	45	1	-	9	-	-
South South	Edo	319	32	87	11	60	13	4	10	-	-	232	21	204	9	-	19	1	-
South South	Rivers	128	33	41	11	37	-	-	4	-	-	87	22	80	-	-	7	6	-
South South Total		701	132	258	47	186	13	4	55	-	-	443	85	396	10	-	37	7	-
South West	Ekiti	56	19	19	8	16	2	-	1	-	-	37	11	29	6	-	2	-	-
South West	Lagos	26	9	6	3	3	2	-	1	-	-	20	6	14	1	-	5	-	-
South West	Ogun	94	27	69	17	36	6	-	27	-	-	25	10	17	-	-	8	5	-
South West	Ondo	143	29	45	11	37	1	5	2	-	-	98	18	68	23	-	7	-	-
South West	Osun	36	19	20	11	7	2	-	11	-	-	16	8	16	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	65	19	53	12	23	-	2	28	-	-	12	7	11	-	-	1	-	-
South West Total		420	122	212	62	122	13	7	70	-	-	208	60	155	30	-	23	5	-
Grand Total		21,532	2,670	16,761	1,905	8,203	6,661	180	1,717	34	3	4,771	765	2,982	1,238	4	547	51	1

Appendix 7A: Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020												
		Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	23	3	-	2	-	1	-	1	3	8	2	-	3
North West	Kaduna	2,017	30	26	17	91	240	217	196	196	119	401	413	71
North West	Kano	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	1,018	-	2	2	27	37	26	180	287	230	116	41	70
North West	Kebbi	75	1	-	4	21	5	40	1	-	1	1	-	1
North West	Sokoto	254	5	-	1	22	-	4	24	79	100	15	1	3
North West	Zamfara	835	89	51	1	47	26	77	128	215	117	63	7	14
North West Total		4,227	128	79	27	208	309	369	530	780	575	598	462	162
North Central	Abuja FCT	17	3	1	-	3	1	1	6	-	2	-	-	-
North Central	Benue	377	-	3	-	7	7	69	49	80	105	21	28	8
North Central	Kogi	112	-	6	6	24	4	3	6	4	15	25	16	3
North Central	Kwara	4	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	74	-	-	-	8	-	-	4	25	2	20	8	7
North Central	Niger	654	15	18	34	27	29	57	60	168	31	37	72	106
North Central	Plateau	300	4	1	2	71	19	41	56	16	42	21	10	17
North Central Total		1,538	22	29	42	141	60	172	181	294	198	124	134	141
North East	Adamawa	288	7	28	4	65	10	5	39	78	41	11	-	-
North East	Bauchi	13	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	10	-	1	-
North East	Borno	4,400	256	168	317	426	269	167	143	628	902	400	372	352
North East	Gombe	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
North East	Taraba	323	-	12	2	18	4	6	33	124	102	12	6	4
North East	Yobe	333	4	22	32	74	3	20	119	34	6	1	6	12
North East Total		5,360	267	230	355	584	286	198	334	865	1,061	427	385	368
South East	Abia	26	-	-	-	2	2	-	6	-	4	1	1	10
South East	Anambra	34	5	3	2	3	-	-	7	6	2	-	1	5
South East	Ebonyi	32	-	1	-	-	2	14	3	6	2	2	-	2
South East	Enugu	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-
South East	Imo	30	1	3	3	1	1	11	1	4	4	1	-	-
South East Total		125	6	7	5	6	5	25	18	16	12	4	4	17
South South	Akwa Ibom	21	2	3	-	2	-	-	3	1	2	7	1	-
South South	Bayelsa	68	-	8	7	11	7	4	6	-	9	5	11	-
South South	Cross River	70	14	1	2	-	-	2	11	19	10	4	5	2
South South	Delta	119	13	6	-	7	28	19	17	11	10	2	6	-
South South	Edo	97	7	17	7	6	40	2	4	2	1	6	2	3
South South	Rivers	68	10	4	8	6	7	1	1	6	5	2	7	11
South South Total		443	46	39	24	32	82	28	42	39	37	26	32	16
South West	Ekiti	18	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	11	-	2	2
South West	Lagos	85	4	3	20	21	9	3	6	9	5	-	4	1
South West	Ogun	39	-	-	2	3	6	4	4	10	-	7	-	3
South West	Ondo	27	-	-	7	5	2	5	5	1	-	1	-	1
South West	Osun	16	-	3	6	2	-	-	1	-	2	-	1	1
South West	Oyo	35	-	5	-	6	3	-	-	3	7	6	5	-
South West Total		220	4	11	36	37	20	12	18	23	25	14	12	8
Grand Total		11,913	473	395	489	1,008	762	804	1,123	2,017	1,908	1,193	1,029	712

Appendix 7B: Civilian Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020												
		Total Civilians Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	20	3	-	2	-	1	-	1	3	7	2	-	1
North West	Kaduna	1,819	29	20	17	82	191	200	194	175	96	400	363	52
North West	Kano	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	576	-	2	2	4	37	2	155	86	210	31	21	26
North West	Kebbi	75	1	-	4	21	5	40	1	-	1	1	-	1
North West	Sokoto	142	5	-	1	22	-	4	22	77	-	7	1	3
North West	Zamfara	254	1	51	-	47	9	37	-	17	74	13	2	3
North West Total		2,891	39	73	26	176	243	288	373	358	388	454	387	86
North Central	Abuja FCT	14	3	1	-	1	1	1	6	-	1	-	-	-
North Central	Benue	357	-	3	-	7	7	69	45	75	98	20	28	5
North Central	Kogi	99	-	6	2	24	4	3	6	4	13	18	16	3
North Central	Kwara	4	-	-	-	1	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	67	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	25	2	19	8	5
North Central	Niger	567	15	18	34	23	22	34	41	159	22	37	62	100
North Central	Plateau	287	4	1	2	71	15	37	56	15	39	20	10	17
North Central Total		1,395	22	29	38	135	49	145	154	279	176	114	124	130
North East	Adamawa	253	6	26	4	48	2	-	37	78	41	11	-	-
North East	Bauchi	13	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	10	-	1	-
North East	Borno	1,880	92	17	139	176	185	35	49	163	627	164	152	81
North East	Gombe	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
North East	Taraba	301	-	12	2	14	4	6	33	116	98	10	6	-
North East	Yobe	58	4	8	-	20	3	2	6	-	6	1	3	5
North East Total		2,508	102	63	145	259	194	43	125	358	782	189	162	86
South East	Abia	19	-	-	-	2	2	-	5	-	4	1	1	4
South East	Anambra	32	5	3	-	3	-	-	7	6	2	-	1	5
South East	Ebonyi	31	-	1	-	-	2	14	2	6	2	2	-	2
South East	Enugu	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	25	1	3	3	1	1	11	-	2	2	1	-	-
South East Total		108	6	7	3	6	5	25	15	14	10	4	2	11
South South	Akwa Ibom	19	2	3	-	2	-	-	3	1	-	7	1	-
South South	Bayelsa	52	-	6	7	6	3	4	6	-	9	5	6	-
South South	Cross River	62	14	1	2	-	-	1	11	19	9	-	5	-
South South	Delta	91	4	2	-	7	23	17	16	11	3	2	6	-
South South	Edo	67	2	9	6	4	31	2	4	1	1	2	2	3
South South	Rivers	54	6	4	8	6	7	1	-	4	1	2	4	11
South South Total		345	28	25	23	25	64	25	40	36	23	18	24	14
South West	Ekiti	18	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	11	-	2	2
South West	Lagos	73	4	1	13	21	9	3	6	8	5	-	2	1
South West	Ogun	28	-	-	2	3	3	3	3	10	-	1	-	3
South West	Ondo	20	-	-	6	1	-	5	5	1	-	1	-	1
South West	Osun	14	-	3	6	2	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1
South West	Oyo	34	-	5	-	6	3	-	-	3	7	5	5	-
South West Total		187	4	9	28	33	15	11	16	22	25	7	9	8
Grand Total		7,434	201	206	263	634	570	537	723	1,067	1,404	786	708	335

Appendix 7C: Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

Geopolitical zone	State	2021												
		Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	26	3	1	3	-	13	2	-	-	-	2	1	1
North West	Kaduna	2,051	112	56	132	173	298	258	110	203	55	237	201	216
North West	Kano	16	2	5	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	3	2
North West	Katsina	857	109	259	78	61	41	21	80	29	24	32	67	56
North West	Kebbi	585	1	3	6	52	37	169	65	103	137	7	-	5
North West	Sokoto	395	19	2	2	8	26	59	26	72	15	23	48	95
North West	Zamfara	1,890	62	55	47	182	117	102	196	52	377	385	262	53
North West Total		5,820	308	381	269	477	532	612	477	460	608	686	582	428
North Central	Abuja FCT	65	13	3	5	1	11	8	8	2	-	2	2	10
North Central	Benue	1,320	6	10	32	3	26	49	223	645	117	111	83	15
North Central	Kogi	91	5	1	6	1	12	-	-	12	10	5	11	28
North Central	Kwara	42	2	-	-	5	-	7	4	2	5	6	8	3
North Central	Nasarawa	89	3	3	2	13	-	17	24	5	7	15	-	-
North Central	Niger	1,336	53	10	104	27	128	128	125	248	69	21	225	198
North Central	Plateau	691	33	2	6	13	58	14	37	84	42	125	251	26
North Central Total		3,634	115	29	155	63	235	223	421	998	250	285	580	280
North East	Adamawa	147	2	2	17	-	1	-	40	6	2	57	2	18
North East	Bauchi	12	3	-	2	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	2
North East	Borno	3,628	429	425	241	323	390	582	236	268	170	132	199	233
North East	Gombe	29	-	-	-	-	4	-	25	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	170	7	7	2	5	2	3	40	75	8	15	4	2
North East	Yobe	283	19	6	10	82	48	17	60	15	4	5	3	14
North East Total		4,269	460	440	272	410	445	605	401	364	184	211	208	269
South East	Abia	44	5	-	-	1	7	8	2	8	9	-	2	2
South East	Anambra	255	5	3	-	-	20	23	104	31	15	9	22	23
South East	Ebonyi	445	2	9	1	28	25	102	76	164	22	7	6	3
South East	Enugu	112	6	-	1	-	1	49	6	18	2	19	8	2
South East	Imo	584	3	2	2	14	14	-	41	23	411	17	45	12
South East Total		1,440	21	14	4	43	67	182	229	244	459	52	83	42
South South	Akwa Ibom	65	1	3	1	8	1	10	11	17	6	5	2	-
South South	Bayelsa	22	1	2	6	-	5	-	2	3	1	2	-	-
South South	Cross River	46	6	-	1	11	3	6	-	15	-	-	4	-
South South	Delta	183	31	13	22	19	17	7	21	13	2	16	4	18
South South	Edo	80	9	9	6	13	10	7	2	9	4	8	1	2
South South	Rivers	162	30	9	1	-	10	4	37	42	1	2	17	9
South South Total		558	78	36	37	51	46	34	73	99	14	33	28	29
South West	Ekiti	35	3	6	-	2	-	6	12	2	-	2	2	-
South West	Lagos	136	32	17	3	12	5	4	6	10	17	9	16	5
South West	Ogun	96	4	1	7	5	37	5	-	2	8	4	19	4
South West	Ondo	59	4	2	4	7	11	1	1	23	3	2	-	1
South West	Osun	77	6	-	11	5	4	11	-	11	9	1	18	1
South West	Oyo	150	14	11	16	25	11	11	3	4	38	15	2	-
South West Total		553	63	37	41	56	68	38	22	52	75	33	57	11
Grand Total		16,274	1,045	937	778	1,100	1,393	1,694	1,623	2,217	1,590	1,300	1,538	1,059

Appendix 7D: Civilian Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

Geopolitical zone	State	2021												
		Total Civilians Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	19	2	1	-	-	13	1	-	-	-	-	1	1
North West	Kaduna	1,539	55	43	86	99	202	205	85	188	52	234	179	111
North West	Kano	13	2	5	1	1	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	2
North West	Katsina	487	57	138	25	39	29	20	27	24	17	28	53	30
North West	Kebbi	520	1	3	6	52	37	146	32	103	135	-	-	5
North West	Sokoto	313	19	1	-	7	23	59	26	51	12	20	45	50
North West	Zamfara	1,020	59	25	37	126	65	46	140	35	313	98	59	17
North West Total		3,911	195	216	155	324	369	478	310	402	529	380	337	216
North Central	Abuja FCT	53	13	3	5	1	11	4	7	1	-	1	2	5
North Central	Benue	1,224	3	4	19	3	26	48	171	643	103	111	78	15
North Central	Kogi	58	5	1	4	1	12	-	-	10	8	5	9	3
North Central	Kwara	42	2	-	-	5	-	7	4	2	5	6	8	3
North Central	Nasarawa	75	3	3	-	2	-	17	24	5	7	14	-	-
North Central	Niger	809	21	5	101	26	127	81	107	186	27	5	27	96
North Central	Plateau	671	33	2	6	13	58	13	37	84	40	117	242	26
North Central Total		2,932	80	18	135	51	234	170	350	931	190	259	366	148
North East	Adamawa	130	2	1	16	-	1	-	39	3	1	57	2	8
North East	Bauchi	11	3	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	2	-	2
North East	Borno	702	153	154	80	37	56	18	43	24	7	3	28	99
North East	Gombe	29	-	-	-	-	4	-	25	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	161	7	7	1	3	1	3	36	75	8	15	3	2
North East	Yobe	62	1	-	7	2	13	1	22	2	1	-	3	10
North East Total		1,095	166	162	106	42	75	24	165	104	17	77	36	121
South East	Abia	21	5	-	-	-	-	1	2	6	3	-	2	2
South East	Anambra	190	2	3	-	-	9	13	103	15	14	6	12	13
South East	Ebonyi	414	-	9	1	25	25	102	62	153	22	7	5	3
South East	Enugu	85	4	-	1	-	1	43	4	14	2	8	8	-
South East	Imo	385	1	2	2	10	8	-	18	7	291	8	29	9
South East Total		1,095	12	14	4	35	43	159	189	195	332	29	56	27
South South	Akwa Ibom	42	1	3	1	6	1	4	6	8	5	5	2	-
South South	Bayelsa	19	-	1	6	-	4	-	2	3	1	2	-	-
South South	Cross River	35	6	-	-	11	-	-	-	15	-	-	3	-
South South	Delta	139	29	13	20	14	10	5	17	3	2	14	3	9
South South	Edo	76	9	9	6	13	10	7	2	6	3	8	1	2
South South	Rivers	105	21	9	1	-	10	4	24	13	1	2	14	6
South South Total		416	66	35	34	44	35	20	51	48	12	31	23	17
South West	Ekiti	33	3	5	-	2	-	6	12	2	-	2	1	-
South West	Lagos	129	32	17	3	12	5	4	6	10	13	9	16	2
South West	Ogun	81	4	1	7	5	37	5	-	-	4	4	10	4
South West	Ondo	51	4	2	4	3	7	1	1	23	3	2	-	1
South West	Osun	61	6	-	11	5	4	11	-	10	5	-	8	1
South West	Oyo	136	6	11	14	24	11	11	2	4	38	13	2	-
South West Total		491	55	36	39	51	64	38	21	49	63	30	37	8
Grand Total		9,940	574	481	473	547	820	889	1,086	1,729	1,143	806	855	537

Appendix 7E: Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

Geopolitical zone	State	2022												
		Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	33	-	2	5	3	1	12	4	-	1	3	-	2
North West	Kaduna	1,801	150	108	162	164	112	453	192	21	118	78	14	229
North West	Kano	89	-	-	43	-	-	4	6	33	-	-	-	3
North West	Katsina	629	28	31	16	49	137	103	28	34	12	107	15	69
North West	Kebbi	541	-	-	-	130	25	191	71	4	106	-	2	12
North West	Sokoto	543	99	174	113	23	38	11	12	20	12	30	-	11
North West	Zamfara	1,594	138	56	83	348	125	213	138	195	26	101	7	164
North West Total		5,230	415	371	422	717	438	987	451	307	275	319	38	490
North Central	Abuja FCT	56	-	-	2	1	4	4	7	6	6	11	1	14
North Central	Benue	574	22	32	15	23	43	73	133	68	91	10	6	58
North Central	Kogi	88	16	1	9	3	4	7	5	4	7	8	7	17
North Central	Kwara	47	2	2	2	4	5	1	7	7	2	3	1	11
North Central	Nasarawa	94	1	5	46	32	-	-	-	4	2	-	1	3
North Central	Niger	2,110	150	86	32	476	304	699	130	52	88	14	14	65
North Central	Plateau	619	13	17	21	45	12	26	283	16	50	93	8	35
North Central Total		3,588	204	143	127	584	372	810	565	157	246	139	38	203
North East	Adamawa	142	36	-	29	16	2	22	-	6	13	10	3	5
North East	Bauchi	48	7	1	3	-	-	4	8	9	9	3	-	4
North East	Borno	3,372	415	199	306	240	212	252	413	219	197	70	6	843
North East	Gombe	37	-	6	8	12	2	-	-	4	2	-	3	-
North East	Taraba	707	3	68	9	53	1	32	55	164	10	187	59	66
North East	Yobe	97	3	23	17	4	20	-	16	-	-	2	-	12
North East Total		4,403	464	297	372	325	237	310	492	402	231	272	71	930
South East	Abia	92	10	1	5	7	8	7	-	1	6	5	-	42
South East	Anambra	304	35	14	34	11	60	9	19	35	37	23	1	26
South East	Ebonyi	146	39	20	1	12	7	8	30	10	6	2	1	10
South East	Enugu	131	8	2	2	17	19	22	8	2	31	4	-	16
South East	Imo	220	24	15	22	39	16	15	23	13	3	4	32	14
South East Total		893	116	52	64	86	110	61	80	61	83	38	34	108
South South	Akwa Ibom	42	8	2	4	10	1	1	5	9	-	-	-	2
South South	Bayelsa	44	3	2	-	1	11	5	2	5	9	2	-	4
South South	Cross River	94	-	1	-	2	-	8	4	24	36	14	-	5
South South	Delta	146	10	2	16	6	13	33	10	14	16	10	4	12
South South	Edo	90	-	5	1	5	7	9	22	7	9	9	1	15
South South	Rivers	61	1	13	1	3	1	4	9	5	4	3	-	17
South South Total		477	22	25	22	27	33	60	52	64	74	38	5	55
South West	Ekiti	9	-	3	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	-	1	1
South West	Lagos	107	10	13	4	12	8	10	2	22	4	4	8	10
South West	Ogun	87	11	-	2	19	7	26	-	5	5	7	1	4
South West	Ondo	116	1	13	14	14	4	4	1	1	61	1	-	2
South West	Osun	68	3	1	4	16	16	1	6	-	2	4	8	7
South West	Oyo	59	4	2	1	2	11	11	8	5	4	3	2	6
South West Total		446	29	32	25	63	47	53	17	33	78	19	20	30
Grand Total		15,037	1,250	920	1,032	1,802	1,237	2,281	1,657	1,024	987	825	206	1,816

Appendix 7F: Civilian Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

Geopolitical zone	State	2022												
		Total Civilans Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	21	-	2	5	1	1	3	4	-	1	2	-	2
North West	Kaduna	1,181	21	48	111	128	89	400	149	16	110	57	12	40
North West	Kano	40	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	33	-	-	-	3
North West	Katsina	296	28	29	16	32	43	23	16	27	8	51	7	16
North West	Kebbi	318	-	-	-	105	25	20	71	2	83	-	2	10
North West	Sokoto	374	99	145	30	-	8	11	12	16	12	30	-	11
North West	Zamfara	934	99	42	43	242	122	126	12	146	12	56	5	29
North West Total		3,164	247	266	205	508	288	587	264	240	226	196	26	111
North Central	Abuja FCT	49	-	-	2	1	3	4	7	6	6	7	-	13
North Central	Benue	516	22	27	15	19	38	62	123	62	77	10	6	55
North Central	Kogi	58	15	1	6	3	1	1	-	4	2	5	5	15
North Central	Kwara	26	2	1	1	-	3	1	1	4	2	3	1	7
North Central	Nasarawa	89	1	2	46	32	-	-	-	2	2	-	1	3
North Central	Niger	940	35	13	13	374	169	109	84	38	46	13	14	32
North Central	Plateau	398	13	16	21	42	12	22	139	16	43	42	8	24
North Central Total		2,076	88	60	104	471	226	199	354	132	178	80	35	149
North East	Adamawa	104	36	-	4	14	-	22	-	-	13	7	3	5
North East	Bauchi	43	7	1	3	-	-	4	8	9	8	2	-	1
North East	Borno	400	4	13	48	36	56	13	9	104	74	20	6	17
North East	Gombe	35	-	6	8	12	1	-	-	4	2	-	2	-
North East	Taraba	611	3	67	9	53	1	23	41	156	3	180	59	16
North East	Yobe	25	-	-	5	2	-	-	16	-	-	2	-	-
North East Total		1,218	50	87	77	117	58	62	74	273	100	211	70	39
South East	Abia	76	3	1	3	5	8	7	-	1	6	-	-	42
South East	Anambra	151	18	6	10	6	32	4	7	28	25	1	1	13
South East	Ebonyi	107	30	20	-	11	1	4	28	1	5	2	-	5
South East	Enugu	97	6	2	2	17	5	22	8	2	26	2	-	5
South East	Imo	144	16	8	18	35	11	4	21	3	3	3	12	10
South East Total		575	73	37	33	74	57	41	64	35	65	8	13	75
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	8	2	4	9	1	-	5	8	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	27	1	1	-	1	6	4	-	5	4	1	-	4
South South	Cross River	70	-	1	-	2	-	8	1	21	34	-	-	3
South South	Delta	68	10	2	13	4	5	11	1	3	6	4	1	8
South South	Edo	33	-	5	1	2	2	7	11	1	1	1	-	2
South South	Rivers	39	-	3	1	-	1	3	4	4	4	2	-	17
South South Total		274	19	14	19	18	15	33	22	42	49	8	1	34
South West	Ekiti	5	-	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	2	-	1	-
South West	Lagos	70	10	11	4	6	6	4	1	10	3	4	1	10
South West	Ogun	57	7	-	2	13	7	11	-	2	4	7	-	4
South West	Ondo	111	-	13	14	12	4	2	1	1	61	1	-	2
South West	Osun	58	3	1	2	14	16	1	3	-	2	1	8	7
South West	Oyo	43	-	2	1	2	8	11	5	5	-	3	2	4
South West Total		344	20	27	23	47	42	30	10	18	72	16	12	27
Grand Total		7,651	497	491	461	1,235	686	952	788	740	690	519	157	435

Appendix 7G: Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2023												
		Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	18	1	2	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	12	-
North West	Kaduna	946	55	137	260	50	34	85	93	53	43	18	48	70
North West	Kano	61	1	2	-	-	32	3	12	3	8	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	469	109	8	11	19	159	36	5	5	31	57	18	11
North West	Kebbi	180	72	49	7	7	5	-	1	5	-	-	2	32
North West	Sokoto	305	14	11	35	104	-	11	11	7	72	12	1	27
North West	Zamfara	1,379	149	158	380	30	18	80	66	89	132	173	73	31
North West Total		3,358	401	367	693	211	249	215	188	162	287	260	154	171
North Central	Abuja FCT	44	5	-	3	5	4	2	7	3	3	3	3	6
North Central	Benue	1,135	92	63	3	47	112	119	268	176	75	78	42	60
North Central	Kogi	85	15	2	12	1	7	-	16	3	3	18	5	3
North Central	Kwara	43	5	3	-	6	1	1	4	5	3	4	2	9
North Central	Nasarawa	278	26	1	-	62	-	6	34	134	5	4	-	6
North Central	Niger	987	16	63	26	145	8	180	151	33	131	26	136	72
North Central	Plateau	642	33	26	4	9	10	23	54	183	81	113	58	48
North Central Total		3,214	192	158	48	275	142	331	534	537	301	246	246	204
North East	Adamawa	66	3	2	7	3	11	-	4	9	8	4	11	4
North East	Bauchi	156	3	3	65	13	1	8	3	-	3	23	2	32
North East	Borno	3,902	215	306	486	231	459	629	187	143	452	207	381	206
North East	Gombe	14	-	2	3	1	3	2	-	-	1	-	2	-
North East	Taraba	283	33	13	11	-	8	17	26	44	58	64	5	4
North East	Yobe	55	-	1	-	-	20	2	14	10	1	1	-	6
North East Total		4,476	254	327	572	248	502	658	234	206	523	299	401	252
South East	Abia	57	2	16	4	3	9	6	-	10	-	2	-	5
South East	Anambra	229	13	46	10	34	64	8	2	15	9	21	3	4
South East	Ebonyi	101	8	5	21	16	7	6	5	7	4	13	8	1
South East	Enugu	217	17	86	39	7	14	6	4	1	4	10	14	15
South East	Imo	189	4	6	34	34	3	3	12	9	59	11	6	8
South East Total		793	44	159	108	94	97	29	23	42	76	57	31	33
South South	Akwa Ibom	52	4	7	6	-	2	4	5	20	1	1	2	-
South South	Bayelsa	24	3	-	1	-	3	7	3	1	1	1	4	-
South South	Cross River	35	13	1	-	-	6	1	1	-	1	-	1	11
South South	Delta	162	6	6	19	22	12	12	6	22	7	30	9	11
South South	Edo	81	10	11	-	6	4	8	8	8	1	8	12	5
South South	Rivers	146	3	16	4	7	14	13	13	20	32	8	9	7
South South Total		500	39	41	30	35	41	45	36	71	43	48	37	34
South West	Ekiti	11	-	-	2	1	-	1	4	1	1	-	1	-
South West	Lagos	94	7	5	10	9	8	21	11	3	4	8	5	3
South West	Ogun	82	2	5	1	4	5	7	6	7	16	7	1	21
South West	Ondo	60	2	2	10	16	8	4	3	5	7	1	2	-
South West	Osun	43	2	1	1	6	11	3	2	3	-	-	5	9
South West	Oyo	55	3	4	6	8	4	5	1	16	3	4	1	-
South West Total		345	16	17	30	44	36	41	27	35	31	20	15	33
Grand Total		12,686	946	1,069	1,481	907	1,067	1,319	1,042	1,053	1,261	930	884	727

Appendix 7H: Civilian Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2023												
		Total Civilans Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	14	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	11	-
North West	Kaduna	555	6	45	124	26	15	71	67	49	27	18	41	66
North West	Kano	57	1	2	-	-	32	1	11	2	8	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	249	26	8	8	13	107	23	-	3	9	27	14	11
North West	Kebbi	136	71	43	6	-	5	-	1	-	-	-	-	10
North West	Sokoto	173	14	10	32	4	-	1	11	7	70	1	-	23
North West	Zamfara	476	59	37	59	2	-	12	16	48	105	63	55	20
North West Total		1,660	177	145	229	46	160	108	106	109	220	109	121	130
North Central	Abuja FCT	40	3	-	3	4	4	2	7	3	2	3	3	6
North Central	Benue	1,088	79	63	3	44	101	119	263	164	75	78	39	60
North Central	Kogi	73	9	2	10	1	7	-	16	3	2	15	5	3
North Central	Kwara	30	3	3	-	3	1	1	2	5	2	4	1	5
North Central	Nasarawa	252	24	1	-	57	-	6	21	132	2	3	-	6
North Central	Niger	300	9	20	6	20	3	59	30	6	88	9	31	19
North Central	Plateau	603	23	26	4	8	10	23	54	183	81	90	58	43
North Central Total		2,386	150	115	26	137	126	210	393	496	252	202	137	142
North East	Adamawa	41	1	1	1	2	1	-	4	8	8	4	10	1
North East	Bauchi	83	-	3	38	9	1	6	3	-	3	16	2	2
North East	Borno	306	9	31	2	1	1	36	11	1	47	54	73	40
North East	Gombe	11	-	2	3	1	1	2	-	-	-	-	2	-
North East	Taraba	244	13	13	6	-	8	15	26	38	53	64	5	3
North East	Yobe	15	-	1	-	-	-	1	11	-	1	1	-	-
North East Total		700	23	51	50	13	12	60	55	47	112	139	92	46
South East	Abia	30	-	11	-	-	8	6	-	3	-	-	-	2
South East	Anambra	98	8	10	10	25	21	2	-	4	5	8	3	2
South East	Ebonyi	67	4	5	12	11	7	3	1	1	4	12	7	-
South East	Enugu	165	9	76	30	1	14	4	3	1	4	5	10	8
South East	Imo	135	1	3	27	18	2	-	6	7	57	11	3	-
South East Total		495	22	105	79	55	52	15	10	16	70	36	23	12
South South	Akwa Ibom	43	4	6	1	-	2	2	4	20	1	1	2	-
South South	Bayelsa	20	3	-	-	-	3	7	3	1	1	1	1	-
South South	Cross River	28	6	1	-	-	6	1	1	-	1	-	1	11
South South	Delta	98	3	6	16	16	5	11	4	10	2	18	5	2
South South	Edo	62	4	11	-	5	4	8	4	4	1	5	11	5
South South	Rivers	83	2	4	1	7	12	10	11	13	18	-	3	2
South South Total		334	22	28	18	28	32	39	27	48	24	25	23	20
South West	Ekiti	11	-	-	2	1	-	1	4	1	1	-	1	-
South West	Lagos	80	7	5	7	9	7	21	5	3	3	7	3	3
South West	Ogun	55	2	2	1	4	5	7	4	7	10	5	1	7
South West	Ondo	53	2	2	8	16	8	4	3	1	6	1	2	-
South West	Osun	36	2	1	1	6	11	3	1	3	-	-	3	5
South West	Oyo	45	1	3	6	8	3	5	-	12	2	4	1	-
South West Total		280	14	13	25	44	34	41	17	27	22	17	11	15
Grand Total		5,855	408	457	427	323	416	473	608	743	700	528	407	365

Appendix 7I: Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023												
		Total Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	100	7	5	10	4	16	14	5	3	10	7	13	6
North West	Kaduna	6,815	347	327	571	478	684	1,013	591	473	335	734	676	586
North West	Kano	171	3	7	44	1	32	13	18	37	8	-	3	5
North West	Katsina	2,973	246	300	107	156	374	186	293	355	297	312	141	206
North West	Kebbi	1,381	74	52	17	210	72	400	138	112	244	8	4	50
North West	Sokoto	1,497	137	187	151	157	64	85	73	178	199	80	50	136
North West	Zamfara	5,698	438	320	511	607	286	472	528	551	652	722	349	262
North West Total		18,635	1,252	1,198	1,411	1,613	1,528	2,183	1,646	1,709	1,745	1,863	1,236	1,251
North Central	Abuja FCT	182	21	4	10	10	20	15	28	11	11	16	6	30
North Central	Benue	3,406	120	108	50	80	188	310	673	969	388	220	159	141
North Central	Kogi	376	36	10	33	29	27	10	27	23	35	56	39	51
North Central	Kwara	136	9	5	2	16	6	10	15	15	11	13	11	23
North Central	Nasarawa	535	30	9	48	115	-	23	62	168	16	39	9	16
North Central	Niger	5,087	234	177	196	675	469	1,064	466	501	319	98	447	441
North Central	Plateau	2,252	83	46	33	138	99	104	430	299	215	352	327	126
North Central Total		11,974	533	359	372	1,063	809	1,536	1,701	1,986	995	794	998	828
North East	Adamawa	643	48	32	57	84	24	27	83	99	64	82	16	27
North East	Bauchi	229	13	4	70	14	1	15	11	10	22	28	3	38
North East	Borno	15,302	1,315	1,098	1,350	1,220	1,330	1,630	979	1,258	1,721	809	958	1,634
North East	Gombe	83	-	8	11	13	9	2	25	4	3	3	5	-
North East	Taraba	1,483	43	100	24	76	15	58	154	407	178	278	74	76
North East	Yobe	768	26	52	59	160	91	39	209	59	11	9	9	44
North East Total		18,508	1,445	1,294	1,571	1,567	1,470	1,771	1,461	1,837	1,999	1,209	1,065	1,819
South East	Abia	219	17	17	9	13	26	21	8	19	19	8	3	59
South East	Anambra	822	58	66	46	48	144	40	132	87	63	53	27	58
South East	Ebonyi	724	49	35	23	56	41	130	114	187	34	24	15	16
South East	Enugu	463	31	88	42	24	34	77	19	21	37	33	24	33
South East	Imo	1,023	32	26	61	88	34	29	77	49	477	33	83	34
South East Total		3,251	187	232	181	229	279	297	350	363	630	151	152	200
South South	Akwa Ibom	180	15	15	11	20	4	15	24	47	9	13	5	2
South South	Bayelsa	158	7	12	14	12	26	16	13	9	20	10	15	4
South South	Cross River	245	33	3	3	13	9	17	16	58	47	18	10	18
South South	Delta	610	60	27	57	54	70	71	54	60	35	58	23	41
South South	Edo	348	26	42	14	30	61	26	36	26	15	31	16	25
South South	Rivers	437	44	42	14	16	32	22	60	73	42	15	33	44
South South Total		1,978	185	141	113	145	202	167	203	273	168	145	102	134
South West	Ekiti	73	3	9	3	3	1	8	18	3	14	2	6	3
South West	Lagos	422	53	38	37	54	30	38	25	44	30	21	33	19
South West	Ogun	304	17	6	12	31	55	42	10	24	29	25	21	32
South West	Ondo	262	7	17	35	42	25	14	10	30	71	5	2	4
South West	Osun	204	11	5	22	29	31	15	9	14	13	5	32	18
South West	Oyo	299	21	22	23	41	29	27	12	28	52	28	10	6
South West Total		1,564	112	97	132	200	171	144	84	143	209	86	104	82
Grand Total		55,910	3,714	3,321	3,780	4,817	4,459	6,098	5,445	6,311	5,746	4,248	3,657	4,314

Appendix 7J: Civilian Killing analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023												
		Total Civilians Killed	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	74	5	3	7	2	16	4	5	3	9	4	12	4
North West	Kaduna	5,094	111	156	338	335	497	876	495	428	285	709	595	269
North West	Kano	115	3	7	1	1	32	11	11	36	8	-	-	5
North West	Katsina	1,608	111	177	51	88	216	68	198	140	244	137	95	83
North West	Kebbi	1,049	73	46	16	178	72	206	105	105	219	1	2	26
North West	Sokoto	1,002	137	156	63	33	31	75	71	151	94	58	46	87
North West	Zamfara	2,684	218	155	139	417	196	221	168	246	504	230	121	69
North West Total		11,626	658	700	615	1,054	1,060	1,461	1,053	1,109	1,363	1,139	871	543
North Central	Abuja FCT	156	19	4	10	7	19	11	27	10	9	11	5	24
North Central	Benue	3,185	104	97	37	73	172	298	602	944	353	219	151	135
North Central	Kogi	288	29	10	22	29	24	4	22	21	25	43	35	24
North Central	Kwara	102	7	4	1	9	4	10	7	12	10	13	10	15
North Central	Nasarawa	483	28	6	46	99	-	23	45	164	13	36	9	14
North Central	Niger	2,616	80	56	154	443	321	283	262	389	183	64	134	247
North Central	Plateau	1,959	73	45	33	134	95	95	286	298	203	269	318	110
North Central Total		8,789	340	222	303	794	635	724	1,251	1,838	796	655	662	569
North East	Adamawa	528	45	28	25	64	4	22	80	89	63	79	15	14
North East	Bauchi	150	10	4	43	10	1	12	11	10	21	20	3	5
North East	Borno	3,288	258	215	269	250	298	102	112	292	755	241	259	237
North East	Gombe	78	-	8	11	13	6	2	25	4	2	3	4	-
North East	Taraba	1,317	23	99	18	70	14	47	136	385	162	269	73	21
North East	Yobe	160	5	9	12	24	16	4	55	2	8	4	6	15
North East Total		5,521	341	363	378	431	339	189	419	782	1,011	616	360	292
South East	Abia	146	8	12	3	7	18	14	7	10	13	1	3	50
South East	Anambra	471	33	22	20	34	62	19	117	53	46	15	17	33
South East	Ebonyi	619	34	35	13	47	35	123	93	161	33	23	12	10
South East	Enugu	348	19	78	33	18	20	69	16	17	32	15	18	13
South East	Imo	689	19	16	50	64	22	15	45	19	353	23	44	19
South East Total		2,273	113	163	119	170	157	240	278	260	477	77	94	125
South South	Akwa Ibom	141	15	14	6	17	4	6	18	37	6	13	5	-
South South	Bayelsa	118	4	8	13	7	16	15	11	9	15	9	7	4
South South	Cross River	195	26	3	2	13	6	10	13	55	44	-	9	14
South South	Delta	396	46	23	49	41	43	44	38	27	13	38	15	19
South South	Edo	238	15	34	13	24	47	24	21	12	6	16	14	12
South South	Rivers	281	29	20	11	13	30	18	39	34	24	6	21	36
South South Total		1,369	135	102	94	115	146	117	140	174	108	82	71	85
South West	Ekiti	67	3	5	3	3	1	8	18	3	14	2	5	2
South West	Lagos	352	53	34	27	48	27	32	18	31	24	20	22	16
South West	Ogun	221	13	3	12	25	52	26	7	19	18	17	11	18
South West	Ondo	235	6	17	32	32	19	12	10	26	70	5	2	4
South West	Osun	169	11	5	20	27	31	15	4	13	9	1	19	14
South West	Oyo	258	7	21	21	40	25	27	7	24	47	25	10	4
South West Total		1,302	93	85	115	175	155	120	64	116	182	70	69	58
Grand Total		30,880	1,680	1,635	1,624	2,739	2,492	2,851	3,205	4,279	3,937	2,639	2,127	1,672

Appendix 8A: Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020												
		Total Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	458	7	-	12	177	56	1	41	-	39	48	33	44
North West	Kano	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	2	-	5	16	11
North West	Kebbi	30	1	1	-	1	1	26	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	158	-	-	-	150	-	6	-	-	-	2	-	-
North West	Zamfara	11	4	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West Total		707	12	8	12	328	57	33	57	2	39	55	49	55
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
North Central	Benue	34	-	-	-	-	-	7	15	-	12	-	-	-
North Central	Kogi	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	19	-	-	3	3	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-
North Central	Niger	240	6	4	6	21	9	15	13	33	13	24	21	75
North Central	Plateau	5	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	1
North Central Total		351	8	5	9	24	23	25	28	33	25	38	21	112
North East	Adamawa	35	-	11	-	14	7	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	10	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	-
North East	Borno	349	13	10	38	64	42	-	7	8	53	60	11	43
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	79	-	-	-	32	-	3	2	3	32	-	-	7
North East	Yobe	17	2	1	-	-	1	3	-	3	-	-	7	-
North East Total		490	15	22	38	110	50	7	9	14	88	60	27	50
South East	Abia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Imo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South South	Delta	41	2	-	-	11	9	7	-	8	-	4	-	-
South South	Edo	6	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Rivers	17	2	4	-	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
South South Total		68	4	4	3	18	9	12	1	9	1	4	-	3
South West	Ekiti	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	1
South West	Lagos	5	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	24	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	1	-	4	-	-
South West	Ondo	10	-	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	2	3	-
South West	Osun	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
South West	Oyo	8	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	2	-	3	-	-
South West Total		55	2	3	2	21	-	4	2	3	-	12	3	3
Grand Total		1,677	41	42	64	501	139	81	99	61	153	173	100	223

Appendix 8B: Civilian Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2020)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020												
		Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	457	7	-	12	177	56	1	41	-	39	47	33	44
North West	Kano	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	2	-	5	16	11
North West	Kebbi	30	1	1	-	1	1	26	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Sokoto	158	-	-	-	150	-	6	-	-	-	2	-	-
North West	Zamfara	11	4	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West Total		706	12	8	12	328	57	33	57	2	39	54	49	55
North Central	Abuja FCT	38	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	36
North Central	Benue	34	-	-	-	-	-	7	15	-	12	-	-	-
North Central	Kogi	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	19	-	-	3	3	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	14	-	-
North Central	Niger	240	6	4	6	21	9	15	13	33	13	24	21	75
North Central	Plateau	5	-	-	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	-	-	1
North Central Total		351	8	5	9	24	23	25	28	33	25	38	21	112
North East	Adamawa	35	-	11	-	14	7	-	-	-	3	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	10	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	9	-
North East	Borno	347	13	10	38	64	42	-	7	8	53	60	9	43
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	77	-	-	-	32	-	3	-	3	32	-	-	7
North East	Yobe	17	2	1	-	-	1	3	-	3	-	-	7	-
North East Total		486	15	22	38	110	50	7	7	14	88	60	25	50
South East	Abia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Imo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	4	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South South	Delta	41	2	-	-	11	9	7	-	8	-	4	-	-
South South	Edo	6	-	-	-	-	-	5	1	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Rivers	11	-	-	-	7	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	3
South South Total		62	2	-	3	18	9	12	1	9	1	4	-	3
South West	Ekiti	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	3	-	1
South West	Lagos	5	2	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	23	-	-	-	19	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South West	Ondo	10	-	-	2	1	-	2	-	-	-	2	3	-
South West	Osun	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
South West	Oyo	8	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	2	-	3	-	-
South West Total		54	2	3	2	21	-	4	2	2	-	12	3	3
Grand Total		1,665	39	38	64	501	139	81	97	60	153	172	98	223

Appendix 8C: Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

Geopolitical zone	State	2021												
		Total Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
North West	Kaduna	1,430	20	43	33	71	76	221	170	58	125	546	11	56
North West	Kano	3	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	639	58	8	322	16	66	27	4	92	20	-	3	23
North West	Kebbi	225	8	-	27	49	3	39	3	-	90	6	-	-
North West	Sokoto	318	-	-	-	-	39	103	8	5	-	110	23	30
North West	Zamfara	1,198	31	42	-	7	311	150	9	-	112	78	308	150
North West Total		3,816	118	93	384	143	495	541	194	155	347	741	345	260
North Central	Abuja FCT	67	1	-	-	-	29	4	2	2	9	6	3	11
North Central	Benue	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	4	4	2	1
North Central	Kogi	27	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	9	3	5
North Central	Kwara	29	5	-	-	-	-	6	1	-	1	-	13	3
North Central	Nasarawa	42	22	2	-	1	-	-	-	13	2	1	1	-
North Central	Niger	1,278	33	18	83	66	274	61	63	601	54	1	9	15
North Central	Plateau	44	7	-	3	1	5	10	1	3	6	-	7	1
North Central Total		1,508	72	20	86	68	308	81	73	624	81	21	38	36
North East	Adamawa	55	2	2	-	-	-	-	50	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
North East	Borno	298	9	18	201	58	-	1	1	-	4	6	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	17	2	1	-	-	1	4	1	1	4	1	1	1
North East	Yobe	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		375	17	21	201	58	1	5	52	2	8	7	1	2
South East	Abia	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	11	-	-	2	1
South East	Anambra	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South East	Imo	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-
South East Total		25	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	11	3	-	2	2
South South	Akwa Ibom	17	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	2
South South	Bayelsa	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
South South	Cross River	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	11	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	2
South South	Edo	40	-	14	20	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
South South	Rivers	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	19	5	-
South South Total		97	1	14	20	2	1	16	-	2	-	27	5	9
South West	Ekiti	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-
South West	Lagos	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Ogun	21	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	12	4	-	3	-
South West	Ondo	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
South West	Osun	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	5	3	-
South West	Oyo	46	-	-	-	1	1	3	35	4	2	-	-	-
South West Total		86	-	-	-	1	1	5	38	17	9	5	9	1
Grand Total		5,907	209	148	691	272	806	648	363	811	448	801	400	310

Appendix 8D: Civilian Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2020 - Sept 2021)

Geopolitical zone	State	2021												
		Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1
North West	Kaduna	1,430	20	43	33	71	76	221	170	58	125	546	11	56
North West	Kano	3	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	639	58	8	322	16	66	27	4	92	20	-	3	23
North West	Kebbi	225	8	-	27	49	3	39	3	-	90	6	-	-
North West	Sokoto	318	-	-	-	-	39	103	8	5	-	110	23	30
North West	Zamfara	1,198	31	42	-	7	311	150	9	-	112	78	308	150
North West Total		3,816	118	93	384	143	495	541	194	155	347	741	345	260
North Central	Abuja FCT	67	1	-	-	-	29	4	2	2	9	6	3	11
North Central	Benue	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	4	4	4	2	1
North Central	Kogi	27	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	9	3	5
North Central	Kwara	29	5	-	-	-	-	6	1	-	1	-	13	3
North Central	Nasarawa	42	22	2	-	1	-	-	-	13	2	1	1	-
North Central	Niger	1,278	33	18	83	66	274	61	63	601	54	1	9	15
North Central	Plateau	44	7	-	3	1	5	10	1	3	6	-	7	1
North Central Total		1,508	72	20	86	68	308	81	73	624	81	21	38	36
North East	Adamawa	55	2	2	-	-	-	-	50	1	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
North East	Borno	298	9	18	201	58	-	1	1	-	4	6	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	17	2	1	-	-	1	4	1	1	4	1	1	1
North East	Yobe	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		375	17	21	201	58	1	5	52	2	8	7	1	2
South East	Abia	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	11	-	-	2	1
South East	Anambra	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South East	Imo	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-
South East Total		25	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	11	3	-	2	2
South South	Akwa Ibom	17	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	2
South South	Bayelsa	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
South South	Cross River	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	11	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	7	-	2
South South	Edo	40	-	14	20	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4
South South	Rivers	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	19	5	-
South South Total		97	1	14	20	2	1	16	-	2	-	27	5	9
South West	Ekiti	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	3	-
South West	Lagos	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Ogun	21	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	12	4	-	3	-
South West	Ondo	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	-
South West	Osun	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	5	3	-
South West	Oyo	46	-	-	-	1	1	3	35	4	2	-	-	-
South West Total		86	-	-	-	1	1	5	38	17	9	5	9	1
Grand Total		5,907	209	148	691	272	806	648	363	811	448	801	400	310

Appendix 8E: Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

Geopolitical zone	State	2022												
		Total Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
North West	Kaduna	2,563	74	21	264	131	355	534	183	145	273	283	40	260
North West	Kano	11	1	1	1	-	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	415	7	2	11	81	23	84	26	17	10	46	34	74
North West	Kebbi	240	-	-	-	51	11	30	1	2	20	1	27	97
North West	Sokoto	340	1	14	43	7	45	10	-	18	136	65	-	1
North West	Zamfara	765	5	65	106	2	116	237	5	32	54	69	3	71
North West Total		4,336	88	103	425	273	550	895	217	220	493	465	104	503
North Central	Abuja FCT	124	10	7	9	-	2	5	10	-	45	18	5	13
North Central	Benue	17	1	3	1	1	1	-	-	2	-	5	-	3
North Central	Kogi	57	4	11	1	4	10	7	-	1	11	1	7	-
North Central	Kwara	30	10	10	1	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	1
North Central	Nasarawa	15	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	7	-	-	2	-
North Central	Niger	2,106	75	377	4	515	254	193	208	82	151	82	106	59
North Central	Plateau	169	-	9	7	10	1	9	96	-	3	5	20	9
North Central Total		2,518	102	417	23	539	268	214	314	92	212	111	141	85
North East	Adamawa	23	3	2	3	3	-	1	5	-	1	3	-	2
North East	Bauchi	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
North East	Borno	237	76	2	32	50	5	3	-	-	54	-	7	8
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	153	2	28	11	85	-	7	-	-	-	6	12	2
North East	Yobe	4	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		422	81	32	46	142	7	11	5	-	55	12	19	12
South East	Abia	41	1	10	-	-	1	-	-	6	1	20	2	-
South East	Anambra	11	-	1	1	-	5	-	-	3	-	1	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	4	-	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	40	-	-	-	6	1	-	2	-	13	18	-	-
South East	Imo	45	4	-	5	11	-	-	-	-	15	-	7	3
South East Total		141	5	13	6	17	9	-	2	9	29	39	9	3
South South	Akwa Ibom	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South South	Bayelsa	14	-	1	-	1	3	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	24	-	-	1	-	-	21	-	-	-	1	-	1
South South	Edo	139	123	7	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
South South	Rivers	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	-	22
South South Total		207	123	8	1	1	10	21	4	-	9	6	-	24
South West	Ekiti	24	16	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3
South West	Lagos	8	-	-	-	5	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Ogun	29	6	-	-	8	3	5	3	-	-	-	1	3
South West	Ondo	72	6	4	-	13	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	42
South West	Osun	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
South West	Oyo	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
South West Total		138	28	4	3	26	5	7	3	-	-	6	7	49
Grand Total		7,762	427	577	504	998	849	1,148	545	321	798	639	280	676

Appendix 8F: Civilian Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2021 - Sept 2022)

Geopolitical zone	State	2022												
		Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
North West	Kaduna	2,556	74	21	264	130	353	533	181	145	273	283	40	259
North West	Kano	11	1	1	1	-	-	-	2	6	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	408	7	2	5	81	23	84	26	17	10	46	33	74
North West	Kebbi	240	-	-	-	51	11	30	1	2	20	1	27	97
North West	Sokoto	340	1	14	43	7	45	10	-	18	136	65	-	1
North West	Zamfara	764	5	65	106	2	115	237	5	32	54	69	3	71
North West Total		4,320	88	103	419	271	547	894	215	220	493	465	103	502
North Central	Abuja FCT	110	10	7	9	-	2	5	10	-	45	4	5	13
North Central	Benue	17	1	3	1	1	1	-	-	2	-	5	-	3
North Central	Kogi	57	4	11	1	4	10	7	-	1	11	1	7	-
North Central	Kwara	30	10	10	1	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	1	1
North Central	Nasarawa	15	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	7	-	-	2	-
North Central	Niger	2,103	75	377	4	515	251	193	208	82	151	82	106	59
North Central	Plateau	169	-	9	7	10	1	9	96	-	3	5	20	9
North Central Total		2,501	102	417	23	539	265	214	314	92	212	97	141	85
North East	Adamawa	22	3	2	3	3	-	1	5	-	-	3	-	2
North East	Bauchi	5	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
North East	Borno	225	76	1	32	50	5	-	-	-	54	-	7	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	153	2	28	11	85	-	7	-	-	-	6	12	2
North East	Yobe	4	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		409	81	31	46	142	7	8	5	-	54	12	19	4
South East	Abia	41	1	10	-	-	1	-	-	6	1	20	2	-
South East	Anambra	10	-	-	1	-	5	-	-	3	-	1	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	40	-	-	-	6	1	-	2	-	13	18	-	-
South East	Imo	44	3	-	5	11	-	-	-	-	15	-	7	3
South East Total		135	4	10	6	17	7	-	2	9	29	39	9	3
South South	Akwa Ibom	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South South	Bayelsa	14	-	1	-	1	3	-	-	-	9	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	24	-	-	1	-	-	21	-	-	-	1	-	1
South South	Edo	138	123	6	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	3	-	-
South South	Rivers	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	-	22
South South Total		206	123	7	1	1	10	21	4	-	9	6	-	24
South West	Ekiti	24	16	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	3
South West	Lagos	8	-	-	-	5	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Ogun	25	6	-	-	8	3	5	2	-	-	-	1	-
South West	Ondo	72	6	4	-	13	2	-	-	-	-	-	5	42
South West	Osun	3	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
South West	Oyo	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
South West Total		134	28	4	3	26	5	7	2	-	-	6	7	46
Grand Total		7,705	426	572	498	996	841	1,144	542	321	797	625	279	664

Appendix 8G: Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2023												
		Total Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,340	68	118	223	40	70	113	35	129	80	80	166	218
North West	Kano	6	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	1	-
North West	Katsina	476	53	10	81	43	45	65	7	4	5	68	72	23
North West	Kebbi	96	15	15	29	-	-	16	3	-	-	-	-	18
North West	Sokoto	210	24	5	73	2	-	11	-	18	8	13	21	35
North West	Zamfara	1,073	27	210	277	29	5	27	87	3	80	98	152	78
North West Total		3,203	187	358	685	115	120	232	134	155	174	259	412	372
North Central	Abuja FCT	238	2	1	32	6	16	15	64	28	38	2	4	30
North Central	Benue	59	11	1	2	-	-	-	16	2	7	4	-	16
North Central	Kogi	133	-	37	8	9	5	19	3	-	5	3	5	39
North Central	Kwara	76	6	3	-	19	-	3	1	24	12	2	1	5
North Central	Nasarawa	48	-	13	-	10	-	-	14	3	4	-	2	2
North Central	Niger	1,347	101	20	85	57	1	211	224	201	175	28	157	87
North Central	Plateau	73	35	3	2	2	2	1	3	5	10	3	1	6
North Central Total		1,974	155	78	129	103	24	249	325	263	251	42	170	185
North East	Adamawa	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	2	3
North East	Bauchi	34	-	2	-	5	-	-	-	-	13	5	7	2
North East	Borno	189	-	-	-	12	4	7	9	-	7	56	71	23
North East	Gombe	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	75	2	-	-	8	3	5	-	14	-	-	-	43
North East	Yobe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		312	2	2	-	25	8	12	9	21	21	61	80	71
South East	Abia	13	-	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	49	2	1	11	3	19	1	1	-	3	3	1	4
South East	Ebonyi	17	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Enugu	146	71	7	-	6	-	-	-	1	18	3	11	29
South East	Imo	79	1	1	4	9	12	19	6	6	1	19	-	1
South East Total		304	87	11	16	18	31	20	7	7	32	29	12	34
South South	Akwa Ibom	18	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	12
South South	Bayelsa	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	50	-	17	5	2	3	4	-	-	15	1	-	3
South South	Delta	65	-	-	-	36	1	12	10	3	1	1	-	1
South South	Edo	135	-	20	-	42	-	13	-	36	-	19	5	-
South South	Rivers	64	18	10	4	-	-	3	3	9	4	1	10	2
South South Total		336	23	48	9	80	4	32	13	50	22	22	15	18
South West	Ekiti	22	4	-	-	1	-	1	-	11	-	1	-	4
South West	Lagos	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	8	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	25	-	1	-	2	-	3	2	-	5	12	-	-
South West	Ondo	58	-	2	10	-	-	3	3	-	15	-	-	25
South West	Osun	20	-	-	-	9	-	4	3	3	-	1	-	-
South West	Oyo	9	7	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South West Total		146	11	3	10	13	-	11	12	15	28	14	-	29
Grand Total		6,275	465	500	849	354	187	556	500	511	528	427	689	709

Appendix 8H: Civilian Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2022 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2023												
		Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	1,339	68	118	223	40	70	113	35	129	80	80	165	218
North West	Kano	6	-	-	-	1	-	-	2	1	1	-	1	-
North West	Katsina	476	53	10	81	43	45	65	7	4	5	68	72	23
North West	Kebbi	96	15	15	29	-	-	16	3	-	-	-	-	18
North West	Sokoto	210	24	5	73	2	-	11	-	18	8	13	21	35
North West	Zamfara	1,071	27	210	277	29	5	27	87	3	80	96	152	78
North West Total		3,200	187	358	685	115	120	232	134	155	174	257	411	372
North Central	Abuja FCT	237	2	1	31	6	16	15	64	28	38	2	4	30
North Central	Benue	58	11	1	2	-	-	-	16	2	6	4	-	16
North Central	Kogi	133	-	37	8	9	5	19	3	-	5	3	5	39
North Central	Kwara	75	5	3	-	19	-	3	1	24	12	2	1	5
North Central	Nasarawa	47	-	13	-	10	-	-	13	3	4	-	2	2
North Central	Niger	1,345	101	20	85	57	1	211	222	201	175	28	157	87
North Central	Plateau	70	35	3	2	1	2	1	3	5	10	1	1	6
North Central Total		1,965	154	78	128	102	24	249	322	263	250	40	170	185
North East	Adamawa	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	2	3
North East	Bauchi	31	-	2	-	5	-	-	-	-	11	5	7	1
North East	Borno	189	-	-	-	12	4	7	9	-	7	56	71	23
North East	Gombe	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	75	2	-	-	8	3	5	-	14	-	-	-	43
North East	Yobe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		309	2	2	-	25	8	12	9	21	19	61	80	70
South East	Abia	11	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	47	2	1	11	2	18	1	1	-	3	3	1	4
South East	Ebonyi	17	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Enugu	146	71	7	-	6	-	-	-	1	18	3	11	29
South East	Imo	78	1	1	3	9	12	19	6	6	1	19	-	1
South East Total		299	87	9	15	17	30	20	7	7	32	29	12	34
South South	Akwa Ibom	18	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	-	-	12
South South	Bayelsa	4	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	50	-	17	5	2	3	4	-	-	15	1	-	3
South South	Delta	65	-	-	-	36	1	12	10	3	1	1	-	1
South South	Edo	135	-	20	-	42	-	13	-	36	-	19	5	-
South South	Rivers	64	18	10	4	-	-	3	3	9	4	1	10	2
South South Total		336	23	48	9	80	4	32	13	50	22	22	15	18
South West	Ekiti	22	4	-	-	1	-	1	-	11	-	1	-	4
South West	Lagos	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	8	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	25	-	1	-	2	-	3	2	-	5	12	-	-
South West	Ondo	58	-	2	10	-	-	3	3	-	15	-	-	25
South West	Osun	20	-	-	-	9	-	4	3	3	-	1	-	-
South West	Oyo	9	7	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South West Total		146	11	3	10	13	-	11	12	15	28	14	-	29
Grand Total		6,255	464	498	847	352	186	556	497	511	525	423	688	708

Appendix 8I: Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023												
		Total Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	7	-	-	2	1	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	1
North West	Kaduna	5,791	169	182	532	419	557	869	429	332	517	957	250	578
North West	Kano	20	2	1	3	1	-	-	4	7	1	-	1	-
North West	Katsina	1,580	118	20	414	140	134	176	53	115	35	119	125	131
North West	Kebbi	591	24	16	56	101	15	111	7	2	110	7	27	115
North West	Sokoto	1,026	25	19	116	159	84	130	8	41	144	190	44	66
North West	Zamfara	3,047	67	324	383	38	432	414	101	35	246	245	463	299
North West Total		12,062	405	562	1,506	859	1,222	1,701	602	532	1,053	1,520	910	1,190
North Central	Abuja FCT	467	15	8	41	6	47	24	76	30	92	26	12	90
North Central	Benue	131	12	4	3	1	1	7	37	8	23	13	2	20
North Central	Kogi	218	8	49	9	13	15	26	3	2	21	13	15	44
North Central	Kwara	154	21	13	4	27	13	9	2	24	15	2	15	9
North Central	Nasarawa	119	24	15	-	15	-	-	14	23	6	15	5	2
North Central	Niger	4,971	215	419	178	659	538	480	508	917	393	135	293	236
North Central	Plateau	291	42	12	12	13	9	23	100	8	19	8	28	17
North Central Total		6,351	337	520	247	734	623	569	740	1,012	569	212	370	418
North East	Adamawa	121	5	15	3	17	7	1	55	3	5	3	2	5
North East	Bauchi	53	3	2	-	5	2	1	-	-	13	8	16	3
North East	Borno	1,073	98	30	271	184	51	11	17	8	118	122	89	74
North East	Gombe	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	324	6	29	11	125	4	19	3	18	36	7	13	53
North East	Yobe	22	3	1	-	4	1	3	-	3	-	-	7	-
North East Total		1,599	115	77	285	335	66	35	75	37	172	140	127	135
South East	Abia	74	2	12	1	-	1	-	5	17	11	20	4	1
South East	Anambra	63	2	2	12	3	24	1	3	3	3	4	1	5
South East	Ebonyi	21	13	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Enugu	191	71	7	-	12	1	-	2	1	32	25	11	29
South East	Imo	127	5	1	9	20	12	19	7	6	18	19	7	4
South East Total		476	93	24	22	35	40	20	17	27	64	72	23	39
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	2	1	-	-	1	15	-	2	1	-	-	15
South South	Bayelsa	23	3	1	3	1	3	-	-	-	10	1	-	1
South South	Cross River	53	1	17	5	2	3	4	-	1	16	1	-	3
South South	Delta	141	2	-	1	49	10	40	10	11	1	13	-	4
South South	Edo	320	123	41	20	42	7	19	1	36	-	22	5	4
South South	Rivers	134	20	14	4	7	-	3	7	11	4	22	15	27
South South Total		708	151	74	33	101	24	81	18	61	32	59	20	54
South West	Ekiti	56	20	-	1	1	-	1	2	11	1	8	3	8
South West	Lagos	26	2	3	-	5	-	2	4	-	8	-	-	2
South West	Ogun	99	6	1	-	29	3	10	5	13	9	16	4	3
South West	Ondo	143	6	6	12	14	2	5	3	1	17	2	8	67
South West	Osun	36	-	-	2	9	-	4	6	3	-	6	4	2
South West	Oyo	65	7	-	-	3	1	5	35	7	2	5	-	-
South West Total		425	41	10	15	61	6	27	55	35	37	37	19	82
Grand Total		21,621	1,142	1,267	2,108	2,125	1,981	2,433	1,507	1,704	1,927	2,040	1,469	1,918

Appendix 8J: Civilian Abduction analysis: The spread over months (Oct 2019 - Sept 2023)

Geopolitical zone	State	2020-2023												
		Total Civilians Abducted	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep
North West	Jigawa	6	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	2	-	1
North West	Kaduna	5,782	169	182	532	418	555	868	427	332	517	956	249	577
North West	Kano	20	2	1	3	1	-	-	4	7	1	-	1	-
North West	Katsina	1,573	118	20	408	140	134	176	53	115	35	119	124	131
North West	Kebbi	591	24	16	56	101	15	111	7	2	110	7	27	115
North West	Sokoto	1,026	25	19	116	159	84	130	8	41	144	190	44	66
North West	Zamfara	3,044	67	324	383	38	431	414	101	35	246	243	463	299
North West Total		12,042	405	562	1,500	857	1,219	1,700	600	532	1,053	1,517	908	1,189
North Central	Abuja FCT	452	15	8	40	6	47	24	76	30	92	12	12	90
North Central	Benue	130	12	4	3	1	1	7	37	8	22	13	2	20
North Central	Kogi	218	8	49	9	13	15	26	3	2	21	13	15	44
North Central	Kwara	153	20	13	4	27	13	9	2	24	15	2	15	9
North Central	Nasarawa	118	24	15	-	15	-	-	13	23	6	15	5	2
North Central	Niger	4,966	215	419	178	659	535	480	506	917	393	135	293	236
North Central	Plateau	288	42	12	12	12	9	23	100	8	19	6	28	17
North Central Total		6,325	336	520	246	733	620	569	737	1,012	568	196	370	418
North East	Adamawa	120	5	15	3	17	7	1	55	3	4	3	2	5
North East	Bauchi	50	3	2	-	5	2	1	-	-	11	8	16	2
North East	Borno	1,059	98	29	271	184	51	8	17	8	118	122	87	66
North East	Gombe	6	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	5	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	322	6	29	11	125	4	19	1	18	36	7	13	53
North East	Yobe	22	3	1	-	4	1	3	-	3	-	-	7	-
North East Total		1,579	115	76	285	335	66	32	73	37	169	140	125	126
South East	Abia	72	2	10	1	-	1	-	5	17	11	20	4	1
South East	Anambra	60	2	1	12	2	23	1	3	3	3	4	1	5
South East	Ebonyi	17	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
South East	Enugu	191	71	7	-	12	1	-	2	1	32	25	11	29
South East	Imo	125	4	1	8	20	12	19	7	6	18	19	7	4
South East Total		465	92	19	21	34	37	20	17	27	64	72	23	39
South South	Akwa Ibom	37	2	1	-	-	1	15	-	2	1	-	-	15
South South	Bayelsa	23	3	1	3	1	3	-	-	-	10	1	-	1
South South	Cross River	53	1	17	5	2	3	4	-	1	16	1	-	3
South South	Delta	141	2	-	1	49	10	40	10	11	1	13	-	4
South South	Edo	319	123	40	20	42	7	19	1	36	-	22	5	4
South South	Rivers	128	18	10	4	7	-	3	7	11	4	22	15	27
South South Total		701	149	69	33	101	24	81	18	61	32	59	20	54
South West	Ekiti	56	20	-	1	1	-	1	2	11	1	8	3	8
South West	Lagos	26	2	3	-	5	-	2	4	-	8	-	-	2
South West	Ogun	94	6	1	-	29	3	10	4	12	9	16	4	-
South West	Ondo	143	6	6	12	14	2	5	3	1	17	2	8	67
South West	Osun	36	-	-	2	9	-	4	6	3	-	6	4	2
South West	Oyo	65	7	-	-	3	1	5	35	7	2	5	-	-
South West Total		420	41	10	15	61	6	27	54	34	37	37	19	79
Grand Total		21,532	1,138	1,256	2,100	2,121	1,972	2,429	1,499	1,703	1,923	2,021	1,465	1,905

Appendix 9A: Killing analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2019 – Sep 2020)

	2020																											
	Killings									Community Killings									Other Killings									
Aggressors	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	3,780	678	3,602	2,525	465	-	612	138	40	3,404	539	3,284	2,230	453	-	601	113	7	376	139	318	295	12	-	11	25	33	
Other Terrorist Groups	1,932	522	1,577	288	150	-	1,139	182	173	1,529	418	1,487	267	144	-	1,076	12	30	403	104	90	21	6	-	63	170	143	
Boko Haram	1,969	228	1,382	612	279	-	491	342	245	1,308	121	1,240	526	249	-	465	39	29	661	107	142	86	30	-	26	303	216	
ISWAP	1,155	152	336	134	41	-	161	431	388	327	41	315	133	30	-	152	12	-	828	111	21	1	11	-	9	419	388	
Cultists	223	77	201	22	25	-	154	-	22	196	69	188	10	25	-	153	-	8	27	8	13	12	-	-	1	-	14	
Security Forces	2,667	372	166	12	49	-	105	19	2,482	128	12	24	8	8	-	8	-	104	2,539	360	142	4	41	-	97	19	2,378	
Locals	149	80	144	3	-	-	141	5	-	2	1	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	147	79	142	3	-	-	139	5	-	
Assailants	17	3	16	16	-	-	-	-	1	15	1	15	15	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	
Vigilantes	18	6	7	7	-	-	-	-	11	7	3	7	7	-	-	-	-	-	11	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	3	2	3	-	-	-	-	3	-	3	2	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Communal clash	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	11,913	2,120	7,434	3,619	1,009	-	2,806	1,117	3,362	6,919	1,207	6,565	3,196	909	-	2,460	176	178	4,994	913	869	423	100	-	346	941	3,184	

Appendix 9B: Killing analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2021)

	2021																											
	Killings									Community Killings									Other Killings									
Aggressors	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	5,529	745	4,711	3,350	735	13	613	408	410	4,475	587	4,153	2,892	644	13	604	177	145	1,054	158	558	458	91	-	9	231	265	
Other Terrorist Groups	4,689	1,007	3,460	785	366	11	2,298	455	774	3,578	790	3,274	697	337	11	2,229	160	144	1,111	217	186	88	29	-	69	295	630	
Locals	493	183	455	59	52	-	344	17	21	119	13	117	57	50	-	10	2	-	374	170	338	2	2	-	334	15	21	
Security Forces	2,881	424	395	39	36	-	320	47	2,439	247	37	139	31	6	-	102	1	107	2,634	387	256	8	30	-	218	46	2,332	
Cultists	354	163	349	23	-	-	326	1	4	344	158	340	23	-	-	317	-	4	10	5	9	-	-	-	9	1	-	
Boko Haram	613	58	237	29	22	-	186	166	210	194	22	183	18	22	-	143	1	10	419	36	54	11	-	-	43	165	200	
ISWAP	1,523	245	196	9	5	-	182	1,002	325	194	30	150	9	5	-	136	41	3	1,329	215	46	-	-	-	46	961	322	
Assailants	81	10	80	16	13	-	51	1	-	80	9	80	16	13	-	51	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	73	24	30	2	-	-	28	33	10	23	10	23	2	-	-	21	-	-	50	14	7	-	-	-	7	33	10	
Communal clash	14	3	14	11	-	-	3	-	-	14	3	14	11	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vigilantes	24	3	13	5	8	-	-	-	11	11	1	11	5	6	-	-	-	-	13	2	2	-	2	-	-	-	11	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	16,274	2,865	9,940	4,328	1,237	24	4,351	2,130	4,204	9,279	1,660	8,484	3,761	1,083	24	3,616	382	413	6,995	1,205	1,456	567	154	-	735	1,748	3,791	

Appendix 9C: Killing analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2021 – Sep 2022)

	2022																											
	Killings									Community Killings									Other Killings									
Aggressors	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
Other Terrorist Groups	5,914	1,185	4,497	2,375	1,816	20	286	570	847	3,947	565	3,388	1,620	1,574	15	179	149	410	1,967	620	1,109	755	242	5	107	421	437	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,691	334	1,661	1,537	74	11	39	16	14	1,257	211	1,241	1,142	54	10	35	11	5	434	123	420	395	20	1	4	5	9	
Security Forces	5,185	546	398	236	82	6	74	101	4,686	1,135	73	244	142	47	2	53	32	859	4,050	473	154	94	35	4	21	69	3,827	
Boko Haram	688	57	362	265	96	-	1	57	269	407	26	337	244	92	-	1	20	50	281	31	25	21	4	-	-	37	219	
ISWAP	745	90	266	146	107	2	11	181	298	242	25	194	115	71	-	8	10	38	503	65	72	31	36	2	3	171	260	
Cultists	245	104	150	115	14	-	21	1	94	35	12	35	20	-	-	15	-	-	210	92	115	95	14	-	6	1	94	
Locals	192	124	130	85	18	1	26	6	56	27	15	26	9	-	1	16	-	1	165	109	104	76	18	-	10	6	55	
Communal clash	91	22	75	47	16	-	12	-	16	32	4	32	13	7	-	12	-	-	59	18	43	34	9	-	-	-	16	
Assailants	70	52	65	51	14	-	-	4	1	3	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	67	49	62	48	14	-	-	4	1	
Vigilantes	161	21	26	5	21	-	-	3	132	70	3	20	-	20	-	-	-	50	91	18	6	5	1	-	-	3	82	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	55	26	21	15	5	-	1	18	16	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	54	25	20	15	5	-	-	18	16	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs																												
Total	15,037	2,561	7,651	4,877	2,263	40	471	957	6,429	7,156	938	5,521	3,308	1,865	28	320	222	1,413	7,881	1,623	2,130	1,569	398	12	151	735	5,016	

Appendix 9D: Killing analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2022 – Sep 2023)

	2023																											
	Killings									Community Killings									Other Killings									
Aggressors	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
Other Terrorist Groups	3,419	874	2,505	1,447	1,002	26	30	468	446	2,653	571	2,125	1,220	864	22	19	194	334	766	303	380	227	138	4	11	274	112	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	2,109	418	1,974	1,741	199	7	27	65	70	1,976	385	1,939	1,716	189	7	27	22	15	133	33	35	25	10	-	-	43	55	
Security Forces	4,361	592	383	219	150	6	8	105	3,873	232	21	160	79	81	-	-	-	72	4,129	571	223	140	69	6	8	105	3,801	
Boko Haram	1,089	57	219	65	151	-	3	25	845	261	26	191	63	128	-	-	5	65	828	31	28	2	23	-	3	20	780	
Cultists	294	129	212	146	14	36	16	4	78	101	38	93	71	4	8	10	-	8	193	91	119	75	10	28	6	4	70	
Locals	226	156	188	126	53	4	5	2	36	45	20	36	15	21	-	-	-	9	181	136	152	111	32	4	5	2	27	
Communal clash	116	19	108	80	20	7	1	-	8	105	15	100	75	19	5	1	-	5	11	4	8	5	1	2	-	-	3	
Assailants	114	74	102	58	41	3	-	5	7	26	16	21	14	6	1	-	-	5	88	58	81	44	35	2	-	5	2	
ISWAP	707	62	81	8	69	-	4	69	557	300	11	29	8	21	-	-	14	257	407	51	52	-	48	-	4	55	300	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	76	28	63	52	11	-	-	6	7	48	14	48	37	11	-	-	-	-	28	14	15	15	-	-	-	6	7	
Vigilantes	175	15	20	3	16	1	-	-	155	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	172	13	20	3	16	1	-	-	152	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	12,686	2,424	5,855	3,945	1,726	90	94	749	6,082	5,750	1,119	4,742	3,298	1,344	43	57	235	773	6,936	1,305	1,113	647	382	47	37	514	5,309	

Appendix 9E: Killing analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2019 – Sep 2023)

	2020-2023																											
	Killings									Community Killings									Other Killings									
Aggressors	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	Grand total of killings	Grand total # of incidents with killings	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed	
Other Terrorist Groups	15,954	3,588	12,039	4,895	3,334	57	3,753	1,675	2,240	11,707	2,344	10,274	3,804	2,919	48	3,503	515	918	4,247	1,244	1,765	1,091	415	9	250	1,160	1,322	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	13,109	2,175	11,948	9,153	1,473	31	1,291	627	534	11,112	1,722	10,617	7,980	1,340	30	1,267	323	172	1,997	453	1,331	1,173	133	1	24	304	362	
Boko Haram	4,359	400	2,200	971	548	-	681	590	1,569	2,170	195	1,951	851	491	-	609	65	154	2,189	205	249	120	57	-	72	525	1,415	
Security Forces	15,094	1,934	1,342	506	317	12	507	272	13,480	1,742	143	567	260	142	2	163	33	1,142	13,352	1,791	775	246	175	10	344	239	12,338	
Locals	1,060	543	917	273	123	5	516	30	113	193	49	181	81	71	1	28	2	10	867	494	736	192	52	4	488	28	103	
Cultists	1,116	473	912	306	53	36	517	6	198	676	277	656	124	29	8	495	-	20	440	196	256	182	24	28	22	6	178	
ISWAP	4,130	549	879	297	222	2	358	1,683	1,568	1,063	107	688	265	127	-	296	77	298	3,067	442	191	32	95	2	62	1,606	1,270	
Assailants	282	139	263	141	68	3	51	10	9	124	29	119	48	19	1	51	-	5	158	110	144	93	49	2	-	10	4	
Communal clash	221	44	197	138	36	7	16	-	24	151	22	146	99	26	5	16	-	5	70	22	51	39	10	2	-	-	19	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	207	80	117	69	16	-	32	57	33	75	27	75	39	11	-	25	-	-	132	53	42	30	5	-	7	57	33	
Vigilantes	378	45	66	20	45	1	-	3	309	91	9	38	12	26	-	-	-	53	287	36	28	8	19	1	-	3	256	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	55,910	9,970	30,880	16,769	6,235	154	7,722	4,953	20,077	29,104	4,924	25,312	13,563	5,201	95	6,453	1,015	2,777	26,806	5,046	5,568	3,206	1,034	59	1,269	3,938	17,300	

Appendix 10A: Abduction analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2019 – Sep 2020)

	2020																										
	Total Abductions									Community Abductions									Other Abductions								
Aggressors	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups
Other Terrorist Groups	293	52	293	170	5	-	118	-	-	261	40	261	155	3	-	103	-	-	32	12	32	15	2	-	15	-	-
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	988	134	978	695	73	-	210	10	-	680	76	677	431	63	-	183	3	-	308	58	301	264	10	-	27	7	-
Boko Haram	217	45	215	87	13	-	115	2	-	112	25	110	62	13	-	35	2	-	105	20	105	25	-	-	80	-	-
ISWAP	52	10	52	20	-	-	32	-	-	6	2	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	46	8	46	14	-	-	32	-	-
Security Forces	117	19	117	5	-	-	112	-	-	33	2	33	-	-	-	33	-	-	84	17	84	5	-	-	79	-	-
Assailants	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Locals	8	4	8	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	4	8	-	-	-	8	-	-
Vigilantes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Communal clash	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cultists	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	1,677	266	1,665	977	91	-	597	12	-	1,094	147	1,089	654	79	-	356	5	-	583	119	576	323	12	-	241	7	-

Appendix 10B: Abduction analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2021)

	2021																											
	Total Abductions									Community Abductions									Other Abductions									
Aggressors	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	
Other Terrorist Groups	2,754	247	2,754	1,006	864	2	882	-	-	2,556	193	2,556	909	806	2	839	-	-	198	54	198	97	58	-	43	-	-	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	2,887	446	2,887	1,237	1,338	-	312	-	-	2,454	378	2,454	1,000	1,295	-	159	-	-	433	68	433	237	43	-	153	-	-	
Boko Haram	88	12	88	24	8	-	56	-	-	76	10	76	19	8	-	49	-	-	12	2	12	5	-	-	7	-	-	
ISWAP	55	7	55	13	-	-	42	-	-	54	6	54	12	-	-	42	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	
Security Forces	25	11	25	17	4	-	4	-	-	18	7	18	13	3	-	2	-	-	7	4	7	4	1	-	2	-	-	
Assailants	71	16	71	36	23	-	12	-	-	64	15	64	36	23	-	5	-	-	7	1	7	-	-	-	7	-	-	
Locals	13	5	13	4	1	4	4	-	-	10	2	10	3	-	4	3	-	-	3	3	3	1	1	-	1	-	-	
Vigilantes	12	2	12	7	5	-	-	-	-	12	2	12	7	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Communal clash	2	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Cultists	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	5,907	747	5,907	2,346	2,243	6	1,312	-	-	5,246	614	5,246	2,001	2,140	6	1,099	-	-	661	133	661	345	103	-	213	-	-	

Appendix 10C: Abduction analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2021 – Sep 2022)

	2022																											
	Total Abductions									Community Abductions										Other Abductions								
Aggressors	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abduction	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	
Other Terrorist Groups	5,984	651	5,948	3,289	2,312	132	215	36	-	4,331	400	4,313	2,093	1,935	132	153	18	-	1,653	251	1,635	1,196	377	-	62	18	-	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,275	144	1,266	1,027	208	1	30	8	1	902	94	895	724	148	1	22	6	1	373	50	371	303	60	-	8	2	-	
Boko Haram	250	12	249	173	76	-	-	-	1	131	4	131	76	55	-	-	-	-	119	8	118	97	21	-	-	-	1	
ISWAP	186	15	175	86	89	-	-	11	-	48	4	48	33	15	-	-	-	-	138	11	127	53	74	-	-	11	-	
Security Forces	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Assailants	41	20	41	34	6	-	1	-	-	4	1	4	-	4	-	-	-	-	37	19	37	34	2	-	1	-	-	
Locals	20	1	20	20	-	-	-	-	-	20	1	20	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Vigilantes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Communal clash	4	1	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	
Cultists	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	7,762	846	7,705	4,634	2,691	133	247	55	2	5,438	506	5,413	2,947	2,157	133	176	24	1	2,324	340	2,292	1,687	534	-	71	31	1	

Appendix 10D: Abduction analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2022 – Sep 2023)

	2023																											
	Total Abductions									Community Abductions									Other Abductions									
Aggressors	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	
Other Terrorist Groups	4,746	616	4,733	2,192	2,454	43	44	11	2	3,722	476	3,717	1,719	1,925	39	34	3	2	1,024	140	1,016	473	529	4	10	8	-	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	1,253	160	1,249	955	284	2	8	4	-	1,111	133	1,109	850	254	2	3	2	-	142	27	140	105	30	-	5	2	-	
Boko Haram	150	22	150	18	76	-	56	-	-	133	20	133	18	66	-	49	-	-	17	2	17	-	10	-	7	-	-	
ISWAP	39	6	39	1	38	-	-	-	-	37	5	37	1	36	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	
Security Forces	33	9	32	21	11	-	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	32	8	31	20	11	-	-	1	-	
Assailants	39	22	39	30	9	-	-	-	-	10	8	10	6	4	-	-	-	-	29	14	29	24	5	-	-	-	-	
Locals	4	3	4	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	3	4	2	2	-	-	-	-	
Vigilantes	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Communal clash	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Cultists	3	2	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	5	5	3	3	-	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	3	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	6,275	846	6,255	3,228	2,874	45	108	18	2	5,020	646	5,013	2,601	2,285	41	86	5	2	1,255	200	1,242	627	589	4	22	13	-	

Appendix 10E: Abduction analysis: by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

	2020-2023																											
	Total Abductions									Community Abductions									Other Abductions									
Aggressors	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	Grand total of abductions	Grand total # of incidents with abductions	Total civilians abducted	Christians	Muslims	ATRs	Unknown	Security Forces	Terror Groups	
Other Terrorist Groups	13,777	1,566	13,728	6,657	5,635	177	1,259	47	2	10,870	1,109	10,847	4,876	4,669	173	1,129	21	2	2,907	457	2,881	1,781	966	4	130	26	-	
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	6,403	884	6,380	3,914	1,903	3	560	22	1	5,147	681	5,135	3,005	1,760	3	367	11	1	1,256	203	1,245	909	143	-	193	11	-	
Boko Haram	705	91	702	302	173	-	227	2	1	452	59	450	175	142	-	133	2	-	253	32	252	127	31	-	94	-	1	
ISWAP	332	38	321	120	127	-	74	11	-	145	17	145	52	51	-	42	-	-	187	21	176	68	76	-	32	11	-	
Security Forces	176	40	175	44	15	-	116	1	-	53	11	53	15	3	-	35	-	-	123	29	122	29	12	-	81	1	-	
Assailants	151	58	151	100	38	-	13	-	-	78	24	78	42	31	-	5	-	-	73	34	73	58	7	-	8	-	-	
Locals	45	13	45	26	3	4	12	-	-	30	3	30	23	-	4	3	-	-	15	10	15	3	3	-	9	-	-	
Vigilantes	12	2	12	7	5	-	-	-	-	12	2	12	7	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Communal clash	6	2	6	6	-	-	-	-	-	2	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	4	1	4	4	-	-	-	-	-	
Cultists	6	5	6	3	-	-	3	-	-	5	4	5	2	-	-	3	-	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	
IPOB (Indigenous People of Biafra)	5	5	3	3	-	-	-	2	-	1	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	
Hoodlums, Gangsters, Gangs	3	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Total	21,621	2,705	21,532	11,185	7,899	184	2,264	85	4	16,798	1,913	16,761	8,203	6,661	180	1,717	34	3	4,823	792	4,771	2,982	1,238	4	547	51	1	

Appendix 11: Top 100 Local Gov't areas (LGAs) with most civilian killings (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	2020-2023								
			Total killed	# of incidents with killing	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Zangon Kataf	Kaduna	North West	1,246	225	1,232	1,013	35	1	183	1	13
Shiroro	Niger	North Central	1,498	171	986	571	291	-	124	180	332
Kajuru	Kaduna	North West	870	254	858	699	50	1	108	1	11
Chikun	Kaduna	North West	1,064	253	718	535	34	-	149	21	325
Guma	Benue	North Central	742	150	707	657	4	-	46	16	19
Wasagu/Danko	Kebbi	North West	809	58	641	397	197	29	18	64	104
Bassa	Plateau	North Central	615	157	607	442	14	-	151	7	1
Munya	Niger	North Central	748	126	509	299	92	1	117	42	197
Katsina-Ala	Benue	North Central	553	52	506	423	-	-	83	2	45
Giwa	Kaduna	North West	732	88	504	228	201	-	75	1	227
Faskari	Katsina	North West	602	79	465	160	142	-	163	4	133
Takum	Taraba	North East	462	40	420	407	8	3	2	13	29
Monguno	Borno	North East	907	77	388	244	99	-	45	208	311
Kaura	Kaduna	North West	366	57	362	330	10	-	22	4	-
Maru	Zamfara	North West	1,067	81	360	18	137	-	205	103	604
Sabon Birni	Sokoto	North West	558	56	359	29	177	-	153	44	155
Mangu	Plateau	North Central	384	65	349	305	33	-	11	2	33
Birnin Gwari	Kaduna	North West	949	156	337	177	74	-	86	63	549
Anka	Zamfara	North West	443	28	334	79	221	-	34	10	99
Gwer West	Benue	North Central	306	55	303	258	-	1	44	3	-
Maradun	Zamfara	North West	790	48	286	48	145	-	93	13	491
Maiduguri Metro	Borno	North East	830	98	285	81	45	-	159	158	387
	Imo	South East	364	4	284	256	28	-	-	80	-
Igabi	Kaduna	North West	463	109	278	93	102	-	83	60	125
Bali	Taraba	North East	254	28	246	169	22	12	43	-	8
Rafi	Niger	North Central	605	96	240	98	65	1	76	59	306
Bungudu	Zamfara	North West	322	48	237	22	99	-	116	27	58
Jere	Borno	North East	307	26	237	3	178	-	56	40	30
Konduga	Borno	North East	987	80	231	77	75	-	79	169	587
Apa	Benue	North Central	233	26	229	210	-	-	19	1	3
Gusau	Zamfara	North West	412	75	219	23	158	-	38	46	147
Chibok	Borno	North East	322	47	213	158	11	-	44	5	104
Gubio	Borno	North East	346	30	211	126	39	-	46	38	97
Jos North	Plateau	North Central	218	62	209	119	43	1	46	1	8
Mariga	Niger	North Central	659	45	208	107	52	-	49	23	428
Sakaba	Kebbi	North West	329	15	208	155	50	-	3	83	38
Bukkuyum	Zamfara	North West	378	35	206	37	134	-	35	4	168
Goronyo	Sokoto	North West	216	25	202	70	107	1	24	-	14
Askira/Uba	Borno	North East	451	47	199	150	19	-	30	36	216
Isi Uzo	Enugu	South East	197	34	189	189	-	-	-	4	4
Ngala	Borno	North East	676	67	188	66	106	-	16	90	398
Batsari	Katsina	North West	382	56	184	52	73	-	59	16	182
Madagali	Adamawa	North East	211	18	182	131	-	-	51	10	19
Ado	Benue	North Central	184	20	180	170	-	-	10	1	3
Kauru	Kaduna	North West	184	32	177	114	1	-	62	1	6
Zurmi	Zamfara	North West	616	57	177	33	84	-	60	8	431
Gassol	Taraba	North East	221	31	168	107	22	-	39	-	53
Bakura	Zamfara	North West	294	30	166	45	107	-	14	13	115
Kukawa	Borno	North East	994	70	165	12	38	-	115	177	652
Agatu	Benue	North Central	163	35	163	126	-	-	37	-	-
Mashegu	Niger	North Central	240	33	158	55	84	2	17	1	81

Continued Killing analysis: totals by LGA

			2020-2023								
LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	Total killed	# of incidents with killing	Total civilians killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	ATRs killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Ukum	Benue	North Central	193	29	158	117	2	-	39	5	30
Makurdi	Benue	North Central	172	65	153	102	2	-	49	2	17
Riyom	Plateau	North Central	158	75	153	132	9	-	12	2	3
Kachia	Kaduna	North West	201	43	151	113	32	-	6	2	48
Kaura Namoda	Zamfara	North West	242	28	151	28	99	-	24	5	86
Kwande	Benue	North Central	149	23	149	130	-	7	12	-	-
Talata Mafara	Zamfara	North West	191	27	148	8	100	-	40	-	43
Bama	Borno	North East	2,140	164	146	5	57	-	84	131	1,863
Illela	Sokoto	North West	180	19	146	51	59	-	36	2	32
Jos South	Plateau	North Central	156	52	144	109	8	-	27	-	12
Tsafe	Zamfara	North West	277	37	143	7	102	-	34	8	126
Barkin Ladi	Plateau	North Central	154	52	141	124	1	1	15	4	9
Logo	Benue	North Central	152	50	137	103	2	1	31	2	13
Otukpo	Benue	North Central	128	12	127	122	-	-	5	-	1
Ohaukwu	Ebonyi	South East	126	13	125	125	-	-	-	1	-
Bakori	Katsina	North West	170	8	120	66	48	4	2	50	-
Danmusa	Katsina	North West	321	47	120	5	41	-	74	12	189
Dambo	Borno	North East	1,002	121	119	30	28	-	61	265	618
Jema'a	Kaduna	North West	122	30	118	97	6	-	15	4	-
Jibia	Katsina	North West	417	67	116	18	55	-	43	31	270
Gwoza	Borno	North East	1,196	142	114	28	8	-	78	38	1,044
Afikpo South	Ebonyi	South East	114	7	113	113	-	-	-	1	-
Bokkos	Plateau	North Central	109	32	109	90	8	-	11	-	-
Kankara	Katsina	North West	165	34	107	10	48	11	38	7	51
Hong	Adamawa	North East	106	12	106	55	-	-	51	-	-
Gummi	Zamfara	North West	141	17	105	30	60	-	15	-	36
Kanam	Plateau	North Central	246	5	104	100	-	-	4	-	142
Dikwa	Borno	North East	564	65	98	22	33	-	43	106	360
Doma	Nasarawa	North Central	108	10	96	23	65	-	8	10	2
Karu	Nasarawa	North Central	96	9	94	83	8	-	3	-	2
Karim Lamido	Taraba	North East	111	9	92	48	24	5	15	9	10
Ohaukwu	Ebonyi	South East	96	8	92	30	-	-	62	-	4
	Niger	North Central	141	14	91	30	10	-	51	11	39
Nganzai	Borno	North East	247	30	90	30	45	-	15	88	69
Shinkafi	Zamfara	North West	279	33	90	7	21	-	62	20	169
Orlu	Imo	South East	114	31	89	56	-	-	33	10	15
Wukari	Taraba	North East	101	41	88	58	-	-	30	-	13
Kala/Balge	Borno	North East	179	16	85	11	50	-	24	29	65
Oredo	Edo	South South	117	57	80	18	1	3	58	4	33
Rabah	Sokoto	North West	220	16	80	13	67	-	-	24	116
Sabuwa	Katsina	North West	86	19	80	16	24	-	40	-	6
Biu	Borno	North East	292	38	79	49	20	-	10	43	170
Kaduna North	Kaduna	North West	193	41	78	15	12	-	51	39	76
Zuru	Kebbi	North West	79	11	78	53	12	5	8	1	-
Okpokwu	Benue	North Central	77	10	76	76	-	-	-	-	1
Dutsin-Ma	Katsina	North West	132	33	75	3	26	-	46	8	49
Ughelli North	Delta	South South	109	57	75	32	1	-	42	14	20
Magumeri	Borno	North East	224	35	74	2	28	-	44	63	87
Owo	Ondo	South West	78	14	73	53	1	-	19	-	5
Totals killed top 100 LGAs			40,140	5,463	22,846	13,019	4,929	90	4,808	3,004	14,290
Totals killed all LGAs			55,910	9,970	30,880	16,769	6,235	154	7,722	4,953	20,077

Appendix 12: Top 100 Local Gov't Areas (LGAs) with most civilian abductions (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	2020-2023								
			Total abducted	Total abduction incidents	Total civilians abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATR abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Kajuru	Kaduna	North West	2,185	238	2,184	2,001	175	-	8	1	-
Rafi	Niger	North Central	1,275	69	1,275	356	725	53	141	-	-
Chikun	Kaduna	North West	1,160	90	1,158	899	123	1	135	2	-
Munya	Niger	North Central	1,151	200	1,151	648	424	4	75	-	-
Shiroro	Niger	North Central	845	179	845	479	338	-	28	-	-
Birnin Gwari	Kaduna	North West	628	47	627	259	263	24	81	1	-
Maru	Zamfara	North West	546	16	546	63	402	5	76	-	-
Talata Mafara	Zamfara	North West	443	14	443	21	422	-	-	-	-
Giwa	Kaduna	North West	425	16	425	279	133	-	13	-	-
Maradun	Zamfara	North West	423	12	423	61	347	-	15	-	-
Kachia	Kaduna	North West	420	25	420	340	79	-	1	-	-
Kankara	Katsina	North West	403	10	403	52	335	-	16	-	-
Bungudu	Zamfara	North West	390	18	390	147	239	-	4	-	-
Wasagu/Danko	Kebbi	North West	377	32	377	190	159	1	27	-	-
Paikoro	Niger	North Central	337	41	334	201	110	2	21	3	-
Rijau	Niger	North Central	288	21	288	210	43	35	-	-	-
Mashegu	Niger	North Central	289	25	287	94	181	4	8	2	-
Igabi	Kaduna	North West	281	18	280	195	84	-	1	1	-
Kagarko	Kaduna	North West	259	27	259	93	143	-	23	-	-
Gusau	Zamfara	North West	248	41	246	61	185	-	-	2	-
Jibia	Katsina	North West	219	25	219	29	147	-	43	-	-
Sabon Birni	Sokoto	North West	216	14	216	36	71	-	109	-	-
Bakura	Zamfara	North West	206	6	206	66	136	-	4	-	-
Lapai	Niger	North Central	202	35	202	94	96	-	12	-	-
Sokoto South	Sokoto	North West	200	2	200	150	-	-	50	-	-
Maiduguri Metro	Borno	North East	197	15	197	45	28	-	124	-	-
Zaria	Kaduna	North West	175	25	174	57	93	-	24	1	-
Sabuwa	Katsina	North West	167	8	167	53	61	-	53	-	-
Zurmi	Zamfara	North West	157	10	157	43	105	8	1	-	-
Faskari	Katsina	North West	160	22	154	70	64	-	20	6	-
Tsafe	Zamfara	North West	142	12	141	32	106	-	3	1	-
Goronyo	Sokoto	North West	134	13	134	20	91	-	23	-	-
Esan South-East	Edo	South South	127	3	127	127	-	-	-	-	-
Gummi	Zamfara	North West	124	3	124	35	72	-	17	-	-
Mariga	Niger	North Central	123	13	123	49	68	-	6	-	-
Kaga	Borno	North East	122	9	121	72	26	-	23	-	1
Chibok	Borno	North East	121	18	121	93	15	-	13	-	-
Anka	Zamfara	North West	113	3	113	4	4	-	105	-	-
Konduga	Borno	North East	110	17	109	21	41	-	47	1	-
Batsari	Katsina	North West	109	11	109	1	85	-	23	-	-
Kuje	Abuja FCT	North Central	101	20	101	58	33	-	10	-	-
Riyau	Niger	North Central	101	12	101	71	19	11	-	-	-
Kwali	Abuja FCT	North Central	98	17	98	48	49	1	-	-	-
Bukkuyum	Zamfara	North West	95	5	95	12	83	-	-	-	-
Ngala	Borno	North East	92	4	92	35	48	-	9	-	-
Bosso	Niger	North Central	91	12	91	38	47	-	6	-	-
Abaji	Abuja FCT	North Central	90	10	90	49	18	-	23	-	-
Isa	Sokoto	North West	86	6	86	25	59	-	2	-	-
Wushishi	Niger	North Central	83	12	83	15	68	-	-	-	-
Shinkafi	Zamfara	North West	80	3	80	25	50	-	5	-	-
Wurno	Sokoto	North West	80	2	80	-	20	-	60	-	-

Continued Abduction analysis: totals per LGA

			2020-2023								
LGA	State	Geopolitical zone	Total abducted	Total abduction incidents	Total civilians abducted	Christians abducted	Muslims abducted	ATR abducted	Unknown religious identity abducted	Security Forces abducted	Terror Groups abducted
Yauri	Kebbi	North West	80	1	80	17	63	-	-	-	-
Ose	Ondo	South West	77	9	77	59	16	-	2	-	-
Bali	Taraba	North East	75	6	75	43	32	-	-	-	-
Tureta	Sokoto	North West	74	3	74	19	55	-	-	-	-
Illela	Sokoto	North West	73	8	73	24	48	-	1	-	-
Nsukka	Enugu	South East	72	6	72	59	8	-	5	-	-
Funtua	Katsina	North West	71	9	71	17	41	-	13	-	-
Gwagwalada	Abuja FCT	North Central	71	7	71	46	3	-	22	-	-
Kanam	Plateau	North Central	71	2	71	70	1	-	-	-	-
Kaura Namoda	Zamfara	North West	70	9	70	5	65	-	-	-	-
Bama	Borno	North East	72	10	69	2	3	-	64	3	-
Bwari	Abuja FCT	North Central	83	14	68	57	11	-	-	15	-
Batagarawa	Katsina	North West	68	7	68	6	18	-	44	-	-
Jere	Borno	North East	67	5	66	-	17	-	49	1	-
	Kaduna	North West	66	4	66	66	-	-	-	-	-
Gassol	Taraba	North East	57	9	57	49	6	-	2	-	-
Matazuu	Katsina	North West	53	12	53	20	33	-	-	-	-
Jema'a	Kaduna	North West	52	11	52	49	3	-	-	-	-
Takum	Taraba	North East	52	7	52	40	4	-	8	-	-
Hong	Adamawa	North East	51	2	51	51	-	-	-	-	-
Wukari	Taraba	North East	52	6	50	11	-	-	39	2	-
Gada	Sokoto	North West	50	1	50	27	23	-	-	-	-
Bakori	Katsina	North West	49	13	49	17	25	1	6	-	-
Toto	Nasarawa	North Central	48	6	48	24	7	1	16	-	-
Patani, Delta	Delta	South South	47	2	47	47	-	-	-	-	-
Etsako West	Edo	South South	46	5	46	23	9	-	14	-	-
Malumfashi	Katsina	North West	44	10	44	25	19	-	-	-	-
Kafur	Katsina	North West	43	13	42	31	11	-	-	1	-
Augie	Kebbi	North West	42	2	42	27	-	-	15	-	-
Gwoza	Borno	North East	42	11	42	6	2	-	34	-	-
Kogi	Kogi	North Central	41	6	41	30	11	-	-	-	-
Emohua	Rivers	South South	40	7	40	33	-	-	7	-	-
Ughelli North	Delta	South South	38	6	38	24	-	-	14	-	-
Isin	Kwara	North Central	37	6	37	27	-	-	10	-	-
Tambuwal	Sokoto	North West	37	4	37	12	25	-	-	-	-
Wase	Plateau	North Central	37	4	37	21	16	-	-	-	-
Isuikwuato	Abia	South East	36	8	36	36	-	-	-	-	-
Isi Uzo	Enugu	South East	35	7	35	35	-	-	-	-	-
Kontagora	Niger	North Central	35	2	35	-	35	-	-	-	-
Ofu	Kogi	North Central	35	6	35	34	-	-	1	-	-
Suleja	Niger	North Central	35	4	35	16	7	-	12	-	-
Asa	Kwara	North Central	34	11	34	12	18	-	4	-	-
Dange Shuni	Sokoto	North West	34	3	34	9	16	-	9	-	-
Okene	Kogi	North Central	33	6	33	27	6	-	-	-	-
Ajaokuta	Kogi	North Central	32	5	32	29	3	-	-	-	-
Danmusa	Katsina	North West	32	5	32	7	25	-	-	-	-
Mangu	Plateau	North Central	32	11	32	10	21	-	1	-	-
Zangon Kataf	Kaduna	North West	32	22	31	21	10	-	-	-	1
Zuru	Kebbi	North West	31	3	31	11	-	20	-	-	-
Totals abducted top 100 LGAs			18,978	1,842	18,933	9,453	7,429	171	1,880	43	2
Totals abducted all LGAs			21,621	2,705	21,532	11,185	7,899	184	2,264	85	4

Appendix 13A: Killing analysis: Christian killings by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023													
Geopolitical zone	State	Total Christians Killed	Total Christians Killed	Total Christians Killed	Total Christians Killed	Total Christians Killed	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
North West	Jigawa	6	12	9	-	27	26	16	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
North West	Kaduna	1,237	1,003	862	446	3,548	3,519	2,498	14	1	934	17	3	-	2	-	8	42	29
North West	Kano	-	4	18	11	33	33	4	-	-	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	123	104	71	88	386	386	56	3	-	325	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
North West	Kebbi	42	368	182	64	656	653	429	-	-	224	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
North West	Sokoto	26	28	123	32	209	205	37	-	-	168	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
North West	Zamfara	32	46	233	80	391	375	50	-	-	306	-	-	-	-	5	-	14	16
North West Total		1,466	1,565	1,498	721	5,250	5,197	3,090	17	1	1,995	17	3	-	2	5	8	59	53
North Central	Abuja FCT	-	18	16	22	56	52	7	-	2	35	2	4	-	-	-	-	2	4
North Central	Benue	199	939	495	1,040	2,673	2,653	2,247	1	-	366	5	11	-	-	-	17	6	20
North Central	Kogi	58	5	41	42	146	141	75	-	1	62	1	1	-	-	-	-	1	5
North Central	Kwara	1	-	15	18	34	34	1	-	-	21	3	9	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Nasarawa	11	36	73	160	280	279	206	-	-	64	1	-	-	-	-	3	5	1
North Central	Niger	385	291	549	167	1,392	1,357	711	14	5	601	16	-	-	-	2	-	8	35
North Central	Plateau	208	408	334	550	1,500	1,497	978	9	-	469	4	1	-	-	-	26	10	3
North Central Total		862	1,697	1,523	1,999	6,081	6,013	4,225	24	8	1,618	32	26	-	-	2	46	32	68
North East	Adamawa	115	38	94	32	279	275	83	109	1	74	2	-	-	-	-	-	6	4
North East	Bauchi	-	-	18	24	42	42	2	-	-	31	3	-	-	-	-	4	2	-
North East	Borno	848	113	184	58	1,203	1,179	161	644	207	165	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	24
North East	Gombe	-	20	28	6	54	54	42	-	-	6	-	-	-	1	-	1	4	-
North East	Taraba	194	111	524	152	981	965	514	155	77	168	-	1	-	-	7	42	1	16
North East	Yobe	17	-	18	1	36	33	7	22	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	3
North East Total		1,174	282	866	273	2,595	2,548	809	930	288	444	5	1	-	1	7	47	16	47
South East	Abia	2	1	26	30	59	35	3	-	-	12	5	7	-	1	-	-	7	24
South East	Anambra	-	75	135	95	305	264	70	-	-	116	4	41	-	17	1	-	15	41
South East	Ebonyi	-	290	102	65	457	437	222	-	-	159	2	22	-	15	-	9	8	20
South East	Enugu	-	67	94	162	323	305	199	-	-	84	4	4	-	8	1	1	4	18
South East	Imo	-	267	136	130	533	409	265	-	-	104	5	1	-	23	1	-	10	124
South East Total		2	700	493	482	1,677	1,450	759	-	-	475	20	75	-	64	3	10	44	227
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	35	34	69	65	2	-	-	16	2	31	-	-	-	5	9	4
South South	Bayelsa	14	1	22	19	56	50	16	-	-	20	3	8	-	-	-	-	3	6
South South	Cross River	7	-	65	27	99	81	-	-	-	52	1	9	-	-	-	9	10	18
South South	Delta	34	5	57	79	175	158	44	-	-	50	13	25	-	1	1	2	22	17
South South	Edo	11	8	31	51	101	90	41	-	-	27	5	10	-	-	-	5	2	11
South South	Rivers	9	10	26	77	122	115	8	-	-	52	6	44	-	-	1	1	3	7
South South Total		75	24	236	287	622	559	111	-	-	217	30	127	-	1	2	22	49	63
South West	Ekiti	12	3	5	7	27	25	14	-	-	5	4	1	-	-	-	-	1	2
South West	Lagos	7	2	41	60	110	87	2	-	-	28	13	15	-	-	1	-	28	23
South West	Ogun	8	20	35	34	97	88	24	-	-	22	-	31	-	-	-	-	11	9
South West	Ondo	7	7	101	36	151	147	82	-	-	40	2	6	-	-	-	2	15	4
South West	Osun	3	1	41	21	66	63	7	-	-	14	14	21	-	1	-	1	5	3
South West	Oyo	3	27	38	25	93	86	30	-	-	37	4	-	-	-	-	2	13	7
South West Total		40	60	261	183	544	496	159	-	-	146	37	74	-	1	1	5	73	48
Grand Total		3,619	4,328	4,877	3,945	16,769	16,263	9,153	971	297	4,895	141	306	-	69	20	138	273	506

Appendix 13B: Killing analysis: Muslim killings by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023													
Geopolitical zone	State	Total Muslims Killed	Total Muslims Killed	Total Muslims Killed	Total Muslims Killed	Total Muslims Killed	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
North West	Jigawa	-	1	11	14	26	26	8	-	-	10	2	-	-	-	-	-	6	-
North West	Kaduna	169	65	280	107	621	571	209	-	-	348	10	-	-	-	-	1	3	50
North West	Kano	-	2	22	46	70	70	5	-	-	45	9	-	-	-	-	-	11	-
North West	Katsina	160	110	182	157	609	599	127	4	-	463	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	10
North West	Kebbi	9	113	106	72	300	288	121	-	-	166	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	12
North West	Sokoto	94	112	189	137	532	515	107	-	-	387	6	-	-	-	11	-	4	17
North West	Zamfara	86	372	668	394	1,520	1,498	252	22	-	1,143	9	25	-	-	6	-	41	22
North West Total		518	775	1,458	927	3,678	3,567	829	26	-	2,562	36	25	-	-	17	1	71	111
North Central	Abuja FCT	-	1	22	14	37	36	4	-	2	23	3	-	-	-	-	-	4	1
North Central	Benue	4	-	-	8	12	10	4	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	2
North Central	Kogi	3	1	8	25	37	35	20	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2
North Central	Kwara	-	8	4	10	22	22	5	-	-	8	2	3	-	-	-	-	4	-
North Central	Nasarawa	-	12	16	92	120	63	47	-	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	57
North Central	Niger	54	188	357	126	725	701	234	5	-	432	-	-	-	-	22	1	7	24
North Central	Plateau	-	46	56	51	153	115	15	-	5	73	6	1	-	-	3	9	3	38
North Central Total		61	256	463	326	1,106	982	329	5	7	565	11	4	-	-	25	10	26	124
North East	Adamawa	-	-	6	9	15	13	-	1	-	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	2
North East	Bauchi	-	5	23	59	87	83	9	-	-	57	7	-	-	-	-	4	6	4
North East	Borno	427	140	192	241	1,000	967	218	500	212	35	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	33
North East	Gombe	-	-	6	5	11	11	-	-	-	1	2	1	-	1	-	-	6	-
North East	Taraba	-	8	44	75	127	108	19	4	-	65	-	-	-	-	2	18	-	19
North East	Yobe	-	1	7	14	22	18	2	12	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
North East Total		427	154	278	403	1,262	1,200	248	517	215	166	10	1	-	1	2	22	18	62
South East	Abia	-	-	8	-	8	8	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	-	19	9	1	29	29	19	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	-	-	1	2	3	3	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	-	29	3	5	37	36	29	-	-	4	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1
South East Total		-	48	22	8	78	77	49	-	-	24	-	-	-	4	-	-	-	1
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	2	-	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	-	-	1	1	2	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	-	-	3	14	17	15	-	-	-	2	2	-	-	11	-	-	-	2
South South	Edo	-	-	-	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South South	Rivers	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
South South Total		-	-	6	17	23	20	-	-	-	3	2	-	-	11	-	2	2	3
South West	Ekiti	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	1	-	10	8	19	12	-	-	-	2	2	6	-	-	-	-	2	7
South West	Ogun	-	1	12	5	18	13	-	-	-	5	1	4	-	-	1	-	2	5
South West	Ondo	-	-	1	4	5	4	2	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Osun	-	1	9	8	18	17	1	-	-	-	4	10	-	-	-	1	1	1
South West	Oyo	2	2	4	17	25	23	15	-	-	5	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	2
South West Total		3	4	36	45	88	72	18	-	-	14	9	23	-	-	1	1	6	16
Grand Total		1,009	1,237	2,263	1,726	6,235	5,918	1,473	548	222	3,334	68	53	-	16	45	36	123	317

Appendix 14A: Abduction analysis: Christian abductions by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023													
Geopolitical zone	State	Total Christians Abducted	Total Christians Abducted	Total Christians Abducted	Total Christians Abducted	Total Christians Abducted	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
North West	Jigawa	-	1	1	-	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	312	1,093	2,049	883	4,337	4,321	1,757	85	1	2,433	17	-	-	-	7	-	21	16
North West	Kano	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	23	110	134	126	393	389	93	-	-	296	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4
North West	Kebbi	28	115	80	59	282	279	143	-	-	136	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
North West	Sokoto	150	20	115	50	335	335	150	-	-	171	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Zamfara	7	198	233	141	579	579	119	-	-	460	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West Total		520	1,537	2,615	1,259	5,931	5,908	2,262	85	1	3,501	31	-	-	-	7	-	21	23
North Central	Abuja FCT	36	31	51	162	280	280	97	-	-	179	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Benue	13	18	14	54	99	98	45	1	-	52	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
North Central	Kogi	-	17	52	107	176	176	23	-	-	152	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	6	8	19	54	87	87	11	-	-	72	1	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
North Central	Nasarawa	14	1	6	38	59	59	9	-	-	40	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	151	430	1,066	693	2,340	2,333	807	70	-	1,435	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	7
North Central	Plateau	1	39	137	59	236	236	49	1	-	171	12	-	-	-	-	2	1	-
North Central Total		221	544	1,345	1,167	3,277	3,269	1,041	72	-	2,101	49	-	-	-	-	2	4	8
North East	Adamawa	17	51	19	7	94	93	15	8	5	65	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
North East	Bauchi	-	3	1	8	12	12	3	-	-	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	130	86	118	17	351	351	45	127	112	67	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	6	6	6	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	30	12	111	49	202	202	49	4	2	146	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
North East	Yobe	12	-	4	-	16	16	7	5	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		189	152	253	87	681	680	119	144	119	297	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
South East	Abia	-	20	41	11	72	72	51	-	-	20	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	-	-	8	43	51	51	-	-	-	50	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	17	17	17	-	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	4	1	40	132	177	177	113	-	-	61	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	-	3	39	78	120	119	4	-	-	108	2	-	3	2	-	-	-	1
South East Total		4	24	128	281	437	436	168	-	-	256	6	-	3	3	-	-	-	1
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	2	2	18	22	22	2	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	3	2	13	4	22	22	5	-	-	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	2	-	50	52	47	9	-	-	36	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	5
South South	Delta	15	2	24	64	105	104	71	-	-	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South South	Edo	1	16	138	109	264	261	183	-	-	68	6	-	-	-	-	4	-	3
South South	Rivers	7	25	21	64	117	117	11	-	-	101	3	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		26	49	198	309	582	573	281	-	-	275	11	2	-	-	-	4	-	9
South West	Ekiti	5	2	22	16	45	44	3	-	-	41	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West	Lagos	-	1	5	11	17	17	6	-	-	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	-	13	18	22	53	53	3	-	-	50	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ondo	7	1	45	52	105	105	4	1	-	100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Osun	-	5	3	15	23	23	11	-	-	10	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	5	18	2	9	34	33	16	-	-	15	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
South West Total		17	40	95	125	277	275	43	1	-	227	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	2
Grand Total		977	2,346	4,634	3,228	11,185	11,141	3,914	302	120	6,657	100	3	3	3	7	6	26	44

Appendix 14B: Abduction analysis: Muslim abductions by aggressor (Oct 2020 – Sep 2023)

		2020	2021	2022	2023	2020-2023													
Geopolitical zone	State	Total Muslims Abducted	Total Muslims Abducted	Total Muslims Abducted	Total Muslims Abducted	Total Muslims Abducted	Terror Groups	Armed Fulani Herdsmen	Boko Haram	ISWAP	Other Terrorist Groups	Assailants	Cultists	Hoodlums	IPOB	Vigilantes	Community Clash	Locals	Security Forces
North West	Jigawa	-	2	-	2	4	4	1	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kaduna	-	253	437	427	1,117	1,117	195	8	-	901	13	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kano	-	1	8	6	15	15	2	-	-	11	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Katsina	2	392	198	349	941	941	76	-	-	864	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Kebbi	2	83	123	34	242	239	124	-	-	115	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
North West	Sokoto	6	53	216	160	435	435	9	-	-	426	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North West	Zamfara	-	800	509	913	2,222	2,213	585	-	-	1,623	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	9
North West Total		10	1,584	1,491	1,891	4,976	4,964	992	8	-	3,943	16	-	-	-	5	-	-	12
North Central	Abuja FCT	-	7	34	74	115	115	47	3	-	63	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-
North Central	Benue	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kogi	-	7	5	25	37	37	2	-	-	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Kwara	-	4	10	20	34	34	1	-	-	29	3	-	-	-	-	-	1	-
North Central	Nasarawa	-	18	9	8	35	35	17	-	-	18	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central	Niger	47	593	931	627	2,198	2,195	791	53	-	1,334	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	3
North Central	Plateau	-	4	32	11	47	47	5	-	-	41	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North Central Total		47	633	1,021	768	2,469	2,466	863	56	-	1,523	21	-	-	-	-	-	3	3
North East	Adamawa	-	2	3	1	6	6	2	-	-	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Bauchi	1	1	4	23	29	29	5	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Borno	33	22	107	116	278	278	22	107	127	21	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Gombe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Taraba	-	1	40	23	64	64	9	2	-	53	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East	Yobe	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
North East Total		34	26	154	163	377	377	38	109	127	102	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Abia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Anambra	-	-	-	3	3	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Ebonyi	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Enugu	-	-	-	8	8	8	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East	Imo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South East Total		-	-	-	11	11	11	8	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Akwa Ibom	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Bayelsa	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Cross River	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Delta	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Edo	-	-	-	22	22	22	2	-	-	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South	Rivers	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South South Total		-	-	-	23	23	23	2	-	-	21	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ekiti	-	-	2	6	8	8	-	-	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Lagos	-	-	2	1	3	3	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ogun	-	-	3	3	6	6	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Ondo	-	-	18	6	24	24	-	-	-	24	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Osun	-	-	-	2	2	2	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	Oyo	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West Total		-	-	25	18	43	43	-	-	-	43	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Grand Total		91	2,243	2,691	2,874	7,899	7,884	1,903	173	127	5,635	38	-	-	-	5	-	3	15

FACT SHEET NIGERIA – KILLINGS IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘TERROR’

This Fact Sheet is based on the upcoming [ORFA](https://orfa.africa/)¹ report (10/2019 - 9/2025).²

The data presented are based primarily on primary data from our local research partners and on secondary ACLED data for Nigeria. Both sources are essential, as neither is exhaustive. Furthermore, ACLED rarely mentions the religious affiliation of fatalities and relies primarily on selected media sources and official reports, which rarely provide such details. Therefore, additional research was needed to break down the ACLED totals by religious affiliation. When this was not possible, the data was marked as "Unknown religious identity."

Introduction

Nigeria is grappling with a complex security crisis characterized by widespread violence, especially targeting religious groups. From 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2025, research shows that the Muslim Fulani Ethnic Militia have been carrying out mass killings, abductions, and torture of Christians with little resistance. Government forces largely failed to intervene, focusing their efforts elsewhere while these attacks continued unopposed.

Nigeria: Key Violence Statistics On Killings (Oct 2019–Sept 2025)

- Total people killed: 79,323 (civilians: 42,033; Security Forces or Terror Groups: 37,290)
- Attacks with killings: 15,434
- Average: 7 attacks per day involving killings

Religious Group Impact Of Killings

- More Nigerian Christians were killed than Nigerians holding to other religious affiliations. Amongst the 42,033 civilians killed:
 - Number of Christians killed: 22,835
 - Number of Muslims killed was 10,519
 - Number of African Traditional Religionists killed: 184
 - Religious identity of 8,495 civilians killed remained unknown.
- Ratio Christians to Muslims killed: 2.2
- Ratio (adjusted for religious population in the different states): Christians/Muslims killed: 4.4

Distribution of Killings With Unidentified Religious Identity Over Other Categories

After distribution of the number of civilians killed with unknown religious identity over the other categories, the new numbers for the 42,003 civilians killed are:

- Number of Christians killed: 28,551
- Number of Muslims killed was 13,224
- Number of African Traditional Religionists killed: 258

Patterns of Attack With Killings

- Most civilians were killed during attacks on their communities: 31,573 (75%).

Trends Over Time For Killings

- Attacks with civilians killed, especially Christian farmers in the North Central, peaked between April and May, which is the heart of the farming season.

¹ <https://orfa.africa/>

² To be published 2nd week of February 2026.

- During this peak there was considerably less engagement by Security Forces.
- Security Forces concentrated operations in North West and North East, leaving North Central more vulnerable.

Groups Responsible For Killings

- Civilians; Most civilians were killed by Fulani Terror Groups (18,577; 44%) and Unidentified Terror Groups (13,346; 32%). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 4,941 (12%) civilians killed.
- Christians: Fulani Terror Groups were responsible for 53% of all Christian killed; Unidentified Terror Groups for 28%. Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 8% of all Christians killed.
- Muslims: Unidentified Terror Groups were responsible for 42% of all Muslims killed; Fulani Terror Groups for 32%. Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 16% of all Muslims killed.

Additional Findings


- ORFA's research showed that the Fulani Terror Groups are affiliated to FEM (Fulani Ethnic Militia). FEM is an ethno-religious terror group.
- Additional research showed that a significant part of the Unidentified Terror Groups consists of so-called bandit groups. Many of them have a Fulani background and can be considered as affiliated to FEM.
- It follows that the affiliates of FEM were a much larger factor in the violence in Nigeria than Boko Haram and ISWAP combined.
- The number of Muslims killed and/or abducted has been substantial over the years. Many of them were Hausa Muslims. Those who killed and/or abducted Muslims were largely the same as those who killed and/or abducted Christians. This underscores the ethno-religious nature of much of the violence in Nigeria. The religious terrorism of Boko Haram and the like, has gradually been 'overtaken' by the ethno-religious terrorism of FEM.

Final Notes


- Behind the numbers are devastating realities for many Nigerians. Community attacks not only caused death and kidnapping but also led to severe trauma and economic devastation through destruction of properties and loss of land, incurring ransom debts and forced displacement.
- Many Nigerians live in fear, as this text fragment indicates (<https://middlebelttimes.com/2025/10/13/the-night-they-come-living-with-fear-in-northern-nigeria/>).

Maps


All people killed from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025




Civilians killed from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025




Christians killed from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025




Muslims killed from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025




Security Forces killed from Oct 2019 to Sept 2025



Terror Groups killed from Oct 2019 to Sept 2025



Security Forces and Terror Groups combined killed from Oct 2019 to Sept 2025



FACT SHEET NIGERIA – ABDUCTIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF ‘TERROR’

This Fact Sheet is based on the upcoming [ORFA](https://orfa.africa/)¹ report (10/2019 - 9/2025).²

The data presented are based primarily on primary data from our local research partners and on secondary ACLED data for Nigeria. Both sources are essential, as neither is exhaustive. Furthermore, ACLED rarely mentions the religious affiliation of fatalities and relies primarily on selected media sources and official reports, which rarely provide such details. Therefore, additional research was needed to break down the ACLED totals by religious affiliation. When this was not possible, the data was marked as "Unknown religious identity."

Introduction

Nigeria is grappling with a complex security crisis characterized by widespread violence, especially targeting religious groups. From 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2025, research shows that the Muslim Fulani Ethnic Militia have been carrying out mass killings, abductions, and torture of Christians with little resistance. Government forces largely failed to intervene, focusing their efforts elsewhere while these attacks continued unopposed.

The analysis has been carried out only for civilian abductions. The difference between all people abducted and civilians abducted was small. In clashes between Security Forces and Terror Groups (and Terror Groups amongst each other) people are normally killed, not abducted.

Nigeria: Key Violence Statistics On Abductions (Oct 2019–Sept 2025)

- Total people abducted: 34,917 (civilians: 34,773; Security Forces or Terror Groups: 144)
- Attacks with abductions: 4,590
- Average: 2 attacks per day involving abductions

Religious Group Impact Of Abductions

- More Nigerian Christians were abducted than Nigerians holding to other religious affiliations. Amongst the 34,773 civilians abducted:
 - Number of Christians abducted: 15,932
 - Number of Muslims abducted was 15,272
 - Number of African Traditional Religionists abducted: 252
 - Religious identity of 3,317 civilians abducted remained unknown.
- Ratio Christians to Muslims abducted: 1.0
- Ratio (adjusted for religious population in the different states): Christians/Muslims abducted: 3.2

Distribution of Abductions With Unidentified Religious Identity Over Other Categories

After distribution of the number of civilians abducted with unknown religious identity over the other categories, the new numbers for the 34,773 civilians abducted are:

- Number of Christians abducted: 17,642
- Number of Muslims abducted was 16,857
- Number of African Traditional Religionists abducted: 274

Patterns of Attack With Abductions

- Most civilians were abducted during attacks on their communities: 25,246 (73%).

¹ <https://orfa.africa/>

² To be published second week of February 2026.

Trends Over Time For Abductions

- Over the overall 6-year reporting period, the North West was the epicentre of abductions, followed by the North Central zone. The abduction phenomenon is more spread out over the year than is the case with killings, although most abductions also take place in the context of community attacks.


Groups Responsible For Abductions

- Civilians: Most civilians were abducted by Unidentified Terror Groups (17,197; 49%) and Fulani Terror Groups (15,107; 43%). Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 2,164 (6%) civilians abducted.
- Christians: Unidentified Terror Groups were responsible for 54% of all Christians abducted; Fulani Terror Groups for 41%. Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 3% of all Christians abducted.
- Muslims: Unidentified Terror Groups were responsible for 50% of all Muslims abducted; Fulani Terror Groups for 43%. Boko Haram and ISWAP combined were responsible for 6% of all Muslims abducted.


Please see the 'Fact Sheet Nigeria – Killings In The Context Of 'Terror'' for additional findings and final notes.

Maps


Civilians abducted from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025



Christians abducted from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025




Muslims abducted from Oct 2019 to Sep 2025



NO ROAD HOME

**Christian IDPs displaced by
extremist violence in Nigeria**



FULL REPORT

1 September 2024



International Institute
for Religious Freedom



OpenDoors



WEA EST. 1846
WORLD EVANGELICAL ALLIANCE

Contents

1. Key findings	3
2. Introduction	4
3. Review of existing literature	5
3.a. Literature related to violence	5
3.b. Literature related to forced displacement	9
4. Violent incidents	14
4.a. Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa findings	14
5. Findings	19
5.a. Drivers of displacement	20
5.b. Experiences in displacement	26
5.c. Risk of return	33
6. Beyond Nigeria	36
7. Conclusion	38
8. Recommendations	40
9. Methodology	42

Pastor Barnabas's story (Image from front cover)

This story from Benue state illustrates the situation faced by many internally displaced Christians across parts of Nigeria.

Pastor Barnabas was attacked in 2019 by Fulani militants. He explains: "I was on the farm with my brother, Everen, and his wife, Friday. We were walking when we heard rapid shooting of guns and other sounds ... We didn't know that the militants had surrounded us. [They] came with guns, machetes, [and] sticks." Everen and Friday weren't able to escape their attackers. It has been almost five years, but Pastor Barnabas is still impacted by the trauma of the attack. "I kept running [...and] one of [the militants] followed me ... He hit me on my hand with a stick and my hand was badly broken." Years later, his hand remains damaged and he cannot afford the medical fees for the necessary operation. "Now, I have lost everything that I had. Everything in my home and village was burnt; I was left with nothing."

He has been living in an informal internally displaced persons (IDP) camp for five years, made up of makeshift tents. His tent is too small to house all of his family and informal camps have limited access to essential support. Most of the Christians in the camp fled because of violence that has targeted their communities. He says: "We are displaced because of violence. The news doesn't care about it, politicians don't talk about it, we are remaining in darkness ... being forgotten, being disregarded."

Today, Pastor Barnabas is a minister for thousands of Christian IDPs in the camp. He speaks of the appalling living conditions and the risk of violence. "We don't have good hygiene, water, toilets [or] sanitation. Many people are dying ... People only live here because it's worse outside the camps – because of the horrendous persecution that has displaced them."

Pastor Barnabas remains committed to caring for his church members, with the support of local Open Doors partners.

**Name changed for security reasons.*

1. Key findings

Extremist violence across parts of Nigeria over the last decade has resulted in mass displacement of Christian communities, amongst others. In the northern state of Borno where Islamic militants thrive and target Christians, and in Plateau state, where Fulani militant violence results in uprooted Christian communities, the problem is unrelenting. While the root causes of the violence are complex and Christians and non-Christians alike are impacted, this research illustrates the specific vulnerabilities of displaced Christians. They have been singled out for violence, face harsh living conditions and experience faith-based challenges throughout their displacement journey.

Drivers of displacement: Targeted violence and a failure to protect Christian communities has resulted in mass internal displacement.

Though violence has affected both Christians and non-Christians, recorded testimonies indicate that Boko Haram, Islamic State of West Africa Province (ISWAP) and militant Fulani groups have deliberately targeted Christians or Christian communities, their livelihood, faith leaders and places of worship.

Nigerian state security personnel regularly failed to respond in a timely or effective manner to violent attacks against Christians. This failure created distrust in the security forces among Christians. Furthermore, widespread impunity by the state for the perpetrators of violence encouraged an environment where more violence and greater displacement can and does take place.

Experiences in displacement: Inadequate and poorly distributed resources, faith-based discrimination and insufficient understanding of specific displacement experiences increased the vulnerabilities of Christians during displacement.

The limited resources available to IDPs through the United Nations, national and international actors are concentrated in North-East Nigeria; those displaced in the North-Central region have been largely ignored. Need far outpaces current funding commitments by international governments.

In Borno state, religious identity was a factor in whether Christian IDPs received support during their displacement. Christian IDPs there held the local government and members of the public accountable for unfair treatment and faith-based discrimination, particularly in terms of access to shelter, humanitarian aid, education and employment. Additionally, some efforts to pressure, coerce or force conversion to Islam by the local government and members of public were described.

In Christian-majority Plateau state, religious identity was not identified as a determining factor for support. Rather, the Nigerian government's reductive narrative describing the

crisis as "clashes" and the failure of international agencies to recognize the scale of displacement appears to have greatly inhibited national and international support for thousands of displaced people. The International Organization for Migration's (IOM) official numbers of IDPs in Plateau are nearly 80% lower than those reported by local communities.¹

Risk of return: Faith increases the level of risk for displaced Christians who try to return home.

Christians, particularly in Borno state, reported it is relatively safer for Muslims to return to their homes as they have not been further targeted for their faith by Boko Haram or ISWAP. Christians in Borno also recounted that state officials pushed them to return involuntarily and left them to fend for themselves without adequate preparation, materials or security protection.

Muslims and Christians both faced the threat of abduction, including upon return to their homes. However, militants targeted Christians and demanded a higher ransom for a Christian than a Muslim, with the highest ransom demanded for Christian faith leaders. Where Boko Haram was present, Christians reported an even higher threat level when trying to return home, as the militants often ignored Muslims or had their Muslim neighbors actively inform the militants about Christians in the area. Consequent risks included extra fines, forced conversion or even death.

IDPs from Christian communities in both Borno and Plateau states also reported land grabbing, which included attackers remaining on the land belonging to the displaced. Their attackers, whether Boko Haram, ISWAP or Fulani militants, are still an active threat for displaced Christians and their lands remain destroyed, occupied or unprotected by security forces.

For recommendations to address these findings, see [page 40](#).

This research was initiated as part of a larger Open Doors campaign, Arise Africa, in order to more thoroughly investigate the faith-related violence facing Christians in Sub-Saharan Africa.² A summary report of research findings is also available.³

See [page 43](#) for a list of acronyms used throughout the document.

¹ See [page 29](#) for details.

² For more on the campaign, see [here](#).

³ For the summary report, see [here](#).

2. Introduction

“Our churches are shut down. We are still in the situation. Nobody can tell our story better than us. We want the world to know we are still not far from these problems.”

IDP FROM GWOZA LGA, BORNO STATE.

Nigeria is among the top 10 of IDP hosting countries across the world.⁴ It is also currently sixth on the World Watch List (WWL 2024), a ranking that indicates the presence of acute levels of religious persecution and discrimination for Christians.⁵ Recognizing the overlapping nature of these two phenomena, Open Doors, in conjunction with the International Institute for Religious Freedom (IIRF) and the World Evangelical Alliance (WEA), carried out in depth research to explore how religious affiliation shaped the experiences of internally displaced Christians in some of the most affected regions of Nigeria.

Defining Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): “persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State.”⁶



A girl in a Christian IDP camp, Benue state

While Nigeria is religiously diverse, this research has concentrated on Christian communities, as Open Doors focuses on Christians facing profound levels of persecution and discrimination across the globe. Christian IDPs in Nigeria are often invisible – and facing a humanitarian crisis that has been underacknowledged and downplayed. Open Doors acknowledges the multifaceted challenges facing all IDPs in Nigeria and encourages further research with other religiously affiliated groups.

Existing evidence paints a complex picture of the causes of the displacement; factors such as poverty, environmental issues, ethnicity and food scarcity also interconnect with ongoing violence and religious extremism. All IDPs in Nigeria face considerable challenges by the very nature of forced displacement. Research is lacking, however, as to whether some challenges are specific to or exacerbated for Christian IDPs because of their faith, particularly for the North-Central region.

This research in Borno and Plateau states makes a fresh contribution by examining displacement through a faith-based lens. It indicates mass displacement driven by deliberate attacks on Christian communities, and State failure to protect them. Christian IDPs have reported faith-based discrimination and neglect in displacement settings, and an increased threat level for Christians who try to return home.

Borno and Plateau states were chosen as two regions with considerable IDP populations, yet distinct dynamics of violence. 292 people were interviewed from January to April 2024, as identified by local partners. Interviewees were primarily IDPs, with some workers from humanitarian agencies also interviewed. Research focused on Gwoza and Ngala Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Borno state, and Bassa and Mangu LGAs in Plateau.

From October 2019 to September 2023, 2.7 times as many Christians were killed as Muslims in violent attacks in Nigeria. The total number of Christians killed in the reporting period was 16,769, while the total number of Muslims killed was 6,235. The total number of African Traditional Religionists (ATR) killed was 154. The religious identity of 7,722 civilians killed remained unknown. Most civilians were killed during community attacks: 25,312 civilians killed during 4,666 incidents, highlighting the disruptive nature of the attacks.⁷

⁴ Norwegian Refugee Council, [Global Displacement Overview](#), 14 June 2023.

⁵ Open Doors, [WWL 2024 Table of Scores and Ranks](#), 2024.

⁶ OCHA, [Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement](#), ADM 1.1, PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109, 22 July 1998.

⁷ [Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa \(ORFA\)](#), June 2024.

3. Review of existing literature

The following review of existing literature reveals that analyses of the religious dynamics of forced displacement in Nigeria is limited. Analysis of the role and impact of violent Islamist militancy is more extensive, illustrating how the Sahel region has become a hotspot for such groups.⁸ This is significant as it has contributed to considerable forced displacement in the region. It is also intertwined with religious dynamics; the region is religiously heterogeneous and there has been some analysis on how this has affected religious communities. This review focuses on Christian communities as one such example, with existing literature illustrating how Christian communities have experienced targeted violence, either wholly or in part due to religious reasons. Economic, political, ethnic and anti-colonial factors have also been highlighted.

Literature relating to forced displacement in Nigeria identifies general risks for displaced persons such as trauma, physical danger, overcrowding, malnutrition, poor sanitary conditions and tension with host communities. However, most Nigerian data is focused on the North-East and government-run IDP camps; research that addresses the increased violence in the North-Central region and informal IDP settings is still limited.

Religion matters in displacement settings. Some research has begun to illustrate how, in countries where religious freedom is particularly limited, Christians are likely to be forcibly displaced and to experience psychological and physical violence within displacement settings because of their religious identity and activity. Accordingly, they may have additional protection needs on the basis of their religious identity and can face ongoing threats within displacement settings. This correlates with research from other authors such as Eghdamian⁹ and Avis.¹⁰

While there is limited research specifically on how religion interacts with the experiences of IDPs in Nigeria, there are indications of the importance of religion from individual testimonies gathered in the country. Further research is urgently required to develop a clearer understanding of the exact role that religion plays. This will enable deeper understanding and more effective and tailored support for those vulnerable communities. The primary research carried out among Christian IDPs in Borno and Plateau states (see page 19) begins to meet this need.

In outlining existing research, this review first looks at violence, in particular the wider picture of the Islamist militancy across Sub-Saharan Africa before considering the history and dynamics of Islamist militancy in Nigeria and other dynamics of violence. The review then looks at the wider picture of forced displacement, focusing on displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa before exploring the existing body of research on the dynamics of displacement in Nigeria. Finally, this review looks at what research has been conducted as to how one's religion impacts displacement.

3.a. Literature related to violence

3.a.i. Islamist militancy in Sub-Saharan Africa

The roots of Islamist militancy are complex and contested.¹¹ Weak states, corruption, proliferation of arms, and economic inequality have provided fertile ground for the growth of extremism based on religion and political ideology. As a result, numerous militant Islamist groups have arisen across Africa.

Poverty and political instability delay traditional markers of manhood such as marriage, starting a family and finding employment, making young men vulnerable to recruitment.¹² In joining Islamist militia, they gain the promise of mutual protection and crucial economic resources.¹³ Reflecting a lack of academic or religious education, many young men are influenced by the rhetoric of radical Islamist teachers.¹⁴

Violence perpetrated by militant Islamist groups has risen to alarming levels across Sub-Saharan Africa. It is essential to remember that Islamism marks a shift away from Islam as a faith to Islam as a radical political ideology and movement.¹⁵ Militant Islamist groups in the region also target traditional Sufi Muslims, forcing them to more radical interpretations of Islam. Under this extreme interpretation of Sharia (Islamic law),¹⁶ violence is accepted as a justifiable means to create a pure Islamic state.

The three terrorist groups responsible for the most terrorist-related deaths in 2022 have Islamist extremist roots – Islamic State (IS), Al-Shabaab and Jamaat Nusrat Al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).¹⁷ In 2022, 60% of the world's terrorism

⁸ Islamism is defined as “a set of political ideologies drawing on Islamic tradition and teaching to pursue socio-political objectives”, moving away from Islam as a faith and towards a radical political ideology and movement. [Britannica, Islamism](#). Accessed 5 August 2024.; Islamist militancy (or violent Islamist extremism) includes a commitment to violence aimed at eradicating or converting non-Muslims (viewed as unclean, infidels and apostates) and ushering in an Islamic state. [Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability, Report of the Public Inquiry into the Attack on Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017](#). Crown copyright 2023. March 2023.

⁹ Eghdamian, K., [Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan](#). Journal of Refugee Studies, 30(3), September 2017, pp.447–467.

¹⁰ Avis, W., [Challenges religious minorities face in accessing humanitarian assistance](#). K4D Helpdesk Report 666. Institute of Development Studies, 2019.

¹¹ Adelaja, A.O. et al., [Public Opinion on the Root Causes of Terrorism and Objectives of Terrorists: A Boko Haram Case Study](#). Perspectives on Terrorism, 2018, 12(3), pp. 24-34.

¹² [USAID](#), Sahel Youth Analysis, 2017.

¹³ [Africa Youth Population](#), The New York Times, October 2023.

¹⁴ Onuoha, F.C., [Why Do Youth Join Boko Haram?](#). United States Institute of Peace, June 2014.

¹⁵ Hamid, S. & Dar, R., [Islamism, Salafism, and jihadism: A Primer](#). Brookings, July 2016.

¹⁶ Jain, K., [What is Sharia? Islamic law shows Muslims how to live, and can be a force for progress as well as tool of fundamentalists](#). The Conversation, 30 August, 2021.

¹⁷ This translates to “Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims.” [Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2023](#). March 2023. While there is no single, universal definition of “terrorism”, the Global Terrorism Index uses the following definition: “the systematic threat of use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behavior of the larger group.” p.6.

deaths occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa – an increase of 8% from the previous year.¹⁸ Africa's Sahel region alone accounted for 47% of global terrorism deaths in 2023, compared to just 1% in 2007.¹⁹

Historic ethno-religious distrust,²⁰ the proliferation of arms in the Sahel region, the backing of proxies²¹ and the presence of foreign fighters²² all exacerbate ongoing violence.

3.a.ii. Islamist militancy in Nigeria

Islam arrived in the region known today as Nigeria in the 11th and 12th centuries through trade and migration. By the early 14th century all the ruling elites in Hausaland (comprising much of modern-day Northern Nigeria) were Muslim.²³ Islamism accelerated in the early 19th century when a radical Islamist scholar, Usman dan Fodio started a reformist jihad campaign to establish a new world dedicated to Islamic purity.²⁴ Great Britain implemented “indirect rule” from the late 19th century and into the 20th, leaving governance to local leaders under colonial guidance and pursued a policy of “divide and rule.”²⁵ These policies effectively froze the northern states as Muslim and the southern states as Christian, ending jihadist expansion from the North but entrenching ethno-religious divides across Nigeria. There were numerous campaigns in the years following colonialism to expand the reach of Islam, with debates over political representation and governance across the various regions, ending in the official implementation of Sharia in twelve northern states.²⁶ Commentators have proposed that this undermined the Constitution and the civil liberties of non-Muslims.²⁷

During the presidency of Muhammadu Buhari (2015-2023), militant violence and unrest spread across the northern and North-Central states and increasingly into the South.²⁸

Boko Haram, an Islamist organization that developed from non-violent to violent in just a few years, launched its militant activities in 2009, seeking to create an Islamic State in northern Nigeria.²⁹ The Nigerian government has acknowledged that Boko Haram intentionally targets

Christians.³⁰ As of 2018, Letswa and Isyaku, in their article on the causes of internal displacement in Nigeria, state: “Of all the social menace in Nigeria that caused internal population displacement, Boko Haram insurgency was the most single social epidemic that caused contemporary national challenges of internally displaced persons.”³¹

Splinter groups have broken off from Boko Haram. Ansaru, an al-Qaeda affiliate split off from Boko Haram, remains active in the North-West.³² The North-East has long been the center of activities for Boko Haram, who pledged allegiance to Islamic State (IS) in 2015, taking up the name Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP).³³ However, in 2016, the group split in two, into ISWAP and Jama’u Ahlis Sunna Lidda-awati wal-Jihad (JAS) (Boko Haram’s original name; most current media distinguishes solely between ISWAP and Boko Haram).³⁴

3.a.iii. Fulani militant violence

In the last decade, the conflict between Fulani herdsmen and sedentary farmers in the North-Central region and surrounding areas has escalated into “daily occurrences of mass violence,” according to Ezenwa.³⁵ Commentators note that the significant overlap of religion, ethnicity and profession makes it challenging to assess the underlying causes of the crisis in this region.³⁶ Many commentators identify this as relating to a conflict over scarce resources.³⁷ Government policies, including restrictions on grazing and land rights, and conflicts between the national government and state governments play a role.³⁸

Fulani are predominantly Muslim and most farmers are predominantly Christian, necessitating examination of religious dynamics.³⁹ Ethno-religious violence is viewed by some commentators not as a by-product of militancy for economic gain but as a parallel or even greater motive, including to control large swathes of presently Christian occupied land.⁴⁰ The Christian Association of Nigeria is campaigning for the return of over 100 villages permanently occupied by the Fulani in Plateau state alone.⁴¹ The tactic of occupying land has reportedly increasingly been seen in southern states.⁴²

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Benkirane, R., *Radicalization, Violence and (In)security*. Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2016.

²¹ Velturo, M. & Dick, S., *How Arms Proliferation Is Driving Herder-Farmer Conflict in the Sahel*. World Politics Review, March 2020.

²² Open Doors International, *Nigeria: Full Country Dossier*. January 2023.

²³ Harvard Divinity School, *Islam in Nigeria. Religion and Public Life*, accessed 1 July 2024.; Hill, M *The Spread of Islam in West Africa: Containment, Mixing, and Reform from the Eighth to the Twentieth Century*. SPICE Digest, Stanford University, January 2009.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ The “divide and rule” policy kept Nigerian ethnic groups (and often therefore religious groups, as ethnicity and religion are intricately intertwined) as separate from each other as possible, fostering suspicion rather than collaboration between different communities in order to reduce the risk of organized opposition to colonial rule. *Britannica, Nigeria as a colony*. Accessed 1 July 2024.

²⁶ Nwankpa, M., *The North-South Divide: Nigerian Discourses on Boko Haram, the Fulani, and Islamization*. Hudson Institute, October 2021.

²⁷ Hoffmann L.K. & Wallace, J., *Democracy in Nigeria*, Chatham House, June 2022.

²⁸ CSW-UK and CSW Nigeria, *Submission to the 45th session of the Universal Periodic Review*. July 2023.

²⁹ Ibid., p. 15. See also Iyekekpola, W.O., *Boko Haram: understanding the context*. Third World Quarterly, 37(12), 2016, pp. 2211-2228.; Onapajo H. & Uzodike, U.O., *Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria: Man, the state, and the international system*. African Security Review, 21(13), 2012, pp. 24-39.

³⁰ Casper, J., *Government Agrees: Islamist Terrorists Target Christians*. Christianity Today, 2 March 2020.

³¹ p.37, Letswa, A.M. & Isyaku, S.S., *Insurgency and Internally Displaced Persons IDPs in Nigeria: A Reflection on the Causes, Implication and Way forward*. International Journal of Innovative Studies in Sociology and Humanities, 20(5), 2018.

³² Iyora, F., *Rivalry among Boko Haram factions compounds violence in northern Nigeria*. Al Jazeera, 8 September 2023.

³³ International Crisis Group, *Facing the Challenge of the Islamic State in West Africa Province*. 16 May 2019.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ p.180, Ezenwa E.O., *The Politics of Eco-Violence: Why Is Conflict Escalating in Nigeria's Middle Belt?*. Terrorism and Political Violence, 36(2), 2024, pp.180-197.

³⁶ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism*. 2015.; UK APPG ForB Report, *Nigeria: Unfolding Genocide? Three years on*. 2023.

³⁷ For example, see: Ikezue, C.E. & Ezeah, P., *Recurrent conflicts among migrant Fulani herdsmen and indigenous communities of southern Nigeria: A review of literature*. International Journal of Health and Social Inquiry, 3(1), 2017.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria's Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence*. 26 July 2018.

⁴⁰ UK APPG ForB Report, *Nigeria: Unfolding Genocide? Three years on*. 2023.

⁴¹ Nanlong, M., *These Fulani men are no bandits but land grabbers*. Vanguard News, 1 January 2022.

⁴² Open Doors International, *Nigeria: Full Country Dossier*. January 2023.



A village destroyed by Fulani militant violence near Jos, 2024

Some commentators propose that militant Fulani herdsmen attack farming communities with impunity.⁴³ This violence is spilling into the South, leading many Nigerians to no longer distinguish between Boko Haram and the militant Fulani, instead fearing a wider, violent conspiracy to Islamize all Nigeria, according to Nwankpa.⁴⁴ Many of the bandit groups in the North-West, who engage in abductions, cattle rustling and other acts of violence are similarly ethnic Fulani.⁴⁵

There are multiple ways that the conflict has been framed, including around “sedentarization” and “fulanization”.⁴⁶ Many argue that Fulani militants turn to arms due to feeling marginalized,⁴⁷ and to defend their pastoralist livelihoods and access to land,⁴⁸ as evidenced by the ongoing conflict between Muslim Fulani pastoralists and fellow Muslim, Hausa farmers in the North-West.⁴⁹ In the context of deepening hostility from farming communities who often feel besieged by multiple pressures, communal defenses have been organized; however this, along with the execution of reprisal attacks which can create cycles of reprisal killings, risks exacerbating communal tensions further according to the International Crisis Group.⁵⁰

While the majority of Fulani are not militants, militant groups among them are rising in prominence (along with debate about their various leaders’ motivations). In an escalation of hostilities, a new Fulani vigilante group was launched in January 2024 following large-scale, fatal attacks by suspected Fulani militants on Christian communities in Plateau state.⁵¹ Fulani militants have reportedly partnered with Islamist militant groups.⁵² Some commentators view these partnerships as opportunistic or strategic on the side of Fulani participants.⁵³ However, it appears some Fulani militants have been radicalized.⁵⁴

⁴³ USCIRF, *Issue Update: Ethnonationalism and Religious Freedom in Nigeria*, June 2023.

⁴⁴ Nwankpa, M., *The North-South Divide: Nigerian Discourses on Boko Haram, the Fulani, and Islamization*, Hudson Institute, October 2021.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Chukwuma, K.H., *Constructing the herder-farmer conflict as (in)security in Nigeria*, African Security, 13(1), 2020, pp.54-76.

⁴⁷ Ejiofor, P.F., *‘We don’t have anything’: Understanding the interaction between pastoralism and terrorism in Nigeria*, Conflict, Security & Development, 22(4), 2022, pp. 345-385.

⁴⁸ Brottem L., & McDonnell, A., *Pastoralism and Conflict in the Sudano-Sahel: A Review of the Literature*, Search for Common Ground, 2020.

⁴⁹ Ejiofor, P.F., *‘We don’t have anything’: Understanding the interaction between pastoralism and terrorism in Nigeria*, Conflict, Security & Development, 22(4), 2022, pp. 345-385.

⁵⁰ International Crisis Group, *Managing Vigilantism in Nigeria: A Near-term Necessity*, 21 April 2022.; International Crisis Group, *Stopping Nigeria’s Spiralling Farmer-Herder Violence*, 26 July 2018.

⁵¹ Truth Nigeria, *Claiming Victim Status, Nigeria’s Cattle Cartel Launches Militia Group to Fight Banditry*, 20 January 2024.; Open Doors Australia, *Update: Christians lead peace march in Plateau State, Nigeria*, 22 January 2024.

⁵² Ejiofor, P.F., *‘We don’t have anything’: Understanding the interaction between pastoralism and terrorism in Nigeria*, Conflict, Security & Development, 22(4), pp. 345-385.

⁵³ Ibid.; locchi, A., *Nigeria’s “Wild West”: Insecurity, Pastoralism and Banditry in the Muslim North*, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, February 2023.

⁵⁴ Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the Impact of Terrorism*, November 2019.



A Christian IDP camp, Benue state

In addition, armed bandits operate in vast swathes of Nigeria. Largely driven by criminality, their actions have an impact across various religious communities. There are some reports of exacerbated religious tensions, as many bandits are ethnic Fulani and attack majority Christian farming communities.⁵⁵ However, the motivations of Fulani militant groups, the armed bandits and their leaders are complex – as reflected in the various terms used to describe the conflict in the central regions of Nigeria.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the term “bandits” is frequently used to describe different groups, further confused by armed gangs camping alongside Fulani herders, the two often being “indistinguishable.”⁵⁷

In summary, the picture is complex. While some Fulani militant groups will be actively pursuing an extremist jihadist agenda, others will not. Yet, despite contested motivations, often the result is the attack and expulsion of Christian communities.

3.b. Literature related to forced displacement

3.b.i. Forced displacement overview

The scale of forced displacement is vast and growing. By the close of 2023, a record 117.3 million people were reported to be displaced worldwide.⁵⁸ 68.3 million were IDPs, 37.6 million refugees and 6.9 million asylum-seekers.⁵⁹ Despite IDPs forming the majority of forced migrants, there is greater global awareness of refugees. However, efforts have been made since 1998 to better monitor IDPs and respond to their needs.⁶⁰

While IDPs share many similar characteristics to refugees – primarily that they are fleeing their homes due to a fear of persecution and are unable/unwilling to return – there are several differences, the most visible of which is that IDPs have not crossed an internationally recognized state border. Refugees enjoy greater legal protection under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, while IDPs primarily depend on the non-binding 1998 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.⁶¹ These Guiding Principles, introduced by the Commission on Human Rights as the first international standards for IDPs, guide states on how to prevent, respond to and resolve internal displacement. They impress the notion of sovereign responsibility, urging national authorities to provide an appropriate framework of protection for IDPs in accordance with international standards.

As such, while refugees have an international protection system to appeal to and are afforded specific rights under the

1951 Convention, such as the right to housing and education, IDPs rely on the policies and protection of their national governments, including in instances where the State has itself been an agent of persecution.

3.b.ii. Religion and forced displacement

It is evident that religion can play an important role in displacement, both as a driver of displacement and as a factor that might make a displaced person more vulnerable to persecution. For example, in the Syrian context, Eghdamian illustrates how Christian and Druze refugees have experienced “isolation, insecurity and discrimination because of their religious identity.”⁶² It is important to stress that religion can be a marker of cultural or ethnic identity rather than personally held convictions. For example, in the Sahelian context, Christians and other religious minorities can be targeted by militant Islamists for their perceived religious identity, irrelevant of how they would self-identify.⁶³

A growing body of scholarly work has served to increase understanding in the role faith-based actors can play in meeting the spiritual, physical and psychological needs of those displaced.⁶⁴ For example, Fiddian-Qasmiyeh and Ager examine how local faith communities (LFCs) can strengthen community resilience.⁶⁵ Despite these contributions, the broader relationship between religion and forced displacement remains largely unexplored, in part due to a lack of relevant statistics; there is no comprehensive data on the religious affiliation of forcibly displaced persons globally or for any country.

3.b.iii. An uneasy relationship between religion and humanitarianism

UNHCR and similar agencies understate and typically omit the religious affiliations of refugees, despite collecting comprehensive data about each person.⁶⁶ These agencies do not make readily available whether religion is a factor in their journey of displacement, or in how or where people are displaced e.g. in formal or informal camps, in urban or rural areas. Analyzing and understanding the religious affiliation may, however, help humanitarian agencies determine and address specific protection needs that differ between those displaced of different faiths.

⁵⁵ Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, [Nigeria](#), August 2023.

⁵⁶ “Farmer-herder conflict”, “eco-violence”, “armed violence and criminality”, “population-induced warfare”, “ethno-religious conflict” and “ethnonationalist”, to name a few.

⁵⁷ International Crisis Group, [Managing Vigilantism in Nigeria: A Near-term Necessity](#), 21 April 2022.; See also, International Crisis Group, [Violence in Nigeria's North West: Rolling Back the Mayhem](#), 18 May 2020.

⁵⁸ UNHCR, [Refugee Data Finder](#). Accessed 5 August 2024.

⁵⁹ Ibid. Note that asylum-seekers are people whose asylum case is not yet processed, and therefore not yet legally recognized as refugees.

⁶⁰ The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) was established in 1998. For an overview of the impact of the 1998 Guiding Principles, see [Joint IDP Profiling Service](#), Twenty Years of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, Forced Migration Review, 59, October 2018.

⁶¹ UNHCR, [1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol](#), September 2011; OCHA, [Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement](#), 22 July 1998, ADM 11.PRL 12.1, PR00/98/109.

⁶² p.447 Eghdamian, K., [Religious Identity and Experiences of Displacement: An Examination into the Discursive Representations of Syrian Refugees and Their Effects on Religious Minorities Living in Jordan](#), Journal of Refugee Studies, 30(3), September 2017, pp.447–467.

⁶³ In Nigeria for example, Christians are easily detected by their names. One's ID can mean life or death at roadblocks set up by violent Islamist groups. Open Doors International, [Nigeria: Full Country Dossier, 2023](#), January 2023.

⁶⁴ Major journals have dedicated special issues to this theme: [Special Issue: Faith-Based Humanitarianism in Contexts of Forced Displacement](#) Journal of Refugee Studies, 24(3), 2011; [Faith and Responses to Displacement](#), Forced Migration Review, 48, 2014. Furthermore, in 2012, UNHCR held a dialogue on [Faith and Protection in Geneva](#) (December 12-13, 2012).

⁶⁵ Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, E. & Ager, A., [Local faith communities and the promotion of resilience in humanitarian situations](#), Refugee Studies Centre, February 2013.

⁶⁶ Allouche, J. et al. [Humanitarianism and Religious Inequalities: Addressing a Blind Spot](#), CREID Working Paper, October 2020.

The Sphere Handbook recognizes that understanding religious identity and whether it could play a factor into the level or equality of aid can help ensure application of the principle of impartiality:

[G]roups may be under-served and discriminated against because of nationality, ethnicity, language, or religious or political affiliation, which requires special attention to reflect the principle of impartiality.⁶⁷

Initial studies have noted that understanding the needs of the displaced based on their religion by providing access to religious leaders and practices represents a tool of resilience, or the “ability to anticipate, withstand and bounce back from external pressures and shocks.”⁶⁸ These studies have demonstrated that for displaced people religious practices represent a source of continuity and comfort.⁶⁹ Many IDPs view religion as playing a positive role in aiding recovery from trauma and helping build an environment of tolerance and acceptance between different communities.⁷⁰

Some scholars have raised concerns about religious bias among individuals acting under the auspices of UN bodies.⁷¹ One Nigerian scholar argues, that it is for these reasons that faith-based organizations (FBOs) have stepped in to meet the needs of Christians in informal IDP camps in Nigeria.⁷²

3.b.iv. The role of Faith-Based Organizations

The significant role that Faith-Based Organizations (FBOs) can play in supporting forced migrants has been more widely acknowledged in literature.⁷³ FBOs can be first responders in emergencies due to their local knowledge and ability to access remote areas. Their social capital enables them to mobilize human and financial resources quickly, they understand their community’s psychosocial needs (and often have a track record of providing pastoral care), they tend to be well-trusted (even by members of different religious groups) and have a longer-term commitment to an area than other humanitarian organizations.⁷⁴

Christian FBOs in Nigeria are typically located in the central and southern states, and can find it more difficult to work in predominately Muslim states, where Christian IDPs are typically more vulnerable to discrimination.⁷⁵ They remain nonetheless better positioned to provide support than many other actors due to their local knowledge and resources. Iweze states:

Historically, Faith-Based Organizations have a long history of offering humanitarian assistance in providing food, clothing, and shelter to the needy and have been important players in the international community’s response to emergencies. FBOs have been prominent in providing support and welfare packages to many IDPs in Nigeria.⁷⁶

FBOs have a role to play pre, during and post displacement. The Shalom Trauma Center in Nigeria, for example, offers holistic support to trauma victims, as well as training to church leaders in how to provide trauma care.⁷⁷

3.b.v. An overview of forced displacement in Nigeria

Internal displacement in Nigeria has remained consistently high, driven by multiple factors including insurgency, conflict, criminality and environmental disasters.⁷⁸ As of 2023, Nigeria was home to 3.4 million IDPs.⁷⁹ While the North-East of Nigeria has been most affected, the distribution of violence means the North-Central region has seen a rapid rise in internal displacement.⁸⁰

Research indicates that Nigerian IDPs are mostly hosted in the community, with some forming informal IDP camps and even fewer living in government-run IDP camps.⁸¹ While those accommodated in government-run camps are more likely to receive government support or humanitarian aid, those living in informal settings in parts of Nigeria are ineligible for government support and receive little humanitarian assistance.⁸² Most IDPs try to earn a small living and/or rely on assistance from religious, community or special interest groups or members of the public.⁸³

⁶⁷ p.12, [Sphere Project](#), Sphere Association Handbook. 6 November, 2018.

⁶⁸ p. 2, UNICEF, [Building Resilience](#), March 2011.

⁶⁹ Ní Raghallaigh, M., [Religion in the Lives of Unaccompanied Minors: An Available and Compelling Coping Resource](#), British Journal of Social Work, 41, 2011, pp. 539-556.

⁷⁰ Pertek, S.I., [“God Helped Us”: Resilience, Religion and Experiences of Gender-Based Violence and Trafficking among African Forced Migrant Women](#), Social Sciences, 11(5), May 2022.

⁷¹ UNHCR’s approach to religious minorities has been critiqued by several authors, including: Eghdadian, K., [Religious Plurality and the Politics of Representation in Refugee Camps: accounting for the Lived Experiences of Syrian Refugees Living in Zaatar](#), Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, 4(1), 2014, pp.37-40.; Allouche, J. et al, [Humanitarianism and Religious Inequalities: Addressing a Blind Spot](#), CREID Working Paper, October 2020.

⁷² Iweze, D.O., [Faith-based organizations’ intervention for the internally displaced persons from the northeast Nigeria’s region at Uhogua camp in Edo State](#), African Identities, 2022.

⁷³ Kraft, K., [The Faith Factor](#), Open Doors, 2022.; Sulewski, D., [Religious Actors and the Global Compact on Refugees Charting a Way Forward](#), September 2020.;

Holdcroft, D., [The contribution of FBOs working with the displaced](#), Forced Migration Review, 48, November 2014.

⁷⁴ Fiddian-Qasbiyeh, E. & Ager, A., [Local faith communities and the promotion of resilience in humanitarian situations](#), Refugee Studies Centre, February 2013.

⁷⁵ Davis, C. et al., [Comparing Religious and Secular NGOs in Nigeria: are faith based organizations distinctive?](#), Religions and Development Research Programme, Working Paper 56, 2011; Odumosu, O. et al., [Faith Based Organization in development in Nigeria: a preliminary mapping](#), Religions and Development Research Programme, Research Summary WP38, 2009.

⁷⁶ p.3, Iweze, D.O., [Faith-based organizations’ intervention for the internally displaced persons from the northeast Nigeria’s region at Uhogua camp in Edo State](#), African Identities, 2022.

⁷⁷ Kraft, K., [The Faith Factor](#), Open Doors, 2022.

⁷⁸ Most new displacements in 2022 were caused by flooding. See: [IDMC, Internal Displacement and Food Security](#), GRID 2023, April 2023.

⁷⁹ IDMC, Nigeria, [Global Internal Displacement Database](#), Accessed 21 May 2024.

⁸⁰ Ibid.; In 2022, 50% more IDPs were displaced in the Middle Belt (North-Central) than in 2021. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, [Record 36 Million Africans Forcibly Displaced](#), 19 July 2022.

⁸¹ 57% of Nigerian IDPs are in host-communities, compared to 43% in camp settings. International Organization for Migration, [Displacement Tracking Matrix - Nigeria North East Zone 44](#), March 2023.; A 2020 study of IDPs in Benue State, Nigeria, found that only 15% of IDPs were in official, government-run IDP camps, with the remaining 85% in unofficial camps or living in the community. Ukase P.I. & Jato, T. P. J., [From Home to Homelessness: The Dilemma of Internally Displaced Persons in Benue State](#), Complete Research Report on the Condition of IDPs in Benue State. Catholic Diocese of Makurdi Foundation for Justice, Development and Peace, 2020.

⁸² Ukase, P.I. & Jato, T.P.J., *ibid*.

⁸³ Onifade, V. & Osinowo R., [Living Conditions of Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) in Northern Nigeria](#), Urbanism and Crisis Management in Nigeria, Institute for Peace and Strategic Studies, 2019, pp.369-389.



The Shalom Trauma Center, Nigeria

worsened for those suffering displacement. Child and maternal mortality rates are extremely high.⁸⁹

While Nigeria is party to the Kampala Convention, the world's only legally binding regional instrument on internal displacement, it has come under criticism for not adequately domesticating and implementing adequate protection measures as set out in the Guiding Principles.⁹⁰ In 2021, the federal government launched a National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons, drawing on the Guiding Principles and the African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.⁹¹

Criticisms of the Nigerian government have included the fragmented legal framework for IDP protection, insufficient mechanisms and provisions to address the needs and rights of IDPs, and poor accountability and transparency of state and non-state actors.⁹² In Nigeria's Borno state, for example, the authorities began a campaign to close IDP camps, resulting in many people being relocated to unsafe areas. According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the shutdowns "compelled displaced people to leave the camps without consultation, adequate information, or sustainable alternatives to ensure their safety and livelihoods."⁹³ These

actions were in violation of Article 9 of the Kampala Convention, in particular Article 9, 2e which states that IDPs should be safeguarded from forcible return to any area that their life, safety, liberty and/or health would be at risk.

The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs warned that the burden on host communities and poverty of IDPs in Nigeria increases the risk of IDPs suffering multiple displacements.⁸⁴ Serial relocation in the country hampers effective humanitarian response and can contribute to host communities viewing IDPs with suspicion due to increased economic burdens, perceived risk of external attack or suspicion of IDPs colluding with extremist groups.⁸⁵

An estimated 55% of Nigerian IDPs are female, and 59% are below 18.⁸⁶ Gender-based violence is reportedly pervasive⁸⁷ and girls are less likely to attend school once in displacement settings than boys.⁸⁸ Access to acceptable levels of healthcare is poor in many regions, a situation

3.b.vi. Experiences of displaced Christians in Nigeria

There has been some literature written on the specific experiences of Christian IDPs in Nigeria. However, a paper based on interviews with IDPs by researchers from the American University of Nigeria in 2016 specifically notes that the personal stories of IDPs are rarely told, "usually lost in statistics and media reports of humanitarian responses."⁹⁴ A few studies present testimonies from interviewees that indicate

⁸⁴ [End of Mission Statement](#) by the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced persons, Mr. Chaloka Beyani, on his visit to Nigeria, 23 to 26 August 2016, OHCHR.

⁸⁵ Demuyne, M., [Mass Displacement and Violent Extremism in the Sahel: A Vicious Circle?](#) International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, August 2022.

⁸⁶ These figures are taken from the North East region, but provide an indication of the gender and age breakdown in Nigeria. International Organization for Migration, [Nigeria — North-east — Displacement Tracking Matrix](#), March 2022.

⁸⁷ Ojengbede, O. et al., [Sexual and gender-based violence in camps for internally displaced people and host communities in northeast Nigeria: a mixed methods study](#). The Lancet, 7(1), March 2019; Obiageli, M., [Gender-based violence in situations of internal displacement: Realities faced by women within the IDP camps in Nigeria](#). International Review of Law and Jurisprudence, 3(1), 2021, pp.132-138.

⁸⁸ Lasukawa, L., [Gender dynamics in internal displacement](#). Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, November 2023.

⁸⁹ UNICEF, [Levels and Trends of Child Mortality in West and Central Africa](#), September 2023.

⁹⁰ Fayeun O. & Akanle, O., [Humanitarian Crises and Internally Displaced Persons in Nigeria](#). The University of Warwick, 2022.

⁹¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, [National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons](#), September 2021.

⁹² T. Magaji, [The Implications of Non-Domestication of Kampala Convention to the Protection of the Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) in Nigeria](#). Wukari International Studies Journal, 7(3), 2023.

⁹³ Human Rights Watch, ["Those who returned are suffering" Impact of Camp Shutdowns on People Displaced by Boko Haram Conflict in Nigeria](#), 2 November 2022.

⁹⁴ Jacob, J.U. et al., [Narratives of Displacement: Conversations with Boko Haram Displaced Persons in Northeast Nigeria](#). Contemporary French and Francophone Studies, 20(2), 2016, pp.176-190.

the strong likelihood that religion plays a significant role in the experience of Nigeria's IDPs, which are detailed below.

Christians displaced from the North

Islamic extremist groups such as Boko Haram and its splinter groups have been primarily active in the North, resulting in the displacement of Christians.⁹⁵ The Nigerian government has struggled to meet the needs of those who have been forcibly displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency in the north of Nigeria. In an article on the role of FBOs in IDP camps in the North-East of Nigeria, Iweze states that church organizations have established informal IDP camps, separate from government IDP camps, to meet the needs of Christians displaced by Boko Haram.⁹⁶

A paper on IDPs in Nigeria details the types of abuse women can face in IDP camps. The paper notes that both women and girls are raped, sexually abused and battered on a daily basis.⁹⁷ This correlates with reports that Christian women have been abducted and singled out for their faith. HRW interviewed abductees from Borno state and found:

The victims appear to have been targeted either because of their presumed religious affiliation or for attending western-styled schools...One young woman held in a [militant] camp near Gwoza described how combatants placed a noose around her neck and threatened her with death until she renounced her religion.⁹⁸

There have been reports of Christians facing discrimination in aid distribution in IDP camps in the North-East.⁹⁹ One church leader from Maiduguri, Borno state said: "Christians are not being taken care of like the Muslims ... when the Christians discovered that they were not given food or clothing like the Muslims, they left the camps."¹⁰⁰

Christian IDPs fleeing Boko Haram/ISWAP violence report intense fear of Muslim IDPs. One Christian IDP residing in Port Harcourt shared:

They [Muslims] have already caused us enough anguish; we are fleeing because of them [Boko Haram]. They have slain many of our people, and no one has been prosecuted. They are constantly [invading] land all around the Middle Belt, including Kaduna. Are we going to pretend that since we are Christians, this isn't happening? They believe they are superior to us in the North.¹⁰¹

A Christian IDP community leader in Port Harcourt agrees:

There are ill feelings between Christians and Muslims; first, the Christians have unresolved anger due to the Boko Haram crisis being primarily religiously motivated; you cannot blame us. Boko Haram raided my community and killed Christians, while Muslims were forced to recite the Qur'an to show their religion, and many were forced to flee.¹⁰²

The fear experienced by Christian IDPs is also shared by some host communities. This fear was noted by two IDPs living in different cities – one Christian in Port Harcourt and one Muslim in Onitsha. The Port Harcourt Christian IDP community leader reflected: "the locals see IDPs as terrorists, and the Muslims even worse, so not living with Muslims gives us a softer landing with the locals."¹⁰³ While one Muslim IDP in Onitsha explained: "Anambra state, where we are, is a Catholic state, and since people often equate IDPs with Islamic terrorism, communities that welcome us do not provide Muslims with the exact same freedom as Christian IDPs."¹⁰⁴

Christian IDPs from central and southern Nigeria

The security of IDPs in their host communities varies significantly depending on where they are hosted. In a study focusing on IDP experiences in Jos, Plateau state, the majority of IDPs were displaced from their farmlands by militant Fulanis – 59% reported feeling safer in Jos than at home, and 13% felt less safe with some fearing their attackers would find them.¹⁰⁵ Most of those interviewed from their host community felt safe, but 17% felt less safe due to a rise in crime and because they "feared that the presence of IDPs in their community would increase their risk of external attacks."¹⁰⁶

A report focused on IDP experiences in the South indicates that religion impacts where IDPs go for help and with whom they will live. The report interviewed 107 IDPs and refugees, all living in displacement settings in southern Nigeria, but originally from the North-East and North-Central regions.¹⁰⁷ They had a 48%/51% Muslim/Christian split.¹⁰⁸ When first seeking help during displacement, 27% went to a church, 29% went to their friends, 18% had no help, 17% went to the local community, 7% went to the mosque and the remaining 2% went to their families.¹⁰⁹ When asked if it would be possible for IDPs to stay with other IDPs from different ethno-religious groups, only 8% said yes.¹¹⁰ The IDPs' responses indicate that one's religion can be both a source of practical aid and support, and a continued source of tension in displacement settings.

⁹⁵ USCIRF, *Factsheet: Violent Islamist Groups in Northern Nigeria*. February 2021.

⁹⁶ Iweze, D.O., *Faith-based organizations' intervention for the internally displaced persons from the northeast Nigeria's region at Uhogwa camp in Edo State*. African Identities, 2022.

⁹⁷ John, E.O., *The Problem of Refugees, Gender and Religious Differences in Nigeria's IDP Camps*. Pinisi Journal of Art, Humanity and Social Science, 1(6), 2021, pp.14-24.

⁹⁸ p.2, Human Rights Watch, *"Those Terrible Weeks in their Camp" Boko Haram Violence against Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria*. October 2014.

⁹⁹ Open Doors International, *Nigeria: Full Country Dossier*. January 2023.

¹⁰⁰ Bivan, N., *Borno's Christian IDPs (I): Struggling For Survival Almost Without Support*. HumAngle, 31 August 2021.

¹⁰¹ p.403, Roberts, R.E. & Lawanson, T., *Understanding IDPs in Nigerian Cities Working Paper No. 36*. Researching Internal Displacement, May 2023, pp. 43-44.

¹⁰² p. 44, Ibid.

¹⁰³ p. 44, Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ p. 44, Ibid.

¹⁰⁵ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Impacts of Displacement: Displaced by violence*, Jos, Nigeria. 2021.


¹⁰⁶ p.5, Ibid.

¹⁰⁷ The IDPs and refugees currently residing in Lagos (37%), Ibadan (28%), Onitsha (23%), and Port Harcourt (12%). The IDPs hailed from Yobe State (7%), Borno State (25%), Taraba State (10%), Adamawa State (10%), Bauchi State (12%), Gombe State (16%), Benue State (8%), Katsina State (1%) and Niger State (1%), and the refugees hailed from Cameroon (7%), Mali (2%), and Togo (1%). Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.



Pastor Andrew was living in Monguno, North-East Nigeria, when the community was attacked by Boko Haram. He and his family fled, and they He were transferred to Guyaku, a town still relatively untouched by the Boko Haram insurgency then (2014/2015). In February 2015 Boko Haram attacked Guyaku, burning down most of the houses. Pastor Andrew lost everything he owned.

The experience of returnee Christians in Nigeria

Commentators report that the safe return of Christians to their homes is severely hindered in both the North-Central and the North-East regions by ongoing instability and the strategies and motivations of militant groups targeting Christians and occupying their land.

Some IDPs in northern Nigeria have been forcibly returned, despite ongoing instability. Borno state has closed numerous IDP camps and forcibly returned their inhabitants. One female IDP testifies: “The conflict that made us flee our homes out of fear, is what the government is forcing us to go back and face.”¹¹¹ International Crisis Group notes that Islamist militants operate near the sites to which some of the IDPs are being involuntarily returned, causing a significant security risk. There are reports of attacks on returned IDP settlements by ISWAP, such as at Mallam Fatori.¹¹²

Forcible return to areas where Islamist militants operate is especially problematic for Christians. Boko Haram, ISWAP and Ansaru are clear about their desire to establish an Islamic State in the North, which in essence requires acquiring land and removing or subjugating non-Muslims.¹¹³

In the central regions of Nigeria, Fulani militants have also been clear about forcibly taking and occupying land.¹¹⁴ IDPs support these allegations. Saleh Bayana, from Shonwan, Bakki district, reported: “Since 2014 when we were attacked and displaced, no one has been able to go back [to our homes]...The Fulani now live there with their cattle. They’ve built normal houses and are living there, we dare not go near there.”¹¹⁵

The Para-Mallam Peace Foundation reports that “about 60 villages have been occupied by Fulani militants in Riyom and neighboring LGAs of Plateau state.”¹¹⁶ They additionally highlight allegations from IDPs in 2020 that Fulani militants attacked their communities in Kajuru, Kaduna, and then occupied their land.¹¹⁷

Reports indicate that such ongoing violence and insecurity make it additionally challenging for IDPs to safely return to their lands in the North-Central region. The testimony of Amina, a Christian IDP from Plateau state, supports this: “The Fulanis came to our community and killed 18 people. My husband, Yakubu and son Emmanuel were killed during the attack and since then we were forced to leave the community because the attackers never stopped coming.”¹¹⁸

¹¹¹ Amnesty International, [Nigeria: Plans to close IDP camps in Maiduguri could endanger lives](#), 15 December 2021.

¹¹² International Crisis Group, [Rethinking Resettlement and Return in Nigeria's North East](#), 16 January 2023.

¹¹³ UK APPG ForB Report, [Nigeria: Unfolding Genocide? 2023](#).

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ Para-Mallam Peace Foundation, [After Killing and Displacing us, Fulani now Occupy our Ancestral Communities: Riyom IDPs Cry Out](#), 12 August 2023.

¹¹⁶ Ibid.

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

4. Violent incidents

Numerous organizations have highlighted the risk faced by Christians in Nigeria. Violence targeting the Christian community has become more common since 2020 amid a wider trend of insecurity across the country.¹¹⁹ Violence is a key driver of displacement in Nigeria, with the vast majority of IDPs being displaced by conflict and violence rather than disasters (the two categories of displacement driver used by the IDMC).¹²⁰ To understand forced displacement in Nigeria, an insight into the violence precipitating much of the displacement is essential.

The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project reported a 21% rise in violence “targeting Christians in relation to their religious identity” in Nigeria in 2021 compared with 2020.¹²¹ The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect identified “patterns of violence against civilians, or members of an identifiable group based on their ethnicity or religion, as well as their property, livelihoods and cultural or religious symbols”¹²² as a significant risk in Nigeria. Fulani militants have intentionally attacked Christian communities and churches with congregants killed or kidnapped¹²³ and many displaced.¹²⁴

4.a. Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa findings

The Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa (ORFA) has released the following data analyzing violent incidents in Nigeria over four years (2019-2023). It reveals high levels of violence, where Christians were disproportionately affected and primarily subject to violence by Fulani militants. Violence is particularly concentrated in the North-West and North-Central regions, with some violence also in the North-East. However, the Nigerian security forces are primarily present in the North-West and North-East regions. Civilians are the most vulnerable in their homes, where community attacks can have a significant impact, including forcing people to flee.

This data gives a picture of the most recent violence and the relevance of religious dynamics. However, in the context of forced displacement generally in Nigeria, it does not cover the deadliest years of Boko Haram and ISWAP; many people are still experiencing protracted displacement as a result of this earlier violence.

ORFA reports on religious background to explore the data behind contrasting analyses of violence in Nigeria, aiming to maintain a neutral stance and to present data without bias.

The following sections on violent incidents are taken from ORFA data, reproduced with their permission, available at orfa.africa, August 2024. Please note ORFA uses the term “Terror Groups” to refer to an assortment of groups including

Boko Haram, ISWAP, Fulani militants, bandits and other smaller groups. “Armed Fulani Herdsmen” is used for Fulani militants, as a subcategory of “Terror Groups”.

4.a.i. Overall insecurity

In the four-year period between 2019 and 2023, ORFA registered 55,910 deaths and 21,621 abductions in Nigeria, across 11,610 attacks. This indicates a high level of violence and insecurity.

Many civilians across parts of Nigeria faced insecurity and fear of the unexpected. For example, eyewitnesses talked about children sleeping in trees at night as a form of protection. In total, 30,880 civilians were killed in 6,942 attacks. For context, there were 9,970 attacks with killings in total. 21,532 civilians were abducted in 2,670 attacks. The remaining 25,030 people killed were members of the Security Forces or Terror Groups. The remaining 89 people abducted were members of the Security Forces or Terror Groups. This gives a sense of the scale of the violence, and the considerable risk to Nigerian civilians.



A woman who fled Fulani violence living in a Christian IDP camp, Benue state

¹¹⁹ ACLED, [Fact Sheet: Attacks on Christians Spike in Nigeria Alongside Overall Rise in Violence Targeting Civilians](#), 21 July 2022.

¹²⁰ As of the end of 2023, IDMC records 3.4 million IDPs displaced by conflict and violence in Nigeria, compared to 81,000 by disaster. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, [Displacement data: Nigeria](#). Accessed 1 August 2024.

¹²¹ Ladd Serwat, [Fact Sheet: Attacks on Christians Spike in Nigeria Alongside Overall Rise in Violence Targeting Civilians](#). ACLED, July 2022.

¹²² Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, [Nigeria](#), 29 February 2024.

¹²³ World Evangelical Alliance and Open Doors, [Nigeria: Violence, Insecurity and Protection of the Population – Report to the UPR 45th session](#), 18 July 2023.

¹²⁴ Iweze, D.O., [Faith-based organizations' intervention for the internally displaced persons from the northeast Nigeria's region at Uhogua camp in Edo State](#). African Identities, 2022.

Table 1: All incidents with killings and abductions in the geographical zones, Oct 2019 – Sept 2023, with special emphasis on civilians killed

Geopolitical zone	# of all incidents with killings	Total killed	# of incidents with civilians killed	Total civilians killed	# of abduction incidents	Total people abducted	# of civilian abduction incidents	Total civilians abducted
North West	2,900	18,635	2,128	11,626	1,054	12,062	1,047	12,042
North Central	2,307	11,974	1,978	8,789	999	6,351	993	6,325
North East	2,058	18,508	823	5,521	269	1,599	261	1,579
South East	954	3,251	636	2,273	124	476	115	465
South South	921	1,978	671	1,369	135	708	132	701
South West	830	1,564	706	1,302	124	425	122	420
Total	9,970	55,910	6,942	30,880	2,705	21,621	2,670	21,532

4.a.ii. Religious affiliation & perpetrators

The data shows how Christians were disproportionately affected by killings and abductions. The simple ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was 2.7:1; Christians to Muslims abducted was 1.4:1. However, when adjusted to reflect the size of the Christian and Muslim populations in the individual states, the ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was 6.5:1 and Christians to Muslims abducted was 5.1:1.

Table 2: Geopolitical Zones, a comparison of the ratio of the number of Christians killed to the number of Muslims killed from Oct 2019 until Sept 2023 taking into account the Christian/Muslim population levels

Geopolitical zone	Total Christians and Muslims killed	Christians killed	Muslims killed	Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed	Ratio of Christians to Muslims killed, based on their population size in the different states
North West	8,928	5,250	3,678	1.4	7.5
North Central	7,187	6,081	1,106	5.5	4.6
North East	3,857	2,595	1,262	2.1	5.3
South East	1,755	1,677	78	21.5	5.3
South South	645	622	23	27.0	6.3
South West	632	544	88	6.2	3.1
Grand Total	23,004	16,769	6,235	2.7	6.5

The ratio of Christians to Muslims killed was by far the highest in the South-South (27.0:1) and the South-East (21.5:1). The ratio in the North-West (1.4:1) and the ratio in the North-East (2.1:1) were the lowest. However, adjusted to reflect of the population sizes of Christians and Muslims in the different states, the highest ratio was in the North-West (7.5:1), followed by the South-South (6.3:1), and then the North-East (5.3:1) and South-East (5.3:1) on par.

Although affected at different rates, Muslims were generally killed by the same groups that killed Christians, with different percentages. 55% of the Christians killed were killed by *Armed Fulani Herdsmen* (9,153); 29% by *Other Terrorist Groups* (4,895). *Boko Haram* and *ISWAP* combined stood for 8% of the Christians killed (1,268). For Muslims it was the opposite: 24% of the Muslims killed were killed by *Armed Fulani Herdsmen* (1,473); 53% by *Other Terrorist Groups* (3,334). *Boko Haram* and *ISWAP* combined stood for 12% of the Muslims killed (770).

Table 3: All killings, distinguishing attacks by different aggressor categories from Oct 2019 – Sept 2023 with percentages for civilians, Christians and Muslims killed by the different categories of perpetrator

Perpetrators	# of all incidents with killings	Total killings	Total civilians killed	% total civilians killed	Christians killed	% Christians killed	Muslims killed	% Muslims killed	ATR killed	Unknown religious identity killed	Security Forces killed	Terror Groups killed
Other Terrorist Groups	3,588	15,954	12,039	39%	4,895	29%	3,334	53%	57	3,753	1,675	2,240
Armed Fulani Herdsmen	2,175	13,109	11,948	39%	9,153	55%	1,473	24%	31	1,291	627	534
Boko Haram	400	4,359	2,200	7%	971	6%	548	9%	-	681	590	1,569
Security Forces	1,934	15,094	1,342	4%	506	3%	317	5%	12	507	272	13,480
Locals	543	1,060	917	3%	273	2%	123	2%	5	516	30	113
Cultists	473	1,116	912	3%	306	2%	53	1%	36	517	6	198
ISWAP	549	4,130	879	3%	297	2%	222	4%	2	358	1,683	1,568
Assailants	139	282	263	1%	141	1%	68	1%	3	51	10	9
Communal clash	44	221	197	1%	138	1%	36	1%	7	16	-	24
IPOB (Indigenous People of Baifra)	80	207	117	0%	69	0%	16	0%	-	32	57	33
Vigilantes	45	378	66	0%	20	0%	45	1%	1	-	3	309
Total	9,970	55,910	30,880		16,769		6,235		154	7,722	4,953	20,077

The numbers of Muslims killed by Christian local vigilantes are included in ORFA data, as are Muslims killed by retaliatory attacks by Christians on Muslims. However, the data shows that by far the majority of Muslims were killed by the same aggressors who killed Christians and ATRs. This means that most of the Muslims killed as reported by ORFA are typically not victims of Christian violence but victims of extremist violence. The main victims of the Christian local vigilantes were members of groups such as Boko Haram, ISWAP and Fulani militants.

4.a.iii. Targeting homes and communities

People's homes became the places where they were most vulnerable. Most civilians were killed (25,312) or abducted (16,761) during attacks on their communities. Attacks on communities were especially devastating for the victims. They often involved a whole spectrum of violence, suffering and destruction, leading to high numbers of forcibly displaced people. This spectrum of violence and suffering included people killed or abducted; people wounded or maimed; women and girls raped; houses, shops and other businesses destroyed or occupied; fields destroyed or occupied; houses of

worship abandoned, closed or destroyed; people driven from their homelands into dire situations of internal displacement.


Most civilians were killed during attacks on their communities. Attacks on communities were apparently meant to disrupt the lives of the inhabitants and terrorize them or drive them away from their livelihoods.

- The number of civilians killed during 4,666 attacks on communities was 25,312.
- The number of civilians killed during 2,276 attacks elsewhere was 5,568.
- The ratio "Civilians killed during community attacks" to "Civilians killed during other attacks" was 4.5.
- The average number of civilian killings per community attack was 5.4; for attacks outside of a community setting it was 2.4.

4.a.iv. Most affected regions

The North-West and the North-Central regions hosted the majority of civilian killings and abductions. Most civilian killings took place in the North-West (11,626) and North-Central (8,789), followed by the North-East (5,521). Of these numbers, Christian abductions totaled 5,250, 6,081 and 2,595 respectively; for Muslims they were 3,678, 1,106 and 1,262 respectively. Most civilian abductions were in the North-West (12,042) and North-Central (6,325). For Christians these numbers were 5,931 and 3,277 respectively; for Muslims they were 4,976 and 2,469 respectively.


Map 1: Killings by location (Oct 2019 – Sept 2023) - shows the spread of the killings over the country



When looking specifically at community attacks, violent incidents followed the same regional pattern. Most civilians were killed during community attacks in the North-West (10,305), North-Central (7,515) and North-East (4,632). By comparison, the total in the three southern geopolitical zones is 2,860 civilians killed.

The areas of operation of the Nigerian Security Forces were mainly in the North-West and the North-East. This means that, despite the high levels of activity by *Armed Fulani Herdsmen*, the population of the North-Central region was relatively under-protected, when compared to the other regions with high levels of killings and abductions.

Map 2: 2019-2023 Cumulative killings by Security Forces



The map above shows the killings by Security Forces (15,094). Most people killed by the Security Forces were members of the *Terror Groups* (13,480). The map shows that the Security Forces were most active in the North-West and North-East.




A school class taking place in a Christian IDP camp, Benue state

5. Findings

The following three sections are conclusions from field-based primary research, conducted in 2024.¹²⁵ Researchers facilitated in-person interviews and focus groups with Christian IDPs and humanitarian workers from Ngala and Gwoza LGAs, Borno state, and Bassa and Mangu LGAs, Plateau state, totaling 292 people. This qualitative research provides valuable, in-depth insight into the experiences of Christian IDPs in Borno and Plateau states. Open Doors recommends further research be conducted into the experiences of IDPs in other states and adherents of other religions.

MAP OF NIGERIA



BORNO STATE

- Region: North-East
- LGAs researched: Gwoza & Ngala
- Threat of violence primarily from Islamic militants, such as Boko Haram and ISWAP
- Threat of violence primarily from Islamic militants, such as Boko Haram and ISWAP
- Generally, longer term, protracted displacement (due to the long-running violence in the region)
- Distinction between official, registered camps run by the government and informal, unregistered camps that are not government-recognized and are supported by other actors, including churches

PLATEAU STATE

- Region: North-Central (also known as the Middle Belt)
- LGAs researched: Bassa & Mangu
- Threats of violence primarily from Fulani militants
- Currently, displacement has been short term due to recent violence.
- The few camps that have emerged were created in an ad-hoc way and remain informal, but some do receive limited support from the government, local actors including churches and some humanitarian agencies.¹²⁶ However, 98% of IDPs live in host communities.¹²⁷

Distinguishing formal and informal camps

Organizations such as IOM group together camps and camp-like settings. This category includes both formal and informal camps. Formal camps are in government-approved locations and have more established channels of support. Informal camps are generally not recognized by national authorities and have “limited access to essential support.”¹²⁸

¹²⁵ For more information, see [Methodology](#).

¹²⁶ For example, see World Health Organization, [Restoring hope to displaced Plateau State communities through coordinated humanitarian response](#), 27 January 2024.

¹²⁷ International Organization for Migration, [Nigeria — North-Central and North-West Displacement Report 12](#) (December 2023), 4 January 2024.

¹²⁸ p.4, Ekezie, W., [Resilience actions of Internally Displaced Persons \(IDPs\) living in camp-like settings: a Northern Nigeria case study](#), Journal of Migration and Health, 6, 2022.

5.a. Drivers of displacement

Targeted violence and a failure to protect Christian communities has resulted in mass internal displacement.

Violence by Islamic extremists and Fulani militants has been the primary driver of the displacement of Christians in Borno and Plateau states. In both states this violence has deliberately targeted Christian communities, although others have also been affected. The failure of security forces to protect Christian communities and resulting impunity for attackers is also observed in both Borno and Plateau.

5.a.i. Borno state

Protracted violence by militant Islamist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP was overwhelmingly cited by interviewees as the primary driver of displacement in Borno state. They stated that the violence they experienced was driven by religious objectives.

This is supported by literature that details the explicit targeting of Christians in Boko Haram ideology.¹²⁹

In one of its early statements, the group declared that: “Boko Haram is an Islamic revolution which impact is not limited to Northern Nigeria, in fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria...We have started a Jihad in Nigeria which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamise Nigeria, and ensure the rule of the majority Muslims in the country.” In their conception, Christianity is synonymous with Western civilisation, which they see as the source of the multi-dimensional societal crises

which the group aims to address. Thus, Christians—seen as infidels—were declared as one of their primary targets. For example, in one of the releases of the group it was stated that: “The Nigerian state and Christians are our enemies and we will be launching attacks on the Nigerian state and its security apparatus as well as churches until we achieve our goal of establishing an Islamic state in place of the secular state.”¹³⁰

This has led to attacks on churches in Borno state. An interviewee summarizes this impact on churches in Gwoza LGA: “Now, all the churches in Gwoza have been destroyed by Boko Haram, and many of the Christians have fled and are living as IDPs in different locations. Since the attacks and the destruction of churches in Gwoza, I have not returned, and the churches are still in their deplorable state since their destruction.”¹³¹

According to local Nigerian researchers, LGAs such as Gwoza and Ngala have historically had significant Christian populations. As violence has resulted in Christians being forcibly displaced, their lands were unprotected and the demographics of the LGAs has reportedly shifted. A Christian IDP from Ngala LGA summarized, “I think for Goshe even during the time of displacement most of the community members were Christians. But now the resettled members are almost ninety percent Muslims in the place I went to. It used to be a Christian community, but now it is a Muslim community.”¹³²

While non-Christians have also been forcibly displaced because of violence across the state, Christian IDPs spoke of religiously targeted violence. This included attacks and abductions that particularly focused on Christian leaders and places of worship. One interviewee from Gwoza LGA spoke of



An internally displaced woman fleeing Fulani militant violence in northern Nigeria

¹²⁹ Onapajo, H. & Usman, A.A., [Fuelling the Flames: Boko Haram and Deteriorating Christian–Muslim Relations in Nigeria](#). Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 35, 2015. p.111, Ibid.

¹³¹ Interview notes, Individual Interview 7-16-P.

¹³² Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17HA.

the violence that forced their family to flee several years ago: “Boko Haram target people that are working with the church, maybe you have a position like Secretary or you have any position in church, you are a target. In every community they have a list of people they are looking for.”¹³³

Intense insecurity has been a fluctuating risk for over a decade. Demonstrating the persistence of the challenges facing these communities, CSW observed in 2014 that Boko Haram was targeting indigenous communities of Christians in Gwoza LGA, clearly violating “their right to freedom of religion of belief.”¹³⁴ A 2015 VOA news report quoted the military spokesman at the time, Colonel Sani Kukasheka Usman, speaking of Ngala LGA:

Since the advent of the Boko Haram insurgency, they captured the town and killed most of the inhabitants of the town and some of them have either gone as refugees or become internally displaced persons within the country. Unfortunately, the level of destruction in Gamboru-Ngala, by Boko Haram terrorists is unprecedented. Almost all the structures have been destroyed and you can’t even get a single soul. Remember this is a very big town that is very strategic and economically [viable] too.¹³⁵

Violence has life-changing consequences for the individuals involved, such as subsequent trauma.

But a key consequence for the Christian communities in Borno state was the fear instilled by such attacks, pushing them to flee their homes. Many also took with them an increased distrust of the Muslims they used to live alongside. A Christian IDP in Gwoza LGA explained such fears, saying:

The Christians after they were displaced by Boko Haram from their communities were asked by the government to go to the National Youth Service Camps (NYSC) to stay there, but they refused because the camp was dominated by Muslims whom the Christian IDPs believed were the sole cause of their misfortune. Their refusal to go was also because the Muslims in the camp shared the same faith with their killers, therefore, they were suspicious of what the Muslims could do to them.¹³⁶

Some Christian interviewees related instances where their Muslim neighbors, in order to gain a degree of protection, reported them to Islamist militant groups. An interviewee from Ngala LGA, speaking of the risk of being informed upon, said that many of the displaced persons who returned home lived as “endangered species.” However, one interviewee shared that he and his family were saved by a warning of an attack from a Muslim stranger – they were able to flee in advance of the violence.

Violence targeting the Christian community has become more common since 2020 amid a wider trend of insecurity across the country targeting civilians.¹³⁷ Total civilian targeting

increased by 28% from 2020 to 2021, and this trend has continued.¹³⁸ Outside the North-West and North-Central regions, Borno state has registered the second-highest number of violent events targeting Christians.¹³⁹ Additionally, from 2019-2023, Borno state has recorded the highest number of registered killings, at 15,302.¹⁴⁰

CASE STUDY: GWOZA LGA, BORNO STATE

Between February and May 2014, Boko Haram attacked Isaac’s village six times, each time killing seven to ten people.¹⁴¹ He and his family fled to Adamawa state, where they encountered violence again. Their church was attacked. He describes, “the Sunday school children were out ... we suddenly heard gunshots everywhere.” Having initially fled the violence, he and his wife came to search for their children once the attack ceased, but could only find four of the five, with one child missing.

Forced to sleep in hilly terrain, with no food, the family ate from the plants they saw. They trekked to multiple places, trying to locate their son. Isaac was given an opportunity to share about his son on the radio and they were also given information and money by people in Maiduguri. After 29 days they were reunited as a family.

“We passed through places that were under attack, we saw dead bodies, we could not eat, I was so weak ... [and] said the government should just come and kill me.” Both Isaac and his wife became very sick. “Some people took my wife to a hospital and she was diagnosed with kidney problems. I know it was as a result of the kind of food we had been forced to eat.”

The continued presence of Boko Haram in their ancestral lands prevents Isaac and his family from returning. Currently living in a camp in Maiduguri, they have been living as IDPs for a decade.



Maiduguri, Borno state

¹³³ Transcription, Individual Interview, 7-16-J.

¹³⁴ CSW, *Christians in Borno State targeted by Boko Haram*, 4 June 2014.

¹³⁵ Clotey, P., *Nigeria Military Recaptures Border Town from Boko Haram*, VOA, 9 September 2015.

¹³⁶ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHD.

¹³⁷ ACLED, *Fact Sheet: Attacks on Christians Spike in Nigeria Alongside Overall Rise in Violence Targeting Civilians*, 21 July 2022.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ *Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa* (ORFA).

¹⁴¹ Name changed for security reasons. Case study from: Interview Notes, Individual Interview, 7/16/J.



An informal Christian IDP camp in the North-Central region, hosting Christians who have fled Fulani militant violence



5.a.ii. Plateau state

Displacement in Plateau, a majority Christian state, was triggered by attacks on communities by Fulani militant groups.

There are ongoing debates as to the extent of the radicalization of various Fulani militant groups and the precise religious dynamics at play (see Fulani militant violence on page 6). However, interviewees indicated the presence of religious dynamics. One interviewee from Bassa LGA observed that, “when the Fulani gunmen come to attack, they would be heard shouting ‘Allahu Akbar, we will destroy all Christians ...’”¹⁴² Some indigenous Muslims live in Plateau state, and a few interviewees

reported Muslims would get advance notice prior to attacks by Fulani militant groups, while Christians would not. This illustrates some of the specific risks of violence for Christians.

The level of violence can be extreme. One attack that demonstrates this occurred on 16th May 2023. According to Solomon Maren, member of the House of Representatives, National Assembly, the death toll hit 100 within 48 hours, including women and children. Many others were left wounded with varying degrees of injuries. Houses and property were razed to the ground, farm and food products destroyed and livestock carted away.¹⁴³



A resident from Mangu LGA shows the destruction to his house

¹⁴² Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-YO3.

¹⁴³ Majeed, B., [Over 100 killed in Plateau in 48 hours – Lawmaker raises alarm](#). Premium Times, 17 May 2023.

An important theme raised by Christian IDPs across both LGAs in Plateau state was the lack of protection by the security forces. Interviewees reported that safety was not guaranteed in their communities, that the security forces either delayed their responses to attacks or didn't respond at all. An interviewee from Mangu LGA shared:

We don't have what it takes to defend ourselves. Some of our brothers who are hunters only come out with their hunter's guns that have nothing to do with their defense compared to the sophisticated weapons the attackers came with that was why there was massive destruction and massive loss, and most of the time before the security agents will also come to the scene the worst has been done.¹⁴⁴

This also highlights a disproportionality in weapons used by Fulani militants and those that the Christian farmers defend themselves with. The proliferation of small arms across Nigeria has been highlighted as an issue exacerbating violence by multiple studies, including by International Crisis Group and SBM Intelligence.¹⁴⁵

In extreme cases of lack of protection, some believed the security forces were complicit with the Fulani militants in their attacks on Christians. A Christian IDP from Bassa LGA commented, "The security was supporting them, rather than protecting us, this was the people coming to us killing us, and destroying our properties, and farms, and the security, could not even protect us nor our farms, or barracks is near us, but I was so angry that nobody could come to our aid, we were helpless. That is why we felt they were there for them; no single house of the Fulani was burnt."¹⁴⁶ Regarding the barracks, the IDP is explaining that one of the largest military compounds is located nearby where they were attacked, yet no military protection was provided. This is not the first time concerns regarding security forces failing to protect civilians have been raised; in 2018 Amnesty International has also commented on the Nigerian government's failure to protect civilians in the north of the country.¹⁴⁷

In Bassa LGA, during a particular Fulani attack, a respondent shared that "soldiers who were stationed in that village withdrew shortly before the attack happened, we still don't understand why the soldiers acted that way."¹⁴⁸ Many of them concluded that the Army must be collaborating with the attackers, increasing distrust. According to another: "When we report to the security [forces], they remain mute on the matter. The district head's house was burnt in front of the security agents and even the General Officer Commanding (GOC) was standing there. The whole community was burned down in 2021."¹⁴⁹

Violence in Plateau state has not just created IDPs but has resulted in IDPs being displaced multiple times. For example, some IDPs fled to what they thought was safety in Bokkos,

only to flee back to Mangu after brutal attacks by Fulani militants on Christmas Eve 2023 killed 335 people across Bokkos and Mangu.¹⁵⁰ This creates additional challenges in accessing support, as well as exacerbating feelings of insecurity and uncertainty.

An interviewee from Bassa LGA gave an example:

They were burning houses and killing people, so I ran with my children to Miango and eventually relocated to Jos to our relatives' house but our house was burnt completely and we did not escape with a single thing, we stayed there for one year and some months while rebuilding our house and then we returned. We thought all had calmed down until in March 2022, they returned and started killing and burning houses some were even burnt inside their houses. As for me we did not lose anyone but the only thing we lost was our house and personal belongings.¹⁵¹

Multiple displacements are a recurring pattern across the region. While there have been some doubts raised regarding IOM's data for Plateau state (see The scale of displacement: Plateau), they do report 66% of IDPs in the North-West and North-Central regions being displaced 2 or more times.¹⁵²

CASE STUDY MANGU LGA, PLATEAU STATE

A pastor spoke about the attack on Jebbu Miango on 3 August 2021. Fulani militia numbering up to 300 attacked the entire community during the burial of a local community member. The pastor stated that the military moved to support the Fulani militia, leaving the youths to attempt to defend the community. Farmland was destroyed and the church in Tafi Gana was burnt down.

Two weeks later, the attackers returned, destroying buildings they missed in the first attack and killing people including five members of the church. The attackers also ambushed people on their farms, launched attacks on roads and abducted people. They burnt down houses, destroyed crops, stole property and killed animals, forcing people to flee. Most fled first to nearby communities where they could find friends or relatives. Others settled in the nearest school building or church that they felt safe in. They remained displaced because their security could not be guaranteed despite the presence of soldiers. This was partly due to reports of possible complicity.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁴ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CHD.

¹⁴⁵ International Crisis Group, [Violence in Nigeria's North-West: Rolling Back the Mayhem](#). 18 May 2020.; SBM Intelligence, [Report on Small Arms, Mass Atrocities & Migration in Nigeria](#). April 2020. See also, Gyong, J.E. & Ogbadoyi, C., [Public Perception of the Proliferation of Illegal Small Arms and Ethno-Religious Conflicts in Kaduna Metropolis, Kaduna State, Nigeria](#). American Journal of Contemporary Research, 3(1), January 2013.

¹⁴⁶ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-CHD.

¹⁴⁷ Amnesty International, [Nigeria: The Harvest of Death - Three Years of Bloody Clashes Between Farmers and Herders in Nigeria](#). December 17, 2018.

¹⁴⁸ Meeting notes, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-CE.

¹⁴⁹ Interview Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-YO.

¹⁵⁰ See more about the attacks here: [World Health Organization, Restoring hope to displaced Plateau State communities through coordinated humanitarian response](#). 27 January 2024.; 25 December, 2024.; Open Doors Australia, [Update: Christians lead peace march in Plateau State, Nigeria](#). 22 January 2024.

¹⁵¹ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 2_24_wc.

¹⁵² International Organization for Migration, [Nigeria — North-Central and North-West Displacement Report 12](#) (December 2023). 4 January 2024.

¹⁵³ Meeting notes, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-CHD.

5.b. Experiences in displacement

Inadequate and poorly distributed resources, faith-based discrimination and insufficient understanding of specific displacement experiences increased the vulnerabilities of Christians during displacement.

Need currently far outpaces international support in Nigeria. The UN humanitarian response lists a funding gap of \$868.5 million, with funding coverage only at 6.26%.¹⁵⁴ Furthermore, funding commitments and beneficiaries are concentrated in just three states in the North-East: Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.¹⁵⁵

Living conditions for IDPs generally across Nigeria are hugely concerning. In Borno and Plateau states, interviewees cited issues including inadequate shelter, overcrowding, lack of food and water, and challenges accessing medical care, education, skills training and WASH facilities. The ongoing risk of violence was also a common concern.

An interviewee from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, explained the situation they are facing.

Our people here in camp do not have enough places to sleep. [In] most of the schools the children look for blankets and spread them on the ground or they sleep on sacks. In most of the camps, you can't find access to drinking water. At the time of the attacks when it was over some of the men were able to go back to their communities. As at the time of the attack boreholes were vandalized by the Fulanis. They destroyed all social amenities; schools, hospitals. No conducive place to sleep or water to drink it's a problem that's why right now a lot of young children are down with malaria, and typhoid because no good water.¹⁵⁶

Further complicating a challenging situation, Christian IDPs in Borno state reported faith-based discrimination in aid distribution and access to accommodation and livelihoods. In Plateau state, where the majority of IDPs are from Christian communities, there was a notable lack of significant international agency support.

Local church organizations try to care for displaced Christians but are insufficiently resourced to meet the considerable level of need. Where Christians report discrimination in relief provision, particularly in Borno, Christian IDPs are looking to Christian leaders and organizations for support as places of trust.

5.b.i. Borno state

According to Christian IDPs, faith-based discrimination by the state government and community members in Borno has increased their vulnerability by pushing them into more precarious living situations.

For example, to gain access to critical support, some have felt compelled to convert to Islam or deliberately hide their faith.

Two Christian IDPs from Gwoza LGA explained, "there are a lot of different camps..., once you enter any camp and they discover you are a Christian, if you will not convert and be a Muslim, for this, you must leave the camp. So, when they came to Maiduguri and began to enter camps, they would have to convert if they were not Muslim, you had to convert first before you were accepted into the camp."¹⁵⁷ And, "due to the biting hardship and severe living conditions, Christian IDPs are lured and cajoled by Muslims to convert to Islam for temporary benefits or they are forcefully converted."¹⁵⁸

Accordingly, informal camps run by Christian organizations have emerged to meet the needs of Christian IDPs. However, these informal camps are poorly resourced by the government, resulting in humanitarian need that is outpacing support. An interviewee from Gwoza LGA comments, "there is no food or support from the government in the camp, except for Christians who bring the little that they have to us. People fight for it because it's not sufficient for everyone in the camp."¹⁵⁹

Discrimination by Borno state government

Christian IDPs reported that official IDP camps run by the state government in Borno are mostly hosting Muslim IDPs; the few Christians there experienced discrimination and persecution by the camp officials and camp leaders because of their faith. Christian IDPs from Gwoza and Ngala LGAs observed that the so-called "white paper cards" – distributed as a license to receive humanitarian assistance by the state government – were deliberately withheld from Christian IDPs. Sometimes cards were given to community leaders to distribute, but usually to Muslim community leaders, who would then bypass Christians.

A Christian IDP from Ngala LGA explained, "The problem with distribution in these areas; if a token card is given to community leaders, they will not give it to Christians. They only give their brother Muslims. So that is the problem. When the government comes with the token cards, they hand them over to the community leaders, [but] the community leaders are Muslims, and they only share with the Muslims [and] don't share with the Christians."¹⁶⁰

A humanitarian worker from Ngala LGA reported that on the lists of vulnerable persons needing assistance, Christian names on vulnerability assessments carried out by the government or government partners would be replaced with Muslim names once it came to the distribution of aid on the basis of those assessments. For those few Christian IDPs who might have been able to access a white paper card, the humanitarian worker reported that distribution of relief items would be deliberately done on Sundays when Christians would be in church, and so be unable to access aid. In their own words, "In Borno state, we are still suffering persecution from the government, from partners ... Palliatives are being shared on Sunday so that no Christian can benefit from them."¹⁶¹

Some of the Gwoza LGA interviewees reported that they used to be well looked after by some organizations, but they alleged these organizations were then instructed by the

¹⁵⁴ OCHA, [Nigeria](#). Accessed 3 May 2024.

¹⁵⁵ Humanitarian Action, [Nigeria](#). 8 December 2023.

¹⁵⁶ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE.

¹⁵⁷ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 7-18-LA.

¹⁵⁸ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHD.

¹⁵⁹ Transcription, Individual Interview, 7-16-CA 1.

¹⁶⁰ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHDX.

¹⁶¹ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-HA.

government to focus on the Muslims including the Kanuri ethnic group who share that faith. This discrimination has led the majority of Christian IDPs to leave official camps. A Ngala IDP said, “There has been a lot of bias in the way relief materials are distributed within Gamburu Ngala and the situation became very unbearable that we had to leave the camps to fend for ourselves.”¹⁶² Another IDP commented, “While we were still in the camp, we were not given cards because we were Christians.”¹⁶³

However, leaving a formal camp is not a straightforward choice for Christian IDPs. Both the national and state emergency management agencies focus their attentions on the official, recognized camps; leaving an official camp means leaving a primary provider of essential humanitarian support, even if there are significant challenges in accessing that support.

Other studies have also highlighted general issues for the Nigerian government related to IDP camp mismanagement, including criticisms of policy, corruption and lack of supervision.¹⁶⁴

Discrimination in host communities in Borno state

Some of the IDPs were accommodated in host communities, which presented challenges for both Christian IDPs and the host communities. Faith-based hostility and greater pressure on amenities and resources were both reported dynamics.

When trying to access accommodation, interviewees said that some Muslims refused to rent to Christians. An interview from Ngala LGA explained this, as well as challenges in accessing aid:

Recently money was shared to Muslims in the community where we stay by some NGOs but we the Christians did not receive any, not even food was given to us. There is no government targeted intervention to Christians here. Aid is segregated and Christians don't get this aid, it is a systematic segregation of Christians when aid is given. The way it is here, even to rent houses as a Christian is difficult, ...[unless] it is a Christian brother who owns the house, [who] will want to rent it to Christians.¹⁶⁵

Christian IDPs also reported cases when accessing schools and jobs was harder because of their faith. They observed that in some places of education they could not gain admission with Christian names, or that the best and most lucrative course places would be given to those with Muslim names. An IDP youth shared that, “if you decide to go back to school, you will not be offered admission because if they see your name, like I have told you Philip or Philibus, John or Markus and the course you applied for will not be given to you and the courses that seems very irrelevant...will be offered to you and you are left with the decision to study it or not and because of that we are having problems.”¹⁶⁶

In Ngala LGA there were reports of Christians being required or pressured to convert to Islam in order to access jobs. One IDP from Ngala LGA reported: “They intentionally require Christians to convert to Islam, by giving you options to choose from. I knew a teacher who was a Secretary of [a] church and he was due to be a Headmaster and they told him if he wants the position, then he must convert to Islam and he did. I also knew someone who was previously idle but because she converted to Islam, she was given a job as a cleaner in the secretariat. They both got converted because of pressure and hunger.”¹⁶⁷

When reflecting on what this means for Christian IDPs, it is also important to consider the broader context of IDPs located in host communities as opposed to designated IDP camps. For humanitarian agencies, providing support to IDPs in host communities is more time-consuming and complex; however, it is important for agencies to respect the choice of the IDPs in how they choose to manage their displacement.¹⁶⁸ It is also good to recognize that IDPs can place an indirect “heavy economic and social burden on local communities” which can “produce resentment among local host populations.”¹⁶⁹ This means that when accounting for faith-based vulnerabilities within host community settings, there are multiple complex factors to incorporate.

THE SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT: BORNO

The scale and length of displacement has been considerable. As of December 2023, IOM reported 1,711,481 IDPs hosted in Borno state alone – Borno hosts 74% of IDPs in the North-East region of Nigeria.¹⁷⁰ Of that 1.7 million in Borno, 74% were displaced before 2021,¹⁷¹ illustrating how many IDPs have been dealing with the harsh realities of displacement settings for many years. 68% of IDPs have been displaced two or more times.¹⁷² No data exists on the religious affiliation of forcibly displaced persons.

¹⁶² Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CE 2.

¹⁶³ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-DF.

¹⁶⁴ Onuh, E.M., *Assessment of the role of government in addressing the challenges of internally displaced persons in Abuja, Nigeria camps*, African Journal of Social Issues, 5(1), 2022.; Shimawua, D., *Appraisal of the Management of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Nigeria*, Network for Research and Development in Africa, International Journal of Knowledge and Dynamics Systems, 13(2), December 2020, pp.63-75.

¹⁶⁵ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-LA.

¹⁶⁶ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-16-YO2.

¹⁶⁷ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-Yo 3.

¹⁶⁸ Davies, A., *IDPs in Host Families and Host Communities: Assistance for hosting arrangements*, UNHCR, April 2012.

¹⁶⁹ p.3, Haider, H., *Refugee, IDP and host community radicalisation*, GSDRC: Helpdesk Research Report, 31 October 2014.

¹⁷⁰ International Organization for Migration, *Nigeria — North-east — Mobility Tracking Round 46 IDP and Returnee Atlas* (December 2023). 14 February 2024.

¹⁷¹ Ibid.

¹⁷² International Organization for Migration, *Nigeria — Borno - Intention Survey* (April 2024). 15 April 2024.



Destruction following attacks carried out in Plateau state by militant Fulani militants on Christmas 2023

5.b.ii. Plateau state

In Plateau state, the experiences of IDPs in displacement settings was not primarily affected by their religious affiliation, a key difference to the findings from Borno. Instead, it was shaped by the distinct lack of attention to the area by humanitarian agencies. International humanitarian funding for Nigeria is focused on three states in the North-East: Borno, Adamawa and Yobe.¹⁷³ This neglect has created a humanitarian crisis among the displaced communities in the state, whose population is Christian majority.¹⁷⁴

Of those displaced within the state, the vast majority are hosted in local communities. IOM reports 98% of the IDPs that they were aware of in the state in September 2023 being dispersed among host communities.¹⁷⁵ People often initially fled in chaos, heading for the bush, neighboring towns and random buildings, some of which evolved into informal IDP camps. This is reinforced by a report from a UNICEF field visit in Plateau state, who observed “temporary IDP camps set up both in public buildings and in host communities.”¹⁷⁶ Often interviewees said they fled to what they thought was simply the nearest place of safety. Such informal camps then slowly closed as people moved on; staying with friends and family was often the preferred option.

But the need for humanitarian aid and support is severe. Interviewees cited problems including shelter, access to food and water, education, WASH facilities and access to medical care. According to one IDP:

Many of our women deliver at home without medical care, no vaccine for newborn babies, and no proper clothing for the mothers and children because the mothers ran without anything. Children run for more than four kilometers without shoes on their legs, many of them had no proper clothing for this weather, and some of the children were presently sick because of the weather. Food in the camps is not always enough, pregnant women have no proper diet, and our women and children are in a very bad situation.¹⁷⁷

Displaced Christians in Plateau commonly come from farming communities – expulsion from and an inability to return to their home also means a fundamental disconnect with their livelihood. One interviewee from Mangu LGA summarized: “Mangu people do not depend on government work, they depend on their farms.”¹⁷⁸ Not only were they forced to flee, but frequently their farms were also destroyed by Fulani militants. In Mangu LGA, 51,131,69 hectares of farmland and crops were destroyed between April 2023 and January 2024; in Bassa LGA over 448 farms were recorded as destroyed between 2018 and 2023, with one youth sharing with a local organization that between 2021 and 2023, “farm destruction became so rampant that a lot of households did not bother to officially report the incidents.”¹⁷⁹

This need for practical support correlates with needs assessments by IOM, who report that among IDPs living in

¹⁷³ OCHA, [Nigeria: Humanitarian Funding Overview](#) (As of 31 July 2023). 31 July 2023.

¹⁷⁴ For state by state religious affiliation, see Stonawski, M. et al, [The changing religious composition of Nigeria: causes and implications of demographic divergence](#). The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(3), pp.361-387, September 2016.

¹⁷⁵ International Organization for Migration, [Nigeria – North-Central and North-West Displacement Report 12](#) (December 2023). 4 January 2024.

¹⁷⁶ p.1, UNICEF, [Nigeria Response Report](#). June 2024.

¹⁷⁷ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-WC.

¹⁷⁸ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CHD.

¹⁷⁹ Mwaghavul Development Association (MDA), January 2024. Received 16 February 2024.



A resident from Mangu LGA shows Open Doors partners the destruction to her house

host communities in Plateau, 75% have no access to livelihood support.¹⁸⁰ In a 2021 study conducted with IDPs by IDMC in Jos, Plateau state, the impact of displacement on livelihoods was one of the most severe, with nearly a third of IDPs becoming unemployed once they arrived in Jos.¹⁸¹ Interviewees also raised the importance of access to education as a key barrier to the long-term prospects for supporting themselves in the future. While primary education is “officially mandatory and free in Nigeria,” IDMC reports that IDPs still encounter a key barrier of school fees, as well as costs related to uniforms and materials and other necessities.¹⁸²

IDMC has highlighted the lack of humanitarian attention and research on the North-Central region of Nigeria, “making it difficult to effectively tailor support for IDPs...and assess IDPs’ progress towards durable solutions.”¹⁸³ Out of the ten possible activities that IOM carries out state by state in Nigeria, only three are carried out in Plateau: Rapid Incident/Flash Assessment, Mobility Tracking/Master List Assessment and Mobility Tracking/Needs Monitoring. While this is not the least state by state activity (Kogi and Anambra each only host one), by contrast, IOM carries out seven activities in Borno state and five in the nearby Benue.¹⁸⁴

Research from another state in the North-Central region, Nasarawa state, demonstrates how displaced persons were reliant on family and friends for shelter and food, and struggled make a living. Relocation to a place of greater safety was one of the cited coping strategies.¹⁸⁵

THE SCALE OF DISPLACEMENT: PLATEAU

IOM reported 54,457 IDPs hosted in Plateau state as of December 2023.¹⁸⁶ However, when our researchers contacted local agencies such as the Mwaghavul Development Association (MDA), they reported significantly higher numbers of IDPs; IOM’s figures were nearly 80% lower. For example, MDA documented 103,000 IDPs in Mangu LGA alone as of January 2024. IOM figures also did not correlate with the observations of researchers working among IDPs in the state, who observed much higher numbers of displaced persons. This presents challenges in confidently presenting a figure for the number of IDPs in Plateau state and indicates an urgent need for further quantitative research to verify the number of IDPs, in order to provide adequate levels of support.



© Mwaghavul Development Association

CASE STUDY: MANGU LGA, PLATEAU STATE

On 16 May 2023, “we went out in the [small] hours of the morning and saw some Fulani [militants]. We then inquired from one of our Fulani neighbors what was going on. Before we knew what was happening, we heard sporadic gunshots all over the neighboring villages. Before long they had invaded our whole street. We did not have any weapons, so we had to [run], every one of us only wearing our clothes and those were all we had with us. We were all displaced around different local government areas. People from same families could not locate one another, because they were forced to run away to different places. This displacement has separated families; no food and nothing to do. Women have been separated from their men. Our families have been shared among relatives. While that incident was happening, we looked for the Nigeria security [forces] to come to our aid, but for five days no one came to help us.” – A Christian IDP interviewee.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁰ Ibid.

¹⁸¹ Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Impacts of displacement: Displaced by violence, Jos, Nigeria*. 2021.

¹⁸² School fees repeatedly cited by Christian interviewees as a challenge. See also, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Impacts of displacement: Displaced by violence, Jos, Nigeria*. 2021.

¹⁸³ p.7, Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Impacts of displacement: Displaced by violence, Jos, Nigeria*. 2021.

¹⁸⁴ International Organization for Migration, *DTM Nigeria Compendium II*. May 2024.

¹⁸⁵ Yikwab, Y.P. & Tade, O., *How Farming Communities Cope With Displacement Arising from Farmer-Herder Conflict in North Central Nigeria*. Journal of Asia and African Studies, 57(4), 23 July 2021.

¹⁸⁶ International Organization of Migration, *Nigeria — North-Central and North-West — Round 13 IDP Atlas* (March 2024). 11 March 2024.

¹⁸⁷ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 13/22/CE 1.

5.b.iii. Psychological impact

The psychological impact was a recurring theme across both Borno and Plateau states. There is an urgent need for intervention and support for those displaced and considering return.

There were reports of many Christian IDPs experiencing trauma from the severe violence and terror that precipitated their displacement as well as the continued insecurity they now face. For example, in Mangu LGA, Plateau state, many of the Christian IDPs had witnessed family members being killed, and their homes being looted and burned down. A parent from Gwoza LGA, Borno state explained: “The situation is traumatic and scary each time I remember. Due to the volume of trauma, we have experienced, my children, each time they hear anything, they panic or go into hiding because it triggers the trauma. The terror of the attacks has not stopped, rather it has increased.”¹⁸⁸

But the psychological impact also has been exacerbated by living in displacement settings. The trauma of the initial violence that forced someone to flee can be compounded by displacement settings; other research has highlighted the need to specifically address the mental health needs of forcibly displaced persons, given the impact of “post-migration traumatic events, discrimination, lack of access to quality and affordable healthcare and housing, and acculturation.”¹⁸⁹ A systematic review of existing research suggests that approximately 30% of populations forcibly displaced by conflict experience depression or PTSD.¹⁹⁰ Research on Borno state highlights the challenge of delivering psychosocial interventions for displaced persons who have experienced violence, it being crucial that psychosocial services are strengthened and sustainable.¹⁹¹

The abject living conditions and lack of support has led to a common theme of hopelessness across both Borno and Plateau states. An interviewee from Gwoza LGA, Borno state, commented: “The situation in the camp is a time bomb if not addressed immediately because the psychological state of the IDPs has grossly degenerated.”¹⁹²

While Christian religious leaders have been committed to supporting their communities, they are often under-resourced and dealing with their own experiences of trauma. Church leaders interviewed expressed frustration as they are unable to meet the needs of their congregants. Churches of different denominations in Ngala LGA, Borno state, have brought relief materials, water pumps and other resources to support IDPs, but IDPs are still facing considerable humanitarian challenges. Research has documented how local faith communities

contribute to the protection and resilience of displaced persons, which often builds on existing coping mechanisms within communities.¹⁹³

Regarding psychological resilience, faith can be a positive factor during displacement; this has also been highlighted by other research.¹⁹⁴ Christian leaders interviewed were concerned about the spiritual lives of the Christian IDPs and held a sense of responsibility towards the faith of IDPs. This prompts recognition of the ways in which Christian leaders can play a role in supporting the psychological wellbeing of displaced Christians. In research from Nasarawa state interviewees also cited their trust in God as a source of resilience.¹⁹⁵

5.b.iv. Vulnerabilities of specific groups

Through interviews with different groups, such as women with children, youth and older generations, some specific vulnerabilities associated with age and sex emerged. Some were specific to Christian IDPs, and some appeared to be a risk for all IDPs including Christians.

Women and girls

- Pregnant women have faced inadequate food supplies and a lack of medical help. As a result, some babies have been lost both during delivery and as newborns. One IDP from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, explained, “Our women delivered in the rain during attacks and some of the children died. No food for the women, some don’t know where their husbands are.”¹⁹⁶
- Some young girls have reportedly been forced into “survival sex”, exchanging sex for basic necessities such as food. From Ngala LGA, Borno state, an interviewee comments that “some people got to have sex with small girls in ISS camp so they can get food to eat. I have witnessed this.”¹⁹⁷ A displaced church leader from Gwoza LGA, Borno state, additionally says “there are also cases where a mother and her daughter are involved in prostitution to earn a living.”¹⁹⁸ HRW have also documented cases in Borno state where displaced women and girls have been coerced into sex in exchange for essential assistance.¹⁹⁹
- Heightened risk of sexual violence. A female Christian IDP from Ngala LGA, Borno state, comments, “Truly our lives as Christian ladies here in the camp requires prayers, because sometimes we will be kidnapped or raped.”²⁰⁰ Multiple authors have documented the prevalence of sexual violence in IDP camps in Nigeria,

¹⁸⁸ Interview Notes, Individual interview, 7-16-P.r.

¹⁸⁹ p.909, Grasser, L.R., [Addressing mental health concerns in refugees and displaced populations: is enough being done?](#). Risk management and healthcare policy, 2022, pp.909-922.

¹⁹⁰ Steel, Z. et al., [Association of Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events With Mental Health Outcomes Among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis](#). JAMA, 302(5), 2009.

¹⁹¹ Umesi, E.J., [Interventions for Persons Affected by Conflicts & Insurgency: An Assessment of Psychosocial Support in IDP camps in Nigeria](#). Psychology and Mental Health Case, 6(3), 22 January 2022.

¹⁹² Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHD 1.

¹⁹³ Ager, J. et al., [Local Faith Communities and the Promotion of Resilience in Contexts of Humanitarian Crisis](#). Journal of Refugee Studies, 28(2), 2015, pp.202-221.

¹⁹⁴ Such as, Ibid.; Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs. [Refugees in Kenya: Roles of Faith](#). November 2015.

¹⁹⁵ Yikwab, Y.P. & Tade, O., [How Farming Communities Cope With Displacement Arising from Farmer-Herder Conflict in North Central Nigeria](#). Journal of Asia and African Studies, 57(4), 23 July 2021.

¹⁹⁶ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 3-22-WC.

¹⁹⁷ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-YO.

¹⁹⁸ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHD 1.

¹⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, [Nigeria: Officials Abusing Displaced Women, Girls](#), 31 October, 2016.

²⁰⁰ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-YO1.

including HRW collecting cases of officials abusing displaced women and girls in Borno state.²⁰¹

- Female-headed households are prevalent. Women face the grief of losing their husbands, alongside the challenge of being the sole provider for their families. A female IDP from Ngala LGA, Borno state, explains the challenges she faces: “My husband was killed, we are struggling with the children, and paying our rent is an issue. We don’t have money for food. Our children disturb us when there is no food to eat, they are crying mummy no food. We don’t even know what to do with our lives... When we had everything, they loved us but now that we have lost our husbands, [the children] are running away from us because we don’t have anything. We are struggling, no house, no food, no school.”²⁰²
- Hygiene challenges, such as sharing one toilet with multiple households and lack of access to sanitary supplies. A female IDP from Bassa LGA, Plateau state, explains, “Where we live, the place was jam-packed, and there was no safety because the women and the men were using one toilet... we are jam-packed in a room, and there was no safe place for us to sleep properly, there was no privacy, and we were just packed men and women all of us in the same place.”²⁰³
- In some places, such as Ngala LGA, to gain acceptance in the community female Christians have sometimes had to wear a hijab. A female IDP comments on the religious dynamic that can be at play, saying “Before we go to the market, we have to disguise ourselves with Hijab still they will recognize us even still they prefer us wearing Hijab because they believe we will later become Muslims.”²⁰⁴

Children and youth

- Children and youth lack education and training opportunities. Sometimes there were no schools, sometimes the schools were closed, and in other situations the fees were too high. This increased the risk of exploitation for children and youth. Some faith-related discrimination in education settings was also reported, such as denying access to some courses to those with Christian names. An IDP youth from Gwoza LGA, Borno state, speaks of the school fees, “going outside to further your education either secondary level or diploma is the problem when it comes to paying school fees.”²⁰⁵ The IDMC comments on the invisibility of child IDPs, who “face many barriers” in accessing education and “tend to need dedicated support.”²⁰⁶

- There are few employment options, particularly for the youth. For example, in Gwoza LGA, few can afford education and many only have farming skills. A female IDP from Gwoza LGA, Borno state, explains some of the gendered dynamics at play in employment and challenges with education, “anytime we step out to look for something to do we always have problem with the men who employ us. As for school we cannot afford it because it’s hard to afford one like me who have finished my secondary school with two years now and its three years now that I have been out of school because we cannot be able to afford it, we don’t have food to eat therefore, we don’t think of university because it’s very expensive.”²⁰⁷



A mother and child in a Christian IDP camp, Benue state

²⁰¹ Including, Durojaye, E. & Adebajo, T., [Addressing the Epidemic of Sexual Harassment in IDP Camps in Nigeria](#), Sexual Harassment, Law and Human Rights in Africa, Palgrave Macmillan, 18 July 2023, pp.169-197; Human Rights Watch, [Nigeria: Officials Abusing Displaced Women, Girls](#), 31 October, 2016.; Ugwa, J., [Sexual Abuse Thrives in Nigeria's IDP Camps with No Recourse for Victims](#), Women's Media Center, 30 May 2021.

²⁰² Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17 WC.

²⁰³ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 2-24-WC.

²⁰⁴ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-YO 28.

²⁰⁵ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-16-YO2.

²⁰⁶ p.10, Cazabat, C. & Yasukawa, L., [Informing better access to education for IDPs](#), Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2022.

²⁰⁷ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-16-YO2.

- Child trafficking was reported in Mangu LGA, with orphans particularly at risk. A Christian IDP from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, commented, “there are children we find without both parents, they are orphans, that nobody identified with because of the crises, after the first attack in particular, and then you find out that some people that are into child trafficking, took advantage of what is happening, came in promising the children a better life ... we were able to bring back 100 children from Port Harcourt and Lagos, and last week I brought about three children from Jos.”²⁰⁸ Research on modern slavery has highlighted forcibly displaced persons as “one of the most at-risk populations for human trafficking,” due to multiple compounding factors such as overcrowding, underfunding, poverty, lack of resources and insecurity.²⁰⁹

Older generations

- Older generations find it physically challenging to queue for food and aid distribution. An IDP from Ngala LGA, Borno state, observes, “you can be in line till 5:00pm before you can get the water, so it’s easier to go 1am in the night to get and because she only has her grandchildren, she has to do it herself in the night and that is not easy.”²¹⁰ Interviewees from Ngala LGA also explained that sometimes IDPs will have to get a spot in a queue three days before an aid distribution and stay there for the three days just to receive some food, a considerable physical challenge. An IDP from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, observed, “They still struggle to

find support to cater for their family; she was trampled upon during one of the distributions, so she decided to go there again because the aged are not taken into consideration in terms of aid of distribution. They often put their lives at risk just to get these aids.”²¹¹

- Lack of accessible medical care. An IDP from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, explained, “there’s no medical care, we use our money for our medical bill.” Both she and her husband who are older have not been properly looked after. When they are sick, they have to rely on their children who are not based here, or relatives to get money and go to the hospital. There is no medical support coming from anywhere. Since she was displaced no aid has gotten to her. Even when assistance is brought, she is afraid to go because she will be trampled upon. The only way they survive is via “good-spirited individuals” from host communities who identify them and give them a little food support.²¹² Another IDP agreed, saying health care is a big problem for older generations because there is no support for them.²¹³
- Reported significant psychological impact from being disconnected from their ancestral lands. A Christian IDP spoke of the significance of the events forcing people to flee, “Before the crisis these were people who depended on themselves they had a means of survival they farmed and they were able to support themselves they had their properties and overnight everything was destroyed.”²¹⁴



²⁰⁸ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-YO.

²⁰⁹ p.1, Lumley-Sapanski, A. et al., [Trafficking in persons and protection of refugees, stateless persons and internally displaced persons \(IDPs\)](#). Submission by the Rights Lab, University of Nottingham, February 2023.

²¹⁰ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CE1.

²¹¹ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE.

²¹² Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE.

²¹³ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE.

²¹⁴ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE.

5.c. Risk of return

Faith increases the level of risk for displaced Christians who try to return home.

Across both Borno and Plateau states, despite a strong desire among Christians to return home, the lack of security and illegal land occupation continues to be a significant obstacle. A Christian IDP from Mangu LGA, Plateau state, summarized, “Our fear is that the Fulani [militants] are still in our villages presently, we are afraid to return back to our communities. As it is now those Fulani [militants] are well armed even presently now with their cattle in our farmlands we can’t even return.”²¹⁵ There was also a high level of distrust of the security forces among interviewees.

5.c.i. Borno state

The Borno state government has pushed for IDPs to return home, a move widely criticized by humanitarian actors.²¹⁶ HRW records an IDP in Borno state saying, “We already suffered at the hands of Boko Haram before now and we are still suffering at the hands of the government.”²¹⁷ While they initially provided some relevant support for IDPs, with time the Borno state government began to resettle IDPs and close down camps in a manner inconsistent with local and international laws. This closure has reportedly pushed IDPs into further destitution. According to HRW, the Borno state government wrote to all humanitarian organizations in December 2021 banning them from distributing food and other aid to resettled communities like Bama in Borno state.²¹⁸

As to the progress of camp closure, “according to the Global Protection Cluster (GPC), a network of NGOs, international organizations, and UN agencies, the move targets the closure of 220 official and unofficial camps housing nearly 900,000 people, or about half of Borno’s IDP population (the rest are accommodated within host community settings). It is unclear how many across the state have so far been relocated, with the state government offering conflicting figures, but by November 2023 at least 13 camps had reportedly been closed.”²¹⁹

The state government have offered incentives to returnees, such as food parcels or one-off payments. A Christian IDP from Ngala LGA gave an example:

The promise the Governor made to us was that if we relocated back to Baga he would be providing us with palliatives since at that time one could not go to the bush; farming or fishing, you could not go. But the promise he made to us was that if we relocated back to Baga he was going to be assisting us with palliative measures. From then – truly once, we were given palliative by the Governor, but what was given to us was not much to write home about, because what he brought to us – rice – was not more than five measures. Beans – was not more than five measures. That was all he gave to us. From then on, we didn’t have any work to do. We now decided that we would brave the odds and go into the bush to fish. We then crossed the back of the fish dam. Between the fish dam and Baga the distance is not more than one and a half kilometers. While at the fishing place, one day Boko Haram came and attacked us.²²⁰



Mother Hannatu holding a photo of her daughter who was kidnapped by Boko Haram alongside 230 other girls in Chibok, Borno state, 2014. Boko Haram released 21 girls in Oct 2016 and another 82 in May 2017. The chairman of the Chibok Parents’ Association, Yakubu Nkeki Maina, says 112 Christian girls have yet to be freed. No one knows how many of them are still alive.

²¹⁵ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-CE 2.

²¹⁶ For example, see International Crisis Group, [Rethinking Resettlement and Return in Nigeria’s North East](#), 16 January 2023.; Amnesty International, [Nigeria: Plans to close IDP camps in Maiduguri could endanger lives](#), 15 December 2021.

²¹⁷ Human Rights Watch, [“Those Who Returned Are Suffering”: Impact of Camp Shutdowns on People Displaced By Boko Haram Conflict in Nigeria](#), 2 November 2022.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

²¹⁹ Baba-Ibrahim, Z., [In northeast Nigeria, those who fled conflict and being returned to conflict](#), The New Humanitarian, 23 April 2024.

²²⁰ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17-CHD 2.



Bethany's daughter Mary* was abducted during a Fulani militant attack on her village in North-West Nigeria. She and three other women were held for 54 days, during which she repeatedly suffered sexual violence. After Bethany paid a ransom that impoverished her family, Mary was released. Mary died suddenly almost a year after her release, only for Bethany herself to be kidnapped and released. *Names changed for security reasons*

As reported by The New Humanitarian, resettlement packages from the state government were only received by a few IDPs and were distributed evenly without taking into account the size of the household; for some family units the packages were used within a few days and prompted a new cycle of displacement.²²¹

Interviewees reported reluctance to return because of ongoing insecurity and the presence of explosive ordinances in their places of origin. Some returnees were attacked by militants and fled again. An interviewee from Gwoza LGA commented, "Boko Haram is still there, they have made camps there and they are living, unless the government evacuates the area and makes it safe because if you go you will be killed, so they are the ones still in possession of the lands."²²²

Christian IDPs regularly commented that they longed to return to their homes and ancestral lands. That desire seemed to be especially strong in those over 50 years of age. This correlates with IOM assessments; as of April 2024, 67% of IDPs in Borno stated an intention to return, but 59% of those who wanted to return explained that their houses were completely destroyed.²²³ Absence of housing and insecurity of area of return were the two most frequently mentioned reasons for not yet returning home.²²⁴ 20% remained undecided about where their future lay, and for the 11% who decided to integrate locally, security was the main factor in deciding not to return.²²⁵

Abductions were cited by interviewees as a key security risk across Borno state. While this was also a risk for Muslim returnees, interviewees explained how ISWAP would ask for higher ransoms for Christian abductees than for Muslims, sometimes twice as much, with ransoms even higher for clergy. The threat from Boko Haram varied. Abductions were less likely for purposes of ransom, with reports of

²²¹ Baba-Ibrahim, Z., *In northeast Nigeria, those who fled conflict and being returned to conflict*. The New Humanitarian, 23 April 2024.

²²² Transcription, Individual interview, 7-16-CA 1.

²²³ International Organization for Migration, Nigeria — Borno - Intention Survey (April 2024). 15 April 2024.

²²⁴ Ibid.

²²⁵ Ibid.

Boko Haram attempting to convert abductees to become foot soldiers and killing those who refused. However, Boko Haram also appeared to have financial motivations, with reports of requirements to pay a jizya tax. For example, farmers who returned needed to pay dues to both farm and to harvest.

An interviewee in Ngala LGA explained how these pressures would combine: “In Doro [located in Kukawa LGA], the Christians have been reduced to a handful. Christians there are struggling to survive because they cannot farm or fish which are their sources of livelihood. If we attempt to farm or fish, Boko Haram will invade the fishing location and your fellow fisherman who is a Muslim will sell you out to them. Concerning farming, we cannot access our farmlands due to the high level of insecurity, and even when we finally farm, we cannot harvest because Boko Haram will harvest it.”²²⁶

As a result of this combination of factors, protracted displacement is common, with one interviewee saying “it has been twelve years of displacement for me and the Christians in Gwoza.”²²⁷ The discrimination experienced in host communities, combined with the threat to life associated with returning home, leaves little prospect for a durable solution to the internal displacement Christians face in Borno.

5.c.ii. Plateau state

Ongoing violence in Plateau presents a continual threat for returnees, prompting repeated cycles of displacement and concerns that Christian communities will become more permanently displaced.

A Christian IDP from Bassa LGA spoke about the impact that this has on education:

So, some of the children, if you just ask them now, they will say, there's no need to go to school again because even though we go, this crisis is not over yet. They will still come back, and they will still be destroyed if we gather enough money to go to school it will be seen as a waste of money to pay school fees again, and they will come and stop you from going to school. You, see? So, most of the children are at home, they are not going to school again. They're just doing mining and other things.²²⁸

Return appeared to be a more frequent occurrence among those interviewed in Plateau state than in Borno state, but those interviewed emphasized that security challenges persisted. Christian IDPs reported that Fulani militants would often stay in the places they attacked, and so remain a threat for those who return. They feared that without greater government commitment to security and with ongoing impunity for perpetrators, Christian communities are being dislodged across the state and losing their ancestral lands.

Demonstrating how security issues play out in practice, an interviewee in Bassa LGA reported that many families are

separated as the men stay in the village to protect their land and the women and children try to find somewhere safer. He shared, “Fulani brought another attack in Jebbu, and burn a lot of places, but my station was attacked and burn places on the 3rd of August, every day, day and night we don't sleep we take women and children to go and sleep in Jebbu and we stay in the town to protect it.”²²⁹ This largely correlates with IOM figures, who record that across the North-Central and North-West regions, 45% of IDPs are girls and 21% are boys.²³⁰ However, IOM's figures do not record religious affiliation.

As well as concerns about safety, the need for shelter and food is acute. Many buildings have been destroyed and many farms are still unsafe. According to a displaced Christian community leader: “In most of the communities mentioned, you can't see any house standing ... Our people are now concentrated within the townships. Our people can no longer go to their farms.”²³¹ In Mangu LGA alone between April 2023 and January 2024, there have been 98 separate attacks on predominately Christian villages, 661 people killed, and 7,363 houses destroyed.²³² MDA further reported that 43 schools were destroyed and 27 health clinics.²³³ In Bassa and Mangu LGAs this means that many have become dependent on aid; one interviewee from Mangu LGA commented that “the greatest need of our people is to return. If the government can return our people, it will help a lot. Our communities have to be rebuilt, but there has to be security.”²³⁴

This correlates with findings from a UNICEF field visit in Plateau state, where “displaced adults and displaced children respectively emphasized that they were keen to return home and to their schools as soon as the security situations allowed.”²³⁵

CASE STUDY: MANGU LGA, PLATEAU STATE

“In Kantoma, the Fulani attacked us. We didn't know that anything was going on. Our men were alerted that the Fulanis are coming. We were warned by men to move out quickly. Before we knew what was happening the village was surrounded by the Fulanis. There were many of them. Many of our men were killed, about 39 of them were killed. We couldn't farm even in the past year. There is no food or shelter. Everything was destroyed. Even this week, there were attacks. Our people are also into tin mining which has been supporting us economically, but this has been affected by this crisis. Some of our people who were bold to go back to tin mining, were attacked. Our schools have been destroyed. Many of our people have been killed. Fulani [militants] have been destroying what is left, even the houses that are standing. There is no food in the camp. We are seriously in need.”
— A Christian IDP interviewee²³⁶

²²⁶ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 14-17 CHD.

²²⁷ Transcription, Individual interview 7-16-P.

²²⁸ Transcription, Focus Group Discussion, 2_24_wc.

²²⁹ Transcription, Individual Interview, 2-24-CHD.

²³⁰ International Organization for Migration, [Nigeria — North-Central and North-West Displacement Report 12](#) (December 2023). 4 January 2024.

²³¹ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-HA.

²³² Mwachavul Development Association (MDA), January 2024. Received 16 February 2024.

²³³ Ibid.

²³⁴ Transcription, Individual interview, 13-22-HA2.

²³⁵ p.1, UNICEF, [Nigeria Response Report](#). June 2024

²³⁶ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 13-22-HA.

6. Beyond Nigeria

These indications of overlapping vulnerabilities on the basis of religion and forced displacement necessitates further research and attention beyond Nigeria. With Islamist militancy spreading more widely in the region, evolving and emerging conflicts such as in Sudan and targeted violence against Christians already being reported,²³⁷ Nigeria is not alone in the displacement-related challenges it faces.

Across Sub-Saharan Africa, forced displacement is a considerable challenge in multiple countries where there are vulnerable Christian communities. For example, Cameroon hosts over 1 million IDPs and Burkina Faso over 2 million. Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) hosts over 6 million IDPs and Sudan over 9 million.²³⁸ Each of these countries can be found in the top 50 countries of the World Watch List 2024, indicating the presence of Christian communities who experience very high or extreme levels of discrimination and persecution on the basis of their faith.

To take one example, Burkina Faso is home to one of the fastest-growing displacement and protection crises globally; as of March 2023, seven in ten of the Sahel region's IDPs are found here (although the definition of Sahelian countries used in this data does not include Nigeria).²³⁹ Furthermore, thousands flee to neighboring countries such as Ivory Coast, Mali, Niger and Benin. UNHCR reported Burkinabe refugees arriving in Ivory Coast without personal belongings or food and being housed by Ivorian families with up to 30 other refugees.²⁴⁰

Internal displacement has risen tenfold since 2013, impacting over 2 million Burkinabes.²⁴¹ In addition to militant Islamist violence, driving this surge in displacement is inter-ethnic violence, insecurity, poverty and environmental changes. Burkina Faso has risen from a score of 48/100 points (at rank 61) in WWL 2019 to a score of 75/100 points (at rank 20) in WWL 2024.²⁴² Its population is 56% Muslim, 23%



"When the terrorists find Christians, they tell them the time of Christianity is over," says Pastor Soré from Burkina Faso. "We had to flee to save our lives."

²³⁷ Open Doors International, [WWL 2024 Summary of Trends](#), February 2024.

²³⁸ Burkina Faso: 2,063,000; Cameroon: 1,075,000; DRC: 6,881,000; Sudan: 9,053,000. IDMC, [IDMC Data Portal](#). Accessed 21 May 2024.

²³⁹ Countries included: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. UNHCR, [R4Sahel coordination platform](#). Accessed 8 April 2024.

²⁴⁰ Cheshirkov, B., [Insecurity drives more Burkinabe into exile, further straining fragile Sahel region](#). UNHCR press briefing at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, 4 February 2022.

²⁴¹ UNHCR, [R4Sahel coordination platform](#). Accessed 8 April 2024.

²⁴² Open Doors International, [World Watch List 2024](#). Accessed 1 July 2024.



Pastor Soré and his family outside of his makeshift house, Burkina Faso

Christian and 20% ethno-religionist. In 2023, Burkina Faso was the country most impacted by terrorism.²⁴³

If Christians, particularly converts from a Muslim background in the Muslim-majority border regions (northern and eastern areas of Burkina Faso), are discovered by militant Islamist groups, they are highly vulnerable to attack. Homes and livelihoods can also be destroyed, forcing Christians to flee.²⁴⁴ Christians are not the only ones who suffer. Mosques and madrassas in militant-controlled areas teach radical versions of Sunni Islam, causing Sufi Muslims to be under threat. Residents also reported that “terrorist groups” were responsible for killing imams whom the groups accused of collaborating with government security forces.²⁴⁵

Since the displacement crisis in Burkina Faso began relatively recently (violence escalated rapidly in 2019),²⁴⁶ reports on the experiences of displaced Christians are lacking. Commentators have noted that reporting on Burkina Faso’s human rights situation is not helped by a 2019 law that hampered media freedom by criminalizing some aspects of reporting on security force operations.²⁴⁷ Reportedly, the government implemented a de facto ban on visits by journalists to IDP camps through requests for visits being denied by the government ministry on

humanitarian action.²⁴⁸ Furthermore, there are reports that the government pressured journalists and victims who reported on allegations of sex in exchange for humanitarian relief.²⁴⁹ It should be noted that while journalists are not granted access, UNCHR operate throughout Burkina Faso to support refugees and IDPs,²⁵⁰ coordinating a protection cluster with the Danish Refugee Council.²⁵¹ Key protection risks identified include child recruitment into armed groups, gender-based violence and attacks on infrastructure.²⁵² These organizations have not reported directly on the experience of Christians in Burkina Faso.

With journalists prohibited from entering displacement settings, and residents unable to leave and often fighting for survival, it is no surprise that experiences of Christian IDPs have been infrequently recorded. Christian leaders paint a picture of communities shattered by Islamic militants attacking villages and forcing inhabitants to leave without money or possessions and relocate to family members in urban areas.²⁵³

More research is needed to fully understand the relationship between religious vulnerability and forced displacement in Burkina Faso, exemplifying the need for similar research in multiple countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

²⁴³ Institute for Economics & Peace, [Global Terrorism Index 2024](#), February 2024.

²⁴⁴ Open Doors International, [Burkina Faso Full Country Dossier 2024](#), January 2024. [password: freedom]

²⁴⁵ USCIRF, [Report on International Religious Freedom](#), 2021.

²⁴⁶ Norwegian Refugee Council, [Once Again, Burkina Faso is the world's most neglected crisis](#), 3 June 2024.

²⁴⁷ US Department of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, [2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burkina Faso](#), 2019.

²⁴⁸ Wilkins, H., With media blocked, [Burkina Faso's displaced denied a voice](#), journalists say, VOA News, 17 June 2021.

²⁴⁹ Wilkins, H., [Burkina Faso's Sex for Food Aid Scandal Draws Government Denial](#), Lawsuit, VOA News, 16 September 2021.

²⁵⁰ UNHCR, [Burkina Faso Fact Sheet](#), 1 March – 30 April 2023.

²⁵¹ The Protection Cluster in Burkina Faso was activated in 2019 to ensure the coordination of protection interventions in emergencies and to respond to the protection needs of persons affected by conflict and disasters. [Global Protection Cluster, Burkina Faso](#), Accessed 1 July 2024.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Open Doors, [“They attack to uproot” - New report reveals the wider strategy behind displacement of Christians](#), 3 July 2022.

7. Conclusion

The scale of suffering caused by forced displacement and violence in Nigeria is vast and concerning. This includes the significant role of religious affiliation in the causes and experiences of displacement. Despair was a common sentiment expressed by Christian IDPs and it is clear that more needs to be done, by both state and non-state actors, to address the material, emotional, spiritual and psychosocial needs of displaced persons in Nigeria.

Yet signs of hope can be seen. While the psychological impacts have been considerable for those interviewed, there was also evidence of remarkable resilience. For example, in Mangu LGA, Plateau state, schools have been closed in most of the rural areas but in April 2023 groups of youth came together to provide educational services. They recruited volunteers to go around different camps to offer teaching to the children, using the syllabus for primary and junior secondary schools which includes literacy, math and science. There are also reports of churches committing to supporting the displaced by a range of means, including paying school fees for orphans and providing soft loans to enable people to restart earning a living.

Forcibly displaced Nigerians are taking action to address some of the issues they are facing. They are asking for support from policymakers and the global church to aid them in their efforts.

For those in positions of influence, they ask for increased commitments to humanitarian support, security and criminal prosecution for perpetrators. Restoration to their ancestral lands is a key step forward. An interviewee from Gwoza LGA, Borno state, says: “If the international community will help us go back and help us rebuild our lives, that is all we want.”

For the global church, Christian IDPs in Nigeria are asking for awareness and spiritual support. Mass displacement and the destruction of church buildings has had a significant impact on the life of the church in the region; primarily as places of worship, but also as sources of mutual encouragement and community. An interviewee in Mangu LGA, Plateau state says: “The global church needs to know that many people are displaced. The global church needs to pray for the people to be able to return.”

From targeted violence to relief distribution, religious dynamics cannot be excluded from understanding and responding to the experiences of forced displacement of Christian IDPs in Nigeria. For example, religious targeting can drive displacement, religious affiliation can shape the experience of an IDP in a displacement setting, and religious structures and leaders can be a key source of support for displaced persons. Religion has to be included as one of the relevant factors in analysis and action related to forced displacement in Nigeria and beyond.

CASE STUDY: MANGU LGA, PLATEAU STATE

“On the 16th of May, 2023, the Fulani [militants] came at us at 6:30am and started to shoot at us. Our youth were able to stand and chase them off. However, the Fulani [militants] reinforced and returned around 11p.m [They] started to shoot again, burning houses. They burnt our animals and our maize plants.

The next day, we went to report at the security post. The man in charge made a few calls and assured us that there was no problem. After he left, they returned on motorbikes again that day and started killing. That day, six [people] were killed ... were it not for God, we would not [be] alive now.

Recently, we have been given a space to live in Pushit and we are grateful to the people for that. The clothes I am putting on now were given to me from someone. We did not come with even a grain of maize. Even if we are to return to our village, they might attack us. We plead that something be done. May God bring this evil to an end and restore normalcy to us.” – A Christian IDP interviewee²⁵⁴

²⁵⁴ Meeting Notes, Focus Group Discussion, 13/22/CE 1.



In May 2023, the Christian communities of Mangu, Plateau state, Nigeria, experienced brutal attacks by Fulani militants that left hundreds of villagers dead (mostly Christians) and tens of thousands displaced. The event irreversibly changed Pastor Zachariah's life.

8. Recommendations

URGENTLY INCREASE HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

Current programming and funding levels are insufficient to meet the needs caused by the escalating crises in Nigeria. We call on

- » The **international community** to:
 - increase their funding to address the basic, urgent humanitarian needs –and long-term practical and psychosocial needs – of IDPs;
 - ensure the needs of IDPs in North-Central Nigeria are accurately understood and met.
- » **Humanitarian actors** to:
 - recognize how IDPs' faith can increase their vulnerability;
 - promote religious literacy among staff to prevent discriminatory treatment that violates fundamental humanitarian principles and ensure equal treatment regardless of age, gender, religion or belief.
- » **The International Organization for Migration** to review its evaluations of the numbers and needs of IDPs in Plateau state, working with Local Government Area (LGA) authorities and adjusting its methodology to account for the highly mobile nature of Plateau's IDPs.

IMPLEMENT & ENFORCE THE NATIONAL POLICY FOR DISPLACED PERSONS

With reference to the 2021 National Policy for Displaced Persons,²⁵⁵ we call on

- » **The Nigerian government** to provide adequate security, food and shelter, and education to all children of school-age IDPs. Further, we ask the Nigerian government to call on Borno state government to ensure that all IDPs receive the necessary support regardless of age, gender, religion or belief.
- » **The Nigerian government** and **international community** to ensure voluntary returns in safety and with dignity. This includes (i) safety and security prior to, during and after return; (ii) recovery and restoration of land, houses and other property; (iii) provision of humanitarian assistance, basic services, and sustainable livelihood opportunities. For Borno state, safe and voluntary returns must include demining activities.

ESTABLISH AN INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

The protracted crises in Nigeria and across Sub-Saharan Africa are exacerbated by transnational religious, historic, socio-economic, and political factors. We call on

- » **The international community** to establish an international commission of inquiry under the auspices of the United Nations to:
 - investigate the nature and scale of violence in Nigeria and other seriously affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, with particular sensitivity to the identity dimensions of such violence;
 - investigate the links between and ramifications of the spread of violence across Sub-Saharan Africa, its connection with global terrorism and consequent threats to international peace and security;
 - advise the governments of Nigeria and other Sub-Saharan countries, national and international civil society, the United Nations Security Council, the African Union, the International Criminal Court and other stakeholders, on dealing with extremist ideologies and transnational violence, faith-based discrimination and impunity, and how to resolve conflicts and promote peace and reconciliation.

²⁵⁵ [Nigeria](#), National Policy on Internally Displaced Persons. 2021.

ADOPT & IMPLEMENT A NATIONAL POLICY FOR ADDRESSING IMPUNITY

For years, militant groups have committed violence with impunity in Nigeria and across Sub-Saharan Africa. We call on

- » **The international community** to work with the **Nigerian government** to:
 - develop a national policy to end impunity, paying specific attention to implement the recommendations of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Killings;²⁵⁶
 - provide training and technical support to members of the police, security forces and judiciary to counter militants and prosecute extremists.

ACTIVELY & COLLABORATIVELY FIND & REMOVE ILLEGAL SMALL ARMS

Reports document that out of 10 million illicit small arms in West Africa, an estimated 1-3 million are in circulation in Nigeria.²⁵⁷ We call on

- » The **Nigerian government** to domesticate the Economic Community of West African States' Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons into national law and ensure its full and effective implementation.²⁵⁸
- » The **international community** to support the Nigerian government to track, collect and destroy illegal weapons and do everything in its power to disarm members of violent militant groups.

LEVERAGE THE PUBLIC TRUSTWORTHINESS OF THE CHURCH & CHRISTIAN LEADERS

The majority of West Africans trust their religious leaders more than any other form of authority.²⁵⁹ We call on

- » **Humanitarian actors** to include the local Christian faith leaders and organizations in the decision making and coordination of the humanitarian response.
- » The **international community**, in partnership with the **Nigerian government** and **NGOs**, to integrate flexible funding opportunities into their programming, building capacity in local faith leaders and Christian-based organizations to deliver humanitarian response, psychosocial care, reconciliation, community- and peace-building initiatives, and to document atrocities.

²⁵⁶ Visit [Nigeria: Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions](#), Agnès Callamard, 11 June 2021.

²⁵⁷ Adeyemi T. T. and Adeyemi M. M., [The proliferation of arms and its effect on the development of democracy in Nigeria](#), Am. Int. J. Res. Hum. Arts Soc. Sci. 5, 233–238, 2003.

²⁵⁸ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), [Convention on Small Arms, Light Weapons, their ammunition and other associated material](#). Art. 13, 2006.

²⁵⁹ Bratton M. and Gyimah-Boadi E., [Do Trustworthy Institutions Matter for Development? Corruption, Trust and Government Performance in Africa](#). Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 112, 2016.

9. Methodology

Aim and Scope

The aim of the primary research presented in the findings of this report was to understand and convey the realities facing forcibly displaced Christians in the identified Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Nigeria: Ngala and Gwoza in Borno state, and Bassa and Mangu LGAs in Plateau state.

Selection of LGAs

As mentioned, many aspects of displacement and migration in Sub-Saharan Africa, including Nigeria, are disputed. However, in Open Doors' many years of monitoring the situation in Nigeria, the most common forms of forced displacement of civilians have been the following:

1. Displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of religiously motivated non-State actors (Boko Haram, ISWAP etc.)
2. Displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of criminal groups involved in kidnapping for ransom ("bandits")
3. Displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of Fulani militants who mostly attack Christian-majority villages
4. Displacement caused by or facilitated by armed conflict involving the Nigerian Security Forces (NSF) and non-State actors notably the extremist Islamist groups known as Boko Haram and ISWAP
5. Displacement caused by or facilitated by climatic events (e.g. floods and drought).

Open Doors' monitoring of Nigeria evidences religious dimensions in two of the five categories listed above: displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of religiously motivated non-state actors (Boko Haram, ISWAP etc.) and displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of Fulani militants who mostly attack Christian-majority villages. These forced displacement categories were therefore selected for closer examination.

Additionally, there were indirect religious dimensions surrounding the displacement during the non-international armed conflict between the NSF and the extremist Islamist groups Boko Haram and ISWAP.

A single LGA was selected as a representative case study from each of these three categories. The following factors were considered:

1. Issues of temporality: examples of "fresh" displacement as well as "historic" displacement over the last five years
2. Issues of geography: case studies from different states in order to develop an understanding of localized responses to the needs of the displaced

3. The varied experiences of persons in their displacement journey. For example, some people are in refugee camps in neighboring countries, others are internally displaced in a range of contexts such as formal and informal camps, neighboring villages, cities etc. Some people have been able to return to their homes, others have not. A range of these contexts and experiences was desirable.
4. Logistical issues, notably physical accessibility and availability of reliable information including satellite imagery
5. Practical limitations, notably the time and resources that available to invest in this study
6. Ensuring the security and well-being of interviewees as well as research team members.

Considering these factors, the following was agreed:

- As a case study of displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of religiously motivated non-State actors (Boko Haram, ISWAP etc.): Ngala LGA, Borno state, where there are camps in Maiduguri town housing IDPs from around the state.
- As a case study of displacement caused by or facilitated by the actions of Fulani militants who mostly attack Christian majority villages: Mangu LGA, Plateau state, supplemented by Bassa LGA also in Plateau state.
- As a case study of displacement during the non-international armed conflict between the NSF and the extremist Islamist groups Boko Haram or ISWAP: Gwoza LGA, Borno state.

Method

An approach was employed that allowed for flexibility and was guided by the International Protocol on Documenting Violation of International Religious Freedom.²⁶⁰ Primary field research was qualitative, with a mixture of focus group interviews as well as in-depth one-to-one interviews. Background research was also commissioned, which helped to create tailored, semi-structured questionnaires.

Some interviews were conducted completely in Hausa, some used interpreters and some were conducted completely in English. Interviews were anonymized and transcripts of audio recordings were translated into English where required. Data is stored securely on internal IT systems. All participants were informed about the purposes of the research and use and storage of their data, with a mix of verbal and written consent.

Selection of Interviewees

For all four LGAs, intermediaries were provided with broad categories of IDPs with whom interviews were preferable, stressing that they should be from all Christian denominations and that there should be a mix of men and women. Persons

²⁶⁰ Bajali, N. et al, [International Protocol on Documenting Violations of Religious Freedom](#). Open Doors International & Religious Freedom Institute, 2021.

from different camps and communities were sought. The team did not interview anyone under the age of sixteen due to safeguarding and consent issues.

Based on these requirements, the intermediaries arranged for 292 individuals to come to meet with the research team in safe locations. These intermediaries did not have the details of the information that the team was seeking to gather through the focus groups and interviews.

Focus groups were held with seven categories of people from each of the four LGAs:

- a. Camp authorities
- b. CAN (Christian Association of Nigeria) and denomination heads
- c. Community leaders and persons over the age of fifty
- d. Humanitarian agencies
- e. Local authorities
- f. Women with children
- g. Youths

In all the LGAs, the team invited several individuals to have one-to-one interviews based on on-site information and the likelihood that there was information worth exploring in greater detail or exploring privately.

For the focus groups and interviews that were held in Maiduguri, the subjects mainly originated from Gwoza and Ngala LGAs, and surrounding areas. Most of them lived in “informal” camps run by Christian bodies, some lived in rented apartments within Maiduguri while some had returned to the communities from which they were displaced.

For the focus groups and interviews that were held in Mangu and Bassa LGAs, the subjects came from IDP camps and various other forms of settlement while others, particularly from Bassa LGA had returned home as all the IDP camps in that LGA had been closed. Most of these individuals were farmers and fishermen. The majority of people interviewed were IDPs, but interviews were also supplemented with three interviews from local authorities and humanitarian agencies.

The initial information gathering took place from 12 January to 26 January 2024. In the course of the review of the material, it became apparent that there were some gaps and follow-up interviews would be necessary in all four LGAs. A slightly differently composed team returned carried out interviews from 24 March to 3 April 2024. Overall, 292 people were interviewed.

Given the level of trust required to carry out these interviews, interviewees were exclusively from Christian communities as interviewers were from a mix of Christian organizations; however, it is also acknowledged that this will shape the perspective and analysis. Interviewees were primarily from Evangelical and Pentecostal denominations, although there was some representation from Catholic and other denominations.

Limitations

The research team were advised that in both states, intermediaries were needed to help identify the people to interview. In addition, travel was highly restricted in Borno state; interviewees were transported to safe locations in Maiduguri to meet with the research team. Travel to volatile areas in Plateau state was not possible.

Some selection in those to be interviewed was inevitable due to wider security concerns. A truly random sample therefore was not possible. In addition, while efforts were made to ascertain the estimated number of IDPs in each LGA, and the proportion of this group which was Christian, there was no reliable data available with such a degree of specificity.

292 displaced persons from four LGAs in two geographically distant states were interviewed. Few of these people knew each other. It is reasonable to consider them as representative of the wider Christian community because despite the natural differences in each person’s experience of displacement, there was broad consistency. However, it cannot be said definitively how significant that is as a sample of the wider IDP populations, particularly in the state or geopolitical zone. As no-one under the age of 16 was interviewed, the experience of this demographic was primarily shared as second-hand information from those connected with under-16s. However, some of the youths over the age of 16 were able to share about their previous experiences as part of this demographic where relevant.

To further develop and strengthen the research, interviews could be conducted across a greater range of Christian denominations and widened to include multiple faiths. While it would have been very helpful to interview displaced Muslims and those accused of forcibly displacing Christians, this was not the focus of the research, and it would have put the research team and interlocutors at unnecessary risk. There could also be a greater gender balance across interviewees. Additionally, quantitative research could prove beneficial in gaining more accurate numbers around the scale of displacement and the religious affiliation of IDPs.

List of Acronyms

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project
FBO	Faith-Based Organization
HRW	Human Rights Watch
IDMC	Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ISWAP	Islamic State of West Africa Province
LFC	Local Faith Community
LGA	Local Government Area
NSF	Nigerian Security Forces
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
ORFA	Observatory for Religious Freedom in Africa
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
WWL	World Watch List

Imprint

Addresses

International Institute for Religious
Freedom
P. O. Box 780068
Orlando, Florida 32878
United States of America

Friedrichstr. 38
2nd Floor
53111 Bonn
Germany

International Director: Dr. Dennis P. Petri (V.i.S.d.P.)
Research Director: Prof. Dr. Christof Sauer
Executive Editor of the IJRF: Prof. Dr. Janet Epp Buckingham
President: Prof. Dr. Dr. Thomas Schirrmacher

Website: <https://iirf.global>
Contact: info@iirf.global

Occassional journal with special reports, research
projects, reprints and documentation published by
VKW Culture and Science Publ.



International Institute
for Religious Freedom

International Institute for Religious Freedom
Bonn | Brussels | Cape Town
Colombo | Brasília | Delhi
Tübingen | Vancouver
iirf.global • info@iirf.global