



OLIRE and IIRF

Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)

For consideration at the 54th session of the UPR Working Group (Jan–Feb 2027)

2026/18

International Institute
for Religious Freedom



International Institute
for Religious Freedom

Internationales Institut für Religionsfreiheit
Institut International pour la Liberté Religieuse
Instituto Internacional para la Libertad Religiosa

The International Institute for Religious Freedom (IIRF) was founded in 2007 with the mission to promote religious freedom for all faiths from an academic perspective. The IIRF aspires to be an authoritative voice on religious freedom. We provide reliable and unbiased data on religious freedom—beyond anecdotal evidence—to strengthen academic research on the topic and to inform public policy at all levels. Our research results are disseminated through the *International Journal for Religious Freedom* and other publications. A particular emphasis of the IIRF is to encourage the study of religious freedom in university institutions through its inclusion in educational curricula and by supporting postgraduate students with research projects.

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
We understand Freedom of Religion and Belief (FoRB) as a fundamental and interdependent human right as described in Article 18 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. In line with CCPR General Comment No. 22, we view FoRB as a broad and multidimensional concept that needs to be protected for all faiths in all spheres of society.



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ABOUT THE AUTHORS

The **Observatory of Religious Freedom in Latin America** (OLIRE) founded in 2017, is a program of the Platform Foundation for Social Transformation (FPST). FPST was established in 2010 as a non-profit organization focused on implementing programs that contribute to democracy, human rights (in particular religious freedom), the fight against corruption, protection of the rule of law, etc. OLIRE monitors the state of religious freedom in the region by documenting incidents of religious freedom violations and investigating the structural conditions that undermine religious freedom. Trains individuals and organizations, especially religious minorities. Conducts advocacy efforts through the development of public policy recommendations for the effective protection of religious freedom, especially for religious minorities in different spheres and at all levels.

The **International Institute for Religious Freedom** (IIRF) is one of the oldest think tanks specializing in religious freedom. It was founded in 2005 with a mission to promote religious freedom for all religions from an academic perspective. We provide reliable and unbiased data on religious freedom to strengthen academic research on the topic and inform public policy at all levels. Our research findings are disseminated through the International Journal for Religious Freedom and other publications.

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Introduction

1. As a result of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela's (hereinafter Venezuela) third cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2022, the country received 328 recommendations. Of the total number of recommendations, the State accepted 221, and 107 were noted.

2. In the third cycle of the UPR, United States of America recommended that the government immediately end all undue interference with the freedoms of expression, religion, association, and peaceful assembly, and allow independent media, religious institutions, civil society organizations, and humanitarian organizations to operate without undue restrictions or threats (31.176). The Venezuelan government did not support this recommendation and instead noted it.

3. Several governments issued recommendations addressing key concerns related to the regulatory framework governing civil society organizations, the protection of fundamental freedoms, non-discrimination in access to social protection programmes, and the promotion of a safe and enabling environment for journalists, human rights defenders, and political actors. These recommendations called for aligning domestic laws and practices with international human rights standards, ensuring equal access to public services, and strengthening safeguards against intimidation, restrictions, and attacks (Ireland, 31.114; Mexico, 31.205; Bahamas, 31.266; Slovakia, 31.169; Republic of Korea, 31.213).

4. Several governments issued recommendations calling on the State to facilitate genuine and inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders and to promote national reconciliation, including at the local level, as well as to undertake independent, thorough, and prompt investigations into all cases of human rights violations, particularly serious abuses such as extrajudicial killings and attacks against journalists and human rights defenders, and to ensure accountability for perpetrators. These recommendations were put forward by Denmark (31.119); Austria (31.124); Poland (31.116); Georgia (31.120); Argentina (31.121); Croatia (31.122); Ukraine (31.123); Belgium (31.125); Mexico (31.126); Finland (31.127); Ecuador (31.136); the Plurinational State of Bolivia (31.146); Australia (31.154); the Holy See (31.155); Germany (31.161); and Italy (31.197).

5. Other countries recommended that the State provide an enabling democratic environment for the activities of political opposition, journalists, and human rights defenders; create a safe and non-discriminatory environment for the press, civil society, and humanitarian organizations; and ensure the safety of individuals working in these areas (Luxembourg, 31.81; Ukraine, 31.175; Estonia, 31.192; Latvia, 31.200).

6. Several States also recommended that the country take measures to promote and protect the right to peaceful assembly, as well as related freedoms such as freedom of expression, opinion, and media freedom, and to ensure the safety of journalists and individuals participating in peaceful demonstrations. These recommendations further called on the State to respect democratic rights, refrain from the use of excessive force against peaceful protestors, and adopt legal and administrative measures to guarantee the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights, in accordance with constitutional and international human rights standards (Latvia, 31.199; Lithuania, 31.203; Malta, 31.204; New Zealand, 31.208; Poland, 31.211; the Republic of Korea, 31.232; Romania, 31.235).

7. States also recommended ensuring a free environment that enables the work of civil society organizations and adopting a policy for the protection of human rights defenders. Establish a free and enabling environment for the work of civil society organizations and ensure that human rights defenders and civic activists

are not persecuted, harassed, or publicly stigmatized (Côte d'Ivoire, 31.186; Czechia, 31.189).

8. In light of the above recommendations, the submitting organizations observe a clear interconnection between the protection of civic space and the effective enjoyment of freedom of religion or belief. Although only the United States of America explicitly referred to freedom of religion, the recommendations issued by other States concerning freedom of association, freedom of expression, the safety of journalists and human rights defenders, the prevention of human rights abuses, and the need to ensure accountability collectively address the structural conditions required for religious communities to operate freely and safely. Without guarantees for these fundamental freedoms and protections, religious actors (including faith leaders, humanitarian organizations, and places of worship) remain exposed to risks of intimidation, discrimination, and restrictions on their activities.

9. In this regard, we consider that the UPR should take into account the situation of religious communities under the lens of a broader human rights context. This is particularly relevant in the current political scenario, following reports of a United States military operation in January 2026 that resulted in the removal of then-President Nicolás Maduro from power, while the ruling party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), continues to exercise control over key State institutions. This change has not necessarily resulted in a full political transition, and governance structures and power networks remain largely intact, creating uncertainty regarding the sustainability of reforms and the protection of fundamental rights. For these reasons, sustained monitoring of civil and political rights, including the protection of freedom of religion or belief, remains essential in assessing the State's compliance with its international human rights obligations.

International commitments

10. Among some of the international commitments, we can point out:

- i. The government of Venezuela has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It has accepted the individual communications procedure under the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and has ratified the Optional Protocol to the ICESCR; however, it has not accepted the inquiry procedure under Article 11 of OP-ICESCR and therefore, the Committee does not have jurisdiction to undertake an inquiry into grave or systematic violations in respect of Venezuela.

Constitutional and domestic legislative framework

11. The legal system of Venezuela recognizes religious freedom:

- i. Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (1999): Article 59 guarantees freedom of religion and worship, providing that every person has the right to profess their faith and manifest their beliefs in private or in public, provided that the exercise of this right does not conflict with morality, good customs, or public order. It also guarantees the independence and autonomy of churches and religious denominations and recognizes

the right of parents to ensure that their children receive religious education in accordance with their convictions. However, it also states that no one may invoke religious beliefs or practices to evade compliance with the law or to prevent another person from exercising their rights.

- ii. Criminal Code of Venezuela (2000): Article 210 establishes that any minister of religion who, in the exercise of their functions, publicly shows contempt for or vilifies State institutions, the laws of the Republic, or acts of public authority may be subject to detention for a period ranging from one to six months. This provision creates a risk of sanctions against religious leaders who publicly express criticism of government authorities or policies.
- iii. Law Against Hate for Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance (2017): Article 20 establishes fines, sanctions, and prison sentences of up to twenty years for individuals who promote or commit so-called “hate crimes” through messages disseminated on radio, television, or social media. In practice, the law has been applied in an arbitrary manner to censor messages perceived as critical of government authorities, creating a climate in which individuals, including religious actors, may face sanctions when expressing opposition to the ruling party or government policies.
- iv. Anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing regulations: The implementation of regulations related to the prevention of terrorism financing and money laundering, particularly through the National Office Against Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing (ONCDOFT) (2021), has increased registration, reporting, and supervisory requirements imposed on obligated entities under the Organic Law against Organized Crime and Terrorism Financing, without clear safeguards to prevent discretionary or abusive enforcement.
- v. Law on the Oversight, Regulation, Performance, and Financing of Non-Governmental Organizations and Related Entities (2024): This legislation imposes additional State control obligations on civil society organizations, including religious organizations, generating concern among religious communities regarding the potential impact of these provisions on their autonomy, financial sustainability, and social and humanitarian activities. Where members or activities are linked to forms of civic engagement that authorities consider contrary to government interests, organizations may face sanctions, repression, or public stigmatization.

12. Although the Constitution formally guarantees freedom of religion or belief, the legal and regulatory framework described above demonstrates that various criminal, administrative, and regulatory measures have introduced restrictions that may limit the effective exercise of this right in its multiple dimensions. These provisions create a legal environment in which the expression of religious views, particularly when linked to social engagement or public criticism of government authorities, may expose religious actors to sanctions or other forms of pressure.

13. In this context, religious affiliation itself is not generally a direct source of discrimination; however, the active participation of religious groups, leaders, and individuals in social, humanitarian, or civic initiatives may increase their exposure to reprisals, stigmatization, or administrative restrictions, especially where such activities are perceived as contrary to government interests or public order.

State Engagement with Religious Actors and Risks to the Separation of Religion and State

14. In recent years, the State has developed a strategy of institutional engagement with certain religious sectors, particularly within segments of the evangelical community. While these initiatives are officially presented as measures of recognition, cooperation, and social support, their scope and implementation have contributed to a gradual blurring of the boundaries between religious institutions and State structures. This dynamic raises concerns regarding the preservation of religious autonomy, equality among denominations, and the principle of separation between religion and State.

15. This engagement is reflected in the creation of institutional mechanisms, social programmes, and administrative practices that foster close interaction between government authorities and selected religious actors. In some cases, these measures provide material support, access to public resources, or preferential administrative treatment to specific religious groups. At the same time, they may create incentives for alignment with government policies or participation in State-led initiatives, thereby increasing the risk of political influence over religious activities and leadership.

16. Examples of such initiatives and mechanisms include:

- i. Institutional engagement and coordination mechanisms: The State and the ruling party have established structures to engage with religious actors, including the Vice Presidency for Religious Affairs of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the Vice Ministry of Religious Institutions and Worship, Government Pastoral Councils across the country, and working groups and coordination meetings with evangelical leaders.
- ii. Financial, social, and material support programmes directed at selected religious sectors: Since 2022, the government has implemented initiatives such as the “Good Shepherd Bonus” (Bono El Buen Pastor), the “My Well-Equipped Church” Programme (Mi Iglesia Bien Equipada), and the “Social Church” Programme (Iglesia Social), providing financial assistance, infrastructure support, and social service delivery through religious organizations.
- iii. Symbolic recognition and administrative facilitation measures: Authorities have formally recognized religious events such as the National Pastor’s Day and the National Day of the March for Jesus, participated in public religious activities, and provided administrative advantages to certain religious organizations, including facilitated registration procedures, permits, access to public spaces, and exemptions from administrative fees.

17. In practice, access to benefits, spaces for dialogue, or symbolic recognition appears, in many cases, to depend on the willingness of churches to maintain a non-confrontational relationship with the government, which introduces incentives for self-censorship and limits the plurality of religious voices in the public sphere.

18. These patterns of selective engagement, material support, and preferential administrative treatment toward certain religious actors raise concerns regarding Venezuela’s compliance with its international human rights obligations. In particular, such practices may undermine the State’s duty under articles 18 and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to guarantee freedom of religion or belief without coercion or discrimination, and to ensure equal treatment of all religious denominations. Where access to public benefits,

recognition, or opportunities for participation depends on alignment with government policies, these measures may also interfere with the effective exercise of freedom of expression and association protected under article 19 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, the absence of transparent and impartial mechanisms to challenge discriminatory practices may be inconsistent with the State's obligation under articles 2(2) and 2(3) of the Covenant to provide effective remedies for violations of fundamental rights.

Religious restrictions linked to political control

19. On 3 January 2026, reports indicate that United States forces carried out a military operation in Venezuela which resulted in the capture and transfer of then-President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, to United States jurisdiction to face federal charges¹. Following this event, Delcy Rodríguez was sworn in as interim President of Venezuela by the National Assembly and assumed executive functions with the stated aim of preserving constitutional order.

20. Since assuming office, Rodríguez has promoted the gradual release of individuals detained for political reasons, including through the advancement of a general amnesty law providing for the release of hundreds of individuals prosecuted or convicted for politically related offenses during 27 years of chavismo, excluding serious common crimes such as homicide, drug trafficking, or human rights violations, although thousands reportedly remain under restrictive measures or in detention, with civil society organizations reporting figures lower than official statistics. In April 2026, the amnesty process concluded without the publication of an official report detailing the individuals who benefited from the measure, raising concerns regarding transparency and accountability.²

21. Despite these measures, human rights concerns persist. The most recent report of the Human Rights Council, published in December 2025, documented serious human rights violations and crimes committed by the Bolivarian National Guard, particularly in the context of public order operations during political and social protests and internal security actions targeting opposition figures.³

22. Despite the removal of Maduro from direct power, reports indicate the continued operation of political control and repression structures, including surveillance mechanisms and practices of censorship. We have received testimonies of ongoing detentions of individuals perceived as dissidents, including arrests of persons suspected of celebrating Maduro's capture. In fact, the UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Venezuela confirmed that the structures that have sustained persecution for years have not been dismantled, nor have State policies been announced to begin that process⁴. Consequently, many

¹ U.S. Department of State. Nicolás Maduro Moros, 2026. <https://state.gov/nicolas-maduro-moros>

² Delcy Rodríguez anuncia que la amnistía en Venezuela «llega a su fin». <https://swissinfo.ch/spa/?p=5042028>

³ International Independent Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Crimes against humanity: the role of the Bolivarian National Guard, 2025. <https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/ffmv/ffm-venezuela-report-11-december-2025.pdf>

⁴ Venezuela: Uncertainty in Venezuela must give way to meaningful human rights change, UN Fact-Finding Mission says. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/venezuela-uncertainty-venezuela-must-give-way-meaningful-human-rights-change>

sectors of the population remain cautious about openly expressing support for political change.

23. In this context and considering the documented history of repression against religious leaders and laypersons known or perceived as “opponents,” uncertainty remains regarding the extent to which effective guarantees of protection can be provided to individuals who are viewed as critical of the government, particularly in an environment where political control mechanisms and security structures remain operational.

24. Documented cases collected by OLIRE through systematic monitoring of religious freedom violations, based on media reports, civil society sources, and field documentation, indicate repeated instances of direct state interference with religious activities, including arbitrary detention, intimidation, and restrictions on movement affecting religious leaders and faith-based actors. In several cases, religious leaders were detained while conducting religious services or humanitarian activities, including a priest apprehended while leading a rosary in a chapel and a pastor detained during a worship service after previously refusing to attend political events organized by pro-government candidates. Other cases involved detention or criminal prosecution under questionable circumstances, such as the arrest of an evangelical pastor charged with terrorism-related offenses following political tensions, and the arbitrary detention of a pastoral couple by security forces seeking information about a relative. In addition, authorities have prevented religious leaders from carrying out pastoral duties or traveling freely, including incidents in which Cardinal Baltazar Porras was prevented from reaching a religious celebration due to military obstruction and was later detained at an airport where his passport was confiscated and canceled, preventing him from leaving the country. The passport was subsequently returned to him.

25. Additional documented cases show the use of administrative, regulatory, and coercive measures to pressure religious actors who decline to align with government directives or participate in political activities. Authorities have ordered the closure of churches and religious facilities, imposed fines, and confiscated equipment following refusals to sign loyalty statements or host partisan activities. In one case, officials from the telecommunications authority, accompanied by military personnel, shut down a Christian radio station after alleging administrative irregularities, following tensions with local authorities. Religious leaders and administrators have also reported threats and harassment after expressing views on social or political issues, including anonymous warnings directed at a Catholic school director who refused to allow partisan activities on school premises and public threats issued by senior government officials referencing statements made by clergy during religious services.

26. These patterns of surveillance, intimidation, and administrative or legal measures directed at individuals and communities perceived as critical of government authorities raise serious concerns regarding Venezuela’s compliance with its international human rights obligations. In particular, the use of coercive practices to discourage public expression, civic participation, or humanitarian engagement by religious actors may be inconsistent with the State’s obligations under articles 18 and 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) to guarantee freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression without undue interference. Where such measures result in arbitrary detention, harassment, or restrictions on dissenting voices, they may also contravene the protections against arbitrary arrest and detention established under article 9 of the ICCPR, as well as the State’s obligation under articles 2(2)

and 2(3) of the Covenant to ensure effective protection and remedies for violations of fundamental rights.

Regulation of religion by organized crime

27. According to InSight Crime, multiple criminal organizations operate in Venezuela,⁵ including the megabands Tren de Aragua, Tren del Llano, and structures led by “El Koki,” “Carlos Capa,” and “Wilexis.” In border areas, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and dissident factions of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia are active, particularly the 33rd and 10th fronts. In the sphere of drug trafficking, groups such as the Cartel of Paraguaná, the Cartel of La Guajira, and the so-called Cartel of the Suns have been identified. In the southern part of the country, groups linked to illegal mining operate, including Organización R, the Tren de Guayana, and the Las Claritas syndicate. Additionally, armed parapolice-style groups are active, including the Cuadrillas de Paz (Cupaz).

28. According to the UN Fact-Finding Mission, especially after the 2016 peace agreements in Colombia, Colombian guerrilla groups including the National Liberation Army (ELN – the Ejército de Liberación Nacional), the Popular Liberation Army (ELP – the Ejército Popular de Liberación) and former members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), have also expanded their presence in Venezuela. These groups have a presence in Bolívar and Amazonas states, where they compete for control over mining resources.⁶ For its part, InSight Crime points out that the presence and operations of the ELN in Venezuela have transformed it into a binational guerrilla force, with a presence in at least 40 municipalities across 8 of the country’s 24 states, operating with the acquiescence and, in some cases, collaboration of Venezuelan security forces, and acting more as a paramilitary force with government support.⁷

29. This presence and consolidation of organized crime groups, guerrilla movements, and armed collectives have resulted in the de facto regulation of community life, including religious activities. Criminal organizations, illegal armed groups, and foreign guerrilla forces operate across different parts of the territory, particularly in border and mining areas, often exercising territorial control and imposing rules on local populations. Reports indicate that some of these groups operate with the acquiescence or, in certain cases, the collaboration of State security forces.

30. The expansion of these actors has had direct consequences for religious leaders and communities. Cases documented by OLIRE through systematic monitoring of religious freedom violations, including information collected from media reports, local sources, and field documentation, indicate that organized crime groups and armed actors exercise direct control over religious activities, humanitarian work, and the movement of religious leaders in various regions. In multiple cases, pastors, priests, missionaries, and laypersons have been threatened, assaulted, detained, or killed after engaging in religious preaching, denouncing local criminal practices, or carrying out social and humanitarian

⁵ Venezuela profile, 2026. <https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/venezuela/#Criminal%20Groups>

⁶ Detailed findings of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (A/HRC/45/CRP.11), 25 September 2020

⁷ ELN in Venezuela, 2026. <https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/eln-in-venezuela/>

initiatives. Religious actors have been explicitly warned not to address issues such as corruption, justice, or criminal activity in sermons, and in some cases have ceased such messages following threats. Armed groups have also imposed conditions on religious practice, including requiring prior authorization for travel, restricting communication and observation during pastoral visits, and limiting religious activities such as vigils or house-to-house outreach. In certain areas, religious leaders have been required to notify armed groups of community activities or humanitarian operations, while volunteers and church members have been interrogated regarding the presence of external organizations.

31. At the same time, documented incidents reflect patterns of extortion, forced displacement, and material attacks targeting religious communities engaged in humanitarian assistance. Armed actors have demanded payments or “contributions” to allow churches and families to continue providing shelter, food, or aid to vulnerable populations, including migrants, and have responded with threats, looting, destruction of property, and forced closure of religious initiatives when such demands were refused. In some cases, individuals and families were forced to flee their homes following threats against their lives or their children. Other incidents include kidnappings, killings, and physical assaults linked to accusations of interference with criminal interests or alleged collaboration with authorities. These cases also show that religious actors and their families are subject to surveillance, including detailed knowledge of their routines and activities. Collectively, these incidents demonstrate that, in affected areas, organized crime groups and armed actors not only restrict but actively regulate religious life and humanitarian engagement through coercion, violence, and control over territory and population.

32. The persistent presence of control, intimidation, and interference by organized crime groups and other non-State actors raises serious concerns regarding Venezuela’s compliance with its international human rights obligations to protect individuals and communities within its jurisdiction. Under articles 18 and 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the State has a duty to ensure that all persons, including religious leaders and communities, can freely practice their religion without coercion or undue interference, including in territories affected by criminal or armed group activity. The failure to prevent threats, harassment, or restrictions imposed by non-State actors, and to provide effective protection or access to justice for affected individuals, may also be inconsistent with the State’s obligations under articles 2(1), 2(2), and 2(3) of the Covenant to respect, protect, and ensure the effective enjoyment of fundamental rights without discrimination and to guarantee effective remedies for violations.

Recommendations

33. Guarantee respect for freedom of religion or belief by ensuring that religious organizations and communities can operate freely and carry out their humanitarian, charitable, and social activities without undue restrictions or interference.

34. Adopt effective measures to prevent, investigate, and remedy acts of intimidation, harassment, or interference affecting individuals and communities in the exercise of their freedom of religion or belief, and provide appropriate protection to those at risk.

35. Cooperate fully with regional and international human rights mechanisms, including the Special Follow-up Mechanism for Venezuela (MESEVE), and facili-

tate their efforts to monitor and support the implementation of human rights obligations.

Imprint

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